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Keith Jennings
Registrar and Deputy Principal

*Thesis’ includes ‘treatise’, ‘dissertation’ and other similar productions.
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT OF
AMEEN RIHANI

NIJMEH SALIM HAJJAR

A thesis submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Arabic and Islamic Studies
Department of Semitic Studies
THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY

1991
ABSTRACT

Ameen Rihani was a prolific writer and activist of manifold interest, and no single study can adequately deal with his personality and intellectual contribution. This thesis, as the title indicates, is mainly concerned with Rihani's political and social ideas. This is done in the context of his life and experiences and against the background of his times.

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Rihani's life and experiences in both East and West, including his travels, form the subject of Chapter One. Special attention is given to his Arabian travels. This biographical sketch is meant to highlight aspects of his experience in order to understand his ideas. It is based on indicative passages in Rihani's own writings, and his correspondence with his contemporaries; supplemented by further references in the writings of his brother and nephew. In this chapter, Rihani's intellectual development is traced through his wide readings and the evolution of his writing career.

In dealing with Rihani the writer and political activist (Chapter Two), his contribution to the varied Arab and English press is discussed. While the main issues which concerned him in his press articles, and throughout his life, are only briefly indicated here, they are discussed in a thematic way in later chapters. The second section of Chapter Two deals with Rihani's historical writings, highlighting his varied reading in history, his methodology, use of sources, attitude to history, and his characteristics and value as a historian.

Rihani was a political activist as well as a writer, and his activities are highlighted against the background of the social and political transformation of the Arab East during his life time. While his endeavours concerning issues such as reform, Arab independence and unity, the future of Syria and Lebanon are discussed through his lectures and contacts, the substance of his ideas on these issues are discussed in later chapters.

Chapters Three and Four, taken together, draw a general framework for Rihani's political and social thought. Chapter Three discusses the idea of progress and means of reform, including his secular anti-sectarian views, both conceptually and from a practical angle. Chapter Four treats the three interconnected concepts
of justice, democracy and socialism in Rihani's thought. These as well as his idea of, and campaign against, tyranny are highlighted in their social, political and economic aspects. Rihani's interesting views of democracy, or rather of its abuse, in the Western capitalist system, and of the Bolshevik Revolution are indicated.

Rihani's political ideas during the period between 1898, the year he first started writing, and 1918, the end of the First World War, are treated in Chapter Five. This examines the development of his ideas against the background of the changing political circumstances in the Arab East, indicating a gradual transformation from 'reformism', to political autonomy and decentralisation within the Ottoman State, to call for revolt and independence.

Chapter Six deals with Rihani's advocacy for Lebanon's political unity with Syria, his views on the Christian "Lebanese Idea", and his perception of the sectarian problem. Although Rihani wrote no elaborate treatise on Syrian patriotism and nationalism, this Chapter attempts to examine his ideas on this issue, on the basis of a detailed examination of his writings. This has made it possible to indicate his understanding of the essential elements of Lebanese-Syrian unity which he perceived within a broader Arab context.

Chapter Seven deals with Rihani's views on the problem of the French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria which he considered as a form of colonisation, and his campaign against French mandatory policies and the means to combat them.

Chapter Eight discusses Rihani's ideas and endeavours concerning Arab unity, including his efforts during his Arabian travels, and afterwards, to bring together Arabian rulers as a practical means of achieving unity. A consideration of the obstacles facing Arab unity and possible means which Rihani perceived to overcome them, demonstrates both his practical approach and latent idealism. Particular emphasis is put on his awareness of economic as well as social and cultural aspects in his striving to see Pan-Arabia realised. Similarly, this Chapter indicates the broadening of Rihani's concept of Arab unity from the Arabian Peninsula to a wider Arab world to include greater Syria and Iraq. Although he did not specifically write on nationalism, Rihani's concept of the Arab nation and Arab unity is discussed on the basis of careful reading of his relevant writings and speeches. Thus Rihani's place as a prominent Arab nationalist thinker and
political activist is explored and presented against the background of his practical approach to questions of Arab unity, development, progress, social justice and the place of the Arabs in the modern world.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am most grateful to Professor Ahmad Shboul for his generous advise, help, and support during the preparation of this thesis. He has given so much of his time and effort to ensure the completion of this study. His guidance and encouragement have sustained me in my studies at this University from the very beginning and throughout. I owe a great deal to his persistence and rigorous scholarship. As a teacher and supervisor he has been a true inspiration.

I should also like to thank the helpful staff of the Fisher Library at Sydney University, the Melbourne University Library, the Menzies Library at the Australian National University, and the New South Wales State Library in Sydney. Mr Jean Bishara has kindly supplied me with a number of useful books for which I am grateful. I should also like to thank my sister Tania for the time she spent looking for research material in Russian libraries during her visit to Moscow.

My nephew Salim has been very helpful in editing and checking during the final stage of the production of this thesis. I should also like to thank all those friends and colleagues who helped in several practical ways, particularly Wafa Chafic.

I should like to express my appreciation to the Department of Semitic Studies, for supporting me in obtaining a Commonwealth Postgraduate Research Award which provided me with four years of financial help. In particular, I should like to thank Professor Alan Crown for his constant support.

Finally my family, my mother, sisters and brothers, have been extremely supportive, patient and understanding throughout this difficult period. I doubt whether I can repay their love and care.
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<tr>
<td>AAB</td>
<td>American Authors and Books</td>
</tr>
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<td>AAK</td>
<td>Al-‘Amāl al-‘Arabiyya al-Kāmila</td>
</tr>
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<td>ACA</td>
<td>Around the Coasts of Arabia</td>
</tr>
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<td>APD</td>
<td>Arabian Peak and Desert</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlan</td>
<td>Atlantic Monthly</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUB</td>
<td>American University of Beirut</td>
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<td>Bookm</td>
<td>Bookman</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCAS</td>
<td>Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies</td>
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<td>CLP</td>
<td>Le Comité Libanaïs de Paris</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUP</td>
<td>Committee of Union and Progress</td>
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<td>Cur Hist</td>
<td>Current History</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIM</td>
<td>Dār al-‘Ilm lil-Malāyīn</td>
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<tr>
<td>E.I.2</td>
<td>The Encyclopaedia of Islam (New Edition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUP</td>
<td>Harvard University Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hutāf</td>
<td>Ḥutāf al-Awdiya</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJMES</td>
<td>International Journal of Middle East Studies</td>
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<td>Int Studio</td>
<td>International Studio</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>Ibn Sa‘oud of Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khalid</td>
<td>The Book of Khalid</td>
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<td>LLP</td>
<td>Lebanon League of Progress</td>
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<td>MADN</td>
<td>al-Mu‘assasa al-‘Arabiyya lil Dirāsāt w-al-Nashr</td>
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<td>MDWA</td>
<td>Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya</td>
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<td>MAJ</td>
<td>al-Majmū‘a al-Kāmila</td>
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<td>MEJ</td>
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<td>Mulūk</td>
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<td>Nubdha</td>
<td>Nubdha fī al-Thawra al-Faransiyya</td>
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<td>OUP</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>Public Opinion</td>
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<td>PUL</td>
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Rasa’îl
RGPL
SCC
Shadharât
SMLLL
SMLRC
al-Taṭarruf
TNYTBRM
UCP
UTP
WFAR
WIWANAA
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Wujūh Sharqiyya wa Gharbīyya
Who Was Who in America
INTRODUCTION

Ameen Rihani was one of the most interesting figures in Arab letters during the first four decades of this century. Not only was he a most prolific writer, but he was also the first modern Arab to write in both Arabic and English, thus addressing two different types of audience in East and West. It is difficult to classify Rihani as a writer. For he concerned himself with literature, art, politics, sociology, philosophy, history, travel and other fields of knowledge.

Although known amongst his contemporaries as "the philosopher of Freike", Rihani may not perhaps be considered as a philosopher in the strict sense of the word. But he certainly was a profound realist thinker, litterateur, and activist.

Among studies that have discussed Rihani, several have concentrated on his place as a literary figure. Only a few, however, have treated him as a thinker. This study considers the development of Rihani’s political and social thought in the light of both his intellectual life and activities. Both aspects are considered here as strongly linked. An attempt is also made to view Rihani’s contribution against the background of the changing social and political conditions of the Arab East, and in the context of contemporary Arab thought of his time.

Through his many articles, letters and books, as well as his speeches and contacts, Rihani participated in the political debates of the period. While reflecting concerns shared by his generation of Arab intellectuals, his writings indicate the political, social and intellectual issues with which he was preoccupied. This study identifies and discusses the most important among such issues. These include the ideas of progress, democracy and justice, as well as political, social and educational reform which Rihani saw as closely interrelated. It is on the basis of such universal ideas that one may discuss Rihani’s concern with the particular issues of political and administrative reform in the Ottoman State and in Mount Lebanon, Arab identity, independence and unity.

It is difficult of course to deal with all aspects of Rihani in one single study no matter how extended. Thus, literary and artistic aspects of his work are not of an immediate concern in this study, and are only considered in so far as they might illuminate his political and social ideas. This is of course not to
underestimate his prominent place in the modern Arabic literary renaissance, or his undisputed role in the Mahjar movement, of which he is rightly considered the pioneer, along with his two younger contemporaries, Jibrān and Na‘īmy.3

Similarly his metaphysical 'philosophy', including his views on the Universe, God and Religion, does not receive detailed attention in this study. However, his understanding of the role of religion in society and politics, and his attitude to sectarianism as an impediment to progress and unity in the Arab world, are discussed in some detail.

No attempt is made to give a descriptive survey of Rihani’s writings in this study, since this aspect has been adequately covered in earlier studies about him (e.g. ‘Abbūd, Jabr, Rāwī, A. Rihani, A. A. Rihani, Zakka). However Rihani’s career as a writer in both Arabic and English, as well as the major themes of his works and the main issues that concerned him as a thinker are discussed in their appropriate place in this thesis.

Although no attempt is made to present a full chronology of his literary output, special attention has been given to establishing, whenever possible, the time, circumstances and context in which Rihani expressed certain ideas. This is systematically done in referring to his works in the footnotes, particularly when citing articles which later appeared in collected volumes. It has been thus possible, through internal evidence, to offer certain corrections to the date and place of publication of some of his letters and articles. Examples of this will be found in several places in this study particularly in the footnotes.

While highlighting Rihani’s efforts to defend Arab rights in Palestine, the substance of his speeches and writings on this issue is not fully discussed in this study. This topic deserves a separate treatment in the future. However, Rihani’s perception of the important place of Palestine, and his advocacy for Palestinian rights, particularly in the West, are indicated in the context of our discussion of his activities and his views on Syrian and Arab unity. Similarly, although Rihani acknowledged the woman’s important place in society, particularly in education, this study does not specifically deal with this particular question due to lack of space.
Writers and thinkers are the product of their environment and are usually influenced by the ideas of their predecessors and contemporaries. Rihani was a true child of his age and was thus no exception to this rule. Above all, his extensive experiences and intellectual formation in both Eastern and Western cultures is to be kept in mind when discussing sources of his thought, and influences upon him. However, rather than attempting to trace possible direct sources for individual components of Rihani's thought, this study indicates the general intellectual ambience and currents of thoughts to which Rihani responded in his own integrative way. Thus in discussing his ideas on progress, justice and anti-sectarianism, for example, the impact of the ideas of the French and European enlightenment, the American environment in which he lived, and Arab-Islamic ideas, both classical and contemporary, are all indicated.

While acknowledging earlier contributions, this study is based on a fresh and thorough reading of Rihani's published works. Rihani published numerous articles and several books in both Arabic and English. No claim for comprehensiveness of coverage can of course be made, particularly in view of the sheer volume of Rihani's literary output. This study had to concentrate on those works by Rihani which relate directly or indirectly to his political and social ideas. These are discussed briefly in Chapter One, and listed in the first section of the Bibliography of this study.  

Although the present writer has consulted several of Rihani's creative writings (particularly The Book of Khalid, The Path of Vision, A Chant of Mystics and the collection of free verse entitled Hūtāf al-Awdiya), systematic reference is only given to his political and social essays and his historical and travel books in both Arabic and English. A special exception here is Rihani's first published tome, The Book of Khalid, which though belonging to the novel genre, is of particular significance for Rihani's early political ideas.

Reference to Rihani's books collected in the complete works (AAK) is by title of a particular book, the volume number in which it appears, and the page number refers to the volume pagination. As a rule, Rihani's articles which were collected later in the complete works are cited individually followed by the
original date of publication of the article whenever possible. This is to provide the historical context for the discussion of Rihani’s ideas.

Since two of Rihani’s close relatives, his brother Albert and his nephew Amīn Albert, have written about him books which are frequently cited in this thesis, it becomes necessary to avoid confusion between the three Rihanis. When referring to Rihani the subject of this study only the title of his works are cited. A. Rihani refers to Albert Rihani and A. A. Rihani refers to Amīn Albert Rihani.

As a rule, Arabic words are transliterated according to the system used in IMES. The name of Ameen Fares Rihani himself, as well as Arabic place names, e.g. Beirut, Freike, Mecca, Riyadh, are given in the commonly accepted spelling. The names of Arabic authors who wrote in English or French, appear in the spelling adopted by them in their own publications.

1. See the works of M. ‘Abbūd, J. Jabr, S. al-Kayyāf, M. ‘A. Mūsā, Ḥ. Ṭ. al-Rawī, N. M. Zakka, cited in the Bibliography; and in particular, A. Rihani, WFAR.

2. See M. ‘Awn, Zakka, and in particular, A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freike, cited in the bibliography.


4. His other literary works are listed in A. Rihani, WFAR. The present writer has planned to make use of Rihani’s library and museum at Freike, but this has unfortunately proven impossible due to the difficult circumstances in Lebanon.
CHAPTER ONE

LIFE AND TRAVELS OF AMEEN RIHANI

Rihani’s thought is best understood against the background of his life and activities. This chapter deals with those aspects of Rihani’s life and experiences which seem particularly significant for such understanding. They are briefly outlined here, covering his childhood in Lebanon, his early youth in the United States of America, and his subsequent travels and constant movement between the Arab world and the West.

Biographical Sketch

Ameen Fares Rihani¹ was born on November 24th, 1876 in Freike (al-Farīka) a little village in the Matn district in Mount Lebanon, 18 Kilometres north east of Beirut. He was the eldest son of Fares, the great grandson of the Maronite Bishop Basilious al-Bajjānī,² and Anīsa, the daughter of the Shaikh of the neighbouring village of Qurnat al-Ḥamrā. The Rihanis seem to have adopted this name when the Bishop resided in al-Shāwiya. By the mid-nineteenth century the family owned a raw silk factory which ensured them a good standard of living compared to the then modest socio-economic conditions of Freike.³

Rihani’s primary education was primitive and disruptive. In 1883, when he was seven years of age, he was sent to an "open air" school in the neighbouring village of Bayt Shabāb, where classes were conducted under a large walnut tree in the outside court of the church. In this school, quite common in Mount Lebanon in the late nineteenth century, Rihani’s education was limited to learning the alphabet and Psalm I.⁴ Two years later, he moved to a modern elementary school where, in addition to Arabic reading, arithmetic and geography, he learnt elementary French. This was a private, secular school run by Naʿīm Mukarzil (1863-1932),⁵ who was later to become his companion to the USA, brother-in-law and the editor of al-Hudā, the Arabic newspaper in Philadelphia in which Rihani eventually began his career as a writer. Mukarzil’s school did not stay in one location, for within two years it changed place three times until it ended up in Freike itself, where it was eventually
closed down, leaving Rihani without regular schooling during the year that preceded his emigration to New York in 1888.

Apart from this, Rihani’s early life in the Mount Lebanon accorded him an energetic and adventurous childhood. Even before reaching ten years of age, his personality was already showing signs of intelligence, love of adventure, dynamism and eagerness for an unusual life. Growing up in a pious, conservative and relatively wealthy family, Rihani did not abide by all social norms and religious obligations. Despite this environment, or perhaps because of it, he was of a rebellious nature. Very often, his adventurous character brought upon him the blame and punishment of his parents. Their prohibitive orders and stern attitude towards his behaviour created in him a certain anxiety to which he could only react by more rebelliousness and troublemaking.⁶

Rihani was hardly twelve years of age when he had to start a new life as an immigrant in New York. Due to the economic and socio-political situation of Mount Lebanon under Ottoman rule, many Lebanese left their country seeking, in America (and Australia), freedom and financial relief.⁷ Rihani was amongst the earliest of Syrian-Lebanese emigrants when, in 1888, he arrived in New York with his uncle ‘Abduh and his teacher Mukarzil. He was sent to a Catholic school in Newburg, a suburb of New York, where he spent what was in fact his first year of regular schooling. But his father, who joined him in New York a year later, needed an assistant who could read and write English, so Ameen had to leave school to become, for four years, a bookkeeper in the family import-export business. It did not take long before Rihani started to complain of the type of work he was assigned to do. In spite of this, and against the will of his father who wanted him for business, he kept on reading abundantly. This in itself is significant, for it showed how hard Rihani had to work to force his own way in a new world of art, literature and science, contrary to the expectations of his father and the prevailing norms of his fellow emigrants.⁸

At the beginning of their stay in New York, Rihani’s family led a life of hardship and financial difficulties. Some of these hardships which his family suffered in common with "every one of their compatriot-merchants" are reflected later in his semi-autobiographical novel, The Book of Khalid, (written in English and published
in 1911). It was at this early stage that Rihani discovered the huge gap between the rich and the poor, especially in a democratic city like New York. This led him to wonder whether "the inhabitants of this New World are better off than those of the Old?".9

In New York, he also felt the wide divide between the "subterrrestrial city guarded by the demons" and the "City of Love" back home. He was shocked by the "manifestations of industrial strength", and the "monstrosities of wealth and power".10 But the flagrant material superiority, the signs of progress and the real grasp on life of New York, provided him with a new challenge for his latent intellectual rebellion. From the infernal world of materialism which dominated every aspect of life, Rihani sought an escape in the cultural diversity which he found in New York. He then committed himself to an exceptionally rigorous self-education programme through readings in Western literature which introduced him to Dante, Emerson, Hugo, Montaigne, Rousseau and Voltaire, among others.11

During this early period of his life in New York, Rihani was exposed to another aspect of Western life, namely theatre and night life. Thus, he began to frequent amusement centres, dancing halls and theatres, and seemed to have overindulged himself somewhat. This was obviously a period of tension with his father which led Rihani to leave the family home for some time.12 Thus, by the end of four years of work and individual struggle, he decided, in 1895, to leave both his family and his father's shop and he joined the Henry Jewett Theatre Company then playing Hamlet and Macbeth in Kansas City.13

This decision by Rihani, at the age of 19, to shift from business to art has been rightly described as "the first break on record with the traditions of Syrian emigrants in the USA and elsewhere".14 Indeed it proved a turning point in his life and perhaps an example for others. When the Jewett Theatre Company went bankrupt shortly afterwards and Rihani had to go back home, he seemed to have made up his mind to devote himself to art and literature. This can be considered the first step towards his career as a writer, traveller and thinker.

Anxious to extend his education, Rihani attended classes at a night school for one year in 1896. This enabled him to be admitted to the "New York Law School".15 But a year later he had to interrupt his studies, partly because of a lung
infection, and partly because he found that, like business, law was incompatible with his temperament. In a state of isolation and desperation, he found his refuge in writing. As early as 1898, he started to publish articles in Na‘ūm Mukarzil’s al-Hudā, then published in Philadelphia. These early contributions which expressed his rebellion, reflected also the conflict which he experienced between English, his adopted language, and Arabic, his native tongue. At this stage, his Arabic was still feeble, and very often he would resort to English to express himself more clearly, leaving the editor of al-Hudā to finalise his articles in Arabic. This conflict stimulated him to intensify and extend his programme of private study, to include not only readings in English but also books in Arabic covering grammar, literature, history, religion, philosophy and politics.

In this rich intellectual and cultural environment of New York, Rihani was not completely isolated from the Syrian-Lebanese community. In the period between 1890 and 1898, he associated with a group of Syrian emigrants who shared some of his intellectual interests and preoccupations. Amongst members of this group were Shibli Damūs, ʻĪsā al-Khūrī, Na‘ūm Labākī, Jamīl Ma‘lūf, Na‘ūm Mukarzil and Sāfin Sarkīs, with whom he had several intellectual debates on the pages of the Arabic press. Meanwhile, Rihani succeeded in establishing contacts with a number of important American literary figures, such as the poets Edwin Markham (1852-1940) and Richard Le Gallienne (1866-1947), and the writer Michael Monahan (1865-1933). This close association with such men made him reasonably recognised in American literary circles as early as 1898, and enabled him later on to achieve celebrity as a writer and poet in both the Arabic and the English-speaking worlds.

In 1898, after ten years in the USA, Rihani returned to Lebanon seeking cure for his lung infection. Apart from that, he was able to join a school in Qurnat Shahwān thus greatly improving his Arabic while working as a teacher of English. This introduced him to the major Arabic linguistic and literary works, such as grammar books, Ḥarirī’s Magāmat (d. 1122), the Muqaddima of Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406), the poetry of both the mystic Ibn al-Fāriq (d. 1235) and the pessimist philosopher Abū al-‘Alāʾal-Maʿarrī (d. 1058). He was especially impressed by Abū al-‘Alāʾ in whom he found a kindred critical and rebellious spirit. Thus, in 1899 he went back to America carrying the Luzūmīyyāt of Abū al-‘Alāʾ of which he
"became the translator". It is clear that the period of ten years between his first emigration from Lebanon to America and his return to the latter country was crucial for Rihani's intellectual development. His keenness for self-education, particularly his wide ranging readings in both Arabic and Western literatures, sharpened his innate tendency to seek philosophical and spiritual truth from both sources. It also faced him with the question of coming to terms with the resulting cultural conflict between two different worlds.

Rihani's activities during his second stay in America (between 1899 and 1904) were mainly concerned with two closely related intellectual pursuits: an active commitment to the cause of his people in New York and back home, and an increasing openness towards, and participation in, Western literary life. This latter activity was reflected in Rihani's intensified readings in English and French literature and through his own publications in English.

Even while still in Lebanon, Rihani had become convinced that the decline of the Arab East as well as the backwardness and lack of cultural impact of the Arab immigrants in the West, were due to two factors: ignorance and religious fanaticism. His intellectual response to this conviction was expressed in a radical way through his writings in Arabic newspapers and his speeches before the Syrian community organisations in New York. For example, on February 9, 1900, during a ceremony on the occasion of St. Maron’s day, at the Maronite Society in New York, Rihani delivered his first Arabic speech, entitled 'al-Tasāḥul al-Dīnī' (Religious Tolerance), in the presence of religious leaders. In this speech, he called for tolerance and strongly attacked religious fanaticism and criticised some attitudes of the clergy. The speech created a strong reaction among the emigrants as well as in the Arab world, especially in Lebanon and Egypt, inaugurating a lively and long lasting controversy in the Arabic press concerning his ideas. As a result of this, the Arabic community in New York witnessed the formation of a widening circle of friends in support of Rihani’s views, thus enhancing his standing in the community.

The death of his father in Lebanon, in 1902, seems to have intensified in Rihani the need to confront, at the personal and spiritual level, the questions of death, and life after death - questions with which he was intellectually familiar for some
time. His reading of Ernest Renan’s *The Life of Jesus*, and Louis Viardot’s *Reasons for Unbelief* in this period strengthened the liberal intellectual tendency within him. In this environment, he wrote his highly controversial book *al-Muḥāلافا al-Thulāṭiyya fi al-Mamlaka al-Ḥayawānīyya* (The Tripartite Alliance in the Animal Kingdom), an allegorical critique of the thinking of clergymen. In this book, first published in New York 1903, Rihani uses animal characters that engage in debating religion, some supporting Rihani’s pro-scientific views, others opposing science in the name of religion. Some of Rihani’s ideas which were elaborated in his later writings are found in this early allegorical novel, particularly as expressed by the fox who discussed and refuted many features of the traditional religious establishment. The novel created strong hostile reactions, both in New York and in Lebanon, especially from the religious leaders who severely criticised Rihani and accused him of heresy. This led to the burning of the book and to Rihani’s excommunication from the Maronite Church. However, Rihani was undaunted and in a novel published in the next year, entitled *al-Muṣāfar w-al-Kāhin* (The Muleteer and the Priest) he reiterated similar views.

At the same time as Rihani was addressing the questions which he considered as hindering the progress of his people in the East, he continued his vigorous interaction with the literary Western tradition. Not only did he intensify his readings in Western literature, as reflected in his first book in Arabic on the French Revolution entitled *Nubdha fī al-Thawra al-Faransiyya* (New York 1902), but he also decided to address the Western readership in English. His first work in English was the translation of selections of al-Maʿarī’s poetry, with the title *The Quatrains of Abu’l Ala* (New York, 1903), which was received enthusiastically. Not only was it launched in the presence of more than 100 American poets and authors, but it was also reviewed and noted in numerous newspapers and magazines in the USA, Canada and Britain as well as in the Arab world. This further enhanced Rihani’s status in American literary circles, and gave him an entrée to the membership of several literary and cultural clubs in New York, such as the Pleiades Club (1903), the Poetry Society of America (1904), and the National Society of Theatrical Art (1904). He became accepted as a writer in English-language journals, thus improving his financial situation and enabling him to devote himself increasingly to literary work.
Rihani's intellectual activities during this period reflect his wide interests in various fields of knowledge. This is clearly seen in the range of his published articles up to 1904.\textsuperscript{37} This period was of special importance in Rihani's intellectual and emotional development. His experiences and activities at both levels are reflected in his writings both in Arabic and English. At the personal level, in addition to the death of his father in 1902, as mentioned above, he was going through deep emotional experiences. Almost simultaneously he fell in love with two Lebanese women in New York. Neither relationship seemed to have lasted long, for one was apparently an older, married woman, and the other, who was nearly his age, died in a drowning accident far away in the Amazon.\textsuperscript{38} This period reflected also Rihani's disappointment with Western culture and way of life. Several of his articles in Arabic newspapers reflected this.\textsuperscript{39} Perhaps it was a combination of these experiences, his ill-health, and the serious illness of his sister which finally decided him to return to Lebanon for an extended stay.\textsuperscript{40}

In 1904, Rihani returned, for the second time, to Lebanon with the aim of "seeking rest for his mind, soul and body".\textsuperscript{41} He attempted to lead a life of secluded meditation and writing, but this seclusion did not last long for he felt it a patriotic duty to try to help his country and his people who were beginning to shake off the Ottoman yoke.\textsuperscript{42} It is important to remember that by this time a number of Arab intellectuals had been active for some years in opposing Ottoman oppression and demanding Arab national rights, and that the Arabic press was playing a particular role in this movement.\textsuperscript{43} During this stay in Lebanon, Rihani's house in Freike was, and continued for a long time to be, a meeting place for Arab intellectuals including those who were active in the Arab nationalist movement. These included Muhammad Kurd 'Ali (1876-1953), Mustafa al-Ghalayini (1886-1945), Muhammad Lu'fi Jum'a, Kha'if Mu'tthi (1871-1949), Mustafa al-Rafi'i (1880-1937), Mu'tthi al-Rṣāfī (1875-1945), Constantine Yanni (1885-1947) and many others who became life-long friends and associates.\textsuperscript{44}

On the other hand, it is clear that Rihani's stay in the Arab East convinced him of the importance of addressing Arab audiences and readership. In this context, his activities between 1904 and 1910 were channelled into three areas: contributions to several Arabic newspapers;\textsuperscript{45} lecturing in cultural associations and schools in
Syria and Lebanon on the theme of social and political reform; and writing two creative works in Arabic: a novella and a play, both with a clear political message. Both works, no doubt, were inspired by the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908 and the overthrow of 'Abdul-Ḥamīd in 1909. The novella, entitled Nabūkhadh Nāṣṣar al-Shāhhādh (Nebuchadnezzar the Beggar) published in Beirut in 1909, illustrated the fate of the tyrant ruler. The play, entitled 'Abdul-Ḥamīd fī al-Asīṭānā ('Abdul-Ḥamīd in Constantinople) was staged in Beirut in November 1909, six months after the overthrow of 'Abdul-Ḥamīd.47

Rihani’s stay in the East did not completely distance him from the West. His writings during this period were not confined to the issue of liberation and progress in the Arab East. For he now began to address national as well as universal issues including problems of the West’s material, spiritual and intellectual conditions. Many of his essays in Arabic which reflect this national-universal commitment were in fact written during this period.48

It was in 1910, after the publication of the first volume of al-Riḥāniyyāt, which contained these essays, that Rihani became known as Fāylasūf al-Freike (the philosopher of Freike), a title which was to remain associated with his name all his life and after his death.49

In addition to his political activities and preoccupations, Rihani’s stay in the East enhanced his contact with the contemporary Arab intellectual milieu. This, in turn, deepened his awareness of the importance of Arab heritage and his concern for Arab material and cultural revival. When in 1905 he spent winter in Cairo with his sick sister Sa’dā, Rihani took the opportunity to meet leading Egyptian and other Arab intellectuals, acquainting himself with current debates on political, social and cultural issues. It was during this visit that he made lasting contacts with literary figures and journalists, such as Shibli Shumayyil (1850-1917), Jurji Zaydān (1861-1914), Ya’qūb Sarrūf (1852-1927) and Khalīl Muṭrān, all of them Syrian-Lebanese, as well as the two major Egyptian poets of the time, ʿAlīn de Shawqī (1868-1932) and Ḥāfiz ʿIbrāhīm (1871-1932). He also visited Shāikh Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), the well-known reformist and the then Mufti of Egypt. His visits to Cairo in 1905 and the following year obviously put him face to face with the current trends of contemporary Arabic thought: the conservative trend of the Azhar ʿUlāmāʾ, the
Islamic Reformist trends of al-Afghānī (1838-1897) and of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and the materialist secularist trend of Shibli Shumayyil and Farah Anṭūn (1874-1922).\textsuperscript{50} On the other hand, his stay for five years in Lebanon, in the heart of nature, far from the noisy and hectic life of New York, offered Rihani an ideal environment for writing. In 1905, he published in al-Hilāl Magazine in Cairo, his first experiment in free verse, or prose poetry. Influenced by the American Walt Whitman (1819-1892) school of poetry, Rihani was the first to introduce what he called prose poetry (al-shiʿr al-manṭūr) or "Free Verse" into Arabic.\textsuperscript{51} During this period, he also began to write in al-Barq newspaper, published in Beirut, a regular literary column under the title of Budhūr lil-Zāriʿān (Seeds for Cultivators).\textsuperscript{52} Between 1907 and 1910, and while staying in Lebanon, he completed The Book of Khalid in English which he described in a personal letter in 1907 as: "a soul-history of an Oriental who has gone through the various mazes of the Civilisation of the West, who has explored the Higher Things of the mind in a spirit not too sympathetic and not too inimical. It is what you call an ambitious work,... a book with a purpose no less than that of the prophet...".\textsuperscript{53} After the completion of this book, Rihani decided to return to New York. It may be that the oppression which the Ottoman authorities started to exert on the Arab nationalists was behind his decision to leave Lebanon, but also the desire to introduce his "Oriental prophet" to his adopted country must have had a great impact on this decision.\textsuperscript{54}

On his way to New York in 1910, Rihani made his first trip to Paris. Here he met a number of important Syrian-Lebanese men of letters and political activists, including Khayrallah Khayrallah, Shukrī Ghānim and ʿAbbās Bajjānī who were to play an important role in Syrian-French relations during and after the First World War. Rihani would meet with Ghānim for the second time in Paris in 1916.\textsuperscript{55} It was also during this visit to Paris in 1910 that Rihani met, perhaps for the first time, Jibrān Khalīl Jibrān (1883-1931) who was then studying painting in Paris.\textsuperscript{56} Together, the two men spent about a month in London acquainting themselves with British cultural and political institutions. This was an opportunity for Rihani to approach a Western audience through poetry recital in a number of literary circles including the Authors Society, the Women's Literary Association and the Poetry Society.\textsuperscript{57} His experience in London and Paris seemed to have raised in
his mind the idea of an opera house in Beirut which he discussed with Jibrān who
drew the sketch; it was captioned by Rihani and signed by both.58

Between 1910, the year he returned to New York, and 1922, the year he
travelled in Arabia, Rihani published several books which established him in America
as a leading representative and interpreter of Oriental culture in the West. In addition
to The Book of Khalid (New York, 1911) which was the first English book written
by an Arab, he published in 1918 a revised edition of his 1903 The Quatrains of
Abu’l Ala under the title The Luzumiyyat, which is actually the unique Arabic title
of one of Abū al-‘Alā’’s collections of verse. In 1920, he published The Descent of
Bolshevism in which he tried to establish a parallel between the Bolshevik Revolution
and a number of non-conformist movements in Islamic history. He also published
The Path of Vision (1921), a collection of contemplative essays on East and West
with mystic bearings. In poetry, he published A Chant of Mystics and Other Poems
(1921), a collection of poems which he had published since 1910 in several American
periodicals. His interests at this stage involved also publications of literary and
political articles, art critiques including painting, ballet and theatre in a number of
English language American periodicals.59

In Arabic, he published the second volume of al-Rihāniyyāt (1911), and a
novel entitled Zanbaqat al-Ghawr (The Lily of the Jordan Valley, 1915) in which the
heroine, having lived in both East and West is meant to represent the meeting of
both, but emerges in fact as the victim of both. In 1917, he published in New York
Khārij al-Harīm (Out of the Harem), a novel originally written (but never published)
in English under the title of Jahan and translated into Arabic by ‘Abd al-Masih
Haddād. The heroine, a self-liberated Turkish social rebel, falls in love with a high
ranking German officer and begets a child who was supposed to symbolise an ideal
East-West union.

The publication of The Book of Khalid which illustrates Rihani’s particular
concern with the possible meeting between East and West led also to the
establishment of an intellectual and emotional relationship between Rihani and an
American writer, Charlotte Teller, whom he had known through Jibrān and his friend
Mary Haskell.60 As a creative writer and intellectual "who had been... taking a hand
in the social reform movement" in New York, Charlotte, a woman "mighty of soul",
as Rihani himself described her, seemed to be a living example of the culture with which Rihani was confronted in the West. Although he loved her and, as he puts it, so much wanted to have a child from an American woman, and a strong intellectual woman such as she was, their relationship did not last long.61

A particularly important relationship developed, since 1916, between Rihani and another Western woman, Bertha Case, an American painter who was to become his wife a few months later. It appears from his unpublished letters, that at the beginning of his marriage to Bertha, Rihani continued to lead the life of a writer and activist, for, as he put it, he did not want marriage to be for him or for his wife an obstacle to their intellectual and artistic interests.62 The Rihani couple travelled in Spain, France and Italy where they visited Pope Benedict XV, and while she stayed in Spain to finish some paintings, he returned to Paris to follow up his intellectual and political activities. It was then that he met for the second time Shukrī Ghānim and discussed with him the possibility that the emigrant Syrians in the USA could join the Allied Army in the First World War. During the same period, he travelled to Mexico for the same purpose.63

His relationship with Bertha, however, became troubled when she insisted on settling in the USA or Europe where she could follow up her painting career, while he preferred to wait until the situation in Lebanon and Syria was settled so he could return and finally live in his country of birth. The situation between them worsened when Rihani decided to undertake his travel in the Arab world. He in vain tried to convince Bertha to accompany him to the East, and when she refused he went on his own. After a long period of estrangement, the marriage was finally dissolved in 1939, one year before Rihani’s death. Meanwhile Rihani travelled in Arabia and went back to Lebanon, to spend the years 1923-1940, moving between the Arab world, the USA and other countries.

This choice between travelling in the Arab countries and his wife not only shows that Rihani failed, at least at the personal level, to reconcile East and west, but also shows how important for him the Arab cause had become. In fact, his Arab concerns during this period began also to affect his relationship with the Mahjar writers in New York, particularly with Jibrān. Thus, it may be appropriate to discuss this relationship as an introduction to the issues which preoccupied him prior to his
travels in Arabia which opened a new era in Rihani’s career as an intellectual and
activist.

No doubt because of their common intellectual and political concerns, a close
friendship grew between Rihani and Jibrān and continued for a long time. Rihani’s
presence in New York and his close connections with its American literary circles
were perhaps important reasons for Jibrān’s relocation when, in 1911, he moved from
Boston to New York where he could count on Rihani to introduce him to his
American and Syrian friends.64 It is also significant that before embarking on his
literary career in English, Jibrān seemed to have held Rihani as his ideal for being
able to make a headway not only in Arabic but also in the English literary world.
He proudly recommended Rihani’s poems to his American friends, and spoke of his
own enchantment at reciting them himself to his circle of Boston poets.65 Jibrān
drew the cover and illustrations for Rihani’s The Book of Khalid (first published in
1911) which seems to have had a strong impact on his own literary work, particularly
on his The Prophet (first published in 1923), the book upon which Jibrān’s fame
largely rests.66

However, the good relationship between Rihani and Jibrān later ran into
difficulties either because of private reasons which remained unclear,67 or because
of Rihani’s disapproval of Jibrān’s “sentimental” literature,68 or perhaps because of
their divergent views on the directions of political change in the homeland.69 The
two writers remained estranged until the death of Jibrān when Rihani paid tribute
to him on the occasion of the arrival of his remains to Lebanon in 1931 and on later
occasions.70

It is perhaps against this background that we may understand Rihani’s attitude
towards the Pen Bond (al-Rābita al-Qalamiyya) which was founded in New York by
Jibrān, Mīkhā’īl Na‘īmy (1889-1988) and other Syrian and Lebanese writers in
1920.71 Rihani did not join al-Rābita, perhaps partly because of his dispute with
Jibrān72 and his disagreement with other Mahjar writers in their literary attitudes,
and partly because his interests at that time had gone far beyond those of al-Rābita.
For not only was he writing in English as well as in Arabic, but he had been more
concerned for sometime with the political future of the Arab countries. Rihani
reproached Jibrān and Na‘īmy for wasting their efforts in idealistic philosophies when
the conditions of the homeland were in urgent need of their attention. It may be that Rihani saw himself far ahead of the founders of al-Rābiṭa. For not only had he preceded them in his concern to free Arabic literature from the classical formulas by about fifteen years, but his interests now extended to Arab society as a whole, in the literary as well as social and political spheres.

It is also significant that by 1920, the year which witnessed the birth of al-Rābiṭa, Rihani had already established his status as a writer in Arabic as well as in English. By 1920, he had published eight books in Arabic and five in English including his major creative work in that language, The Book of Khalid (1911) and his collected poems Myrtle and Myrrh (1905). Since 1910, Rihani had expanded his membership to American literary associations to include the Poetry Society of America (1911), the American Asiatic Society (1918), and the Authors Club (1919) in New York in addition to other societies mentioned above. His reputation as a distinguished writer led in late 1921 to his election as a corresponding member of the Arab Academy of Damascus which was presided over by his friend Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī. Also by this time, Rihani had been considering travelling in Arabia, and was perhaps in no mood to participate in the purely literary activities of al-Rābiṭa.

Between 1922, the year he travelled in Arabia and his death in 1940, Rihani had visited most of the Arab countries as well as India in the East, and several Western countries such as Canada, England, France, Italy and Spain (he also had visited Austria and Germany between 1911 and 1914). His travels, of which the most important were those in Arabia which he undertook in 1922-1923, will be discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.

In January 1922, on his way to Arabia, Rihani passed via Egypt. There, several receptions were held in his honour where he was hailed as the modern Arab genius (nābigha) and had the opportunity to extend his contacts with Egyptian and Syrian leading figures and men of letters. These included the then Secretary of the Egyptian cabinet, Aḥmad Zakī Pasha (1866-1934), a distinguished scholar, diplomat and bibliophile; Prince Michel Luṭfallah, an active leader of the Syrian community in Cairo. He also met Sheikh Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935), Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s renowned disciple who devoted most of his career to propagating a revivalist interpretation of the Islamic faith and institutions. Both
Luṭfallah and Riḍā were active leaders and organisers of the movement for Syrian independence.

In Egypt and other Arab countries, Rihani had an opportunity to meet a number of leading political and intellectual Arab figures with whom he maintained close contacts for a long time. These included, in addition to those mentioned above, Āḥmad Ḍayf (Egypt), Kāẓim al-Dujaylī, Sāṭī‘ al-Ḥuṣṭī, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Naqīb, ‘Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa‘dūn, Muḥammad Riḍā al-Shabībī (Iraq) and other Arab intellectuals, writers and poets. His travels in Arabia are discussed in the appropriate place below, but it is important to point out at this stage that these travels gained him the friendship of most of the Arabian rulers who confided in him regarding their national plans and concerns. This enabled him to play an important advisory role on economic and political matters. For example, he entered some negotiations with oil companies on behalf of Bahrain, Kuwait and Najd. It was in 1924 that this role was most significant when he went to the Hijaz in a mission of mediation in the Hijazi war between Ibn Sa‘ūd and King ‘Alī Ibn al-Ḥusayn, who had succeeded his father that year.

After his travels in Arabia, Rihani’s interests in the Arab cause occupied most of his political and intellectual activities where he became a prominent advocate of Arab rights in the international arena. Within this framework came his visit to Morocco in 1939 where he met the "Khalīfa" al-Ḥasan b. al-Mahdī, ruler of Northern Morocco, the then Spanish protectorate, and in the same year he met General Franco in Bergos (Spain) to discuss the Far Maghrib question and Arab-Spanish relations.

Rihani’s preoccupations during this period were centred around three issues of which the Arab cause in general formed the major and central axis. The second related issue was the future of Syria and Lebanon in particular where the problem of the French Mandate met with Rihani’s hostile attitude which resulted in his temporary expulsion from Lebanon on January 1934. It was during this time that he spent three months in Iraq at the invitation of King Ghāzī (r. 1933-1939). The third issue was the question of Palestine in which he became actively involved at least since 1927, the year he visited Palestine and established connections with Palestinian political parties and leaders, particularly the president of the High Islamic Council, Ḥājj Muḥammad Amin al-Ḥusaynī, and members of the Christian Youth Association.
(Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Masiḥiyīn) and members of the Islamic League (al-Nādī al-Islāmī). With the aim of finding a just solution to the Palestine question, he undertook between 1929 and 1939 a series of lectures in American universities and political associations where he defended Arab rights in Palestine. This gave him the opportunity to discuss and debate the question in the West, not only at the intellectual level but also at the diplomatic and political levels, thus enabling him to extend his Western connections to American and British diplomats, politicians and men of state.

Despite his perpetual movements and activities, or perhaps because of them, this period was rich in intellectual work and writing. Back from his Arabian tour, he published Mulūk al-‘Arab (Beirut 1924, the Kings of Arabia) in two volumes, based on his journey through Arabia, a book which became an immediate and enduring success. After a second visit in 1926 to Ibn Sa‘ūd in Jeddah (which the latter had taken from the Hashimites in 1925) Rihani published Tarīkh Najd wa Mulhaqatihī (Beirut, 1927), a good part of which is based on his findings and observations during his Arabian journeys and his association and lengthy conversations with Ibn Sa‘ūd. In 1928, he published, in English, Ibn Sa‘oud of Arabia, his People and his Land (London, Boston and Toronto), an account of the rise of modern Arabia under Ibn Sa‘ūd. In 1930-1931, he published consecutively Around the Coasts of Arabia and Arabian Peak and Desert based mainly on his Arabic work Mulūk al-‘Arab. And in 1934-1935, he published Faysal al-Awwal (Faysal the First, a history of king Faysal with emphasis on his role as a pioneer of pan-Arabism and as founder of modern Iraq; and Qalb al-‘Irāq (The Heart of Iraq), covering various aspects of modern development and life in Iraq under king Faysal.

All these books have ensured Rihani a good standing as an authority on Arab politics and society. In this connection, a number of Orientalists including H. A. R. Gibb, Henry Lammens, and Louis Massignon visited him in Freiike to discuss social, economic and political issues of the Arab World. Arab amirs, e.g. Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Al Khalīfa of Bahrain and ‘Abd al-Karīm Faḍlī, Sultān of Lāhij, and other Arab personalities also visited him to discuss Arab political and economic issues. Before he died, Rihani left two major travel works, more or less ready for publication. These were Qalb Lubnān (The Heart of Lebanon), a travel book in
which he recorded his reflexions on, and journey within Lebanon, and al-Maghrib al-
Aqsā (The Far Maghrib) including Nūr al-Andalus (the Light of Andalusia), on his
trip to Morocco and Spain. Both works were published posthumously in 1947 and
1952.

In addition to his travel books, Rihani published two more volumes of al-
Riḥāniyyāt (1924), containing some of his collected political essays and reflexions
that had appeared earlier in the Arabic press. Furthermore, he published two more
volumes in 1928: al-Tatarruf w-al-Islāh (Extremism and Reform), a collection of
essays on reform and revolution, and al-Nakabāt (the Catastrophes), a short history
of Syria which is seen as a series of calamities.

In literary criticism, he published in 1933 Antum al-Shuʿārāʾ (Ye Poets), a
literary attack on the type of ‘sobbing’ literature, and an earnest call for what he saw
as a much needed poetry of power, so vital for the building up of a strong national
spirit.\cite{footnote1} In 1934, he published Waṣaʿ al-Zaman (The Loyalty of Time), a play
written on the occasion of the Millennium of the famous Persian poet, al-Firdawsī,
celebrated in Iran in that year, and after which Rihani was awarded the Iran Sach by
the Shāh. His English articles and lectures delivered in American universities and
associations, were published posthumously in 1967 in The Fate of Palestine.

By 1940, the year he died after a bicycle accident in Freike, Ameen Rihani
had become a true celebrity in the world of literature and politics in the East as well
as in the West. He had maintained extensive personal contacts and correspondence
with leading Arab literary and political figures as well as with prominent
Orientalists.\cite{footnote2} His association with some of these figures had extended beyond
official grounds,\cite{footnote3} and sometimes had led to devoted friendship.\cite{footnote4} In 1937 he was
granted an honorary Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in the USA and in 1939 he
was elected an honorary president of the Academy of Moroccan Studies in
Morocco.\cite{footnote5} From 1921, his name started to appear in reference books such as the
Who’s Who in America, Who is Who Among North American Authors, and the
Who’s Who in Literature (Britain), and after his death, in Who Was Who in America
and in American Authors and Books 1640 to the Present Day.\cite{footnote6}
The Traveller

There is no doubt that Rihani was an intrepid traveller, and that his travels in Arabia, in particular, are of great importance. Rihani’s travels covered most Arab lands, and he also visited other countries in Asia and Africa, Europe and the Americas. He wrote several special books on his travels in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco as well as Spain. In all these travels Rihani had the mind and the eye of a keen observer, and this is reflected in all his travel books. Here we shall concentrate on his travels in Arabia which he undertook during the 1920s and on the basis of which he wrote a number of his most interesting books. In particular, his travels in Arabia are significant for his activities in furthering the cause of cooperation between Arab rulers of the time and for understanding his political ideas.

On 25 February 1922, Rihani set foot, for the first time of his life, on the soil of the Arabian Peninsula. This was in Jeddah in the Hijaz where he had several meetings with King Ḫusayn who, upon realising his intention to visit the Yemen, responded to Rihani’s suggestion to mediate between him and the Imām Yaḥyā Ibn Ḫamīd al-Dīn. After some difficulties with the British authorities in Aden, he was allowed to continue to Sanā where he and his companion Constantine Yanni were held captive for ten days by the Imām Yaḥyā who at the beginning suspected Rihani’s intentions. From the Yemen, he moved to ‘Asīr and met its ruler al-Sayyid al-Idrīsī, and then left to Iraq via Bombay where he had attempted to visit Ghandi in prison but without success. After meetings with King Faysal Ibn al-Ḥusayn and negotiations with the British authorities in Baghdad to allow him to visit Najd, he went there and became closely associated with the Sulṭān ‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ibn Sa‘ūd and acted as his interpreter and personal adviser in the Conference of Ojair (‘Uqayr, 28 November - 3 December 1922) between Iraq, Kuwait, Najd and the British. He then moved on to Kuwait across the Naṣūr desert, escorted by Sa‘ūdī companions, to meet Shaikh Aḥmad Ibn Jābir al-Ṣabhāḥ. From Kuwait, he continued to Bahrain and then back to Aden, Iraq and finally to Beirut where, in April 1923, he ended his Arab tour of over one year.

To begin with, it is necessary to explore the possible motives behind Rihani’s travels in Arabia and what distinguished him from other travellers. It is important also to indicate the value of his books based on his travels for modern scholarship.
Unlike Western travellers in Arabia whom Rihani had read before embarking on his trip, Rihani was not the son of a traveller as Palgrave was for example, nor was he a professional explorer supported by a scientific society, nor a member of an official diplomatic mission.

Rihani himself tells us that the idea to travel in Arabia started with him as early as 1910, when he discussed it with his friend Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali who, persecuted by the Ottomans, spent some days at Rihani’s home in Freike, and together they began to explore possibilities to visit Arabia. The idea took another twelve years to be realised by Rihani, however. Ottoman persecution had driven Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali to Europe, and Rihani had to eventually leave Lebanon to spend the years of the First World War between Europe and America.

The most important motive behind Rihani’s decision to go to Arabia was his intellectual journey which he describes in the preface to his Muluk al-‘Arab. In an autobiographical statement, Rihani indicates the stages of his cultural metamorphosis from a Maronite in the Lebanese Mountain to an Arab nationalist promoting the interest of the Pan-Arab movement. Several factors seem to have contributed to this development in his outlook and stimulated his rediscovery of his Arab roots. These included his reading of Thomas Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-Worship which introduced him to the great Arab Prophet, and al-Hambra, by Washington Irving which introduced him to the glories of Arab Spain. The wealth of English travel literature on Arabia, on the other hand, introduced him to the lure of the unknown and the urge to cross the Arabian frontiers.

This intellectual journey brought Rihani back to his Arab identity and he decided to further search for his roots in the land of his ancestors. The dream could not be realised during the 1910s because of the First World War. When the Arab revolt was declared against the Turks in 1916, Rihani identified strongly with this revolt, assuming in his writings, as he puts it, "some of the duties that I was bound to by my love and admiration of my people". His first visit to Andalusia (1917) had a strong impact on him for "I heard voices calling me, in the name of nationalism (al-qawmīyya) and for the sake of the homeland (al-watān), to the cradle of revelation and prophecy". 
On several occasions Rihani indicates that his travels in Arabia had a three fold purpose: to see the country, to write a book about it and to be of some service to its people and their cause. More ambitiously, he connects this with his hopes for Arab unity which "can only be realised by the meeting of all the ruling amirs and their mutual acquaintance and common understanding". He believed that Arab rulers were isolated from each other, if not at war with each other, and none of them had a true knowledge of his contemporaries or their countries, not even through reliable reports. Thus, he thought that his travels in Arabia, and the book which he intended to write about it, would help the Arab rulers to know more about each other, and about the affairs of other Arab countries. This, in his opinion, would help the Arabs to know each other to achieve mutual understanding based on sound knowledge. He also planned to publish a book in English on the basis of those travels to acquaint English readers with contemporary Arabia.

Rihani's motives were questioned by some of his contemporaries, including Western diplomats. Not only did the British authorities in Arabia suspect him of working for the American government and for certain American oil companies who desired concessions in Arabia, but some Arabs accused him of being employed by the British. On several occasions, Rihani asserted that what brought him to travel in Arabia was his love for the country and its people. His answer to doubts about his motives was that although Lebanese and Syrian by birth, American by naturalisation, he was an Arab by origin (wa anā aslan minhum) and in his travels he wanted to be of service to the Arabs.

It is true Rihani while in Arabia had contacts with the American Consul in Aden, and with the British authorities at Aden and Iraq, but his contacts with both parties were in the framework of his attempts to obtain permission to visit certain areas in Arabia which were under British control, such as Aden, or indirect influence, such as Najd. As far as we know, Rihani had no official connections with either the American or the British government. Rihani was also interested in the progress of the Arabs. His interest in Arabia, as he originally declared in a letter to the American Undersecretary of State in 1921, was "that of a friend who desires to see her [i.e. Arabia] go forward hand in hand with European Civilization", and he had "no axe to grind except the axe of Civilization."
At the same time, Rihani did not hide his desire to be of service to the interests of the American Government. As he assumed that this Government "is no doubt interested in the development of conditions in the Near East, particularly in Mesopotamia and Arabia", and he should "be pleased to furnish it, from no other than a purely patriotic motive, with a report on the subject".\textsuperscript{111} On the other hand, when trying to obtain a visa to the Yemen, Rihani assured the British authorities at Aden that if he saw the Arabs needed British assistance, he would advise them accordingly, and he would serve the British, "gratis", in what he believed beneficial to the Arabs.\textsuperscript{112} Does this mean that Rihani was serving both American and British interests in Arabia? There is no doubt, as Irfan Shahid indicates, that Rihani, who had participated for two decades in the American cultural life assimilating what he thought suitable for his people in the Arab homeland, would have liked to have seen the American influence extended to the political sphere with himself as the apostle of the new relationship.\textsuperscript{113} However, once in Arabia, the strong British presence obviously convinced him that the American involvement was remote. Since he saw "European" assistance was inevitable, he recommended to the Arabs the British assistance,\textsuperscript{114} without completely giving up his hopes in American involvement, as indicated by his efforts in the 1930s to bring about rapprochement between the American Government and Ibn Sa\'ūd.\textsuperscript{115}

As far as can be ascertained from available evidence, it can not be said that Rihani was paid or employed by the British or the American government. His trip, as he told his wife, would be funded from the family business in Mexico and from payment for his contributions to American newspapers.\textsuperscript{116} Thus while he would have liked to serve the interests of his adopted country, the USA, it was clear that this would not be against the interests of the Arabs. It was also clear that his advice to the Arabs to seek British assistance was defined within the context of Arab interests. This, in fact, was what made him different from other travellers such as Philby, for example, who was initially sent by the British Government in an official mission.\textsuperscript{117}

Beside his Arab national motives, Rihani's travels in Arabia were undertaken for the purpose of writing a book. While planning his trip, he put to himself a list of questions which seemed to him vital and which he thought could not be answered
until he had gone over the ground thoroughly.\textsuperscript{118} The list of questions showed not only his awareness of the social and political issues which concerned the Arabs at the time, but also that he himself was concerned about the future and progress of the Arab nation.\textsuperscript{119}

Rihani's travels were also different in what they achieved. Being a native Arab with an innate knowledge of the Arabic language and culture certainly facilitated his mission and, together with his intuition, gave him better opportunities of observation and experience. Throughout his travels in Arabia, Rihani enjoyed a special status as a "dear" visitor amongst his own people.\textsuperscript{120} Unlike most of his predecessors who came from the West, he did not change nor did he feel the need to change his identity to gain the people's confidence.\textsuperscript{121} In all places that he visited, he was known as the Arab-Lebanese writer, the "Ustādh" (learned master), a title which stuck to him throughout Arabia. Known as such, particularly that he had already established his reputation as an intellectual in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, Rihani did not have to change or hide his religion, even in the most delicate of situations.\textsuperscript{122}

The warm reception from the ordinary people and from almost all the Arab rulers (the exception being the initial reaction of the Imām Yahyā who suspected him and kept him captive for several days),\textsuperscript{123} the letters of introduction and welcome full of trust and respect,\textsuperscript{124} and the friendly relationship with his escort men facilitated Rihani's journey.\textsuperscript{125} On the whole, his travels were more or less troublefree except for illness and the normal exhaustion, thus disproving the theory that it was not easy for a Christian to travel in Arabia.\textsuperscript{126} The trust engendered by Rihani's sincere Arab identity and commitment, and the bond of language, culture and common concerns were stronger than the barrier of religion. This explains the attitude of King Ḥusayn and Ibn Sa'ūd who were happy to count him as one of their people.\textsuperscript{127}

All these factors enabled Rihani to see the life of the Arabs, bedouin and urban, from the inside and allowed him to share intimately in it. This in turn made it possible for him to draw a clear picture in his writings of Arab traits, strengths and weaknesses.\textsuperscript{128} His genuine interest in the Arab cause gained him the confidence of the Arab rulers who openly discussed their ambitions and concerns, as well as
their conflict with each other or with foreign powers.\textsuperscript{129} This not only enabled him to draw interesting observations on Arabian political conditions,\textsuperscript{130} but helped him to play an important role in creating some mutual understanding between Arabian rulers. Rihani was perhaps the first traveller to participate in the political events of Arabia either as an unofficial adviser, for example in the Conference of Ojair, or as a mediator of peace between Arab rulers, for example between Ḥusayn, the Imām Yahyā, and the Idrīsī of ‘Asīr, and at a later stage between Ibn Saʿūd and King ‘All Ibn al-Ḥusayn in the Hijazi war of 1924-1925.\textsuperscript{131}

On the other hand, Rihani’s interest in the Arab cultural movement and his participation during his travels in some of the literary activities, especially in Bahrain and Iraq, gained him more knowledge of this particular aspect which, with other social, economic and political aspects allowed him to draw a unique picture of Arab society and a vision for potential Arab unity.\textsuperscript{132}

It is true that Rihani may have not discovered new places in Arabia or witnessed more adventures than his predecessors. For example, he did not care much about crossing the Empty Quarter (al-Rubʿ al-Khāli) which was a challenge for Philby, Bertran Thomas and, later, for Wilfred Thesiger.\textsuperscript{133} However, Rihani was more concerned about the well-being of Arabia and its people than about the discovery of new places or even his own safety. Perhaps the genuine feeling of love that he had for the people and the land of his ancestors made him interested not in visiting disputed territories and wondrous places as much as in the social and political progress of Arabia. This was why, unlike Philby who was "jubilant" to safely cross the desert and arrive at the water, Rihani was so sad to see the bad condition of the water wells in al-Ḥafar which had always been the battle-ground of Arab tribes.\textsuperscript{134} This also explains his strong reaction against remnants of the slave trade in Arabia, a "shameful business" which he saw as incompatible with the Arabs' love for freedom and dignity.\textsuperscript{135}

In fact, being an Arab coming from the West, on what he considered as an Arab national mission, gained Rihani enough confidence in criticising, when he deemed it necessary, certain aspects of underdevelopment and backwardness in Arab life. For instance, he did not hesitate to criticise Muslim fanatics in the heart of the Islamic land.\textsuperscript{136} He also criticised the poverty which surrounded the capital of Ibn
Sa'ūd, and advised the Sulṭān to take the necessary steps to end this misery. On the other hand, his knowledge of the Arab land and people, and the fact that he was the product of two civilisations, Eastern and Western, made him a distinct traveller. While he proudly described the glory of Arabia and its people, he fairly criticised them and called upon the Arabs to adopt modern Western science and means of progress.

These were Rihani's main characteristics as a traveller in Arabia. For, as mentioned earlier, although he was not uninterested in geographical discoveries, his main interest was essentially political and cultural. This explains his planned itinerary which, before leaving New York included only the Hijaz, the Yemen and Najd where, he thought, the main tribal Arabs were represented. However, his first experience extended this itinerary to include Aden, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, and the Nine Protectorates.

Rihani was perhaps the first and only traveller who covered most of the Arabian Peninsula in one single journey. After covering thousands of miles, crossing dangerous deserts and mountain ranges on camels, horses and mules, coming back to Beirut, he crossed the Iraq-Syrian desert by car. Beside the difficulties to obtain visas to different Arab sovereignties, he had to face health problems and natural obstacles which prevented him from visiting other areas in Arabia such as Hadramout, Oman, Qatar, and the five separate Shaikhdoms (later to become the United Arab Emirates). Because he was Christian, and despite his close relationship with King Ḥusayn, he was denied the "honour" of visiting Mecca. Although he did not go to Transjordan during his main journey because, as he noted then, "this Emirate, created by the new post-war policy, was not a permanent solid Arab Emirate..." However, at a later stage (1924-1925) he went to Jordan where he had the opportunity to meet Amīr 'Abdullah Ibn al-Ḥusayn who asked him to mediate in the Hijazi war.

Rihani's travels in Arabia were a very important experience in his life as a writer and a thinker. In addition to his Arabic Mulūk al-'Arab which consists of biographies of eight Arab rulers and observations on their countries, he published three books in English and several articles in Arab and English journals and
magazines. A keen observer and intuitive writer, Rihani gives a vivid picture of life in Arabia, at the rulers courts as well as in humbler places. From his works emerges important and interesting information on Muslims in general and the Arabs in particular. The books are treasures of detailed observations and learned footnotes on different fields of knowledge: religion, history, biography, animals, industry, commerce, geography and architecture. Rihani was also interested in individual personalities, and in his narrative many life-like portraits are to be found. In addition to photographs, mostly taken by the author himself, the reader finds interesting comparisons between the author's observations and those of earlier travellers.

Beside his sense of humour and lively style, Rihani's books provide accurate description of the areas which he visited. In this sense, they make a great contribution to the knowledge of Arabia. Interested in solid facts and in conveying impressions, Rihani tried to tell the truth without, as he said, partisanship, partiality or offence. His occasionally grandiloquent style does not seriously distract from the scientific value of his books, as Rihani strove not to hide the truth no matter how embarrassing it might be.

Although his English books on Arabia were based mainly on his Mulūk al-ʿArab, they can not be considered merely as an English version of this book. For, despite what they had in common, differences, not only stylistic but also in the content, can be found between the Arabic and the English works. This shows that Rihani was aware he was writing for two different audiences. These differences can be classified under three kinds. First, there were some details which did not seem interesting to the Western reader were omitted from the English books, such as the details on the treaties between Arab rulers. Secondly, criticism of the Arabs does not appear as strong in the English works, as if Rihani, although anxious to give the full truth, was careful not to add to the negative image of the Arabs in the eyes of the Western reader. Thirdly, criticism of the English colonialist policy was more moderate in his English works, as if he wanted to keep a good relationship with the Western reader and the British authorities in particular, especially that he counted on their assistance to realise the pan-Arabian dream.
Rihani's books on Arabia have been an essential and valuable source for the study of Arabian society and the modern history of the Arabian Peninsula. Based on first hand experience in the Yemen for instance, Rihani's books have been considered more accurate than those of more recent writers. His Mulūk al-'Arab has for long provided historians with useful information on, among other aspects, the commercial life of the Bedu, on the expansion of the Wahhabī state and the boundaries of its political dominance. His Around the Coasts of Arabia has been considered amongst the important sources for the historical background of the Idrīsīs of 'Asīr and their connections with the Sanūsī of North Africa. And his Arabian Peak and Desert is considered one of three "fascinating" books that deal with politics and life under the Zaydī Imamate in the twentieth century.

It is clear that Rihani's travels in Arabia were important for him as a writer and a thinker. This is not only because he became known and widely read throughout the whole Arab world and also in the West, but also because it was during and after these travels that his Arab nationalist thought crystallised. His meetings with Arab kings, leaders and Shaikhs and with a number of ordinary people in the Peninsula, gave him an ideal opportunity to analyse different opinions and attitudes. This enabled him to form a balanced picture of the socio-political conditions in Arabia which helped create the framework of his Pan-Arab nationalist thought which will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

1. More accurately Amin Faris, but in this study Rihani’s own spelling of his name in English is used.

2. Married priests today can not become bishops, but this case can be explained by the fact that this was not prohibited in the eighteenth century, as explained by Rihani himself in Qalb Lubnān, AAK, 3, p. 91, or that the priest ‘Abdullah al-Bajjān (1652-1736), head of the church in Bayt Shabab, was promoted to the Bishopric of Tripoli in 1710 after the death of his wife. His name after that became Basilious ‘Abd al-‘Aḥad Sa‘adē al-Bajjān. See A. Rihani, WFAR, p. 21.


4. Ibid., p. 99. See also A. Rihani, WFAR, p. 22, where the school is described as under the olive tree in Freike itself. For further comments on this type of school, see M. ‘Abbūd, ‘Madāris al-‘Ams wa Madāris al-Yawm’, Ahādith al-Qarṣa, MAJ, 7, pp. 93-100.

5. Qalb Lubnān, AAK, 3, p. 87-89.

6. Ibid., pp. 81-82, 349; A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freike, p. 10.


10. Ibid., pp. 54, 56.


13. Letter to his father, 4 June 1896, in Rasā’il, pp. 9-11.


17. For these articles written in 1898, see Shadharāṭ, AAK, 6, pp. 250-264.


21. See Rihani’s contributions to these debates in Shadharāt, AAK, 6; Rasāʾīl, pp. 14-44; also Ch. 2, below.


23. This was either the Maronite St. Joseph School, or al-Madrassa al-Lubnāniyya (The Lebanese School). See A. A. Rihani, op. cit., p. 23; Jabr, op. cit., p. 32; Zakka, op. cit., f.n. 16, p. 266.

24. See his poem ʻIla ʻAbi al-ʻAila', in Hutafl, AAK, 9, pp. 120-122; also ʻal-Alam al-Shakhsi w-al-Alam al-Qawmī', in Antum al-Shu'ara', AAK, 9, pp. 202-209.

25. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 3.

26. On the social and cultural condition of the Syrian community in New York, see Naff, Becoming American, pp. 224-227. For his ideas on religious fanaticism, see Ch. 3, below.

27. See the speech in al-Rihanīyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 55-63.


29. See for example letters to Rihani from Shīb ʻAladuṣ, 11 Nov. 1900; from ʻAbī al-Khūrī, 23 May 1901, in A. Rihani, (ed.), al-Rihani wa Muʿāširuh, pp. 21-22, 29-33 and passim.

30. Rihani’s father died of tuberculosis.


32. See a letter to ʻAbbās Bajjānī, 11 August 1904, in Rasāʾīl, pp. 50-51.

33. Qalb Lubnān, AAK, 3, pp. 103-104.


35. 160 articles in newspapers and magazines as listed in A. Rihani, WFAR, pp. 485-493.

36. Ibid., pp. 27-28, 185.

37. These were later collected in Shadharāt.


41. ‘Fi al-‘Uzla’ (1908), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 171.

42. See for example his articles and speeches 'Rajul al-Sha‘b' (c. 1909, this is dated 1908, but it was most likely written in 1909); 'Min Ghanim Ilā al-Bustānī’ (1908); 'al-Tarqī fi al-‘Ama' (1909); 'Ilā al-Sha‘b al-Lubnānī’ (1909); 'w-al-Nuwāb' (1909); 'al-Ḥurriyya w-al-Tahdhīb' (c. 1908), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 9, 17, 21, 27, 31, 33 and passim; see also, letter to Jurjī Baz, 7 Oct. 1906, in Rasa’il, pp. 102-104.


45. For his contribution to the press, see Ch. 2, below.

46. See al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 21-26, 33-39, and passim.

47. See 'al-Musawwī’ (1909), a speech delivered on this occasion, in al-Riḥānīyya, AAK, 7, pp. 191-194; see also his letters to Khalīl Muṭrān during 1908; to Jurjī Baz, 24 Jan. 1906; and to Munir Bey during 1906, in Rasa’il, pp. 71-72, 78-79, 125-126. Both the novella and the play were later published in Sijill al-Tawba, Beirut, 1909.


49. The first to give him this title was Salīm Sarkīs, editor of Sarkīs Magazine in Cairo. See several letters addressed to him in A. Rihani (ed.), al-Riḥānī wa Muʿāṣirūh, pp. 144, 152, 165, 182, 193, 207, 293, 322, 330, 349 and passim; A. Rihani, WFAR, pp. 191-193, 428; A. A. Rihani, Faysālīf al-Freikī: ‘Abbūd, Amin al-Riḥānī, p. 7; see also al-Mashrīq, 13 (1910), pp. 389-392, 703-710, where this title was criticised.


52. These were collected and posthumously published under the same title, Beirut, al-Riḥānī House, 1961.


55. See his political activities, Ch. 2, below.
56. Rihani and Jibrān had known of each other by repute before 1910, see Rihani's letter to his mother and sister, 13 July 1910, in Rasā'il, pp. 155-157; Cf. J. and K. Gibran, Khalil Gibran: his Life and World, pp. 192-193; Kh. Ḥāwi, Jibrān Khalīl Jibrān, pp. 102-103.

57. The letter mentioned above. Rihani also attempted to have his play (Wajdah) which he wrote in English in 1908-1909, staged in London without success, A. A. Rihani, Faylasaf al-Freike, p. 56.

58. See the sketch and the comments in Rasā'il, p. 158.

59. See his contributions in Ch. 2, below.


63. Rihani's political activities are further discussed in Ch. 2, below.


67. According to Jamāl Jābri it was an intriguing gossip that caused the rift between the two, see Jābri, Amīn al-Rihānī, Sirāṭuḥu, p. 96.


69. Jibrān, however, is reported to have told Mary Haskell that he himself favoured revolution against the Ottomans, while others, including Rihani, sought home rule through peaceful means, see Gibran, op. cit., p. 289.

70. See his poem 'Ila Jibrān' (1931), in Huṣf, AAK, 9, pp. 141-149; 'Jibrān' (1931), in Wuṣūh, AAK, 9, pp. 568-569; Rihani's open letter to M. Naʿímī, 6 Jan. 1934, in Rasā'il, pp. 439-443, the same letter is reprinted in M. Naʿímī, MAJ, 1, pp. 708-711.

71. Jibrān was the president, Muḥāṣṣa'il Naʿímī the counsellor, other members were: 'Abd al-Masʿūd Ḥaddād, William Catzeffis, Wadiʿ Bāḥūt, Nuḍra Ḥaddād, Naṣīb 'Ariḍa, Rashīd Ayūb and Iliyās Abū Maqī.


75. See A. Rihani, WFAR, pp. 43-45, 185; A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freike, pp. 59, 69.


77. Rihani tells us in his introduction to Mulūk al-'Ārāb that he had been considering travelling in Arabia since the end of the First World War. See Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 7. On October 15, 1921, he had asked the US Undersecretary of State to facilitate for him the issue of a passport and explained the nature of his visit to Arabia. See his letter to the US undersecretary of State, published by I. Shahid, 'Amin al-Rihāni and King 'Abdul-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘īd', in G. Atiyeh and I. Oweiss (eds.) Arab Civilization, p. 238; see also a discussion of this issue, in A. Rihani, WFAR, pp. 43-45.

78. See S. S. Sarkis, 'Cairo Honors a Poet', in TNYTBRM, May 28, 1922, Sec. III, p. 14; A. Rihani, WFAR, pp. 46, 342; A. Rihani (ed.), al-Rihāni wa Mu‘āširūn, pp. 195, 200-201, 209; also M. M. Husayn, al-Ittiḥād al-Watanīyya fi al-Adab al-Mu‘āṣir, vol. 2, pp. 129,281; on Rihāni’s contributions during his visit to Egypt, see, for example, "'Ala Ramī al-Iṣkandariyya' (c. 1922); 'Anā al-Sa‘rāq' (1922); 'Ibnat Fir‘awn' (1922), in Hūsāf, AAK, 9, pp. 92-111.

79. On Rīdā, his thought and activities, see Adonis, and Kh. Sa‘īd (eds.), Muhammad Rashīd Rīdā; A. al-Shawābakh, Muhammad Rashīd Rīdā; Kerr, Islamic Reform.

80. See his correspondence with some of these personalities in Rasā’il, pp. 189-254; A. Rihani (ed.), al-Rihāni wa Mu‘āširūn, pp. 285-286, 324; Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 851-920.

81. ISA, pp. 81-86; letter to ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Naqīb, 30 Dhū al-Hijja 1341 A.H., July 1923 (sic), in Rasā’il, pp. 209-210; also A. Rihani, WFAR, p. 49.

82. See Tarīkh Nādī, AAK, 5, p. 355.

83. See al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā, and Nūr al-Andalus, AAK, 2.

84. He also received invitation to go to Palestine, see a letter from Muḥammad Amin al-Husaynī, 5 Jan. 1934, in A. Rihani (ed.), al-Rihāni wa Mu‘āširūn, p. 300; on his stay in Iraq during this period, see 'A. Arslān, Mudhakkirāt al-Amīr 'Adil Arslān, vol. 1, p. 7.


86. For a full bibliography on reviews of Mulūk al-‘Ārāb, see A. Rihani, WFAR, pp. 104-108.

87. The book was reprinted as Tarīkh Nādī al-Hadīth.

88. See A. Rihani, WFAR, pp. 52, 56-57, 60.


90. For the reactions which the book raised among concerned poets, see E. Ḥunayn, 'Bukā' wa Shi'r wa Naqūd', in al-Mashrīq, 32 (1934), pp. 235-260.

92. For example his friendship with the two Arab monarchs, ‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ibn Sa‘ūd and Faysal I.


95. Letter to Sa‘ūd al-Karmī, 25 Jan. 1922, in Rasā’il, p. 195; AAB, p. 617; WWWA, p. 1035. By his centenary year in 1976, Rihani had 25 books published in Arabic and 11 in English, in addition to his numerous contributions to the Arabic and English language papers and unpublished manuscripts in both English and Arabic.

96. These have been listed above; see also bibliography.

97. See ‘Ghāndī’ (1922), in Wujūh, AAK, 9, p. 539.

98. For this purpose, he met Sir Percy Cox, the High Commissioner in Iraq and his Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell who helped Rihani in obtaining a permission to go to Najd, see Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 501-507; ISA, pp. 7-13; also H. V. P. Winstone, Gertrude Bell, pp. 243-244.


100. Burckhardt’s Travels in Arabia; Burton’s A Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah; Doughty’s Wanderings in Arabia; Palgrave’s Central and Eastern Arabia, see Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 4.

101. Burckhardt, Burton, Palgrave and Philby, each had an official mission in Arabia, see R. Bidwell, Travellers in Arabia, pp. 50, 75, 97, 61.

102. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 6. Perhaps the social and political situation in Lebanon and Syria, particularly after the Arab call to resist the Turkifying process, was the direct motive behind Rihani’s decision to go to Arabia at this early stage.

103. Ibid., p. 6.

104. Ibid., pp. 115, 527; see also APD, PP. 94-95; ISA, p. 39.


106. See his conversations with the British Resident at Aden, and with Ibn Sa‘ūd in Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 82, 526, and passim.

107. See A. Sa‘ādī, al-Islām fī Risālatayn, p. 224; see also A. Rihani, WFAR, p. 50 where reference is made to Cheikho, Mukarzil, Na‘imy and others. Rihani himself was aware of such rumours, see Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 505; ISA, p. 11.

108. Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 81, 100-101, 130-131; APD, pp. 5, 95.


111. Ibid., p. 238.

112. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 81; and APD, p. 5; see also his conversations with Sir Percy Cox in Baghdad, in Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 503-504; ISA, p. 10.


114. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 169.

115. See a letter to Ibn Saʿūd, 25 Nov. 1930, in Rasāʾil, pp. 360-361; other correspondence with Ibn Saʿūd in A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freike, pp. 120-121; also his political activities, Ch. 2, below.

116. Letter to his wife, 20 Sep., probably 1921 partially quoted in A. A. Rihani, op. cit, p. 97; also Rihani's correspondence with Constantine Yanni explaining, among other things, how much the trip would cost him, in Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 7-8.

117. Philby's original mission was to find out Ibn Saʿūd's current views and to persuade him to attack Ibn al-Rashid. See Bidwell, Travellers in Arabia, pp. 97, 100.


119. For further discussion of these questions in the context of Rihani's efforts for Arab unity, see Ch. 8, below.

120. King Ḥusayn treated him as a Hijazi and called him al-ʿazīz (dear) and Ibn Saʿūd considered him a Najdi, see Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 43, 559.

121. Almost all his predecessors pretended to be doctors and changed their name and religion for their safety; see Bidwell, op. cit.

122. See for example a particular incident in the Yemen, in Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 100-101; APD, pp. 40-42.

123. See Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 126-139; APD, pp. 100-101.

124. See example of these letters in Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 89, 514; also letter from Ibn Saʿūd in ISA, p. 21.

125. A letter of introduction carried for Palgrave, for example, a death warrant, and Philby always had argument with his escort men where at a certain stage they planned to kill him. See Bidwell, op. cit, pp. 79, 109-110.

126. See ISA, pp. 290-291.

127. King Ḥusayn for example granted him a piece of the curtain of the Kaʾba which is seldom presented to a Christian. See Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 43; ACA, p. 31.


129. See for example his conversations with King Ḥusayn and with Ibn Saʿūd respectively in Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 55, 72, 588-589, 545-550.

130. Ibid., pp. 68-72, 588-591.

132. See Mulûk, AAK, 1, pp. 52-53, 162-163, 704-708, 879-927. On his endeavour for Arab unity, see Ch. 8, below.

133. Mulûk, AAK, 1, p. 559; Bidwell, op. cit, p. 109; for a more recent perspective on early Western travellers in Arabia (and Syria and Iraq), see J. S. Jabbar, al-Badû w-al-Badiya, pp. 16-17.

134. Mulûk, AAK, 1, pp. 638-640; ISA, p. 337.


137. Ibid., p. 584; also his criticism of the qâ at consumption in the Yemen, in Ibid., pp. 180-186; APD, pp. 30-42.

138. See his letters in Rasâ’il, pp. 189-194, 201-203, 226-228, 253-254; see further discussion on progress in Ch. 3, below.

139. See Mulûk, AAK, 1, p. 12.

140. Ibid., p. 18.

141. Burckhardt and Burton both had changed their name and religion (temporarily) and went in Muslim disguise to be able to visit Mecca and Medina, see Bidwell, Travellers in Arabia, pp. 57, 62.

142. Mulûk, AAK, 1, p. 18.

143. Tarîkh Nâjd, AAK, 5, p. 355.

144. For a full bibliography of his contributions to Arabic and English papers, see A. Rihani, W Farr, pp. 108, 230, 410-412.


146. See Mulûk, AAK, 1, on religion pp. 284-288, 303-310; history, pp. 731-772; biography, pp. 58-63; industry, pp. 404-405; commerce, pp. 402, 519, 615; geography, pp. 603-607; architecture, pp. 124, 612 and passim.

147. See for example the portrait of Mu’azzâf in Bidwell, pp. 626-629.

148. See in particular his English ISA, APD and ACA. Picture of the Imam Yahya in Mulûk, AAK, 1, p. 73, and APD, frontispiece, is drawn by Rihani himself and was the first picture of the Imam.

149. Mulûk, AAK, 1, pp. 147-148, 204, 399, 406, 428.

150. Ibid., p. 18-19; see a letter to the Sultan of Lahaj, 5 Oct. 1925, in Rasâ’il, p. 267.

151. See for example Mulûk, AAK, 1, pp. 111-112.

152. See Ibid., pp. 218-224, 386.
153. See for example the difference between *Mulūk*, AAK, 1, p. 149 and *APD*, p. 115, *Mulūk*, AAK, 1, p. 111, and *APD*, p. 63, when talking about prostitution in the Yemen, how the story differed from one version to the other, in a way to tell the truth without too many embarrassing details.


156. Wenner, *op. cit.*, p. 73.


CHAPTER TWO

RIHANI AS A WRITER AND POLITICAL ACTIVIST

Rihani was undoubtedly one of the most prolific modern Arab writers. However, he was not an armchair writer. For his works in fact reflect his concern with important social and political issues and with reform through committed writing and tireless endeavour. This chapter discusses Rihani both as a writer, particularly as an essayist and historian, and as a political activist.

Rihani as a Contributor to the Press

Rihani’s career as a writer started through the press, when in 1898, he began to publish articles in al-Hudā in Philadelphia. His relationship with newspapers continued long after he began to publish complete works in Arabic and English. Indeed, this relationship developed to include not only the Arabic newspapers in the USA, but also Arabic papers in the Arab homeland and English papers in the USA and elsewhere.

This section deals with the range, main concerns and characteristics of Rihani’s work as a journalist in so far as this highlights his social and political thought. Special attention is given to his contributions to the Arabic newspapers in America, since these reflect his earliest concern with political and social ideas.

The Arabic newspapers in the USA were, naturally, more limited in their range of topics and approach as well as their audience, than those in the homeland, especially since the period during which Rihani wrote was a period of intellectual, cultural and political renaissance in the Arab East. While sharing certain characteristics with the Arabic press in the homeland, the immigrant Arabic newspapers were essentially concerned with the activities and social life of the local Syrian community. The same is true of the differences between those two kinds of papers and the English language papers in the USA. This was reflected in the form and content of Rihani’s different contributions to these three categories of papers.

Rihani contributed to almost all the Arabic papers in the USA particularly between 1898 and 1904. These included, in alphabetical order, al-Ayyām (
published by Yūsuf Ma'lūf, al-Dā‘ira (by ‘Īsā al-Khūrī), al-Hudā (by Na‘ūm Mukarzil), and al-İṣlāḥ (by Shibli Damūs), all published in New York.¹ He also wrote in al-Afkār (by Sa‘īd Abū Jamra) and al-Manāzīr (by Na‘ūm Labākī) both published in Sao Paolo, Brazil. His contribution to the Arabic newspapers in the Americas continued until the late 1930s, particularly in al-Funūn (by Nāṣīb ‘Arīḍa) and Mir‘āt al-Gharb (by Nāṣīb Dyāb) both in New York, and al-Sharq Magazine in Sao Paolo.²

During his stay in the Arab East between 1904 and 1910 and after his return from his Arabian travels, Rihani was able to find a broader forum for his writings in a number of Arabic papers published at that time in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Iraq. These included al-Ahrām, al-Hilāl, al-Mu‘ayyad, al-Muqtabas, al-Muqtataf, and Sarkīs Magazine in Cairo; al-Aḥrār, al-Barq, al-Bayraq, al-Duhūr, al-Funūn, al-İmān, al-Kashshāf, al-Mahābbā, al-Makshūf, al-Manār, al-Mawraj, al-Ma‘rad, al-Mawrid al-İbūl, al-Mawrid al-İsfi, Minervā, al-Nadīm, al-Na‘īr, al-Tal‘i‘a, al-Tarīq, and al-Thabāt in Beirut; al-Dādd, al-Hadīth, al-Kalima, al-Mīzān, al-Muqtabas, and al-Qabas in Syria; Fīlasīṭīn and al-Jāmī‘a al-‘Arabiyya in Palestine; and al-İqlām in Baghdad. He also contributed to some Arabic papers published in Europe such as al-Mustaqbal in Paris and al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabī in Rome.³

As early as 1898 Rihani also seems to have started to contribute to English language papers in the USA.⁴ In 1904 and 1905 he had already contributed to the Poet Lore.⁵ After his return to New York in 1910, Rihani resumed and extended his contributions to English papers. These included Asia, (Journal of the American Asiatic Association), the Atlantic Monthly, the Bookman, the Forum, the Harper’s Monthly Magazine, the International Studio, the Phoenix, the Print Connoisseur, the Review of Reviews, the Saturday Review, the Travel, and the World’s Work.⁶ Particularly during and after his travels in Arabia in 1922-23, he contributed to a wider range of American and international papers which included the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Asia, the Cleveland News, the Current History Magazine of the New York Times, the Literary Digest, the Nation, The New York Times Book Review and Magazine, the Open Court, the Survey, the Sunday World Magazine, and the Syrian World in
the USA; the Manchester Guardian and the Public Opinion in England; the Natal Advertiser and the Natal Witness in South Africa, and Pekin and Tientsin Times in China. 7

From the wide range of papers to which he contributed one can see that, throughout his career as a journalist, Rihani’s interests ranged from the literary, to the artistic, to the intellectual to the political. His contributions to the Arabic papers in America reflected his concerns with the progress of the Arabic community and the cultural and political integration of this community into the American way of life. Through his articles which carried his intellectual reflexions, he also expressed his ideas of reform and his rebellion against ignorance and fanaticism amongst his people, whether in the old or the new country. 8

Better established since the 19th century, the Arabic press in the homeland provided him with a broader forum to disseminate these ideas. Not only did his contributions to these papers include literary and intellectual essays, 9 but they also reflected his concerns with social and political reform, and subsequently with liberation from Ottoman rule. 10 These papers, together with Arab cultural associations at the time, were, for him and for other Arab intellectuals and activists, a means through which they sought to enlighten the people about their rights and call upon them to rise against the Ottomans. When the First World War ended and new problems arose, his contributions to these papers dealt with issues of the Lebanese-Syrian unity, independence from the mandates, the Palestine question and Arab unity. 11

His contributions to the English language papers were more literary and artistic to begin with, but later included articles and reports on current affairs. These contributions reflected mainly his concern with reconciliation and mutual understanding between East and West. He contributed English poems as well as essays on modern social, political and religious tendencies, in the Orient and the Occident. 12 He also wrote literary reviews and art critiques, 13 as well as political articles. These latter included articles on his observations in the Arab world, and his advocacy for the Arab cause, particularly on Palestine and Pan-Arab nationalism. 14
The immigrant Arabic newspapers which started to appear in the USA, particularly in New York, and also in South America, by the end of the nineteenth century, were more amateur than professional. They may be freer in form than Arabic papers in the homeland, but their content projected a true image of the immigrants, their moral, economic and cultural values, as well as their ideological and social tensions. Growing in a more or less sectarian community, these papers, as Rihani himself was to complain, found no better way to prosper than to spread sectarian feelings amongst their readers.\textsuperscript{15}

Although not claiming to be a professional journalist himself, it is clear that Rihani's distinction from the beginning was that he stood at a far higher level than the general run of material published in these papers.\textsuperscript{16} This is best seen in his special column, Kashkūl al-Khawāṭīr (Miscellany of Reflexions), which he wrote under various pen names such as Ibn Yaqzan al-Sūrī and Nūr al-Dīn meaning literally "Son of the Awake Syrian" and "The Light of Religion".\textsuperscript{17} These pieces reflected his revolutionary spirit, his wide range of Eastern and Western readings as well as his early journalistic skills. It is in this context that he has been rightly described as "a teacher descending to his people from a higher realm of knowledge and truth... to raise his fellow Syrians, including journalists, stagnating in their inherited sectarian dogmatic ignorance".\textsuperscript{18}

The Kashkūl, as he himself introduced it, was a column featuring "small articles and short stories" having as source the author's personal reflexions or thoughts (Khawāṭīr), and those of famous writers, their lives and ideas.\textsuperscript{19} These contributions covered different topics including sociology, politics, art and literature, reflexions on philosophical and religious matters as well as other pieces on the immigrant Arabic press itself.

Rihani's writings in the Arabic press of America, however, can not be classified as reports on recent and on-going events; what is popularly described as the "handling of news" does not in any way apply to his work. In fact, what he wrote in this period included much that can be reasonably described as literary material including short stories,\textsuperscript{20} critique of other writers' prose and poetry,\textsuperscript{21} reviews or critical assessment and analysis of musical and theatre performances.\textsuperscript{22} His writings included also historical articles,\textsuperscript{23} and articles where current events
were used as the starting point. He also wrote a series of articles on the lives of prominent statesmen, thinkers and men of letters. Some of his contributions were in the form of comments on issues related to events that had been reported elsewhere in the paper as news items. In other articles, he attempted to familiarise the Arabic community with aspects of the American way of life, or he debated issues affecting the Arabic community in New York.

At the political level, Rihani’s writing in the immigrant Arabic press covered such topics as the political situation in the homeland under the Ottomans, national politics in the USA, the state of the Arabic community and its political activities in New York, and international politics. In terms of Rihani’s own concerns, it is obvious that the politics of the homeland predominated.

As for his articles which dealt with religion, they were not of the type that exhorted or necessarily encouraged the reader in the practice of religion, but rather of the kind in which the author expressed his own critical opinion against traditional teachings and practices, and in which he preached a new religion of science and patriotism.

Rihani was aware that he was dealing with an immigrant Arabic press that was extremely underdeveloped and that often seemed oblivious to the norms of the quality press in the USA or the Arab East. His criticism of the Arabic papers of New York, which is reflected in several of his articles, is particularly developed in a special essay entitled 'Nahnu wa Jarā’īdunā' (We and Our Newspapers).

Rihani sees the duty of the press in enlightening the public about their rights and duties, and in being the watchdog over politicians, officials and influential people. He also raises the important question of the independence of the press, financially and ideologically, a question that he reiterated on several occasions in the 1920s and 1930s. On the other hand, he criticises the archaic style and standard of certain writers in the Arabic New York press.

From the start, Rihani set certain principles for his journalistic profession. He assures his readers that he could be neutral or controversial according to the inherent nature of the topic, but that he would be always "truthful", "frank" and "conscientious" in his writings. Both in his introductory piece for his regular
feature in *al-Hudā*, and in subsequent pieces, Rihani advocates and demonstrates a direct lucid style of Arabic prose which aims at communicating his ideas to the reader without attempting to impress with rhetorical devices or archaic expressions.\(^{38}\)

Although Rihani’s contributions to the Arabic press were, generally, serious discussions and far from "gossipy" statements,\(^{39}\) he tended to use a didactic style with more emphasis on appeal to the emotions of the Arabic readership. His English articles on the other hand, were generally of an informative and analytical nature. This was, no doubt, due to the difference between Arabic and English expression in general, a difference which was more evident in Rihani’s own time. But it was also because the issues which he addressed in Arabic were, as he must have felt, of more immediate concern to his Arab readership. But despite the differences, almost all his contributions in both languages expressed his free views and advocated his convictions, as he himself puts it, within the limits of the prevailing regulations and political circumstances.\(^{40}\)

It is perhaps significant to note that although Rihani was not affiliated to any political party, he was willing to contribute to papers which were either organs of political parties, or known for their particular ideological or political orientations. Thus, he contributed to such papers as *al-Duhūr* and *al-Ṭalī‘a*, organs of the Lebanese and Syrian Communist Parties,\(^{41}\) to *al-Muqtabas* of Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī who was an Arab nationalist, and to *al-Thabāt* of Khalīl Zayniyya who was suspected of being paid by France. Also despite his well-known enmity to the clergy, he contributed to *al-Manār*, a religious magazine founded by Bishop Arsanius Ḥaddad in 1903.\(^{42}\)

There is no doubt that Rihani was fully conscious of the importance of the press as a forum and vehicle for the dissemination of his ideas.\(^{43}\) He continued to write for the press to the end and long after he became an established author of books. It is also clear that he contributed to a wide range of political and literary papers in Arabic as well as in English. However, only on one or two occasions was he a correspondent. He acted as a correspondent in Europe for the *Bookman* and the *Forum* in 1916-1917, and for *Misrīt al-Gharb* at the Washington
conference on the reduction of armaments in 1921. Even in this capacity, Rihani did not aim simply at providing news coverage, for his reports to the above papers were essentially commentary of the "articles de fond" or "leading article" type.44

Modern specialists in the mass media might express the role of a journalist in different terms,45 but Rihani was not concerned with journalism as news. His work with the press at any stage, did not have the function of "surveillance",46 and can not be referred to as gathering and dissemination of information concerning events. His contribution to journalism was much more profound; and as a writer and fine communicator, Rihani certainly succeeded in meeting the criteria for an effective and learned journalist. Through the Arabic press, Rihani aimed at motivating the Arab people to achieve progress and liberation and saw his role as that of an educator and reformer. In the English language press, he saw his role as an advocate for the Arab cause as well as an apostle of mutual understanding between East and West. Some of these ideas as expressed in the press will be referred to in our subsequent discussion of his social and political thought.

Rihani's Historical Writings

Rihani wrote three history books, Ṭārīkh Najd al-Hadīth (1927), al-Nakabāt (1928) and Faysal al-Awwal (1934). He also wrote a short history of the French Revolution under the title of Nubdah fi al-Thawra al-Faransiyya (1902) in addition to his books based on his travels, particularly Mulūk al-‘Arab, which contain important historical discourses. It is necessary to indicate Rihani's skills, if not as a scholar, at least as an amateur historian, by highlighting the extent of his interest in historical writings, his background readings in history, his methodology, his understanding of the aim of historiography and the value of his works.47

Rihani's interest in history started as early as 1898 when his reforming and revolutionary tendencies, influenced by the principles of the French Revolution, led him to read the history of this revolution in French and English literature.48 Three works on this subject seemed of importance to him: History of the French Revolution by Thomas Carlyle, History of France by de Tocqueville, and Origin of Contemporary France by H. A. Taine. While he appreciated the latter two
historians for their "eloquence, accuracy, sincerity and verification", he criticised Carlyle for his indifferent and cynical attitude towards the events of the revolution.\footnote{49}

This particular interest in the French Revolution widened the scope of Rihani's readings to include the general history of ancient and medieval Europe, the Near East and the history of the USA.\footnote{50} His readings on ancient history included \textit{La Resurrection d'Homère} by V. Berard, \textit{The Tell Amarna Tablets} by C. R. Conder, \textit{Ancient Fragments} by Corey, \textit{Phoenicia. Ancient History} by George Rawlinson, and \textit{The Sumerians} by C. L. Woolley.\footnote{51} On modern History, he read histories and documents relevant to the Arab East and the Ottoman Empire written by Westerners such as, \textit{Cinq Ans en Turquie}, by Liman Von Sanders, Arnold Toynbee's \textit{Survey of International Affairs (1930),} the \textit{Letters of Gertrude Bell}, and \textit{The Times History of the War}.\footnote{52} On Iraq, he read Arnold Wilson's \textit{A Clash of Loyalties}; on Syria, he read \textit{Comment La France s'est installée en Syrie}, by de R. Gontaut-Biron; and on Egypt, he read \textit{L'Egypte au XIXe siècle} by Edouard Gouin, and \textit{Histoire de l'Egypte sous le Gouvernement de Mohammad Ali} by Felix Mengin.\footnote{53} In addition, he read books on Arabia written by Western travellers including \textit{Wanderings in Arabia} by Charles Doughty, \textit{The Penetration of Arabia} by D. G. Hogarth, \textit{The Kings of Arabia} by H. F. Jacob, \textit{Arabia Deserta} by Alois Musil, and \textit{The Heart of Arabia} by John Philby.\footnote{54}

He also read works by native Arab authors, both early and contemporary. These included \textit{Khitaṭ al-Šām} on the history of Syria by Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī; \textit{Tārīkh al-Bahrain}, by Shaikh Ḫalīfa b. Muḥammad al-Nabhān; and on Najd, \textit{Rawdat al-Afkar} by Ibn Ghannām, \textit{‘Unwān al-Majd fi Tārīkh Najd} by Ibn Bishr, and Ibrāhīm b. Ṣāliḥ b. Ḫisā's \textit{Tārīkh}.\footnote{55} In addition to the \textit{Mugaddima} and \textit{The History} of Ibn Khaldūn, he read other historical and literary sources which enriched his historical background including \textit{Murūj al-Dhahab} by al-Masʿūdi, \textit{al-Aghānī} of al-Isfahānī, the \textit{Travels of Ibn Jubayr}, and \textit{The Thousand and One Nights}.\footnote{56}

Above all Rihani's own travels, and his interviews and discussions with Arab leaders including King Ḥusayn of the Hijaz, Ibn Saʿūd of Najd, king Faysal of Iraq, Amīr 'Abdullah of Jordan,\footnote{57} the Imām Yahyā of the Yemen, and others
were essential for his historical knowledge. These, together with his access to official documents, supplemented his wide readings for his history and travel books. Even after he returned from his travels in Arabia, Rihani remained in contact with authorities on the Arab countries, and through correspondence sought further details to fill in the gaps and update his information on certain areas of the Arabian Peninsula.⁵⁸

Rihani was aware that the inclusion of an extensive list of sources may be necessary for "exacting scholars" and "meticulous historians". In his own books, however, his bibliographical lists were not meant to be comprehensive, although he uses a wide range of sources in the three languages which he knew: Arabic, English and French.⁵⁹ It is obvious that what was more important for him, was how one used the available sources.⁶⁰

A good example of Rihani's methodology is clearly seen in Tārīkh Najd al-Ḥadīth which started as a "biography of the Sultan Ibn Sa‘ūd", for which Rihani's first source was Ibn Sa‘ūd himself. He found Ibn Sa‘ūd's personal accounts of the recent history of Najd and the Sa‘ūdī family "interestingly compelling (jadhdhāba)"; and described him as "fair to his opponent".⁶¹ Rihani was not alone in considering Ibn Sa‘ūd as a valuable source. Philby, for example, a chronicler of Arabian affairs who equally had long association with Ibn Sa‘ūd, regarded him as "a living and inexhaustible mine of information on the exploits of his ancestors and his people".⁶²

Rihani's methodology in recording the Sultan's narration (riwāya) enhanced the value and authenticity of this source. Two people took notes at the same time to ensure accuracy. While recording, Rihani sought clarification of certain words or local expressions, and finally, Ibn Sa‘ūd read with him what had been recorded, correcting the narrative whenever necessary. Moreover, Rihani incorporated details and insights based on other sources published outside Najd, for example, books by Western travellers and orientalists, and other sources written about the Arab World during the preceding fifty years. These, together with Rihani's own travels in Arabia and what he heard from other "knowledgeable people", were used to confirm or complete the narrative of Ibn Sa‘ūd. To ensure
accuracy in Arabic pronunciation or spelling of place-names, he sought the assistance of a number of scholars (Ulamā) of Najd.63

Although Rihani criticised native historians, such as Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr, for their "artificial rhymed style", he found their information "generally accurate and reliable". In his desire for a more complete picture, however, he compared native and foreign historians on the same subject.64 His attitude towards Orientalist authors on Arabia was not uncritical, but reflects a mixture of healthy scepticism and guarded trust. He was aware that some Orientalists travelled in Arabia with hidden political intentions. For example, Badia Y Leblich was a spy for Napoleon the First, and Burckhardt had a close link to Muhammad 'Alī Pasha of Egypt.65 The fact that some of them travelled as disguised Muslims (e.g. Burckhardt, Burton, Palgrave) must have given him further reason to examine their information and attempt to unravel European attitudes towards Muslims and the people of Arabia in the 19th century. Not only did his use of European writers provide him with a different perspective on the matter, but also helped him to fill in the gaps in the native histories.66

Rihani was not trained as an academic historian, but he certainly reflects characteristics of a modern scholarly methodology which can be found, for example, in his history of Najd, as indicated above.67 It is true that in Faysal al-Awwal, for instance, Rihani himself modestly says that his book "can not be considered a history in the scholarly meaning of the word...", as it contained "nothing but what the author saw and heard, and what he knew and himself investigated".68 His only sources were his lengthy conversations with the king himself and the official documents which the king allowed him to consult. In fact, because of this Rihani's book on Faysal provides original first-hand information and insights on this subject, as well as historical analysis. For the author gives an unusual picture of the king in his struggle to establish the new kingdom of Iraq, and his endeavour to maintain a balance between the demands of the national Iraqi opposition and the pressures of British interests. In this book, Rihani reveals the keys to many social and political events which are sometime passed unnoticed by other writers on Iraq.
Speaking of Rihani’s writings on Arabia, Irfan Shahid rightly observes that “Rihani was not a professional historian; he was a visionary and acute observer of men and events”. On the other hand, Sayyid M. Sālim concerned with the Yemen, points out that because Rihani as a traveller was particularly concerned with the social and cultural scene during only a year or so, his books which are based on his travels in Arabia could not be considered history in the proper sense. Khalīl al-Naqīb in his study of state and society in modern Arabia, names Rihani among the "traditional historians" of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Such historians, according to al-Naqīb, concentrated on the succession of the rulers and the development of their family rule, and on the monotonous sequence of events such as tribal raids, fighting, and tribal alliances.⁶⁹

Al-Naqīb’s view may be true of that part of Ṭārīkh Nājd al-Ḥadīth which was originally intended as a background to the biography of Ibn Sa‘ūd, presenting detailed information about the Sa‘ūdī family and the political development of the Sa‘ūdī State.⁷⁰ It is true that, as a subject-matter of history, a biography may be considered by historians as "non-historical" or even "anti-historical",⁷¹ but Rihani did not limit his history of Najd to the biography of the Sa‘ūdī family. His history reflects important insights into motives and purposes as well as reflexions on politics, warfare and morals,⁷² thus making Ṭārīkh Nājd al-Ḥadīth a truly important historical work. His books based on his travels also contain first hand material and a wealth of information on the society of the Arabian Peninsula with attention to diversity, continuity and change. Indeed this awareness of changes and shifts in modern Arab history is reflected in several instances in Mulūk al-‘Arab.⁷³ These books contain literary portraits of almost every aspect of Arab life, which can be useful for the study and understanding of Arabian society. If history is to be viewed from a socio-economic angle and if historical writing is to provide "conceptual means to unravel the mysteries of events",⁷⁴ then Rihani’s books on his travels, particularly Mulūk al-‘Arab, would not be less historical than his history of Najd.

The prominent Arab historian, Constantine Zurayq, wrote in 1936 that traditional Arab historians of the period, like Western medieval historians, concentrated only on the political side of history and neglected socio-economic
factors which are deeply rooted in human life. "An Arab historian may give
details of causes of the fall of Arab dynasties, of foreign invasions, political facts
and military events which accompanied the fall, but he seldom penetrates into the
heart of Arab life in the past to describe the conflicting economic powers and
social tendencies which have weakened the nation".75 Something of this socio-
economic approach as advocated by Zurayq can be traced in Rihani’s works,
particularly Mulūk al-ʿArab and al-Nakabāt. In Mulūk al-ʿArab, he does not
concentrate on the military and political events, but is more concerned with socio-
economic factors in Arab life. Without neglecting accounts of wars and disputes,
he describes the life of the ordinary people. In Mulūk al-ʿArab, for example,
there are pictures of the ordinary Arab in the very intimate aspects of his life, in
his prayer and fanaticism, food and clothing, education and learning, wars and
travels, customs and traditions.76 Thus, within the chronological setting and
geographical scope defined in his works, and without claiming to be a professional
historian, Rihani can be said to fulfil some of the requirements of a modern Arab
historian as defined by Constantine Zurayq.

This also applies to al-Nakabāt, the short history of Syria, which Rihani
seems to have written as a counterbalance to his friend Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī’s
Khīṭat al-Shām. Rihani describes the latter as "a history for the élite or the
specialists (tārikh lil-khāṣṣa)”, and criticises the author, not only for the length
of his history, but also for limiting his concerns to "the powerful and the rich" in the
nation.77 In his own history, Rihani’s concern was not to write about the lives of
kings and caliphs, but to show that the history of Syria was nothing but a struggle
of the ordinary people against injustice and oppression. Syria’s history becomes
for him a series of catastrophes - hence the title - whose victims were the ordinary
people who paid the price of the greed and caprice of the rulers. As for the
rulers, they did not deserve from him more than a "word or two which
summarised their injustice and tyranny". Even those caliphs who were considered
by other Arab historians as "first-class" rulers, were in his view nothing but
autocratic tyrants.78

In al-Nakabāt, Rihani strongly reacted to the style and approach of other
Arab historians who painted Arab history as a shining picture of life inside the
walls of the royal court, or the mansions of the upper classes. Instead, he drew a picture of the poor classes and the ordinary people who formed the vast majority of the nation, and whose lot was, as he puts it, to "pay taxes, suffer the whip and then carry arms for the Jihād".79

Rihani offers his own view of the causes of the fall of the Arab empire. According to him, this was due not merely to political or military causes, but essentially to socio-economic and moral factors. "Oppression (al-ẓulm) was the first and most important cause of the decline of the Arab states". Although he did not go into much detail in explaining the social and economic factors which weakened the Arab states, he points out that the fall of the Umayyad state, for example, was due to the oppression of the subjects, to maltreatment of tax payers and soldiers, and to bad administration and a general lack of organisation.80

The value of Rihani's historical writings can be indicated, in part, from the extent to which they have been used by other historians, often as primary source, not only for their information but also for their insights. Tārīkh Najd al-Ḥadīth, for example, has been considered as "the first source for the history of the second Wahhābī state" (Ibn Bishr being the first source for the first Wahhābī state).81 Being a contemporary and close to Ibn Saʿūd, Rihani is considered a first hand historian.82 Philby himself in his Arabia, had to refer frequently to Tārīkh Najd al-Ḥadīth which he described as "admirable" but unfairly adds that it was a "popular summary of Arabian history".83

Rihani's books based on his travels are also a valuable source for the modern history of the Arabian Peninsula. Their importance lies in the fact that Rihani was a writer with first hand experience, as in the Yemen for instance. His Mulūk al-ʿArab is rightly seen as "one of the most important Arabic sources which dealt with the history of the Arabian Peninsula in the 1920s".84 Rihani's meetings with the Arab kings, leaders and sheikhs, and with a number of ordinary people in the Peninsula, allowed him to take account of different opinions and attitudes concerning actual political events.85 He demonstrates both critical and analytical ability as well as remarkable impartiality, thus making the book a specially reliable and valuable source for modern historians. His spirit of criticism, particularly of historical evidence, and his ability to discern and distil
extensive details into succinct and incisive conclusions are best reflected in the chapters on the history of Bahrain.\textsuperscript{86}

There is no doubt that Rihani demonstrates a keen sense of history in the way he writes about contemporary events, developments and personalities. For instance, to understand the social and political contemporary developments in Bahrain, he analyses these developments in the light of the history of the Arab/Persian Gulf since the sixteenth century. The national movement in Bahrain and its problems could not be understood in isolation from British policy and presence in the Gulf. He traces this policy back to the time when the British, in order to secure their interest in the Gulf, helped to expel the Portuguese out of the Indian Ocean and were later able to replace the Turks in the Gulf region.\textsuperscript{87} This awareness enabled him to understand the British divide-and-rule policy in the Arab lands, and aspects of the Arab movement during the First World War. It also helped him to form a picture of how Anglo-Arab relations should be conducted in the future.\textsuperscript{88}

Rihani's acute sense of history enhanced his ability as a far-sighted observer of the contemporary political scene who could anticipate the repercussions of certain events and developments on the basis of his keen understanding of the circumstances. For example, in 1922 he indicated to the Imām Yahyā of the Yemen that it would be unwise to put the Idrīsī out of 'Asīr.\textsuperscript{89} What happened in subsequent years justified his point of view, for after the Idrīsī lost Hudaidah to the Imām, he signed a treaty of protection with Ibn Saʿūd. As a consequence of the treaty the two strong men of Arabia, the Imām and Ibn Saʿūd, came face to face in potential, and then actual conflict between them.\textsuperscript{90}

One of the characteristics of Rihani as a historian is his concern with Arab genealogy and his appreciation of its importance in understanding Arab history. His books contain genealogical details which illuminate historical events.\textsuperscript{91} Equally important is his awareness of historical geography and his reference to geographical conditions to explain historical events. Here he is concerned not so much with the effect of geography on people's actions, but rather with the effect of people's perception of geography on their actions.\textsuperscript{92}
As a historian, Rihani was also conscious of the role of ideology in historical movements. He, for instance, links the victory of Ibn Saʿūd’s army to the spirit of conquest with which Ibn Saʿūd had imbued his militant Wahhābīs. He explained that by making the Ikhwān (the Brothers) his religious and national army, Ibn Saʿūd was able to utilise their inextinguishable enthusiasm for Allah and Najd, and had led them to battle and taught them sacrifice. Rihani identifies the secret of this militant spirit, the hijar (the new settlements, pl. of hiira) which Ibn Saʿūd built for the Bedu of Najd where the Ikhwān were recruited.

He provides an analytical study of the Bedu of Najd and of Ibn Saʿūd’s original manner in dealing with this difficult problem. He notes that the Bedu were uncontrollable, inconstant, superstitious and susceptible to religious influence. He explains that to keep the Bedu under control, Ibn Saʿūd conquered them, made good Wahhābīs of them and tied them down to the soil. Thus, the work of "domestication", as he puts it, started with the building of new towns, the hijar, whose inhabitants have not only emigrated from nomadism to settled agricultural life, but also in the religious sense have abandoned the world to seek the pleasure of God.

Rihani notes that the means used by Ibn Saʿūd was at once religious as well as worldly. Emigration of the Bedu from nomadism to settled life made it possible to teach them religion and to control them. The Bedu have been persuaded, or forced, to the hijar and to God by the Wahhābi missionaries (al-muṭawwiʿa). They were saturated with the faith of the Oneness of God and fired with the militancy of it, but they also were converted to law and order. When the Bedu converts were settled in the new towns, Ibn Saʿūd began the second stage of urbanisation. By using the 'Ulama', he persuaded his followers to hold on their lawful wealth and urged upon them the necessity of work to conform to Muslim traditions.

Despite the flourishing settlement, the Arabs of the new towns, Rihani notes, were still warlike and fanatical. "Indeed, the gazu instinct is still very strong even in 'the emigrants of Allah'- the hijrah Arabs. It takes more than a settled population to eradicate it"; it needs also education. But Rihani also
rightly foresaw that the unification of Arab authority which was on its way to Arabia, would naturally put an end to the ghazū, because the Arabs then would not find Arab enemies or Arab mushrikūn (those who associate others with Allah) against whom to declare the jiḥād.\textsuperscript{97}

The influence of Ibn Khaldūn’s \textit{‘ilm al-‘umrān} (science of culture) as expounded in the \textit{Mugaddima}, is evident in Rihani’s treatment of this subject. This is also seen in some of the more important terms and phrases that constitute Rihani’s dominant vocabulary in both the Arabic and English versions of his works on Arabia. Thus the terms allegiance, authority, desert, nomadism and urbanisation, state, tribal life, agriculture, industry and trade, wealth, etc... The influence of Ibn Khaldūn can also be seen in Rihani’s emphasis on the role of religion as a new spirit used to mobilise the Bedu and prepare them for the transformation into a sedentary society. Such mobilisation led to the establishment of the hijar as a new type of political society where the Bedu became accustomed to law and order and to obey the ruler. Thus the life of necessities became a life of lawful wealth, and primitive society became a flourishing centre of trade while the Bedu became regular army soldiers. However, while Ibn Khaldūn saw that life in the city weakens the old bond of ‘asābīyya, Rihani saw that life in the new towns could not by itself eradicate the ghazū instinct which needed education and an Arab central authority to end it.\textsuperscript{98}

Rihani was, obviously, not an armchair historian or a disinterested observer. For he takes the opportunity to tell Ibn Sa‘ūd that "the next emigration for the people of the hijar will be from ignorance to education".\textsuperscript{99} Perhaps even more than Ibn Khaldūn, Rihani believed his analysis had a practical purpose. It is not only "descriptive" but also "prescriptive".\textsuperscript{100} In this case, it is not to prescribe political methods and maxims, but rather to indicate to Ibn Sa‘ūd what needed to be done in practical terms in order to speed up the process of progress of his people. His history, therefore, exceeds the description of past events to the study of politics and social change in the present and planning for, or at least projecting into the future.

Thus the writing of history for Rihani had a practical purpose in addition to its intellectual interest. Although his \textit{Tārīkh Najḍ al-Hādīth} started in his mind
as "a story" (qissa), this traditional meaning of history carried in its essence a message and a commitment which, in his view, the historian should assign to himself. "The story which he records for the people is all new, most of it is attractive, enjoyable (taghīdh) and instructive (mutṣid)." Rihani requires from historians a positive attitude towards the issues which they discuss. The historian, in his opinion, should not be only an observer, or a mechanical recorder without being involved in the history which he writes. For him, "a book devoid of opinion is not history". This was his attitude in his short history of the French Revolution as well as in his books on Arab history. The French Revolution, for example, was for him a historical manifestation of the principles of freedom, equality and fraternity for which the philosophers and historians strove. Thus, historians, in his opinion, must commit themselves to these principles when writing about the revolution, and there should not be any excuse for being indifferent or cynical about these issues as he considered Carlyle's approach was. The same applies to Arab nationalism. When writing the history of the Arab national movement or the biography of Arab national leaders, a historian, in Rihani's opinion, need not detach himself from the concerns of Arab nationalism or from commitment to the social and political progress of the Arabs.

Rihani's commitment as a historian stems from his basic belief in the strong interrelationship between literature - in its broad sense - and life. Because the responsible writer strives for a better society, history becomes a means for the achievement of this aim. Thus, history becomes for Rihani a subject with an objective that goes beyond the science of history itself.

But would not this attitude contradict with objectivity (al-mawdū'īyya) and impartiality (al-tajarrud) which are required, and which Rihani himself expected from historians? Considering history as a means rather than an objective would put history in the service of another aim outside history itself and above the "pure truth" as the ultimate goal of history as a science. How could Rihani, particularly with his dominant nationalist orientation observe the duty of objectivity upon which historical truth depended?
Rihani's rich experiences gained from his travels and his movements between East and West, his self-education in a wide range of humanities, and his mastering of at least three languages, equipped him to be a good historian. His universal vision of evolution and progress of human societies broadened Rihani's outlook and helped him to better understand the past and put the subjects in question in their proper context. It may be argued, however, that Rihani's nationalist orientation could place history in the service of a political idea. Nevertheless, Rihani did not subject the writing of history to a dogmatic ideology or to the service of a political power. In his historical writings, he was fair and endeavoured to be objective as well as critical. Indeed, the Arab rulers themselves were not quite happy with what he wrote about them and their countries. *Mulūk al-'Arab* was banned in Iraq and Laḥaj, and was not well appreciated in the Yemen. It is true that one may discern certain admiration for, and appreciation of Ibn Saʿūd or Faysal for example, but this is most probably based on Rihani's assessment of the political role and statesmanship of those two Arab monarchs. He does not, however, refrain from criticising certain aspects of Faysal's early career.

Although a nationalist, Rihani did not have a romantic attitude towards the past, nor did he overestimate the Arab national past in relation to that of humanity as a whole. On the contrary, Rihani was quite critical in looking at the Arab past, with the aim of rejecting the negative influences of that past, and learning from the positive aspects. He demonstrates a rational spirit of criticism in his appeal for a revision of history and a re-evaluation of the past. In *al-Nakabāt*, he wrote: "how often we read and hear that our history is glorious... Let's review what is most important in history... People are used to accept the judgements of history without reviewing them. Writers and historians are used to copy and borrow from each other without the arbitration of reason in what they copy or borrow... I will try to choose reason and truth as arbitrator". He calls upon his Arab readers to "read history free from bias or inclinations... to understand its essence and forget its rhymes and poetry, ... to understand its spirit..., but not dwell on the past as such".
Arab reality put Rihani face to face with history. He saw that any national renaissance or reform movement should start with a look at the past, and it should rather be a balanced and conscious look. The "catastrophes" that Syria knew throughout its history led him to wonder about the causes, and therefore to look back at history with both its positive and negative aspects. He was conscious that to look towards the future, even if they wished to ignore the past or revolt against it, people need to know this past so they would not repeat its mistakes and would not indiscriminately reject its positive aspects. Rihani, like Zuraiq after him, found that the need for the proper study of history during the times of catastrophes becomes greater because failure to understand catastrophes is even deadlier to a nation than are the catastrophes themselves.

In his introduction to al-Nakabāt (the Catastrophes), Rihani summarised why he wrote this short history of Syria. "If history has any use, it is in its lessons... It is wrong to transfer to our children the evils which we inherited... We should not remain paralysed or drugged (mukhaddarīn) by the illusions of history... We should know the whole truth to be enlightened by it". The historian, in Rihani's view, is a searcher for the truth, an objective critic of the past and a teacher. Unlike those historians whom he criticised, the past for him is not an example to be followed blindly. History is no longer a static subject but a dynamic process of analysis to be used in the understanding of actual issues of the present and the future.

Rihani emphasised the need for rationalism in the process of re-evaluating history in order to be able to use it in the reformation of the present. He explained certain conditions of his time in the light of historical parallels. For example, throughout the history of Syria: "it was always a foreigner who saved us from a foreigner", and "as Romans and Persians made kings of our Arab ancestors, foreign powers still make kings these days...". This is how he explained the colonialist policy of Britain and France in the Arab East in the first three decades of the twentieth century.

Because of his commitment, Rihani could not study the past in a spirit of complete detachment. This may attract criticism from those historians who think of "the past as the proper field for a dispassionate and therefore truly scientific
study, from which partisan spirit, praise and blame, should be banished". Although he could master an objectively scientific critical method in the use of sources and evidence, because of his commitment, Rihani may not be considered a professional historian in the strict sense. He was perhaps aware of this. Just as he himself preferred to be "first-grade in patriotism even if this would make him medium-grade in poetry", he would perhaps choose to be a first-class nationalist even if this would make him appear as a medium weight historian.

**Rihani as a Political Activist**

Throughout his life Rihani worked for a cause. Even the periods of seclusion which he spent in the Mount Lebanon were for him an opportunity to reflect and write on the major social and political issues that concerned him. It was characteristic of him that he did not limit himself to literary and intellectual pursuits, but participated in the arena of social and political reform at a more practical level. Thus, not only did he write and lecture on such issues but he discussed them with both Arab and non-Arab politicians and thinkers.

An important aspect of Rihani's activities can be seen through his close contact with other Arab activists in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Egypt as well as in the USA, Latin America and Europe. He also convened or co-ordinated a number of social and political associations, particularly in America. Perhaps the most important part of his political activities was his endeavour to achieve rapprochement among Arab rulers, many of whom he met, especially those in the Arabian Peninsula. Rihani's contacts were not limited to Arab personalities, for he also met with a number of Western statesmen and politicians especially in connection with advocating the Arab cause including the question of Palestine. However, Rihani was not affiliated to any political party, nor was he a politician in the usual sense of the word.

The evolution of Rihani's political concerns and activities can be seen against the background of the changing political circumstances of his time. These can be divided into three major periods. The first was the pre-First World War period during which his work was mainly concerned with social and political reform and Arab demands for decentralisation within the Ottoman Empire. The
second was during the First World War when his work became more concerned with the liberation of Syria and Lebanon from Ottoman rule. And the third was the inter-war period when his activities broadened to embrace three major concerns: Pan-Arab, Lebano-Syrian and Palestinian. It is along these lines that his activities, at both the intellectual and practical levels, are outlined in this section, while the substance of his political thought will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

During the pre-war period, Rihani’s political activities were expressed through the two available channels at the time, namely the Arabic newspapers and the cultural associations. From an early stage, Rihani was conscious of the role of literature in social and political reform. It is in this respect that he has been rightly considered a committed writer who saw his writings as serving his land and people.\textsuperscript{122} Later in his career, Rihani urged other writers to do the same and he strongly attacked those who saw literature as only a work of art for art’s sake.\textsuperscript{123} His contributions to the Arabic newspapers in Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, as well as his public speeches and lectures, reflected his commitment to the cause of his people who were beginning to shake off the Ottoman yoke.\textsuperscript{124} This activity of writing and lecturing by Rihani, and other like-minded Arab intellectuals of that period, was so effective that the Ottoman authorities directed their censorship at both the newspapers in which Rihani wrote and the cultural associations at which he lectured.\textsuperscript{125} The activities of the Arab nationalists, with whom Rihani had close contacts, increased through the secret societies and reached a particular high watermark in the First Arab Congress held in Paris in 1913.

There is some uncertainty as to whether Rihani himself took part in that Congress. While his name does not appear on the documents of the Congress,\textsuperscript{126} at least three studies agree that Rihani participated but they disagree on his status. According to his brother Albert, and to Jean and Kahlil Gibran in their detailed biography of Jibrān, Rihani was present at the Congress as a representative of the Syrian immigrants in the USA. While his nephew, Amīn Albert Rihani, states that Rihani most probably attended the Congress in his personal capacity rather than as an official representative.\textsuperscript{127} In any case, there
is no doubt that Rihani maintained close contacts, before and after 1913, with participants in the Congress, such as Shukrī Ghānim its secretary, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī (1871-1916), its president, and others. Moreover, his ideas during the same period, for example on political reform and decentralisation, indicate strongly that he shared the ideas and aspirations that were expressed at the Paris Congress.128

During the period of the First World War, while staying most of the time in America with visits to Europe, Rihani’s political activities were mostly concerned with the question of the national liberation of Syria and Lebanon from the Ottomans. When the USA entered the war with the Allies, Rihani, who considered himself both American and Syrian, volunteered to join the American Army, and upon his rejection because of physical disability,129 he was determined to continue, as he puts it, "doing his bit" in his own way.130

His contribution can be seen in two areas: first, his efforts at countering German propaganda through writing and lecturing among his fellow Syrians in the diaspora; and secondly, his work in the organisation of Syrian committees in the USA and Mexico, and co-ordinating with other Syrian nationalists in France and Egypt. His main theme in his articles, pamphlets and lectures during this period was that, by helping the Allies in their war for the cause of liberty, the Syrians in the diaspora would also be helping their own people in Syria and Lebanon to gain their freedom from the Ottomans.131

Furthermore, his co-ordination with Syrian nationalists in America and Europe was to ensure that the Syrians would gain political benefit from their collaboration with the Allies. Thus, when in 1916, he was in Paris as a correspondent for the Bookman and the Forum, he met with Shukrī Ghānim for the second time (the first time was in 1910), president of the Syrian Central Committee (SCC) (al-Lajna al-Markaziyya al-Sūriyya) which was formed in Paris to co-ordinate between the Syrians and the French government to expel the Turks from Syria.132 He discussed with Ghānim the possibility that Syrian emigrants in America might join the Legion d’Orient, formed by the French Ministry of Defence to attack the Turks in Syria. For this purpose, in 1917, Rihani urged the Syrians to organise in New York an affiliate of the SCC. The affiliate, to which
he drew the strategy, was founded in his absence in May 1917, under the name of "The Syrian-Mount Lebanon League of Liberation" (SMLLL), of which he later became the vice-president. For this same purpose, Rihani went to Mexico in 1917-1918, where he held several meetings with the leaders of the Syrian community and succeeded in organising the Syrian-Mount-Lebanon Society, as another affiliate of the SCC of Paris. This activity and his lectures urging the Syrian community to join the Allies drew the attention of the Mexican government which, under German pressure, considered Rihani persona non grata and arrested him. He was released only after the interference of the US Consul in Merida, but was expelled from Mexico.

As an active member of the SMLLL of New York, Rihani was able to meet a number of diplomats, politicians and statesmen to discuss with them the Syrian question. In 1917, he wrote to his wife that together with a delegation from the SMLLL, he was going to Washington to meet the US Secretary of Defence, the British Colonial Secretary, the French Ambassador in Washington and members of the US Congress to urge them all not to make political concessions to the Ottomans at the expense of the Arabs. (We do not know whether these meetings materialised or not). Similarly, in November 1918, together with Na‘ûm Mukarzil, president of the Lebanon League of Progress (LLP) in New York (Jam‘iyat al-Nahda al-Lubnâniyya), and Ayyûb Tābit, Rihani met the French Consul in New York to discuss the Syro-French relations. If we take into consideration the ideological disagreement and the differences between Rihani and the SMLLL on the one hand and Mukarzil’s League on the other, this meeting with the French Consul indicates to what extent Rihani was determined to play an active role in Syrian politics from within the SMLLL.

It seems, however, that Rihani’s membership of the SMLLL ceased after a while, particularly after the end of the war, perhaps because of political disagreement with the other members of this group concerning the future of Lebanon and Syria. This can be deduced from the fact that in a petition sent in February 1919 to the Peace Conference in Versailles in which the SMLLL sought French protection over Syria and Lebanon and opposed any link with the Arabs of
the Hijaz, Rihani's name does not appear with the signatories, although he was at that time in New York. 139

One of the important activities of Rihani on behalf of Lebanon and Syria during the war was his participation in the humanitarian campaign to reduce the sufferings caused by the famine during 1915-1916. Together with other prominent Syrian Lebanese men of letters and activists, including Khaṣīl Jibrān and Ayyūb Tābit, he participated in the work of the Syrian-Mount Lebanon Relief Committee (SMLRC) which was established in New York, in June 1916, for that purpose, and of which Rihani was also the vice-president. 140

It was natural that Rihani's political activities should take a new turn during the French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria which officially began on 5 May 1920. 141 Although in the early years of the French Mandate Rihani was actually preoccupied with his Arabian travels and his "mission" to unite the Arabian rulers, as discussed below in this section, the future of Lebanon and Syria was certainly of no less importance. At this stage, the Arab cause, for him, had become one cause whether in Syria and Lebanon or elsewhere in the Arab world. Thus, even if his mission in Arabia and his writings after his Arabian travels took up most of his time and energy between 1922 and 1925, 142 the question of national rule for Lebanon and Syria was still important for him.

In February 1922, on his route to the Arabian Peninsula, Rihani met in Cairo with Prince Michel Luṭfallah, leading organiser of the Syro-Palestinian Congress held in Geneva in the late summer of 1921 to protest against the French and British mandates at the League of Nations, and the president of the Syrian Union League (Ḥizb al-Ittihād al-Sūrī) which worked for the unity of Syria, including Lebanon, as a first step towards an Arab Confederation. 143 This meeting was attended by other members of the Syrian Union League, including Rashīd Riḍā and Salīm Sarkīs. Although this happened in the context of a party in Rihani's honour at Luṭfallah's palace, 144 it indicates that Rihani's travels in Arabia were a part of his concerns in the Arab cause as a whole. After his return to Lebanon from his Arabian tour, although he was busy with a peace mission in the Hijaz and with writing his books on Arabia, the question of the mandate in Syria and Lebanon was a major issue with which he was concerned. This can be
seen from his writings and public speeches, especially during the Syrian Revolt of 1925-1927. Rihani's political activities, particularly his campaign against the mandate, became even stronger and more committed after the Syrian Revolution. Between 1928 and 1935, after this revolution died down, the national struggle against the mandate in Lebanon and Syria took a peaceful aspect in the form of strikes, demonstrations and other forms of public protest. In his contributions to the Arabic newspapers and his speeches during this period, Rihani strongly attacked the French Mandate, supported the unarmed uprising and advocated the boycott of the economic and political institutions of the Mandate. On the other hand, in a letter sent from Beirut and dated June 3, 1933, on behalf of the Lebanese Arab Youth (al-Shabāb al-Lubnānī al-‘Arabī), Rihani asked Faysal, king of Iraq, on the occasion of the latter's visit to Europe, to endeavour to end French colonialism (isti'mār) in Lebanon, in order to enable it to recover its natural and legitimate rights.

The campaign against the mandate brought upon Rihani the anger of the French authorities which expelled him from the country, particularly after his speech entitled 'Bayn ‘Ahdayn' (Between two Epochs, 1933). He spent three months in Iraq after which he returned to Lebanon to continue his anti-mandate campaign through writing and lecturing.

At the time when preparations for the Lebanese and Syrian constitutions and for negotiations with France were underway to conclude treaties to replace the mandate, and when efforts were made to reunite Lebanon and Syria, Rihani was active in discussing these issues through correspondence and meetings with members of the Syrian and Lebanese political leaders. In 1933, the year which witnessed intensified efforts to conclude the Syro-French treaty, Rihani met on several occasions with members of the Syrian National Block (al-Kutla al-Waṭāniyya), the then leading party in Syrian politics, to discuss the Lebanese Syrian question. These members included Hāshim al-Atāsī, Fakhrī al-Bārūdī, Ibrāhīm Hanānū, Sa’dallah al-Jābīrī, Fāris al-Khūrī, Jamīl Mardam and Shukrī al-Quwwatī who all were among the regular visitors to Rihani's home in Freike, individually or in groups.
On the other hand, in 1936 in Lebanon, Rihani had an important meeting with the Maronite Patriarch Antoine ‘Arıda who, upon Rihani’s invitation, visited him in his home in Freike.\textsuperscript{155} The Patriarch had protested in 1935 against the decision of the French High Commissioner to grant the monopoly of tobacco to a French company, and was known for his frequent attacks against the mandate.\textsuperscript{156} During this visit, Rihani praised the Patriarch’s attitude which was important in establishing a Muslim-Christian and a Lebanese-Syrian rapprochement.\textsuperscript{157}

In addition to his involvement in the Lebanese and Syrian political affairs and those of the Arabian Peninsula, Rihani was also active in the Palestine question. Rihani was well aware of the circumstances which surrounded the problem of Palestine, particularly the dangers of the Balfour Declaration of November 1917. His commitment to the service of the Arabs made it natural for him to become involved in the question of Palestine which he considered as part of geographical Syria and of the wider Arab world.

As usual, Rihani used his skills as a writer and public speaker in both Arabic and English, in the service of the Palestinian cause.\textsuperscript{158} His most important activities in this context were his tours in several cities in the USA and Canada, particularly during 1929-1931, 1937, 1938 and 1939, lecturing in universities and various cultural and political associations and clubs to counteract Zionist propaganda and to encourage the American public opinion to take a stand in favour of the Arabs in Palestine.\textsuperscript{159} These tours were organised and sponsored by three American associations specialising in foreign affairs and international relations: the Foreign Policy Association which had several branches in the USA; the Institute of International Education in New York; and the Institute of Foreign Affairs in Indiana State. Through his lectures, one of which was broadcast from New York Radio,\textsuperscript{160} Rihani not only sought to expound the question of Palestine to the Western public opinion but also to convince the British Government, who was then the champion of the Zionist National Home, not to proceed with the unfair establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine at the expense of the indigenous Arabs.\textsuperscript{161}

During these tours, Rihani was able to debate the Palestinian question not only with specialists in political science and international affairs, but also with
Zionist spokespersons. Indeed Rihani was the first Arab to publicly defend the Arab rights in Palestine, before American and other Western audiences. As the head of a delegation of representative Arabs, he was also able to lay the Arab case before American and British politicians and statesmen. On behalf of the national committees in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, he discussed the Palestine question in two separate meetings held in September 1929 in Washington: one was with the American President, Herbert Hoover and the other with the Secretary of State, Mr. Stampson. He also met with other American politicians in 1931, such as William Adams, Undersecretary of State, and Senator Royal Copland. In the same year, he discussed the role of the British Government in the settlement of the Palestinian problem with the British Prime Minister, Sir Ramsay MacDonald, during the latter's visit to New York.

In the Arab countries, Rihani's activities concerning the Palestine question involved writing to Arab rulers explaining the Arab rights in Palestine and asking them to press on the British Government to solve the problem in favour of the Arabs. His activities involved aslo lecturing in several cities in Palestine, and mediating between conflicting Palestinian parties and groups, a conflict which he saw as between two families exploited by their common enemies. The solution which he suggested was to form a new national party from the two parties which would have a new national programme. This in his view would not be achieved without the union of the two major leaderships in the country, especially that a political party formed of the people had not existed yet, and that the traditional leadership was difficult to replace. As a result of his efforts for the cause, the High Islamic Council in Jerusalem, headed by al-Hajj Muhammad Amín al-Husaynī, nominated him in 1930 as a member of the Palestinian delegation to negotiate with the British Government, but he declined the mission on the ground of his inability to pay for his journey to London, and that he would not accept payment for his services. This of course did not mean the end of his work for the Palestinian cause, for he continued on other occasions to help the Palestinian leaders and to defend the Arab rights in Palestine until his last days.
A particularly important aspect of Rihani’s political activities was, of course, his Pan-Arab mission in the Arabian Peninsula. When in 1922, Rihani embarked on this mission, the Arab movement had suffered a decline after the division of the Arab lands of the Fertile Crescent into spheres of influence between Britain and France, and particularly after the fall of the Arab government in Damascus and the departure of Fayṣal from Syria to Iraq. On the eve of Rihani’s visit, the Arabian Peninsula had four independent rulers: Sharif Ḥusayn of the Hijaz; ‘Abdul-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ūd of Najd; Imām Yahyā of the Yemen and the Idrīsī of ‘Asīr. In addition, there were the small principalities on the seacoast of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean under British influence or direct control, (i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, the Trucial States, Muscat and Oman, and the Protectorates of South Arabia and the Port of Aden under British control.)

Apart from the ties which some of them had formed with Great Britain, there were serious problems separating the four independent sovereigns and affecting their relations with each other. Ḥusayn, recognised only as king of the Hijaz by the Allies, continued to style himself as King of the Arabs, a title that was unacknowledged by Ibn Sa‘ūd and the Idrīsī. The dissension between Ḥusayn and Ibn Sa‘ūd over disputed territory threatened to lead and was later to end in serious battles. Ibn Sa‘ūd’s termination of the dynasty of Ibn al-Rashīd in 1921, and the annexation of the whole territory of Shammar had already brought Ibn Sa‘ūd’s frontier to the borders of Iraq, then ruled by the Hashimite Fayṣal under British influence. The Imām Yahyā of the Yemen was in conflict with the Idrīsī of ‘Asīr over the port of Huidaidah on the Red Sea, claimed by the Imām to be in his own domain.

It was against this background that Rihani began his Pan-Arab mission advocating unity among the Arabian rulers through "acquainting them with each other", and through helping to draw treaties of friendship between them in order to facilitate their rapprochement. Through his close contacts with the Arabian rulers, Rihani gained political influence which allowed him to play the role of an adviser and a mediator between them. Thus he acted on behalf of King Ḥusayn in drawing treaties between him and the Imām Yahyā and the Idrīsī respectively. He also tried to mediate between the latter two over the Huidaidah problem, and he
acted as Ibn Sa‘ūd’s unofficial interpreter and adviser in the conference of Ojair (28 November-3 December 1922). It was during this conference that the northern and north-eastern boundaries of Najd were drawn in a treaty between the governments of Najd, Iraq, Kuwait and Great Britain. Following his efforts during his travels in 1922, Rihani was asked, upon the suggestion of Amīr ‘Abdullah of Jordan, and agreed upon by both Ibn Sa‘ūd and king ‘Alī Ibn al-Ḥusayn, to mediate between them in the Hijazi war in 1924. Three reasons made him accept the mission of mediation, and all were related to his former efforts: because he was in close contact with Ibn Sa‘ūd, then Sulṭān of Najd, and knew his Arab politics; because, from the beginning, he was a messenger for peace and co-operation between the Arab rulers; and because he had suggested to Ibn Sa‘ūd a peaceful solution to the problem of the Hijaz, to which the Sulṭān had responded positively. This was in addition to the interest shown by Muslim leaders in Syria and Lebanon. Rihani’s negotiations with Ibn Sa‘ūd which he conducted through a Lebanese Muslim nationalist and businessman, Ḥusayn al-‘Uwaynī, (Ibn Sa‘ūd was then in Mecca and Rihani as a Christian was unable to meet with him there) went far in the interest of both rulers. Ibn Sa‘ūd’s positive response to Rihani is evident in his correspondence to him during these negotiations. But because of opposing political interferences, negotiations failed and Ibn Sa‘ūd continued the war and eventually occupied the rest of the Hijaz.

It is true that Rihani had not become involved in the Arab revolt of 1916 or even in the post-war events in the Peninsula, but he certainly played a role of some importance, during and after his visit, in the improvement of the relations between the Arabian rulers themselves and between them and the Western powers, particularly Britain and the USA. For example, in his concern to “pave the way” for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USA and Ibn Sa‘ūd, he wrote in 1930 to Yusuf Yāsīn, Ibn Sa‘ūd’s adviser, asking if the king would appreciate Rihani’s mediation between him and the US Government. In another letter, he explained to the king the benefit of such relations with America with all its resources of scientific and material progress. Rihani’s efforts eventually led to the US recognition of the government of Ibn Sa‘ūd in the Hijaz and Najd.
Rihani's political activities in the service of the Arab cause can not be considered in isolation from his writings. For a considerable portion of his writings, in English and Arabic, was dedicated to this cause. Whether in the Arab countries or in the West, his writings and lectures, based on his experience in Arabia, have been instrumental in establishing strong contacts among the Arabs themselves and between them and the West, and perhaps, this is the most important of his achievements. In fact, however important Rihani's political activities were, his writings remained the best testimony to his dedication to a cause which he served for almost a quarter of a century.

In discussing Rihani as a political activist, it is important to note that his activities did not aim to realise the programme of an ideological party or the aims of a political power. Even during the war, when he collaborated with groups having ties with a foreign power, (e.g. Shukri Ghanim and the Syrian Central Committee) his collaboration was not without reservation. It is perhaps important to remember that Rihani at that stage was like almost all the Arabs, especially the Christians, who felt the need of foreign assistance to get rid of the Ottomans. Even Sharif Husayn did not declare the Arab Revolt before he secured the assistance of the Allies in money, arms and ammunitions.

It was Rihani's own conviction, rather than any external influence, that motivated his activities. For he succeeded, throughout, to detach himself from the belligerent parties, whether internal or external. In Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, he had connections with different political groups, and, as indicated above, he contributed to different political organs ranging from the religious (al-Manar) to the national (al-Qabas) and the communist (al-Tali'a). On the other hand, Rihani did not officially serve a government or a ruler. Thus he writes to Ibn Sa'uid in 1939, in connection with the impending arrival of the US ambassador in Jeddah: "I am still, as you well know me, independent from governments and unconnected with officialdom".181 In his Pan-Arab mission, despite his willingness to present the standpoint of one Arab ruler or another in negotiations, he made it clear that his service to them was free from any official obligation.182

Rihani clearly expressed his genuine interest in seeing an Arab-American co-operation especially on the cultural and economic levels, and he worked
towards this aim. But, as Irfan Shahid rightly stated, "in spite of his American and his apparently British connections, he (Rihani) remained a sincere Arab nationalist working for the people he discovered to be his own people". This sincerity is particularly shown in serving his people gratis and refusing to accept money from any state or political party in return to his services to the Arabs.

Rihani was not a professional politician. From an early stage, he was aware that politicians (he certainly had in mind the politicians in Western democracies) seek agreement of their supporters before committing themselves to any decision, and that they are responsible for their actions before the party which they represent. Being detached from any political party, gave Rihani complete freedom in his political activities. What he said and did came out from his own convictions and beliefs. Even when he was negotiating treaties with the Arabian rulers on behalf of Husayn, for example, he retained his freedom in acting according to his assessment of the situation. Although he tried to serve the king's interest, he did not hesitate to take certain initiatives and make some concessions for what he believed was beneficial to the essential cause, i.e. unity of the Arabs.

Throughout his career, Rihani insisted on having complete independence and free opinion. He was conscious that becoming a professional politician would tie his opinion to the will of others. For, he believed that he who joins the "diplomatic corps" would lose his freedom of action and consequently his freedom of opinion. There is no doubt that Rihani as an intellectual was always anxious to remain free from any political partisanship in order to maintain a free opinion on any issue. Indeed he specifically makes the point of refusing to join or be a partisan of any political party or newspaper whether in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine or Iraq.

Despite certain slanderous rumours around his activities, especially after his travels in Arabia, it can be said that Rihani was not after a position as a politician let alone a functionary. Notwithstanding development of his ideas or changes in his perspective during different periods, his ideas did not show any flagrant contradiction which may betray a willingness to compromise his integrity for the purpose of being rewarded by money or position. His sincerity in word
and deed to the cause which he believed in, distinguished him as a political activist. Thus, using his own distinction between the reformer and the politician, "a politician considers first his interest and that of his party before exposing his opinion, the reformer does not swerve... in order to gain the support of the people...",¹⁸⁹ it is certainly more appropriate to consider Rihani as a political activist and political reformer rather than a professional politician.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

1. Al-Hudā was first published in Philadelphia and later moved to New York. I have counted about 80 articles by Rihani which were published between 1898 and 1904 in al-Hudā alone. These were later collected in Shadharāt, AAK, 6.

2. These contributions can be found in Shadharāt, AAK, 6; al-Rīhāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 308-302; al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 171-190; see also A. Rihani (ed.), al-Rīhāni wa Mu‘āṣirūn, pp. 56-57; and the lists in A. Rihani, WFAR, pp. 130-135.


5. See the list of his contributions in RGPL, 1890-1899, 2, p. 837.

6. See the list of his contributions in RGPL, 3, p. 2173; 4, p. 1652; 5, p. 1392; see also A. A. Rihani, Faylāṣif al-Freike, pp. 58, 68.

7. See the lists of these contributions in RGPL, 7, p. 2148; 8, p. 2164; 9, p. 1911; 10, p. 1555; 11, 1550; 12, p. 1723; some of the articles are listed in the bibliography; also A. Rihani, WFAR, pp. 406-412.

8. See his articles published later in Shadharāt, AAK, 6.

9. See particularly ‘Anwar al-Āfkar’ (1905); ‘Waḍī’ al-Freike’ (1904), in al-Rīhāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 95, 68. These two articles were originally published in al-Ahrām and al-Mudātāf.

10. See for example al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 17, 31, 89.

11. See for example Ibid., pp. 250, 272, 294, 299 and passim.

12. See some of the titles in Atlan, Bookm, Forum, Poet Lor listed in RGPL, 1890-1899, 2, p. 837; 3, p. 2173; 4, p. 1652.

13. See some of the titles in the Int Studio listed in RGPL, 5, p. 1392.


16. Representative of his approach at this stage are letters to Na‘ūm Mukarzil, 27 Aug. 1900; to Na‘ūm Labakī, owner of al-Manāẓir, during 1901, in Rasā‘īl, pp. 17-28.

17. See A. A. Rihani, the introduction to Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 238.

19. (Articles here are noted with their title, date, and the paper in which they first appeared (if known), and their location in al-A‘māl al-‘Arabiyya al-Kāmila of Rihani, **AAK**; see 'Madkhal' (1898), al-Ḥudā; in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, p. 239.


22. 'Romeo wa Juliette' (c. 1898); 'Jahannam Dante' (c. 1898); in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 523, 519.

23. 'Robespierre' (1900), al-Iṣlāḥ; 'Ingifta wa-al-Rahma al-Masīhiyya' (1899), al-Ḥudā; in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 412, 398.

24. 'Bayn Shī‘rārat al-‘Urubiyyīn wa Tahkīm al-‘Arab' (1902), al-Ḥudā; in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, p. 476.

25. 'William Ewart Gladstone' (1898), al-Ḥudā; 'Ṣuwar 'An Thomas Huxley' (1902), al-Ḥudā; in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 486, 335.

26. 'al-Mas‘ala al-Fidiyya' (1900), al-Ayyām; al-Sha‘b al-Amīrī al-Muhadhdhab' (1898), al-Ḥudā; 'al-Wasaṭa w-al-Shari‘a al-Dawliyya' (1898), al-Ḥudā; in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 442, 257, 390.

27. 'Nahnu wa Jam‘iyyātunā' (1900), al-Ḥudā; 'Hawla Nahnu wa Jarā‘idunā' (1902), al-Ḥudā; in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 268, 379.

28. 'Waṣāniyyayt al-Umara‘ al-Lubnāniyyīn’ (c. 1898), al-Ḥudā; 'Idhā Kān la Budd Min al-‘Zulm’ (1902), al-Ḥudā, and other articles in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 440, 453, 455-471.


30. 'Nahnu wa Jam‘iyyatunā' (1900), al-Ḥudā; 'al-Dawwār' (1900), al-Dā‘ira; 'al-Mas‘ala al-Fidiyya' (1900), al-Ayyām; in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 268, 272, 442.

31. 'al-Waṣāta w-al-Shari‘a al-Dawliyya' (1898), al-Ḥudā; in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, p. 390.

32. 'Limādhūh Naliduhu‘ (1900), al-Ḥudā; 'Iṣtiqaṭat al-Ra‘i‘ (1901), al-Ḥudā; 'al-‘Ilm al-Masīhi‘ (1901), al-Ḥudā; 'al-Manṭiq wa Thabat al-Adyān‘ (1901), al-Ḥudā; in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 544, 548, 549, 553.

33. See Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 365-378.

34. 'Nahnu wa Jarā‘idunā’ (1902), in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 367, 372.

35. See 'al-Ṣihāfa w-al-Dawla' (1931); also 'Taḥt al-Sīlah' (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, **AAK**, 8, pp. 297-298, 268.


37. 'Madkhal' (1898), al-Ḥudā; in Shadharāt, **AAK**, 6, pp. 239-240.
38. Ibid., pp. 239-241; ‘Hawl Nahnu wa Jara‘idunā’ (1902), al-Hudā; in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 380; see also ‘Salim Sarkis’, in Wujūh, AAK, 9, p. 554.


41. Al-Duhūr was the organ of the Lebanese People’s Party (Hīzb al-Sha‘b al-Lubnānī, official name of the Lebanese Communist Party), and al-Tali‘a, was established by the Lebanese-Syrian Communist Party in 1935. Rihani was amongst the first Arab writers to contribute to these papers. See al-Akkārī, al-Sīhāfa al-Thawriyya fi Lubnān, pp. 14, 165.


43. That he was aware of the special role of mass media can also be seen from his remarks on the importance and effectiveness of the radio. This was on the occasion of the agricultural fair in Iraq in 7 April 1932, where Rihani’s speech was broadcast live. See Qalb al-Iraq, AAK, 4, pp. 192-193.

44. See some of the titles of the Bookm and the Forum in RGPL, 4, p. 1652; al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 171-190.

45. See UNESCO, Voix multiples un seul monde, p. 17.

46. C. R. Wright, Mass Communication, p. 11.

47. For Rihani’s concept of the significance of History within the idea of progress, see Ch. 3, below.

48. See his article ‘Shibl Damūs’ (1939), in Wujūh, AAK, 9, pp. 579-581. On the list of books which he read on this topic, see the introduction of his Nubdha, AAK, 6, p. 8; see also A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freike, pp. 28, 410.


50. For the books he read on these subjects, see A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freike, pp. 20-21, 329, 410.

51. See Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 710; Qalb Lubnān, AAK, 3, p. 609.

52. Fayṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 310, 315, 365, 469.

53. Ibid., pp. 315, 370.

54. Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 723, 147; Tarīkh Najd, AAK, 5, p. 494; al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, p. 155; Naqd Adabi, AAK, 9, p. 370; Musīl, Arabia Deserta: A Topographical Itinerary, not to be confused with C. M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta.

55. Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 721, 731; Tarīkh Najd, AAK, 5, pp. 10, 14; al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, p. 153; ‘Unwān al-Majd was wrongly misprint as ‘Uluww.
56. al-Maghrib al-Aqsa, AAK, 2, pp. 127, 456-459; Qalb al-‘Irāq, AAK, 4, pp. 26, 37-38, 45-48; al-Nakābīt, AAK, 6, p. 172; al-Riḥānīyyat, AAK, 7, p. 389; see also A. A. Riḥānī, Faylasūf al-Freik, pp. 329, 414-415. For the importance of literary sources to the historian of the Middle East, see Hourani, 'The Present State of Islamic and Middle Eastern Historiography', in Europe and the Middle East, pp. 165-166.

57. He met ‘Abdullah al-Jordān in 1925 during the Hijazi war and asked him about certain historical details; see Tārīkh Najīd, AAK, 5, p. 246.

58. See for example his letters in Rasa’il, pp. 197-198, 198-199, 204, 213, 238-240.

59. See for instance the lists of bibliography in Qalb Lubnān, AAK, 3, p. 609; Faysal a-Awwal, AAK, 4, p. 583; Tārīkh Najīd, AAK, 5, pp. 493-494; Nubdha, AAK, 6, p. 8.


61. Tārīkh Najīd, AAK, 5, p. 10.

62. J. Philiby, Arabia, preface, IX.

63. Tārīkh Najīd, AAK, 5, pp. 10-15, 361, 367. For his attempt at accurate transliteration and the help he sought from Western Arabists at British and American universities, see ISA, pp. xi-xii.

64. Tārīkh Najīd, AAK, 5, pp. 12-14.

65. Ibid., p. 13, 77-81; Cf. Bidwell, Travellers in Arabia, pp. 29, 53.


67. For an eloquent discussion of a "positive" academic method in writing history from a modern Arab perspective, see C. Zurayq, Nāhnu w-al-Tārīkh, pp. 69-102.

68. Faysal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 582-583.


70. Tārīkh Najīd, AAK, 5, p. 10; 'al-Nubdha al-Thālitha', on Al Sa‘ūd, pp. 58-106.


72. See for example Ch. 28 on the Bedu and the hijar; Ch. 35 on the Conference of Ojair; and Ch. 30 on the war between Kuwait and Najd, pp. 258-266, 308-315, 270-276.

73. See Mutūk, AAK, 1, pp. 143, 145, 660-661, 773-774; see also M. Rumaithī, al-Khalīj Layya Naftan, pp. 26, 32; (English version) Beyond Oil, pp. 21-22, 54 and notes, where Riḥānī is positively appreciated.

74. al-Naqīb, op. cit, p. 20.


78. al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, pp. 177-178.


80. al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, pp. 181-183.

81. Sharār, al-Ahl w-al-Ghanima, p. 50.

82. Ibid., 40-41, 44, 111-113, 121, 125, 133, 158, 200; Gharaybeh, Muqaddima, pp. 342-344, 351-432; see also ‘A. Abū ‘Aliyyah, al-Dawla al-Sa’udiyya al-Thāniya, pp. 24-25, 72, 157, 158, 229.

83. Philby, Arabia, preface, IX.


85. See Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 242-243, 254-256.

86. See Ibid., pp. 731-772.

87. Ibid., pp. 741-742, 759, 763, 774-776; ACA, pp. 289-304.

88. See Tarīkh Najd, AAK, 5, pp. 229-230; see also his adviṣe to Ibn Saʿūd on the policy which he should adopt with the British, in Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 548-550; for further discussion of this issue, see Ch. 8, below.

89. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 217; APD, p. 241.


91. See Tarīkh Najd, AAK, 5, p. 223; Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 659; ACA, p. 245; see also a letter to Muhammad Rida al-Shabibī, April 1923, in which he enquires about Bani Luʿayr who were the cause of controversy between the Hijaz and Najd, in Rasa’il, p. 204.


93. Ibid., p. 258, ISA, pp. 208-209.


95. ISA, p. 191.

96. Ibid., p. 193.


99. Tarikh *Najd*, AAK, 5, p. 263; see also the dedication of this book in a form of a letter addressed to Ibn Sa'ud, p. 9; ISA, p. 193.

100. Both terms are used by Tarif Khalidi in his discussion of Ibn Khaldun, see T. Khalidi, *Classical Arab Islam*, p. 126.


102. Nubda, AAK, 6, p. 122.

103. It is interesting that Rihani was not unaware of certain negative consequences of the French Revolution, see Khalid, p. 341; Nubda, AAK, 6, p. 118.


105. Fayçal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, p. 570.


109. On the significance of travel for the historian’s task, see in particular Ibn Khaldun, *Al-Muqaddima*, 1, p. 27; A. Shboul, *al-Mas’ûdi and his World*, particularly the Introduction and Ch. 1, pp. 1ff.


111. Such was, for instance, Zurayq's reproach of Arab nationalist historians, see *Ibid.*, p. 102.


113. See, for example, Fayçal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 326-327, 340, 345, 347, 351, 360.

114. See his idea of progress, Ch. 3, below.

115. al-Nakahat, AAK, 6, pp. 149-150, 177.

116. Zurayq, op. cit., pp. 17-24. It is interesting that Zurayq wrote two books with the title of "the meaning of catastrophe and "the meaning of catastrophe reconsidered".
117. *al-Nakabāt*, AAK, 6, p. 147; see also 'Lā Shay' Bilā Shay ' (1917), in *al-Qawmiyyāt*, AAK, 8, pp. 161-162. See a comparison between Rihani’s views and al-Husrito’s in this matter, Ch. 6, below.

118. *al-Nakabāt*, AAK, 6, p. 177.

119. Ibid., pp. 164, 173.

120. This is the reflexion of historians under the influence of Spencerian Evolutionism, see Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, p. 146. It is interesting that Collingwood himself who, early in his career advocated a complete detachment in writing the history, later changed his opinion in this matter, see Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, pp. 97ff.

121. See his speech ‘Hunā wa Hunāk’ (c. 1909), in *al-Qawmiyyāt*, AAK, 8, pp. 41-42.


124. See his contributions during this period, particularly in *al-Qawmiyya*, AAK, 8, pp. 9-106.


126. For example in W. Kawtharani (ed.), *Wathā’iq al-Mu’tamar al-‘Arabī al-Awwal 1913*. This book was not available to us, but for this see, A. A. Rihani, *Faylasūf al-Freike*, p. 88; also S. Taqi al-Din, *al-Mas’ala al-Tariyya fi Lubnān*, pp. 226-227.


129. He suffered a neuritis in his right arm.


131. See ‘al-Sūriyyūn w-al-Harb’ (c. 1917); ‘Lā Shay’ Bilā Shay ‘ (1917); ‘al-Haytāt w-al-Hurriyya w-al-Sayf’ (c. 1917); ‘al-Salib’, (1917), in *al-Qawmiyya*, AAK, 8, pp. 107, 161, 145, 135; see also Ch. 5, below.

132. For more details on the activities of Shukrī Ghānim and the SCC, see ‘I. Khalīfī, *Abhāḥ fi Tarīkh Lubnān al-Mu’asir*, pp. 74-95; see also D. Pipes, *Greater Syria*, pp. 36-37.
133. Letters to Shukri Bakhkhāsh, 18 Apr. 1917; to 'Abd al-Masīḥ Ĥaddād, 19 Apr. 1917, in Rasā'il, pp. 169-174; 'al-Ḥayāt w-al-Hurriyya w-al-Sayf" (c. 1917), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 145-154. The Committee was made up of: Ayyūb Thābet (Ṭabīt) as president, Riḥāni as vice-president, Jibrān Khalīl Jibrān as secretary for English correspondence, Miḥā'l Na'imy as secretary for Arabic correspondence, and the editors of several leading Arabic papers in the USA as members. See J. Dayeh, 'Āqīdat Jibrān, pp. 21, 81-85; Gibran, Gibrān Khalīl, p. 304; Khalīfī, op. cit., p. 84; A. Riḥāni, WFAR, p. 41.

134. A. Riḥāni, WFAR, pp. 41-43.

135. From a letter to his wife, 17 Aug. 1917, partially quoted in A. A. Riḥāni, Faylasūf al-Freike, pp. 91-92.

136. La Ligue Libanaise, as it was known in French, was founded in New York in 1911. Its programme supported the independence of enlarged Lebanon under French protection, see Khalīfī, op. cit., p. 111; Naff, Becoming American, pp. 88-89, 307.

137. Khalīfī, op. cit., p. 110.

138. Early differences between Riḥāni and Mukarzil can be seen in Riḥāni's articles: 'Naḥnu wa Jara'-idūnā (1902); 'Hawl. Naḥnu wa-Jara'-idūnā' (1902), in Shadharālī, AAK, 6, pp. 365-378, 379-381; 'Ma' Mudīr Jarida' (n.d.), in al-Riḥānishīyāt, AAK, 7, p. 122; letter from Mukarzil to Riḥāni, 28 Aug. 1900, in A. Riḥāni (ed.) al-Riḥāni wa-Mu'āṣiruh, pp. 17-20; letter from Riḥāni to Mukarzil, 31 Jan. 1906, in Rasā'il, pp. 80-83. On the ideological disagreement between Riḥāni and Mukarzil, and between the latter and the SMLLL in general, see Ch. 5, and Ch. 6, below; see also Dayeh, 'Āqīdat Jibrān, pp. 162-164, 402-404, 86-87.

139. See Khalīfī, op. cit., p. 85; see the itinerary of Riḥāni's movements in A. A. Riḥāni, op. cit., p. 355.

140. On the famine in Lebanon during 1915-1916, see Y. al-Ḥakīm, Bayrūt wa Lubnān fī 'Abd Al-Ūthmān, pp. 249-252; for further details on this committee and Riḥāni's activities within it, see Dayeh, 'Āqīdat Jibrān, pp. 69-80; Na'imy, Sab'īnā, pp. 40-42. On his contributions in this regard, see his 'al-Ta'mim w-al-Takhīṣ (c. 1916); 'Ikht al-Baljīk (c. 1916); 'Ṣawm wa-Iḥṣān' (c. 1916); 'al-Jū' (c. 1916), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 111, 113, 117, 121. The SMLLL and the SMLRC were two different committees, not one committee as stated in A. A. Riḥāni, op. cit., p. 90.

141. The mandate was decided by the Supreme Council which met in San Remo and took its decisions on the 25th of April, 1920. The decisions were made public on the 5th of May. See Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 305-309; Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, Ch. 9, pp. 163ff.


143. On the role of Luṭfallah in the Congress, see W. Cleveland, Islam Against the West, pp. 49-50; P. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, pp. 223-227; idem, 'Factionalism Among Syrian Nationalists During the French Mandate', in IJMES, 13 (1981), pp. 443-447; see the proclamations of the Congress to the League of Nations in Dh. Qarqūṭ, al-Mashriq al-'Arabī, pp. 200-205; on the Syrian Union League, see Khalīfī, Abhāth, pp. 95-98.

144. See A. Riḥāni, WFAR, p. 344.

145. See 'al-Nazl al-Jamīl (c. 1925, this is dated 1936, but it was most likely written in 1925, see Rasā'il, p. 266.) 'al-Mawdū' al-Malāf (c. 1927, this is dated 1925, but it was most likely written after the Syrian Revolution of 1925-27); 'Wafā' al-Sāḥib (1926); 'al-Maṣnū'āt al-Wataniyya (c.
1926), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 373-376, 223-224, 230-231, 232-236; 'Dimashq' (c. 1925); 'Hijarat Bārîs' (1925), in Hutaif, AAK, 9, pp. 132-134, 135-137; see also letters to 'Abbās Bajani, 29 Dec. 1925; to Muhammad b. Muhammad Sa'id al-Fattâ, 5 Oct. 1925, in Rasâ'il, pp. 272, 265-266.


148. See al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 278, 309, 313, 278, 332, and passim; see further Ch. 7, below.

149. Cited in Hallaq, al-Tayyârât al-Siyâsiyya fi Lubnân, p. 79.

150. See the speech in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 319-328.

151. On his determination to continue the struggle against the mandate, see his correspondence with Mârûn 'Abbûd in Rasâ'il, pp. 444-445; 'Abbûd, Rasâ'il Mârûn 'Abbûd, pp. 27-30. On his contributions, see 'Lânî Amîr' (1934); 'al-Siyâsa w-al-Dîn' (1935); 'Durûs Min al-Qâmûs' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 334, 340, 366; see also 'Nadâb wa Inîdâb' (1933), in Anum al-Shu'ârâ', AAK, 9, pp. 222-229.

152. On this period, see Khoury, Syria, pp. 245-481; S. Murâd, al-Haraka al-Wahlâdiyya fi Lubnân, pp. 195-201, 217-220.


154. See A. Rihani, WAFA, p. 57.

155. Letter to the Patriarch 'Ārîdâ during 1936, in Rasâ'il, pp. 488-489.

156. See A. 'Ārîdâ, Lubnân wa Faransî.

157. 'al-'Alâmûn' (1936); 'Lubnân al-Jadîd' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 370, 393; also Ch. 7, below.

158. See, for example, his articles 'Jaza Allahu al-Shadâ'id' (1926); al-'Arab w-al-'Alâqât al-Dawliyya' (1927), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 399, 403; 'Fa Anâ 'Arabî' (1938), in al-Manâbîr, 45-46 (Nov.-Dec. 1989), pp. 134-135; articles in English: 'Calls on Premier MacDonald in NYC', TNYTRBM, Oct. 13, 1929, sec. X, p. 2; 'Balfour Declaration Must be Revoked to Preserve Peace in Palestine', in TNYTRBM, Jan. 19, 1930, sec. II, p. 6; 'Palestine Arabs Claim to be Fighting for National Existence' in The Historian, 31 (Nov. 1929), pp. 272-279; for his lectures in Arabic, see for example, 'Filastîn' (1937) in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 408, and his English lectures published posthumously in The Fate of Palestine.
159. Letter to his brother Albert, 14 Feb. 1937, in which he explains one of his lecturing tours, in Rasā‘īl, pp. 514-516. For further details on his tours in A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freike, pp. 365-379.


161. See particularly The Fate of Palestine, p. 27.

162. On one of his debates, see 'Mu‘āz zarāt Jadīd Bayn al-Rihānī w-al-Šahīnīyyīn', in Filastīn, Jan. 14, 1930, p. 1; also letter to his brother mentioned above, in Rasā‘īl, pp. 514-515.

163. al-Kayyālī, Amin al-Rihānī, p. 34.


165. See his appeal to four Arab rulers: King Ibn Sa‘ūd, King Ghāzī al-Awwal (Iraq), Imām Yahyā (the Yemen), and King Faruq al-Awwal (Egypt), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 395-398, and in Rasā‘īl, pp. 525-530.


170. This eventually led to the Hijazi war and the downfall of Husayn in 1924.

171. See Mu‘ūk, AAK, 1; Ta‘īkh Nājd, AAK, 5; ACA; APD; ISA; Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 325-334, 358ff; Baker, King Husain, pp. 154-189; Hourani, A History, pp. 314-319; Gharaybeh, Muqaddima, pp. 416-419; Philby, Arabia, p. 265-287; Salim, Takwīn al-Yaman, pp. 244-275.

172. See his ideas and endeavours concerning this particular issue in Ch. 8, below.

173. See Mu‘ūk, AAK, 1, pp. 555-559; Ta‘īkh Nājd, AAK, 5, pp. 308-315; ISA, pp. 69-89.


175. Ibid., pp. 381-387.

176. Ibid., pp. 381-399, 400-426.

177. See his advice to the Imām Yahyā and Ibn Sa‘ūd concerning their policy with the British, in Mu‘ūk, AAK, 1, 169-171, 215, 548-550.
178. Unpublished letter to Yusuf Yāsīn, 12 Feb. 1930, cited in A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freike, p. 120.


182. See for example his conversation with the Imam Yahyā in connection with the latter's doubt in Rihani's task in the Yemen, in Muḥājir, AAK, 1, p. 169.


184. McKinley al-Rajul al-Siyāsī (1900), in Shadhārāt, AAK, 6, p. 434.

185. See Muḥājir, AAK, 1, pp. 218-224, 357-361.

186. See 'Shibl Dāmūs' (1939), in Wujūh, AAK, 9, p. 581.

187. See his article 'Innī Mutaḥazzib' (1927), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 250; also 'Hadāfī wa Wasīlatī' (1935), in al-Rihanīyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 559.

188. Naṣīr Mukarzil wrote that Rihani was after a position in the service of Faysal, letter from Najib Dyāb to Rihani, 5 Feb. 1922, in A. Rihani (ed.) al-Rihānī wa Muṣāfrīh, pp. 195-196; see also Ch. 1, above.

189. McKinley al-Rajul al-Siyāsī (1900), in Shadhārāt, AAK, 6, p. 434.
CHAPTER THREE

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS AND MEANS OF REFORM
IN RIHANI’S THOUGHT

Of the diverse ideas with which Rihani was concerned, those of progress and reform are especially persistent themes in his writings and speeches. He saw progress (al-irtiqā’, al-ruqī, al-taraqqī, al-taqqaddum), and reform (al-islāḥ) as aspects of the process of change which he considered as inevitable in human life in general and as essential for Arab society in particular. Rihani saw certain specific means for reform and progress at the practical level. While not entirely excluding revolution, he emphasises the importance of structural and economic development as mechanisms for progress. In particular, he consistently insists on the need for national secular education and a non-sectarian political system, as essential prerequisites for ultimate progress in Arab society. Indeed, anti-sectarianism and the secular outlook are predominant throughout Rihani’s writings as shall be demonstrated in this study.

Progress: Conceptual Vision and Practical Means

Although Rihani did not formulate his thinking on the idea of progress in an extended treatise, it is possible to extract from his writings and lectures some cohesive views on this important concept.

Progress is one of the most important ideas that have preoccupied modern Arabic thinkers, as is well known.¹ Closely connected with modernity, the idea of progress in Rihani’s thought, can be traced back to three types of sources: his own experience of life in the West; the impact of Western (both American and European) thinkers and philosophers; and the influence of certain earlier Arab thinkers, particularly Ibn Khaldūn.

In the USA Rihani was impressed by the Western sense of order and material superiority. This was reflected in his awareness of the huge gap between East and West - an awareness which was first manifested in amazement and questioning accompanied by awe. This intellectual response to modern Western civilisation can be illustrated from Rihani’s early work, The Book of Khalid.
In this book, Rihani asks and exclaims: "is this the gate of paradise... or the port of some subterrrestrial city guarded by the demons?... what manifestations of industrial strength, what monstrosities of wealth and power are here!"²

Although Rihani condemned certain aspects of the American way of life, particularly its merciless materialism,³ he could not help but be influenced by the discourse of Western intellectuals on the ideals of progress, liberty and human dignity. It is important to remember that by the time Rihani began his contacts with American intellectual life in New York, the philosophies of progress, developed by European thinkers, had long become familiar in America. The idea of progress in particular was explicit in the writings of American thinkers such as Emerson (1803-1882) and Thoreau (1817-1862) whom Rihani read at an early stage of his career.⁴ The material environment and intellectual atmosphere in the USA were favourable to a philosophy of progress which, with the concrete evidence of material advancement on every side, became the faith not only of the philosopher but also of the common man.⁵

In the USA, Rihani had also the opportunity to be introduced to the European philosophies of progress, particularly the philosophers of the enlightenment and the French Revolution which exerted a great influence on him as they did on his American contemporaries.⁶ Furthermore, the philosophies of Darwin, Hegel, Marx and Spencer, who had influenced the idea of progress in the USA, were familiar to him.⁷

Another source of the idea of progress may be found in his reading of the Mugaddima of Ibn Khaldūn which was a major source of the idea of progress in the thought of several Arab thinkers of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. He seems to have read Ibn Khaldūn at an early stage, perhaps after his first return to Lebanon in 1898, and thus before he became familiar with the ideas of late 19th century Arab thinkers such as Buṭrus al-Bustānī and al-Kawākibī, for example. Moreover, unlike some other Arab intellectuals of this period who read Ibn Khaldūn first,⁸ Rihani's reading of the Mugaddima came after he had already read Voltaire and Rousseau and had become familiar with other Western philosophers.⁹
Progress in Rihani’s thought, at the conceptual level, is based on the idea of evolution as developed in nineteenth century European thought. He saw progress as involving two basic assumptions: that social life obeys the same general laws as nature, and that the process involves an increase of happiness. Rihani’s starting point is the assertion that everything in life is changeable, and nothing is permanent except the law of change itself, and that development or evolution (al-tatawwur) is a universal law that applies to nature as well as society. Evolution, for him, "is the law of the particular and general aspects of life, the law of science and religion, of nature and people (al-nās), of politics and nations (al-umam)". Evolution as such, signifies a process of progress, since comparison between the past and the present shows "degrees of improvement and progress".

Rihani’s idea of evolution is always progressive. "I believe in evolution and progress", he says, "and I support evolution and progress in every thing that I know or don’t know in existence, in life and in the universe". Although his views on the evolution of the universe may seem materialistic at first glance, he does leave scope for the divine providence, sometimes expressed as the unknowable existing behind all phenomena. But the role of the Divine Mover is to simply set in motion immutable forces to realise His design. God, in his view, is the force inherent in nature, which puts nature itself in motion. God is the eternal spirit or essence of the universe the progress of which produces the evolution of all beings. Darwin’s theory of evolution and progress which, as he says, related human life’s origin to an accidental and spontaneous progress, was in his opinion, superficial or "mere bubbles", because it underestimated the great role of Divine Providence.

Rihani’s concept of evolution and progress is thus not strictly Darwinian materialist in its outlook, and the spiritual dimension is important for him since he sees God’s "hand" reflected in all aspects of life. In everything in nature he saw something of the divine essence of which the principal source is "God or the Creator". The more the human being develops the study and understanding of nature, the closer he gets to the principal law which governs each of its particulars. This is "the human being’s union with the Creator". Rihani’s spirituality, however, was different from that of religion. So was his God. "I am
this rebellious sinful unbeliever (kafir)”, he says, "and I have many brothers on earth... Our aim is to keep people away from the idle talk of theology (both Christian and Islamic) and get them closer to the divine truth... Our aim is to transform their selfish spiritualism to a spirituality full of good for Humanity". This spirituality is in fact the basis of his advocacy of tolerance that was at the root of his concept of secularism as will be seen later.

Since Rihani saw progress as inevitable and all things as subject to it, human society, in his view, was not static but subject to the law of evolution, the greatest law that puts and keeps the universe in order. On this premise is based his philosophy of revolutionary change in history which is partly reflected in his Nubdha fi al-Thawra al-Faransiyya and his article ‘Ruh al-Thawra’ (The Spirit of Revolution).

Rihani, as indicated above, criticised Thomas Carlyle’s cynical approach in writing about the French Revolution. He also criticised his views on the history of this revolution, for Carlyle appeared to view it as an unexpected event or phenomenon with neither deep causes in the past nor profound consequences in the future. Carlyle’s view, according to Rihani, would mean that the past did not teach us any lessons, that the present was no longer certain and the future no longer attractive. Thus, time would lose its meaning and we would become subject to despair (qunūt), doubt (shakk), resignation (ya’s) and fear (khawf). Rihani emphasises the link of continuous progress between the past and the future, and the role of the positive historian in highlighting the process of progress and continuous ascendance in human society. This he contrasts with the negative philosophy of decline and nihilism which was associated with the static or disconnected view of history. The law of evolution which affects all things in the universe, is particularly reflected in society as the spirit of social change (al-tabaddul) which Rihani calls revolution (al-thawra). Since every natural or social event is not isolated in its causes or results, revolution becomes the result of hidden factors working together in things. "Revolution is a series of hidden events which are manifested in one aspect of social and political life". Since evolution involves progress, revolution, as a "historical necessity", is that event which is not an element of
destruction but rather an instrument of life that "carries the seeds of life... and transmits the principles of progress from one generation to another".24

The optimism of Rihani's view is quite evident. He considers the new revolution, in East and West, as a peaceful one, and as the result of science and reason (al-\textit{jilm} and al-\textit{aqil}). Although he is aware that these results may not be entirely good, for "they may include means of progress and happiness as much as means of misery and distress", he warns against any sense of resignation because the scientific revolution was still recent.25

Revolution, for Rihani, starts at the intellectual and spiritual levels. It is not one imposed by force of weapons but rather born of "sound teachings and high principles". It was on this theory of the peaceful revolution that Rihani based his ideas of reform and progress. However, he adds that force might be beneficial as a revolutionary means only as long as it came from those who honestly understood the spirit of revolution and had respect for its law.26

The practical aspect of Rihani's concept of evolution and progress is clear. The law of evolution and progress is not detached from reality. It is a law that we should feel in our behaviour and embody in our daily life in society. It is in this way that he sees politics as inseparable from society, hence his political commitment as a thinker. Although Rihani was concerned with the progress of humanity and not only of a particular society or nation,27 in a real sense he was responding to the decline of the Ottoman State, which, until the outbreak of the First World War, he considered his nation. Even then, although he had in mind the progress of the Ottomans and the East (al-\textit{sharo}) in general, he was more concerned about the Arabs in particular.28

The social and political decay of the Ottoman State, as Rihani saw it, was particularly caused by two major problems: ignorance and religious fanaticism. Unlike certain Arab thinkers who at this early stage were attracted to the idea of revolution, the solution which Rihani suggested was reform by means of education.29 He viewed reform as a complicated process consisting of several stages which would lead to the establishment of a new system which approaches, as much as possible, what he idealistically called the "philosophy of perfectibility" (al-falsafa al-kam̱āliyya).30 The first stage in such process is to detect the decay
in society and identify its causes which should then be exposed to the people so they would awake and seek removal of corruption. Only then can a new political and social system be established. These stages are connected to each other in such a way that we can not call upon the people to revolt against the system before they understand the meaning and aims of revolution.

Rihani was obviously sceptical as to the possibility of the revival of the Ottoman State which had attained old age and was close to death. Echoing Ibn Khaldūn's well-known concept of the life of dynasties, Rihani was convinced that "states grow and get old like individuals, and when their power declines reform can not spare them from death". Thus, having no realistic hopes in reforming the Ottoman State, he believed that an essential radical change in the political situation should take place. Nevertheless, he believed that, at this stage (1901), revolution was still premature and should not be hurried. The people were not intellectually prepared for it, and if they were called upon to revolt, their revolution may result in negative consequences.

The idea of revolution as a means of progress was elaborated by Rihani in several articles, particularly after the proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908. Rihani saw genuine revolution as more spiritual and educational than political. He was convinced that people could not get rid of ignorance, apathy and stagnation except by education. "I believe in slow but constant (thābit) method of reform in the lives of nations". Revolution in the political sense was, as he puts it, only "a minor lesson" in relation to spiritual and moral education. The genuine revolution is the "peaceful revolution" in "ideas and morals, in literature and religion". Such revolution starts with the education of the individual in the home, schools and institutions.

For him constitutional or administrative reform would not eliminate ignorance, tyranny and corruption in society without education. What the nation (i.e. the Ottoman State) needed was genuine moral liberty protected by the people's cultural values against the exploitation of political parties. "True liberty is the one which emanates from the people not the one which is given by the ruler". Thus what the nation needed was a spiritual revolution which would
help to achieve real progress in all aspects of life. Such revolution would improve the lot of both Turks and Arabs, and the East and Easterners.\textsuperscript{36}

Progress, in Rihani’s view, was not limited to the material side; nor did reform mean for him only the improvement of public service facilities, such as electricity, roads, railways, etc... Real reform comes as a result of science and the acquisition of the arts which can only develop in secular public schools that teach patriotism as well as sound knowledge.\textsuperscript{37}

This does not mean that Rihani excluded active political reform as a means of progress. Rather he considered that without educational and spiritual revolution, any political revolution could not survive. Although the opposite is not necessarily correct, sometimes military revolution might be necessary, however. For change through education may bring about solid reform; but it would need change in the political system to guarantee its survival.\textsuperscript{38}

On the eve of the First World War, Rihani believed that revolution was inevitably coming to achieve change and progress in the East. However, revolution could not be "hurried or delayed" by any external forces. It is true that Easterners had not yet found the appropriate means of revolution: i.e. science, arts, ethics and inherent strength, and that politicians were using their coercive and constitutional powers to prevent revolutionary change, but he believed that politicians were unable to stop it. In this respect he puts particular emphasis on the role and responsibility of the intellectuals to achieve progress in society.\textsuperscript{39}

In the period after the First World War, the changing situation of the Arab East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, undoubtedly led Rihani to concentrate on the affairs of Arab society and the idea of progress continued to be of special importance for him. While he had advocated reform and revolution as means for progress and liberation during the Ottoman era, he now emphasises the role of modern science and technology in addition to intellectual revolution in the desired development of the Arab World. Liberation from the Ottomans had been achieved and his main concern now was to see the reconstruction of a new Arab society on solid foundations, especially as the new challenge now facing the Arabs was that of Western colonialism, both political and cultural.
Rihani saw that the Arabs could not face such challenge without Pan-Arab unity which needed to be fostered by a spirit of nationalism, namely Arabism.\textsuperscript{40} Particularly after his travels in Arabia, he saw that the most serious impediment to Arab progress was the state of fragmentation and stagnation in Arab society at the political, intellectual and cultural levels. He saw that Arabism, as the national spirit uniting the Arabs, could only survive and develop if the Arabs were ready to face the modern world by actively responding to the ideas of progress and science.

The decline in the East in general, including Arab society, was in Rihani's view due mainly to three causes: ignorance (al-jahl), indolence (al-kasal) and arrogance (al-iddi'ā). In his view, ignorance results in tyranny and blind obedience, while indolence leads to apathy and poverty. He saw arrogance as an almost purely Eastern trait, manifesting itself in showiness and vainglory.\textsuperscript{41}

Rihani saw the danger of misunderstanding progress in the Arab World. He made a distinction between some manifestations of material progress such as the mere building of schools, printing presses, cinemas, businesses, industry and importation of cars, etc... and the real progress which is essentially moral and intellectual.\textsuperscript{42} Thus he found that despite some aspects of political and social awakening, the Arab nation was still in the transition phase where nationalism and new political tendencies on the one hand, and religious fanaticism, sectarianism, tribalism, and all sorts of old factionalism on the other, were in conflict. The processes of both material and moral progress were still tied down by the shackles of certain traditions and beliefs which were inconsistent with the spirit of the present age. If this was the situation, how could it be corrected? "How can we reform the nation?" he asks.\textsuperscript{43}

While recognising common problems and obstacles to progress in Arab society in general,\textsuperscript{44} Rihani saw some specific differences in this regard between the northern parts, i.e. Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq on the one hand, and the Arabian Peninsula on the other. In a series of articles and speeches during the late 1920s, Rihani outlined both the problems and the recommended solutions. Since he believed in the natural law of evolution and progress as a basis of social reform, he saw the inevitability of the progress of the Arab World as part of the progress of Humanity. He considered progress as combining material strength (al-
quwwa al-māddiyva) with social development (al-taşāwwur al-ijtīmā‘ī) and moral improvement (al-irtīqa‘ al-khuluqī).\textsuperscript{45}

Although Rihani may generally seem to advocate revolutionary ideas,\textsuperscript{46} he still believes in active reform as a means for change and progress particularly through education and moral refinement in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. Rihani points out that in this part of the Arab world that has come under foreign mandates, a true nationalist feeling among the people was not allowed to develop because of the multitude of sectarian loyalties which were encouraged by the mandatory powers and by sectarian and missionary schools. He therefore, saw secular national public education as the most important vehicle for such active reform and progress.\textsuperscript{47}

Rihani considers that true education which combines the study of science and arts as well as physical, intellectual training, and moral and spiritual refinement, should be based on ten principles. These he enumerates as self-reliance, individual dignity, trust in people, free will, moral courage, abandonment of antiquated old beliefs and traditions, frankness and sincerity in speech, uprightness in opinion and practice, love of justice and fairness, and finally, and most importantly in his view, non-sectarianism (lā-fi‘ifiyya) in politics as well as in literature and culture.\textsuperscript{48}

In the Arabian Peninsula the obstacles to progress were more complex. Here stagnation of the Arabs, as Rihani saw it, was not only due to external political problems created by Western colonialism. He identified four closely connected internal problems which stood in the way of the progress of Arabia. These were ignorance, fanaticism, poverty and oppression. Again, Rihani saw education as the main weapon in the fight against these ills in Arabian society.\textsuperscript{49} "Arabia, free and independent, yes. But we want to see schools and printing presses and hospitals in the country."\textsuperscript{50}

At the level of the general public, Rihani lamented the fact that ignorance and illiteracy were particularly rampant in different parts of Arabia. This was not limited to ignorance of things, places and ideas outside the narrow world of their neighbourhood, but extended to the lack of understanding of the true teachings of their religion. In the case of the Yemen, for example, Rihani was shocked to see
the people so ignorant of the rudiments of health care, and so fatalistic in their attitude towards sickness and diseases, relying blindly on the addictive qat (al-
ghāṭ).

Even the so-called scholars ('Ulamā) in traditional Arabia, particularly in the Yemen, were so ignorant not only of the modern sciences but also of the very field of knowledge in which they were specialists, namely religion. For they misinterpreted religion to the public in a narrow fanatical way. At the level of political leaders, the rulers of different parts of Arabia were, as Rihani points out, ignorant of each other, and of their social condition, and some of them deprived their subjects of opportunities of education.

Rihani perceived fanaticism in certain parts of Arabia, the Yemen for example, as perpetuating a state of stagnation in the minds of the people. Not only were there "impediments born of dogma, religious formula, and theological imbecilities"; but fanaticism created an obstacle that made the people, even the learned among them, see nothing true outside what they were taught to understand from their sacred books. Ignorance as such becomes identical with fanaticism and both were used as tools of power in the hands of the upper class to secure its privileges.

Rihani also blamed the stagnation and lack of progress of the Arabs on religious misunderstanding and the misuse of certain Islamic teachings. Like many modern Muslim reformers, from Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-1791) onwards, who had criticised the negative influence of popular sufism and superstitions, Rihani criticised the kind of sufism prevalent in certain parts of Arabia, e.g. in ‘Asīr, as a philosophy of idleness which considered working for a living as sacrilege. While at the intellectual level he shows appreciation for mysticism and spirituality, he considers the kind of sufism he saw in ‘Asīr as dangerous, particularly at the level of the uneducated public. Such teachings, in his view, were the cause of poverty in Islam because they contradicted the natural laws which viewed working for a living as a means for the salvation and happiness of the human kind. At least on one occasion, it seems that Rihani held the misunderstood Qur‘ān and Hadīth responsible for this spirit of apathy among ignorant Muslims who were, in his view, the majority of Muslims.
Although this led to some reproachful response from certain learned Muslims, such as his friend 'Abd al-Qādir al-Maghribī (1867-1956), member of the Arab Academy in Damascus, Rihani continued to raise and elaborate on this question. In this, Rihani was not the only critic, for, as he himself reminds al-Maghribī, such issues were already raised by al-Kawākibī (1854-1902) in even greater detail. ⁶¹

Both ignorance and fanaticism, according to Rihani, kept the people of Arabia blindly obedient to their tribal and religious leaders, and such obedience was the cause of the prevailing state of disorder and continuing agitation and strife in Arabia. Ignorance, in his opinion, kills patriotism and explains the lack of a true national feeling among the Arabs, and their tendency to rush to arms to uphold a private cause or right a personal or a tribal wrong. ⁶²

The third obstacle to progress in Arabia was poverty. Even though it existed only in parts of Arabia, poverty in Rihani's view, contradicted the spirit of Arab dignity, hindered the progress of the Arabs and consequently prevented their complete independence. While criticising the Sufi "chemistry of belief" which teaches the needlessness of working for a living, ⁶³ Rihani identified other causes for poverty in Arabia. Apart from the barren desert, the Bedu who found themselves living in Ibn Saʿūd's capital, for example, depended on 'begging' for living. There were also those who received allowance in money and lived on the generous donations of the ruler. In this context, Rihani blamed the attitude of the ruler who willingly kept his subjects dependent on him in order to use them in war at any time. Part of Ibn Saʿūd's standing army recruits, for example, had nothing to do in times of peace, and as such were a drain on his resources since he had to feed and clothe them and keep them contented. ⁶⁴ Rihani also warned against the continuity of internal strife and the state of war which aggravated the state of poverty, prevented stability, and hindered political and economic progress in various parts of Arabia. ⁶⁵

Oppression, or injustice (al-zulm) was another serious problem perceived by Rihani as hindering the progress of Arabia. ⁶⁶ One can identify three aspects of oppression to which Rihani draws attention. These are the ruler's oppression of his subjects in general; ⁶⁷ the ruler's tyranny towards his high officials, for
example in the Yemen and 'Asīr, where the Imam Yahyā and the Idrīsī were in the habit of keeping hostages from the families of their officials to guarantee their loyalty; and social oppression as represented in its most shocking aspect in slavery. Rihani was particularly concerned with the slave-trade in Arabia, which he discovered was encouraged by European as well as native authorities. Not only did it prove to him how much Arab civilisation had declined and fallen behind but also how it tarnished the Arabs' pride and dignity and their striving for freedom and political independence. He also blamed the Europeans for their hypocrisy in claiming to uphold civilization while failing to successfully eradicate slavery in the East.71

This backward state of Arab society both in Arabia and the Fertile Crescent did not lead Rihani to hopelessness. In all his writings on the Arabs he stressed that the problems of the Arab nation should not lead to despair because progress was undoubtedly coming. Despite the gloomy picture, Rihani's optimism impelled him to believe that Arab society could be reformed and a new future for the Arab nation could be rebuilt.

To each of the major problems indicated above, Rihani offered a straightforward practical solution which would lead the Arabs to modernity without contradicting their moral values. Ignorance and fanaticism for instance could be treated by education, through the opening of modern public schools and developing the minds of the children which are "like hidden treasures". Oppression and tyranny of the rulers could be treated by establishing democratic just rule. Slavery could be abolished by inspiring both the moral values of Islam which preach justice and freedom and the Western moral values which preach respect of the human being. Moreover, he was "in favour of a radical measure" which did not even exclude the use of force by Western authorities to put an end to slavery in the East. The solution for poverty was work. The Arabs, as he suggested to Ibn Saʿūd, should work to earn their living and to fight the nature of the barren desert. The Arabs, in his opinion, could not remain nomadic and should not depend for their living on ghazū. The desert was not barren as its face showed, but had its hidden treasures; and the Arabs needed to explore these treasures by hard work.
Rihani was probably the first Arab thinker to draw attention to the importance of oil in achieving economic progress and independence of the Arabs. Thus in 1935, he pointed out the importance of oil for the future progress of Iraq. Similarly, in an article published in Asia in 1938, Rihani, among other points, emphasised that it was both in the economic and political interest of the Western countries to help the Arabs achieve progress and political unity. He emphasised the importance of the recognition, by the Western oil companies and their governments, of the Arabs' political and economic aspirations.

To solve all their problems and recover their glory, Rihani saw clearly that the Arabs could not do without modern science and technology. Thus, "if we first recognise and understand the causes of Arab economic weakness and cultural decadence, i.e. the nature of the barren desert and ignorance, we must remember that the greatest and first conqueror today is science." The Arabs, in his view, could achieve progress only if they opened the doors of Arabia to Western science and civilization, and to trade with Europe through treaties of commerce. They could not remain isolated in the heart of Arabia in the age of the telegraph and the aeroplane.

Occasionally Rihani would go as far as outlining a practical blueprint for progress and modernisation to Arab rulers who would listen to him. For example, in a memorandum written in January 1923 while he was in Najd, Rihani enumerates to Ibn Sa'ūd ten specific means of civilisation and progress without which his kingdom would not be established as a modern state. These were: the opening of schools with modern curricula; inviting Arab doctors from Syria and Egypt and opening of hospitals and pharmacies in the major cities of Najd; construction of water wells and drilling of oil and mining of other minerals under the control of Arab engineers (Egyptians and Syrians); installing telegraph facilities between the cities of Najd; establishing at least one newspaper; sending intelligent students to the American University of Beirut; minting of coinage in his name; opening Najd to maritime commerce through a port in al-Qašīf with British assistance; employing trade agents to facilitate commerce with other Arab countries; and enacting a law of succession to the kingship (qānūn witrātha lil-mulk) to protect it against ambitious enemies. Moreover, he particularly
emphasised to Ibn Sa'ūd the importance of justice and education in addition to strength: "if strength and justice are the foundation of the state, education is its shield".79

For Rihani, it was not only important to find solutions for the problems facing the Arabs, but also to adopt such solutions in a way that ensures the continuity of the process of change and progress. To achieve this, the Arabs needed a radical transformation in their mental attitude which would dynamically adopt what is being borrowed from the West to suit their society. On the other hand, Rihani did not support the call for going back to the old Arab and Islamic traditions as means of reform.80 "Islam would continue in its apathy (jumūd) ... unless it was, to some extent, imbued (yulaqqah) with the psycho-social philosophy (al-falsafa al-nafsiyya al-jitima‘iyya) that was known to, and practiced by the philosophers of the Arabs in the past. This is defined in three words: evolution (al-ta‘awwur), life (al-hayāt), and growth (al-numuww)".81

Reform, for Rihani, meant a revolt against the prevalent system, against such inherited traditions which either were inherently unsuitable or which had become outdated and inappropriate.82 It is interesting to note that from an early period (1911), Rihani had argued, for example in The Book of Khalid, that "the so-called Reformation of which... al-Afghani and... Abdu are the protagonists, is false", because "it is based on theological juggling and traditional sophisms".83 At that period, he saw that reform required modernisation of the existing institutions and if necessary the complete rejection and change of these institutions if found inadequate.84 Thus progress, for him, could not be achieved by going back to the static inheritance, but by adopting scientific and modern techniques to deal with the problems of modern society, even if this required the adoption of some of the modern approaches of Western civilisation.85

Progress as understood by Rihani is a dialectical process. He did not attack the whole Arab past but only those aspects which he considered harmful and degenerate in the old traditions and customs. "When one revolts against oneself first, and against what is rotten in the legacy of one's ancestors, and when one reforms the corrupt and rejects the incurable, this is true reform, and true revolution".86 While he called for a radical rejection of unworkable ineffective
past methods and institutions because a provisional reform would not last, he did not advocate the rejection of the whole past, but the understanding of the past and making it relevant to the future. If past methods were to be used in the new age they had to be adjusted and adapted to the times.\textsuperscript{57}

Rejuvenation of the Arab nation requires, in his opinion, shaking off the way of thinking which had shackled the Arabs to their past. Thus commenting on two lines of traditional Arabic verse that were inscribed on the wall outside the court of Ibn Sa'ūd:

\begin{quote}
Although we are of a noble line,
We do not on our line depend;
We build as our ancestors built,
And do as they did, to the end.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

Rihani recognised a "mixture of wisdom and folly". Such aphorism, he thought, was something that Arabs, like most Muslims, have always accepted as an ideal, and which, in his opinion, continued with renewed force to produce its fatal effects: sterilising the mind, the soul, and the heart of the people. The wisdom and good principle in the Arab conduct, according to him, is in singing their noble line but not depending on it. But the folly is to imitate their ancestors in everything they do to the end. Here is, in his own words, "the swamp from which issue all the germs of our social, political and religious diseases".\textsuperscript{59} In his opinion, the Arabs could not and should not entirely and absolutely renounce their past. On the contrary this past is still necessary and can be of benefit to them. There is no harm, therefore, in building as their ancestors built but they should not stop where their ancestors stopped. "The reverence for our ancestors is not complete unless it is coupled with a striving to surpass them - to prove ourselves worthy descendants. For consider what they achieved in an age deprived of the scientific instrumentalities of progress which distinguish our own; and consider what they would achieve if they were in our time".\textsuperscript{60}

In his early writings, Rihani had already asserted his pride in the Arab contribution to world civilization. In his view, the Arabs, who were in the past one of the most civilised people, shared with Europeans all the greatness and the glory that Humanity is now enjoying. They had their own sciences and
philosophy, but hundreds of years of oppression and decline in education led eventually to their decay.\(^{91}\) He continued to stress this point in his later writings, but he made it clear that "nations today can achieve progress with the science of today, and it does not matter if the new science is accompanied by some of the good past science... If we go back to the past we would rather go to compete with it not to imitate it or repeat what the ancestors did".\(^{92}\) Going back to the past to be inspired by its science, although it may give the Arabs a remedy to some of their problems, is not enough to solve all those problems. The old science and philosophy were adequate in the past because they were inspired by certain circumstances which differed from the new conditions of the modern times. Today's new problems need new sciences and technology.\(^{93}\) This leads to Rihani's discourse of the question of borrowing from the West.\(^{94}\)

Rihani found no objection in principle to borrowing from the West. Using the same argument used by other Arab thinkers, he argues that Europeans in the past, when they were in need, borrowed from the East and from the Arabs in particular and as a result they progressed. So what is the harm if the Arabs today borrowed from the Europeans what in the past was theirs. What is the harm if the Arabs recover at least part of the science that they gave to the West when it was living in complete darkness.\(^{95}\) But Rihani points out that the Arabs do not have to borrow everything, only what is appropriate for their society. Rihani saw clearly that not every change in Arab life was necessarily good, and not all European values were suitable for adoption by the Arabs, especially if this adoption meant only the external imitation of certain forms of European progress.\(^{96}\) He rejects borrowing if it meant feign\(^{8}\) knowledge and showiness and servitude to the foreigners. He warns against what he called "Westernisation" (al-tagharrub), "Frankicisation" (al-tafarnuj), or imitation of Europeans only in superficialities, which he considered a general weakness in the East.\(^{97}\)

That only certain aspects of European civilization were suitable for the Arabs was clear in Rihani's mind from an early period and he continued to reiterate it in his later writings.\(^{98}\) For at one level, he considered European civilization as based on materialism, mercantilism and exploitation, on wars and colonisation.\(^{99}\) It was partly this which later convinced him that Western
political institutions, for example the American model of democratic republic, were inappropriate for the Arabian society. What the Arabs should accept from the West, in his opinion, was mainly science and technical assistance. By science he did not only mean adoption of modern sciences in the schools, but also adoption of the example of European liberal institutions and skills, which were free from Western political ambitions. He particularly advocated learning from the example of the application of technical knowledge, and from discipline and the skills of organisation and co-ordination. Such skills he considered necessary to enable the Arabs to participate in the conquest of their natural environment. For if the desert was crossed in the past by the armies of conquest, of pillage and slaughter, today, the desert, in his opinion, needed another conquering army from the West, the conquering army of science and invention and enterprise. "And it must conquer the desert, must triumph over its simooms, its dust storms, its lava regions, its sand-barricades, its parched wastes and wadis, before it can make it the bearer of the life blood of our modern civilization".

Rihani was convinced that by combining the good values from their past with the good values of the West, the Arabs could advance. The process of borrowing, therefore, is not separated from that of seeking inspiration from the past. The two processes are rather inter-connected in a dynamic relationship which would create a new society, a nation capable of keeping up with other modern nations and capable of a renaissance (nahda), of progress and happiness. Optimistically, Rihani anticipated that this new nation would be a blend of the spiritual East, with its passion, sense of honour and generosity, and the material West; of eastern philosophy and the western science and technology. Indeed, at a more utopian or visionary level, Rihani dreamed of what he called "the Great City" (al-Madīna al-ʿUzma) in which the high values of East and West could live together.

Secularism and Anti-Sectarianism as Prerequisites for Progress

One of the important concepts associated with progress in Rihani's thought is that of secularism. Modern Arab thinkers have been concerned, to various degrees, with the idea of secularism from just after the middle of the 19th century;
and the concept continues to be raised in contemporary Arabic and Islamic thought. This concern has ranged from calls for religious tolerance, to separation of religion from politics, to the rejection of the political and social role of religion and limiting its realm to individual spirituality.\footnote{105}

Rihani's secular outlook is particularly seen in his relentless fight against sectarianism which he considered as a major problem hindering the progress of the Arabs. This is a persistent theme in his writings and speeches from the earliest pieces of his output and throughout.\footnote{106} As early as about 1898 his call for reform of the Ottoman State contained expression of anti-sectarian ideas. Although not amounting to a clear vision of a secular state, these early ideas were the first signs of a political attitude which was later to become increasingly manifest in his thought. This secular trend evolved particularly after his travels in Arabia and his political involvement in the affairs of Syria and Lebanon.

Rihani considered secularism as the antithesis of, and indeed the antidote for, sectarianism. He saw the latter as a serious and poisonous disease in its two manifestations: al-ta'ifiyya which divided Christians and Muslims in Lebanon and Syria, and al-madhhabiyaa which created dissension among Muslims of different sects in the Arabian Peninsula and also among Christians of different communities in Lebanon, Syria and the Mahiar. Thus, his remedy for Arab decline was to call for the elimination of sectarianism in both its manifestations and to replace it with a concept of secular nationalism as a first step towards progress and unity.

The first clear articulation of secularism and anti-sectarianism in Rihani's thought is particularly reflected in his call for religious tolerance in his controversial speech, delivered in New York as early as 1900 and entitled 'al-Tasāhul al-Dīnī' (Religious Tolerance).\footnote{107} In this speech, Rihani called for mutual tolerance to terminate sectarian fanaticism, and he declared the motto: "if religion separated us, let's then be united in patriotism (al-wataniyya), for God does not like us to separate."\footnote{108}

In this context, Rihani used the word (tasāhul) in the sense of mutual acceptance and respect on equal terms between the various religious communities regardless of the differences existing between religions. For him, fanaticism is unjustifiable since no one is able to identify the only true religion.\footnote{109} He
therefore asserts the equal rights of all religions to exist. In his opinion, God
didn’t prefer any nation or religious community over another. He who followed
the natural laws (al-shara‘i‘ al-tabī‘iyva), by doing the good and avoiding the bad,
wouldn’t perish, even if he did not know the “true religion” (al-dīn al-haqiqī).
Unlike scientific facts, a religion could not be accepted by all, and if one wanted
to keep one’s religion, one should tolerate the others and respect their religion,
since “in the end, we all are unified by God, and all of us worship the same
God”.111 The oneness of God was expressed in his later writings as a oneness
of religions, for even if they differed in name, all religions in his view were in the
end the same.112 The principle of oneness of religions, not only became the
basis of Rihani’s humanism and his belief in the religion of “all humanity” (al-
insāniyyva ‘alā al-ītlāq), but continued to be the justification for his call for
religious tolerance as a necessity for social harmony.113

Rihani’s call for tolerance was in itself a call for establishing society on
the principles of reason, and not allowing religion to interfere in all matters of
daily life.114 “Mutual tolerance”, he says, “is the basis of modern civilization
and the cornerstone of civic community (al-jāmi‘a al-madaniyya)... it brings about
progress and improvement in all fields of science, religion and philosophy...”. He
then concludes that mutual tolerance in itself imposes the separation what
belongs to religion what belongs to humans. As he puts it, tolerance recognises both the church (al-kanīsa) and the human (al-insān) as having their
separate domains of authority. “Both have limits, and wherever limits exist, rights
exist; any matter outside those limits is injustice”.115

Rihani poses the rhetorical question as to whether the role of religion was
to provide worldly happiness, pleasure, and infinite temporal (zamaniyya)
desires.116 In answer to this, he argues that religion is either “revealed or not
revealed, sacred or not sacred”. If it were not revealed, then only its good
teachings should be kept and respected. But, since “religion is sacred” no one is
entitled to use it for frivolous or personal purposes. “By taking religion out of the
church for a worldly or secular end (ālamīyya) we would be disdaining it and
blaspheming against it”. Rihani then makes a clear distinction between the
temporal and the spiritual, or the civil (secular) and sacred realms, concluding that, for the benefit of both, the two realms must be completely separated.117

Rihani uses the Arabic term ʿalamiyya (secular) correctly as an adjective to refer to the concerns or aims of the temporal world (ʿalam).118 He uses the term ʿalmānī or ʿalmāniyya (secular), also as adjectives, specifically in connection with education and schools.119 In his separation of the temporal from the spiritual or religion from politics, secularism in his thought was connected with the more general and clearer concepts of progress and unity.

In relation to these two latter concepts, Rihani’s secular outlook developed from a concern with social and administrative reform in Mount Lebanon within the Ottoman State, to a concern with the progress and unity of Lebanon and Syria and of the Arab nation, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. In the first instance, Rihani’s secularist ideas are manifest in his suggestion to separate religion from the worldly affairs in Ottoman Mount Lebanon in three areas: education, politics and employment. Subsequently, Rihani was concerned with the need to foster a secular Arab feeling to effectively face European colonialism and to achieve social progress, political independence and Arab unity. In this latter respect, he suggests the separation of religion from politics as the only way out of the prevalent sectarian thinking which strangulates any progress towards the national idea. In such separation, he finds, among other aims, the solution for a major impediment to Arab progress, namely the problem of identity that confronts the Arab individual in a multi-confessional society.120

Concerned with the phenomenon of Ottoman decline and the backwardness of the East, Rihani considered religious fanaticism (al-taʿṣṣūb al-dīnī) as the main cause of that decline. In his view, the school was the first place to remove fanaticism. For it is there that a new sentiment, love of the motherland (ḥubb al-watān) should be nurtured to replace religious fanaticism.121 The proclamation of constitutional and administrative reforms by the Ottoman government in 1908 were considered by Rihani as insufficient to eliminate corruption. In his opinion they did not deeply penetrate the way of thinking and morals of the people.122

No doubt Rihani was aware of the state of education in Ottoman society. Despite the educational reform and the introduction of modern secular schools
since 1838, the Ottomans left the traditional religious schools untouched, thus dividing Ottoman education into two systems, a situation that affected Ottoman society for a long time. In Lebanon and Syria, the situation was even more complicated. Government schools, mostly primary, were limited in number and attracted only poor children, mostly Muslims. On the other hand, the private schools which were more numerous were, with few exceptions, either run by foreign missionaries or by native institutions and individuals with religious and sectarian inclinations. Each of the two kinds of schools, the government and the private not only had distinct curriculums and therefore provided unequal opportunities of education, but each perpetuated a different sense of culture, loyalty, and patriotic feelings.

Rihani's solution, therefore, was to advocate the establishment of national (wataniyya) public ('umumiyya) schools that would be compulsory, free of charge, modern and liberal in their curriculums. He saw the need for "schools that were neither foreign nor sectarian (ma'daris la ajnabiyya wa la ta'ifiyya)", open for "girls and boys from different confessions and sects". In such schools, the curriculums should not be limited to language, philosophy and religious sciences, but should especially include the principles of sound science, pure freedom, sacred patriotism and true fraternity (al-ikha)". This kind of school as advocated by Rihani, would ensure equal opportunities for all the children. For under the old system, not only was education unavailable for the majority of the population, but the system perpetuated disparity between people from different religious groups. In this regard, Rihani puts special emphasis on Muslims, as the majority, to encourage the idea of liberal public national education, otherwise there would be no real hope of reviving the nation.

Rihani's ideas on education reflect a concern that was shared by other Arab thinkers of his time who under the Hamidian régime, saw education and modern sciences as the first means of liberation and progress. On the other hand, it is clear that Rihani was to a certain extent influenced by his experience and culture in the USA where free public education was made available for almost everyone since the early 19th century, and where the secular educational program was almost universally accepted as a means of progress. Thus his ideas on
public education, self-education and moral progress, on the improvement of society by the diffusion of knowledge, and on the role of the educated élite in taking up the cause of progress, all reflect some of the ideas which were developed in the USA by the end of the 19th century.\textsuperscript{129}

However, Rihani did not attempt to graft Western ideas of education on Eastern societies without discrimination. For if these ideas had influenced his early writings, particularly on reform in the Ottoman State, he probably found them insufficient in the context of his call for the progress of the Arabs in the post-Ottoman age. His intimate experience of Arab society, particularly after his Arabian travels, convinced him of the real problems and needs of that society.

Politics was another important area where Rihani's secular attitude was strongly reflected in his ideas on social change and progress. In the framework of his campaign for reform between 1907 and 1913,\textsuperscript{130} Rihani blamed the stagnant and backward situation in Mount Lebanon on the alliance existing between the traditional groups of leaders in the country. He accused the "clergymen" (al-ikfrus), the "notables" (shuyukh al-qura) and the "feudal lords" (al-'iqrā'iyvūn), of conspiring together to obstruct any social change and progress, in order to secure their own authority and selfish interests.\textsuperscript{131} He saw the exploitation of religious sentiments for the promotion of individual political aims as a serious disease in Lebanese politics. Thus he advocated the "purification (tangiat) and the freeing (takhliṣ) of religion from politics" as "an essential condition for true reform".\textsuperscript{132}

Rihani's call for separating religion from politics began as early as 1902. Concerned with the administrative reform of Mount Lebanon, he insisted on the non-interference of the church (al-kanīsa) or the clergy in the affairs of the government (al-hukūma), or the Administrative Council, of Mount Lebanon. Since each of the "church" and "state" (al-dawla) had its specific aims, he saw the need to separate them in order to safeguard and allow them to sufficiently assume their respective duties. The church, he explains, is led by the clergy and serves the spiritual needs of a particular group of the people, while the government should be led by politicians and concerned with the worldly needs of "all people" (al-sha'b 'alā al-itlāq). Therefore, if the government was left to the clergy to
manage its affairs, it would face fanaticism and selfish sectarian ambitions thus leading both the church and the government to be undermined.\textsuperscript{133}

Using the same argument, Rihani rejected the notion, then advanced by some of his contemporaries, which considered the confessional community (al-milla al-diniyya) as a political party. A religious or confessional party (al-hizb al-dini), in his opinion, normally stands on religious beliefs and works for unworldly aims, while a political party (al-hizb al-siyasi) should be based on national (waṭaniyya) and social (jiima'iyya) principles without interfering in spiritual matters. Thus he warned against the confessional party taking over the government, not only because the two have different aims, but also because this would create jealousy and hatred among various groups and cause turmoil in the country. It was on this basis that he advocated the founding in Mount Lebanon of national political parties, and the change of the sectarian system which allowed the confessional communities to interfere in the affairs of the government.\textsuperscript{134}

Employment is the third area where Rihani insisted that a secular policy should be implemented to help achieve social reform and progress in Mount Lebanon. As a response to the proposals of reform by the Mutasarrif, Muzaffar Pasha (1902-1907), Rihani wrote in 1902 a series of articles in which he contrasted the inadequate "promised reform" with the "reform hoped for".\textsuperscript{135} In these articles, Rihani criticised the appointment of public officials and soldiers according to their confessional denomination, because this would result in a clash of interests between loyalty to the confessional community and loyalty to the whole nation. An official appointed only because he belonged to a particular religious group or sect would, in Rihani's opinion, use the authority given to him by the people to protect the interest of that sect against the others.

Thus, for the benefit of all people as a "nation united in patriotism", Rihani saw that the very mention of sect in the government departments should disappear. Practically, this could be achieved by implementing a secular policy on appointments, where only competence would be considered as a criterion. Accordingly, candidates for a position in the government should not be asked about their religion or sect, but should be subjected to a strict examination in the subjects which the position required. This impartiality, in his view, would ensure
the recruitment of competent officials and would secure equal opportunities for all. In this, Rihani aimed at putting an end to the domination of one religious group over the others in order to eliminate a serious factor of distrust and fear in political life.  

In the post-Ottoman period, Rihani's secular thinking was particularly linked to his concern for the progress, independence, and national unity of the Arabs. During this period, Rihani saw a close and dialectical relationship between the achievement of social reform and progress on the one hand and independence from European colonialism and the realisation of national unity on the other.

Throughout his career, Rihani relentlessly fought against sectarian attitudes in politics, literature, and thinking, and he saw that unless sectarianism was removed, the Arab nation could not achieve true and solid reform. In speeches delivered in front of different audiences in Palestine and Lebanon in 1927 and 1928, Rihani asserted that the most serious impediment to Arab progress was sectarianism. This he saw as an obstacle created by religious leaders and exploited by those who feared the outcome of science, freedom, and civil progress, and by those who refused national unity based on fraternity and equality. Sectarianism, he insisted, divided the people, dismembered the nation, and destroyed the foundations of the homeland. Thus, it was a serious impediment which the Arabs needed to overcome if they wanted to achieve progress and national unity.

In this, Rihani clearly distinguishes between religion and sectarianism. His criticism was not aimed at religion itself, but against the "sect" (al-ta‘ifa) as a social system. He considered the sect (al-ta‘ifa), the millet (al-milla), and the clan (al-‘ashīra) as equally hindering social and political progress. Such a narrow group identity isolated its followers from the greater circle of Humanity to the extent that it seldom sees the good except in its own selfish terms.

After the end of the First World War, when Rihani advocated Syrian unity, including Lebanon and Palestine, as a step towards a greater Arab unity, he was aware of sectarianism as the main problem confronting such unity. He lamented the fact that Syrians, including the Lebanese, were brought up to think that they belonged in the first place to their religion (al-dīn), secondly to their
place of birth (masqat al-ra’s) and then to their local area (al-mintaqa). Even in national matters they thought as Muslims, Christians, Druze or Jews. They had different attitudes and aims because they did not put the country above all confessions and religions.\(^{141}\)

Throughout the period of the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon he maintained the belief that the main problem in the Syrian country was sectarianism. "Oh brothers", he says, "our main distress is in this national degeneration (al-tafassukh al-qawmi) caused by our sectarian attitudes... the most serious enemy of the motherland (al-watan) and of nationalism (al-qawmiyya)".\(^ {142}\) He saw the discord between sectarian interests and the public national welfare, because "sectarianism is another word for selfishness ... a kind of national treason".\(^ {143}\)

In criticising sectarianism, Rihani, by implication, criticised any political idea based on it. Thus, after the end of the First World War, he criticised the idea of Lebanon’s separation from Syria which was advocated by the Maronite clergy and a number of Maronite intellectuals and politicians.\(^ {144}\) This he saw as a sectarian idea because its advocates recalled the experience of the Mardaites who, as he puts it, fought the Arabs only because they were Muslim. Not only was the situation so different from the late seventh century but such a "reactionary" idea also contradicted the natural law of progress which itself imposes separation of religion \(\cap\) politics.\(^ {145}\) In the same spirit, in 1927, he criticised the call for establishing a "Christian" Lebanese government, and an Arab "Islamic" government in Syria. He considered both ideas as incompatible with the spirit of modernity and progress.\(^ {146}\)

However, throughout his career, Rihani was optimistic about a change in the fanatical sectarian mentality which had impeded national unity and progress.\(^ {147}\) In order for such change to happen, he believed in the necessity of separating religion from politics. This, in his opinion, should replace the various forms of religious fanaticism by one patriotic solidarity (al-‘asabiyya al-wataniyya). For the sectarian factions (al-tahazzubat al-ta’ifiyya) which fragmented the Syrian country would not disappear unless a new patriotic sentiment uniting all the people was allowed to grow.\(^ {148}\) Here he especially
emphasised the importance of secular education in the process of "moving away from the sectarian thinking (al-fikra al-ta‘ifyya) to the national idea (al-fikra al-qawmiyya)".\textsuperscript{149}

Rihani disagreed with those who thought that agreement between the leaders of the various religious communities was enough to unite these communities. Such a union, in his opinion, would not last because it could not create from the religious groups one patriotic nationality (qawmiyya watanivyva wahida). For "the Muslim in the administration would remain identified as a Muslim, and the Maronite as a Maronite, and so on".\textsuperscript{150} As an alternative, he advocated the establishment of a constitutional government under which everybody, regardless of religion, would be treated equally in rights and duties.\textsuperscript{151} He continued to believe that a "national civil rule" (hukm madani gawmi), an Arab Syrian Lebanese civil government that was neither Muslim nor Christian", was the only way to guarantee both progress and eventual unity.\textsuperscript{152} For, a government based on sectarianism would be tied to the wishes of religious leaders, and would be incompetent and oppressive.\textsuperscript{153}

Convinced that progress was impossible without national unity and that sectarianism was against the spirit of progress, Rihani believed that the people should uphold civil matters above religion and forget their religious belonging outside their place of worship. The sects, in his opinion, "should be dismembered to allow the homeland", the "greatest sect" as he called it, "to form."\textsuperscript{154} This is what he called the "deconstruction of sectarianism" (al-tafakkuk al-ta‘ifi) which does not necessarily mean the complete disappearance of sects (al-idmiha al-ta‘ifi), but rather the "deconstruction inside the sect" (al-tafakkuk fi al-ta‘ifa). This means the separation of the members of each sect to allow them to unite with members of other sects for high national political aims. Different groups, he argues, do not form a genuine unity unless they split first. One could not be a citizen unless, in public matters, one renounces allegiance to one's religious leader or clan chief. "A member of a sect can not, culturally and politically, belong to the largest community, to the homeland (al-watan), unless he whole-heartedly strives for patriotic unity and rejects from his mind and heritage (irth) all the sectarian traditions which obstruct such aim".\textsuperscript{155}
In the context of his concern with the progress of all the Arabs, Rihani saw that this would be best realised within the broad concept of the "Greater Arab Homeland" (al-watan al-'arabī al-akbar). Again, he viewed sectarianism as the main obstacle towards such aim. He saw that true progress of the fragmented Arab nation would begin only when the Arabs start to put their national feeling before and above their religious feelings. "The truth of the great country can only be realised as a result of the civil national outlook which overrides all the narrow religious mentalities". Rihani saw that each sect or group in the Arab world thought of itself as a "country of its own". National renaissance and progress would thus remain impossible unless this narrow sectarian identity was replaced with a broader national one. Nationalism and sectarian sentiments were, in his view, contradictory: "when one gains strength the other weakens". Thus, renouncing the sectarian for the sake of the national, was, in his view, the first necessary condition for national progress and eventual unity. "The Maronite, Druze, Shi‘ite and Sunnite, would not be truly Arabs unless they forget their respective Maronite, Druze, Shi‘ite, or Sunnite identity for the sake of their greater national homeland. And the same is true of the Wahhābī in Najd and the Zaydī in the Yemen". Rihani, who, particularly in the late 1920s, advocated secular Pan-Arab nationalism (al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya) and Arabism (al-‘urūba) against all the narrow sectarian and regional nationalism, saw Arabism as a secular spirit which could be fostered by secular public national education. In his view, this was the only spirit which would unite the Arabs and help them become a developed, strong nation capable of competing with European nations.

In secular nationalism, whether Syrian or Pan-Arab, Rihani found a solution to the problem of religious minorities, and a shield against European interference in the Arab World. He asserted that in Arab nationalism, Christians and Muslims would be equal. He argued that when the government is established on "solid civil bases", all citizens would be treated as equal in rights and duties. The fear of minorities would be unjustifiable and Europeans would not have any pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of the nation. Rihani’s secularism in this regard, expressed in terms of "civil principles" and "separation
of religion from politics", assumes the establishment of the state on rational democratic basis rather than on religious hegemony.\textsuperscript{164}

Also in a secular nationalism, Rihani finds a solution to his dilemma as a Christian Arab. He obviously felt that a narrow Christian Lebanese patriotism would encircle the Christians in a small country, hostile to its Arab Muslim environment and neither economically nor culturally viable. As he expressed it on several occasions since 1920, this not only would put a limit to the aspirations and progress of the Lebanese but would leave them in permanent fear and need for foreign protection.\textsuperscript{165} On the other hand, he feared that as Christians in a Muslim environment, the Lebanese would feel themselves outside a specifically Muslim political order. Thus, he saw secular nationalism as the only solution to give the Christians, and other religious minorities, an identity with which they could exercise their rights as citizens. This explains his confidence in the unity of Lebanon with Syria, and later in Lebanon's place in Arab unity. For if the state was based on secular national principles, it would, in his opinion, give everyone an equal opportunity to the best of their ability. The Christians, he argued, were "talented" and "intelligent", and they should not fear the Muslim majority: because reason, not religion, would be the basis of the state and reason, in his opinion, "is the majority".\textsuperscript{166} One would feel that Rihani was trying to assure the Christians that competence, not numbers, would be the criterion.\textsuperscript{167}

In addition to separating religion from civil matters in education, employment and politics, Rihani suggested such separation in other areas of human relations, e.g. inter-marriage. In a letter to the editor of a prominent Beirut newspaper, Rihani advocated mixed marriages as the best condition for religious and social tolerance and for eventual national unity. People who marry regardless of religious identity are, in his opinion, able to abandon many of their ancestors' attitudes, and can easily accept the differences between their respective religions. To further the cause of mutual acceptance, he suggests that parents in such mixed marriages could teach their children both religions and leave them the freedom of worship.\textsuperscript{168} In this, Rihani seems to be addressing at least two issues that are often raised when civil marriage is in question: disagreement of the married couple on essential religious beliefs; and ensuring a tolerant environment where
children could develop their personalities without any religious or social barriers or complexes.\textsuperscript{169}

Although Rihani regarded this kind of marriage very important in the improvement of inter-community relations, he did not elaborate on this issue; nor did he discuss it at the level of personal statute for example. In general terms, Rihani did not simply call for introducing secular laws, but he always stressed the need to rely on scientific, rather than religious considerations to deal with the problems of modern society. Religious laws, in his opinion, were inappropriate to treat those problems because religions were no longer able to meet present needs.\textsuperscript{170} He rejects the idea of a universal revelation (al-wahi) for all generations and all times, and argues that every age has its "book", and that the book of today was science.\textsuperscript{171} He particularly addresses the Muslims and call for interpretation of the Qur\=
\textsuperscript{\textacuten}an by saying: "every people has its wisdom, and every age has its policy... what was revealed to the Prophet to reform the Arabs is no longer adequate, if taken literally, to treat the problems of today and to reform modern societies".\textsuperscript{172} Thus the concept of secularism in Rihani's thought takes also a dimension of 'asrana derived from 'asr, equivalent to era or age.

Rihani, however, did not simply place religion in opposition to science. It is true that at an early stage (1911) he seemed to emphasise the contrast between divine and scientific truth at the philosophical level,\textsuperscript{173} but later on he tried to reconcile science with faith and religion.\textsuperscript{174} Nevertheless, secularism in Rihani's thought is closely connected to rationalism.\textsuperscript{175} Such connection is manifested in his call to reduce the role of religion in many aspects of life. Laws and judgements, for example, should be inspired by reason, not by "religious superstitions and imaginary notions",\textsuperscript{176} and all religious beliefs and knowledge should be tested by reason, without fear of falling into blasphemy or atheism.\textsuperscript{177} It is reason, in his view, which decides the suitability of laws and beliefs to meet human needs. Thus he insisted that every religious, philosophical and political belief ('\textacuten ida), and every law (sha\textsuperscript{\textacuten}a) that reason does not find suitable for human happiness and progress should be eliminated. For humans, as he puts it, were not created to be "led by the reins" but to be enlightened by science and freedom so they themselves could force their own way.\textsuperscript{178} In order for reason to
develop, it is essential to have complete freedom from "the shackles of imitation (taqlid), conservatism (al-muhafaza), hegemony (al-siyada), interest (al-maslah), need (al-haja) and poverty (al-takaddud)". Reason, for him, is inseparable from freedom; and a rational being would never risk his independence nor subject his mind to the dominance of any sect.

Secularism in Rihani's thought assumes the equality of all citizens regardless of creed. This equality is based on freedom and aims at the separation of religion from politics, but not at atheism. In this respect, the words of George Atiyeh about secularism in the Middle East are equally applicable to Rihani's: "secularism, although it may seem anticlerical, does not deny or affirm the basic principles of religion; it is simply concerned with the affirmation of the principles of freedom and human rights".

Unlike the Marxist school, Rihani's secularism does not simply and purely abolish religion, nor does it aim, like Comte's, at establishing a technocratic society built only upon the precepts of science while being indifferent vis-à-vis religion. Rihani preached a society in which science and religion, materialism and spiritualism are reconciled. Therefore, his secularism fits in better with the school that considers secularism as an emancipation of certain fields of human thought and action from any religious or metaphysical control. Religion is not banished from the secular world but it is reduced to being one of the many activities in this world, rather than controlling everything.

It is clear that Rihani was not concerned with proving the compatibility or incompatibility of secularism with religion, whether Islam or Christianity. But like other Arab thinkers of the time, wishing to lay down the principles of a secular state in which Muslims and Christians could participate on equal footing, he endeavoured to prove this equality within religion itself. For this, he distinguished between what is essential in all religions and what is inessential. This is the basis of true tolerance which, as seen above, with the separation of religion from the civil life, was the condition for Rihani's secularism.

Rihani's attack on sectarianism was a rejection, not of religion, but rather of the sect as a social political system and of religious leaders who exploited
Religious leaders and the clergy, for him, included both Christians and Muslims, for the "Patriarch and the Imam are twins, the sheikh and the priest are two brothers". His anti-sectarianism and anti-clericalism are to be understood against the background of the historical and social reality of Lebanon especially in the sectarian conflict of 1860 which left its marks on politics and society in Lebanon for a long time. Rihani seemed to hold the clergy responsible for the tensions leading to this aforementioned conflict.

Although he endeavoured to assert his belief in the message of all religions, Rihani’s secular ideas were looked upon with disfavour by many, of both Muslim and Christian denomination. While Christians, particularly clergymen, accused him of heresy and atheism, Muslims, who otherwise admired his reformist ideas, disagreed with his secular attitudes which distinguished between religion and science. Some friendly critics described his views on religious fanaticism as "exaggerated". These attitudes towards Rihani’s ideas not only reflect the hostile response to any attack on religious leaders, but more importantly, they show that the conditions of his days were still unfavourable for his liberal ideas. This is despite any assumptions about the intellectual milieu being prepared for such ideas to flourish at the time.

It seems that Rihani, who reflected in his views certain Western values and ideas, did not realise how huge the cultural gap between East and West was. Furthermore, he was addressing the complex issue of secularism in a traditional rural and feudal society where religion was still a strong factor in defining the identity of individuals and groups. Although he was fully aware that sectarianism took the form of old tribalism, he did not refrain from advocating secularism and rationalism in a society where human and political relations were still defined on the basis of religious or sectarian identity. This is significant, for it shows not only Rihani’s radicalism but also his idealism. For although as a reformer and political activist Rihani started from the reality itself, in his call for tolerance and secularism, he appears less realistic and, in retrospect, far too optimistic.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE


2. Khalid, pp. 54-55.

3. See his articles 'Fawq Suūth New York' (1906); 'Fi Mithl Ḥādhā al-Yawm' (1906); 'al-Tamaddun al-Ḥadīth' (c. 1906); 'Abnā' al-Bu's' (c. 1906), in al-Rāhiyyiyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 128, 133, 139, 144; 'al-Thawra al-Khuluqiyya' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyiyāt, AAK, 8, p. 66.


6. See Nubdha, AAK, 6; 'Carlyle fi al-Thawra al-Fransiyyya' (n.d.); 'Shibl Damūs' (1939), in Wujiyy, AAK, 9, pp. 485-497, 579-581; see also Khūrī, Modern Arab Thought, pp. 24, 36-38 and passim.

7. Ekirch, op. cit., p. 12. For Rihani's familiarity with these thinkers see in particular Shadhariyy, AAK, 6, pp. 332, 303 and passim; al-Rāhiyyiyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 90, 166, 180, 274-275, 404.


10. 'Rūḥ al-Thawra' (1913), in al-Qawmiyyiyāt, AAK, 8, p. 97.


12. 'Anwār al-Adkār' (1905); 'Bayn Allāhut w-al-'Ilm' (n.d.), in al-Rāhiyyiyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 97, 236-237.

13. See The Path of Vision, pp. 73-77.


17. He uses both 'Ilm Allāhut, and 'Ilm al-Kalām in this context.

18. 'al-Ḥikma al-Muhallatha' (1924); also 'al-Insān w-al-Dīn' (1926); 'al-Ulūhiyya' (1926); 'al-Ḥaqīqa al-Kubrā' (n.d.), in al-Rāhiyyiyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 395, 399-400, 407-408, 502-503.
19. See 'Islāh al-Umma' (1927), in al-Tatāruf, AAK, 8, p. 455.

20. See Rihani’s historical writings, Ch. 2, above. On Carlyle, see Th. Carlyle, The French Revolution; the introduction to this book by G. T. Bettany; The Oxford Companion to English Literature, under Carlyle and the French Revolution.


23. 'Rūḥ al-Thawra' (1913), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 97-98.

24. Ibid., p. 98.


26. Ibid., p. 103.

27. See 'al-Ḥikma al-Muthallatha' (1924); ‘Rabī‘ al-Ya’s (1928); 'Inna Mutafa‘il' (1932); 'Hadāfī wa Wasiilātī' (1935); in al-Rihaniyyat, AAK, 7, pp. 393, 421-430, 459-463, 559 and passim.


29. He was then responding to his friend Shibli Danūs, see 'Hal Yumkin Iṣlāh al-Sharq' (1901); also 'Ṭariq il-Iṣlāh' (c. 1898), in Shadharat, AAK, 6, pp. 449, 386-387.


31. Ibid., p. 452.


33. 'al-ḤurriyyaWaḥdahā la Tuwaḥhiduna' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 60.

34. 'al-Thawra al-Ḥaqiqiyya' (1911), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 86.

35. 'al-Thawra al-Khuluqiyya' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 68.

36. 'al-Thawra al-Ḥaqiqiyya' (1911), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 88.

37. 'Waṣiyya Fuṣūl Pasha' (n.d. c. 1908), (former Ottoman minister and reformer d. 1869); 'al-Ḥurriyya Waḥdahā la Tuwaḥhiduna' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 48, 60.

38. 'Rūḥ al-Thawra' (1913), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 103.

39. Ibid., p. 105.

40. See Ch. 8, below, on Arab unity.

41. 'Iṣlāh al-Umma' (1927), in al-Tatāruf, AAK, 8, p. 456-457.
42. This has become a current theme in contemporary Arabic thought, see Zurayq, *Mālīb al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabī*, pp. 13-15.

43. 'İṣlāḥ al-Umma' (1927), al-Ṭaṭārruf, AAK, 8, p. 459.

44. 'Pan-Arab Nationalism', in Asia, August, 1939, p. 453.

45. 'İṣlāḥ al-Umma' (1927), in al-Ṭaṭārruf, AAK, 8, p. 456.

46. See in particular 'al-Ṭaṭārruf' (c. 1928) in al-Ṭaṭārruf, AAK, 8, pp. 446-450.

47. 'İṣlāḥ al-Umma' (1927), in al-Ṭaṭārruf, AAK, 8, p. 460

48. Ibid., p. 467.


51. See *Mulūk*, AAK, 1, pp. 99, 167, 189; APD, pp. 35-39, 192-196; also letters to Ahmad Dayf, Feb. 1922 (sic); Dawūd Barakat, Mar. 1922 (sic), in Rasa‘il, pp. 190, 193-194.


54. APD, p. 192.


56. See Jadaane, Usus al-Tagaddum, pp. 196-201.


58. See in particular A Chant of Mystics.


60. Ibid., p. 306.


64. *Mulūk*, AAK, 1, p. 584; ISA, pp. 124-125.

66. For Rihani's ideas on tyranny, see Ch. 4, below.


70. He personally took the matter up with chief officials at the British Residency in Aden, see *Mulūk*, **A**. **A**K. 1, pp. 383-385; **ACA**, pp. 227-231.


72. See *Mulūk*, **A**. **A**K. 1, pp. 52, 161-162; 'Hayya 'Alī al-'Ilm' (1922); 'Ghaybat wa Thawra! (1922), in *al-Qawmiyyāt*, **A**. **A**K. 8, pp. 212-214, 215-217, and passim. For further discussion of national education in Arabia, see Ch. 8, below.

73. On just and organised government, see Ch. 8, below.


75. *Qalb al-`Irāq*, **A**. **A**K. 4, p. 93.


77. 'Rūḥ al-`Urūba' (1928), in *al-Qawmiyyāt*, **A**. **A**K. 8, pp. 261-262.


79. Memorandum to Ibn Sa'ūd from Riyadh, 9 Jan. 1923, in *Rasa'il*, pp. 201-203. Eventually Ibn Sa'ūd proclaimed his son Sa'ūd as Crown Prince in 1933, see Philby, *Sa'udi Arabia*, p. 298. On this occasion Rihani wrote to Ibn Sa'ūd praising this action and reminding him of his own memorandum of 1923, see a letter to Ibn Sa'ūd, 7 Jul. 1933, in *Rasa'il*, pp. 430-431.


82. See in particular 'al-Tāṭarruf' (c. 1928), in *al-Tāṭarruf*, **A**. **A**K. 8, pp. 446-450.


85. See in particular 'Manābit al-Ājīl' (1938), in *al-Rihiyyāt*, **A**. **A**K. 7, pp. 656-661.

86. 'Ghaybat wa-Thawra! (1922), in *al-Qawmiyyāt*, **A**. **A**K. 8, pp. 216-217; also 'al-Tāṭarruf' (c. 1928); 'Iṣlāh al-Umma' (1927), in *al-Tāṭarruf*, **A**. **A**K. 8, pp. 450, 459-460.

88. The lines are by the early Umayyad poet al-Mutawakkil al-Laythī, translated by Rihani himself, see Mufūk, AAK, 1, pp. 585-586; ISA, pp. 231-232.

89. Mufūk, AAK, 1, p. 585; ISA, p. 232.


91. 'Min Ghānim Ila al-Bustānī' (1908), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 18.


93. See in particular 'Manābit al-Asfāl' (1938); also 'al-Mādī w-al-Mustaqbal' (1938), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 657-659, 674; see also an earlier letter to 'Abd al-Qādir al-Maghrībi during 1924, in Rasā'il, pp. 221-222.


96. See 'Takallamū bi-al-'Arabī' (1922); 'al-Mar'a al-Sharqiyya' (1925); 'al-Mawdūd al-Ma'lūf' (c. 1927); 'Habbat Manṭiq' (1933); 'al-Tamarrud 'Alā al-Zulm' (1933); 'al-Ḥurma ǧī al-Hirmān' (1933), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 218-220, 221-222, 227, 311, 314-315, 331-333, and passim; 'Fi Quṣūb al-Nawābīgh' (c. 1926, this is dated 1936, but it is most likely written in 1926 during the Syrian Revolution of 1925-27), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 608-610.

97. Mufūk, AAK, 1, pp. 791-792. For a recent view on what should be preserved from the Arab cultural heritage, what and how to choose from other cultures, see I. Boullata, 'Adonis: Towards a New Arab Culture', in UMMES, 20 (1988), pp. 109-112.

98. See in particular 'Fi Quṣūb al-Nawābīgh' (c. 1926), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 608-613.


100. See Faysal-al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 570-571; also Ch. 8, below.


103. See 'al-Thawra al-Khuluqiyya' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 65ff; 'al-Akhiqa' (1912); 'al-Riḥāniyyāt' (1923), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 292, 389; The Path of Vision, pp. 102-107.

104. 'al-Mādīna al-Uzma (1909), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 182-190; see also The Path of Vision, pp. 102-107.


107. See the speech in al-Rihānīyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 44-63; see also Ch. 1, above.

108. ‘al-Tasāḥul al-Dīnī’ (1900), in al-Rihānīyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 55.

109. Rihānī’s scepticism about human ability to understand the divine truths has become an important theme in the discussion of his "philosophy" and his ideas on religion, see for example, K. el-Hage, ‘Amin al-Rihānī’, in Ma‘ālim al-Fikr al-Insānī, pp. 554-582; A. A. Rihānī, Faylāsūf al-Freike, pp. 194-201 and passim.

110. Ibid., pp. 48, 54.

111. Ibid., pp. 52, 54.

112. See his articles ‘al-Insān w-al-Dīn’ (1926); ‘Fi Rabī’ al-Ya’s’ (1928); ‘al-Haqīqa al-Kubrā’ (n.d.), in al-Rihānīyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 399-400, 421-430, 502-503; articles 15 and 16 in Wāsīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 505-506; The theme of the oneness of religions was also taken up by other famous Mahjar writers, particularly Jibrān and Na‘īmy. See for example Ḥāwī, Jibrān, pp. 169ff.

113. ‘Manāhij al-Hayāt’ (1910), al-Rihānīyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 204.


115. ‘al-Tasāḥul al-Dīnī’ (1900), in al-Rihānīyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 61.

116. Ibid., p. 57.

117. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

118. In recent writings on the subject, the terms which are more frequently used are ‘almānīyya and ‘almānā both derived from ‘Ālam (world). However, some use wrongly the Arabic term ilmānīyya derived from ilm (science). Another usage is the term ‘asrāna derived from ‘asr (era,
sicle) for the French equivalent of "sécularisation". For the latter usage see B. el-Hashem, Introduction à l'étude de la religion et de la sécularisation, particularly, pp. 16-17.

119. See 'al-Ḥayāt w-al-Ḥurriyya w-al-Sayf' (c. 1917); 'Risālat al-'Irāq' (1932), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 150, 305.

120. For a recent view on the importance of secularism in fostering the national identity and social integration in Arab society, see Barakāt, al-Mujtama' al-'Arabi, pp. 124-126.

121. ʿṬariq al-Iṣlāḥ' (1898), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 386.

122. 'Waṣīyyat Fūʿād Pasha' (n.d. c. 1908); also 'al-Ḥurriyya w-al-Tahdhib' (c. 1908); 'al-Ḥurriyya Wahḍahā lā Tuwaḥḥidunā' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 48, 37, 60.

123. On this see S. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, pp. 47ff; also Dūrī, al-Takwīn al-Ṭarikhī, pp. 131-132.


125. 'Ruh al-Thawra' (1913); 'al-Ḥurriyya Wahḍahā lā Tuwaḥḥidunā' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 96, 61-62.

126. 'al-Ḥurriyya Wahḍahā lā Tuwaḥḥidunā' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 61-62.


129. On these ideas see Ibid., pp. 200-219.

130. For his ideas of reform and decentralisation, see Ch. 5, below.

131. 'Huna wa Hunāk' (c. 1909); 'al-Tarīqī fi al-'Amal' (1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 42-43, 25.

132. 'al-Thawra al-Ḥaqiqīyya' (1911); 'al-Thawra al-Khuluqiyya' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 86, 70; also letter to 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī, (c. 1913, this is dated c. 1910, but it was most likely written in 1913), in Rasā'il, p. 150.

133. 'al-Aḥzāb al-Siyāsiyya' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 469-471.

134. Ibid., pp. 470-471.
135. See 'al-İşlāh al-Maw‘ūd’ (1902); 'al-Ṭa‘ifiyya w-al-‘Askar al-Lubnānī’ (1902); 'al-Ahliyya lā al-Ahl’ (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 460-465; see also his ideas of political reform in Ch. 5, below.

136. 'al-Ahliyya lā al-Ahl’ (1902); also 'al-İşlāh al-Maw‘ūd’ (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 465, 461.

137. See, for example, 'al-İttihād’ (1931), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 286.

138. 'İslāh al-Umma’ (1927), in al-Tatārūf, AAK, 8, p. 470.

139. Ibid., p. 470.

140. See Ch. 6, and Ch. 8, below.

141. 'al-Tatārūf w-al-Istiqlāl’, (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 197.

142. 'Ma‘bad al-Waṭan’ (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 384.

143. 'Lā Ṭa‘ifiyya’ (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 385.

144. See Ch. 6, below.

145. 'al-Marada w-al-Ṣalībiyyūn’ (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 203-204.

146. 'İslāh al-Umma’ (1927), in al-Tatārūf, AAK, 8, p. 472.

147. 'al-Marada w-al-Ṣalībiyyūn’ (c. 1920); 'al-İttihād’ (1931), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 203-204, 286-287 and passim.

148. 'al-Tatārūf w-al-Istiqlāl’ (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 197.


150. 'al-Tatārūf w-al-Istiqlāl’ (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 198. See a recent criticism of the idea of "union between the sects" in M. 'Amil, al-Dawla al-Ṭa‘ifiyya, pp. 90ff.

151. 'al-Tatārūf w-al-Istiqlāl’ (c. 1920); 'al-Marada w-al-Ṣalībiyyūn’ (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 197, 209.

152. 'İslāh al-Umma’ (1927), in al-Tatārūf, AAK, 8, p. 473; also 'Madhhabi Waṭanī’ (1927); 'Taḥt al-Silāh’ (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 247, 267.

153. 'Lā Ṭa‘ifiyya’ (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 385.

154. 'İslāh al-Umma’ (1927), in al-Tatārūf, AAK, 8, pp. 470-473.

155. 'Lā Ṭa‘ifiyya’ (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 386-387; 'İslāh al-Umma’ (1927), in al-Tatārūf, AAK, 8, p. 471.

156. 'Tajzi‘a al-Bi‘ād al-‘Arabiyya’ (1936), al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 365.

158. Ibid., p. 422.

159. See 'al-Wṣān al-Wāhid' (1939); 'al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya' (1938), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 422, and passim; for his views on Phoenician and Lebanese nationalism, see 'Lana wa Lakum' (c. 1918); 'al-Marada w-al-Salibiyyūn' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 165-166, 204; for his ideas on Syrian nationalism and Pan-Arab nationalism, see Ch. 6, and Ch. 8, below.

160. 'al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya' (1938); also Ḥayya 'Alā al-Ḥīm' (1922); 'al-Mawdū' al-Ma'lūf' (c. 1927); 'al-Iltihād' (1931); Lubnān w-al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 422, 212, 227, 286, 356-357, and passim; 'Īslāh al-Umma' (1927), in al-Tātaruṣ, AAK, 8, p. 464.

161. 'al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya' (1938), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 422.

162. 'al-'Arab w-al-'Ālaqat al-Dawlīyya' (1937), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 405. See a modern criticism of secularism as a solution to the problem of minorities, by B. Ghalyūn, al-Masʿala al-Taʿīfīyya wa Mushkilat al-Aqḍāλīyyāt, pp. 82, 87-88.

163. 'Taḥt al-Silāh' (1928); 'al-Ḥudūd' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 267, 380-381.

164. For the different meanings of 'al-māniyya, in the modern Arabic political discourse, see al-Jabiri, al-Khitāb al-'Arabī al-Muʿāṣir, pp. 61-76; see also idem, 'Badal al-'Almāniyya, al-Dimuqrāṭīyya', in al-Nahdā, Sydney, 1 Sept. 1988, p. 30, where the author suggests the replacement of 'al-māniyya in the Arab nationalist lexic with democracy and rationalism since these express better the needs of Arab society.

165. 'Lana wa-Lakum' (c. 1918); 'al-Tātaruṣ w-al-Istiqāl' (c. 1920); 'al-Marada w-al-Salibiyyūn' (c. 1920); 'Ishrūn Huja' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 164, 197, 202, 205.

166. 'al-Marada w-al-Salibiyyūn' (c. 1920); 'Lubnān w-al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 204, 358.

167. 'La Taʿīfiyya' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 385.

168. Letter to Bishāra al-Khūrī, the editor of al-Barq, (c. 1910), in Rasā'il, pp. 147-148.


171. Article 13, in Wasīyāt, AAK, 8, p. 504; 'al-Akhlāq' (1912); 'Manāḥib al-ʾAtfāl' (1938); 'al-Madī w-al-Mustaqbal' (1938), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 284, 657-659, 674; letter to 'Abd al-Qādir al-Maghribī, c. 1924, in Rasā'il, pp. 221-222.

172. 'al-Akhlāq' (1912), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 284.


174. See The Path of Vision (1921), esp. pp. 73-77.

175. For a modern view on the essential connection between secularism and rationalism, see Naṣṣār, Nahwa Muṭṭama' Jādiḍ, pp. 181ff.


178. 'al-Akhlâq' (1912), in al-Riḥâniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 289.


180. 'Iṣa la Diniyya' (1931); 'Manâhij al-Ḥayât' (1910), in al-Riḥâniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 447, 203.

181. Atiyeh, 'Humanism and Secularism', in Atiyeh and Oweiss (eds.), Arab Civilization, p. 44.

182. For these schools, see El-Hashem, Introduction, pp. 478-480.

183. See in particular The Path of Vision; 'al-Madîna al-'Uẓmâ' (1909), in al-Riḥâniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 182-190, and passim.

184. For a criticism of secularism and separation of religion from politics as incompatible with Islam, for example, see M. 'Amâra, al-Islâm w-al-'Urubâ w-al-'Almāniyya, pp. 57-81; M. M. Shams al-Dîn, al-Almâniyya, pp. 123-181; see also H. Khalid, al-Muslimûn fi Lubnân, pp. 25, 91, 216, 371-372 and passim.

185. See Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 255.


187. Kamâl el-Hage rightly states that Rihani was not "antireligieux" but "anticlerical", see el-Hage, 'Amin al-Rihani', in Ma'alîm al-Fîkr al-Insânî, p. 571.

188. 'Wasîyyat Fâdîd Pasha' (n.d. c. 1908), in al-Qawmiyyât, AAK, 8, p. 50; 'al-Ḥikma al-Muthallatha' (1924), in al-Riḥâniyyât, AAK, 7, p. 395.

189. Buṭrus al-Bustâni's anti-sectarian campaign in Nafr Surîyya started as a response to the events of 1860, see Nassar, Nahwa Muitama' Jadid, pp. 17-18.

190. See al-Nakabât, AAK, 6, pp. 216-218.


194. 'Islâh al-Ummâ' (1927), in al-Tatsarruf, AAK, 8, p. 470.
CHAPTER FOUR

JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIALISM

A concept closely associated with progress and modernity, and equally important in Rihani’s thought, is that of justice in both its social and political connotations. This chapter discusses the development of the concept of justice in Rihani’s thought, his views on Western democracy, and his ideas on social justice and the socialist movement.

Justice and Despotism

Rihani’s early concerns with justice are reflected in his writings which deal with the main issue of reform in the Ottoman State. To begin with, his idea of justice is expressed in more or less traditional terms: emphasising the obligation of the ruler, the "possessor of authority" (dhū al-sultān) to treat his subjects justly and benevolently. If the sultān was "good (sāliḥ), magnanimous (hālim) and just (‘ādil)" he would effectively eradicate corruption in "his people" (gawm) and succeed in reforming "his nation" (umma). Justice (‘adl) as the opposite of oppression (zulm) is, thus, a requirement in the ruler who should set the right example for "his subjects" (ra‘īyya). For, as Rihani puts it, "if the sultan acted justly his subjects would not dare oppress each other".1

Rihani here uses the terms ra‘īyya, gawm and umma as interchangeable to denote the subjects or the people of an autocratic ruler.2 On the face of it, his idea of the justice of the ruler seems to be conceived as the latter’s duty rather than his subjects’ rights. Such a concept of justice is well within the framework of traditional Arab Islamic political thought, and Rihani finds its justification in the example of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr. However, in an earlier essay entitled ‘Haqīq al-I‘tirād’ (the Right of Opposition), Rihani already speaks of the right of the subjects to claim just treatment,3 a notion that was incorporated, or perhaps revived, in modern Arabic political thought since the mid nineteenth century, particularly by Rifā‘a al-Ṭahāwī (1801-1873).4

In the same context, Rihani speaks of the equal rights of all people to express opposition. "Every man, small or great, poor or rich, has the sacred right
to lodge a complaint or an opposition before his ruler (ḥākim) to claim reform and justice", he says. "The right of opposition" (ḥaqq al-i’tirāf), which in this context also signifies freedom of expression, should belong equally to all people regardless of "rank" or "social class".\(^5\)

Rihani uses the word "freedom" (ḥurriyya) both in its social sense denoting the opposite of slavery, and in its political connotation to mean the right of the people to political expression, for example the right to vote (ḥaqq al-taṣawwīt).\(^6\) The right to participate in the government was expressed in the principle of democracy (al-dīmuqrāṭiyva) to which he also draws justification from the traditional concept of consultation (al-shūrah), as expressed in the Qurʾān and the tradition of the Prophet, as well as from the Christian idea of the "divine paternity" (al-abawīyya al-illāhiyya) and "human fraternity" (al-akhawīyya al-basharīyya).\(^7\)

In two essays entitled 'al-Ḥukūma al-Dīmuqrāṭiyva' (the Democratic Government) and published in New York in 1900, in which the above ideas are discussed, Rihani also speaks with admiration of the American form of democratic government and representation where the ruling power (al-sulṭān al-ḥākima) emanates from the people (al-shaʿb). On the other hand, he attacks the absolute monarchy which concentrates the power in the hands of one person or in a small number of individuals who control people’s affairs according to their own ambitious interests.\(^8\) On this basis, and in his own subtle way, Rihani was able to criticise the "absolute rule" (al-hukm al-muṭlaq) of ‘Abdul-Ḥamīd arguing that if the Sultān was really "Amīr al-Muʿminīn" as he claimed to be, he should be ruling according to the Qurʾān which teaches that only God has the absolute power.\(^9\)

This first stage of Rihani’s political consciousness was characterised by his attempts at definitions, an indication of his awareness that the concepts which he discussed were not so familiar to most of his readers. This is best exemplified in his explanation of various political systems in world history in terms of both formal structures and concrete political reality. Alluding to Aristotle’s politics, Rihani explains the three types of government: the monarchical government (al-ḥukūma al-malakīyya) in which the ruling power is confined to one person under
the pretence of divine right (al-ḥaqq al-ilāhī); the oligarchy (al-ḥukūma al-amīrīyya or al-ulūgārīyya), in which a small number of notable families hold all the power; and the democratic government (al-ḥukūma al-dīmuqrātīyya) which is the antithesis of tyrannical monarchy. In the democratic government there are no special privileges for any one; everybody is free and a general system applies to all. Thus, he concludes that "democracy is another word for freedom".

It may seem at first sight that Rihani responded to an intellectual curiosity rather than an immediate concern. In fact, his guiding interest was not wholly abstract or simply a desire to define ideas somewhat independently from the concrete situation. The fine thread between the abstract and the concrete is best illustrated in the contrast Rihani makes between the US democratic government and the absolute rule of the monarchies of Russia, Italy and, particularly, Turkey (i.e. the Ottoman State). He rejects the second type of government insisting that there was no absolute right for anyone to rule millions of people against their will. Absolute monarchs are, in his opinion, a burden (ḥiml ṭhaqīl) on society (al-hay'a al-jiṭīmā'īyya) because they humiliate the people, "as ‘Abdul-Ḥamīd does", by treating them like animals. Since he was convinced that, in democracy, power emanating from the people (al-shā'b) is in the service of the people, and although he admits that the times were not times of revolution, he proclaims the slogan: "long live the people and down with the monarch, long live democracy and down with monarchy".

Rihani attacks absolute autocratic rule which he saw as enslaving the people and resulting in tyranny or despotism. Having in mind ‘Abdul-Ḥamīd himself, he argued that under the pretence of divine right, the absolute ruler, often a weak or a mad person, disdains his people and treats them like his own chattel (maṭīn). The absolute ruler "kills, rules tyrannically and exploits the resources of the nation and throws it into perilous situations".

Despotism, or tyranny is an important concept that is contrasted with justice and freedom in Rihani’s thought. His usage of the term tyranny (ṣīḥbād) was almost inseparable from injustice or oppression (ẓulm). Almost identical, both terms were used as the opposite to justice (ṣad) and (ṣadāla). Rihani did not present an elaborate treatise on despotism as al-Kawākibi did, for example.
However, one can identify in his writings the different aspects and the development of this important concept in his thought.

Rihani is critical of the various forms of tyranny, oppression and injustice: economic injustice inflicted upon the workers and the poor classes in society; social injustice, when humans are denied natural human rights (hūqūq al-insān al-tabī‘īyya) and individual freedom, as he saw this exercised at its worst against slaves, women, and against the workers who are denied their freedom of choice of work and wages, as well as political tyranny. Rihani continued to be preoccupied with political oppression and tyranny as a serious problem, whether during the Ottoman rule in the Arab East, or in the political practices of the monarchs of Arabia, as discussed in the previous chapter, or in Syria and Lebanon under the oppressive French Mandate. This does not mean, however, that tyranny and injustice were limited in his thought to the East. For Rihani saw other examples of tyranny and injustice in world history including those of the British and the French.

In Rihani’s pre-First World War writings, political tyranny and injustice were characteristics of the Ottoman State, "the most oppressive and unjust state in the world", and particularly of the absolute rule of ʿAbdul-Ḥamīd whose name was "synonymous with injustice". While political tyranny was the outcome of absolute autocracy, Rihani warned that such tyranny would not reign without the ignorance (al-ṭahl) of the subjects, their blind obedience, and without the flattery, hypocrisy (al-taḏīs and al-mudāḥana) and connivance of the self-proclaimed leaders of the people with the tyrannical ruler. On the other hand, he warned that political tyranny not only had its own tools to protect itself, but it also found its best ally in the abuse of religion and in religious leaders. For example, not only did the Ottoman State use official censor (al-Maktūbi), "an ignorant, fanatic, stupid, tyrant and arrogant enemy of truth", to secure its continuity and consolidate its tyranny, but it found a useful ally in the Jesuit Clergy in Syria. The Jesuits, in his opinion, connived (tawāṣṭa) with the Maktūbi to serve tyranny by impeding any progress of knowledge and enlightenment among the people.
Political tyranny, for Rihani, had no religious identity. In Syria, the Muslim Ottoman State and the Christian Jesuit Clergy, were in his opinion, "brothers in evil, injustice and tyranny... In Syria, the Crescent and the Cross have united in evil and corruption not in good and right". Rihani points out that the Qur'ān itself contains many verses aimed at curbing the oppressors and tyrants; while true Christianity teaches passion (al-rahma), love (al-mahabba) and justice (al-'adl). Thus his attack was rather against using religion in the service of tyranny. This is what he calls "religious tyranny" (al-istibdād al-dīnī) in a way reminiscent of al-Kawakibi, or rather the "sophistic tyranny" (al-istibdād al-safṣāri) which, in Rihani's opinion, was worse than political tyranny itself. For even when the latter is removed, religious tyranny would remain a threat to the nation.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Rihani's attack on tyranny took a new significance. Tyranny now signifies selfishness (athara) and hegemony in politics, and inequity (lā musāwāt) in civil matters. He also uses the term istibdād, during this period, in connection with the 'national' governments of Syria and Lebanon under foreign control and with the practices of the French Mandate authorities in particular. Tyranny now has a new attribute: "the constitutional tyranny" (al-istibdād al-dusturi) in relation to the supposed constitutional governments supported by the colonialist power. Such tyranny was particularly manifested in the arbitrariness of judgements, and in the oppression of freedom of expression.

Rihani saw the new form of tyranny as a continuation of the old Turkish tyranny. For the spirit of the national rulers was still autocratic and as such was inherited from the old Turkish imperial "Shāhāniyya" school and the "Bāb-āliyya" environment (in relation to the Sublime Porte). Rihani was seriously concerned that tyranny had become endemic in the East, that it was not confined to the absolute ruler, but reached the whole nation. For "tyranny is at several levels: (al-istibdād darajāt): my foot is over your head... and his foot, may God curse him, is over my head...". Such old "Oriental" traditions of tyranny were in Rihani's opinion, the major threat to the new democratic constitutional governments in Syria and Lebanon.
With the French Mandate, tyranny and injustice acquire a new face and new attributes. Mindful of the experience of ‘Abdul-Ḥamīd Rihani now compares the Hamidian and the colonial brands of tyranny. "From the era of ‘Abdul-Ḥamīd..., from a familiar open tyranny to a masked and sophisticated tyranny. From a tyranny in the name of the Padishah to a tyranny in the name of the League of Nations... From a tyranny which divides and rules for the glory of the State to a tyranny which divides and rules for the benefit of colonialism".32

While Rihani devotes a good part of his writings to expose and attack political tyranny, his means of eradicating such tyranny varied according to circumstances, from gradual reform through education and introduction of democratic rule, to revolutionary methods involving civil disobedience and even armed revolt.33 However, democracy through constitutional parliamentarian rule remains for him the best means to remove tyranny and implement justice. Thus during the Ottoman era he was convinced that constitutional rule was the end of tyranny, and the best safeguard against the return to despotism was full commitment to the constitutional principles.34 Similarly, during the period of the French Mandate Rihani proclaimed that justice could not be secured without democratic constitutional government, and the respect for the freedom of the whole nation. In his opinion, only true democracy would strip the political leaders of their tyrannical autocratic mentality. He thus warned that if "the constitution was mere ink on paper" and "democracy was a disguised lie" the danger of falling back into the dark ages would be greater.35

Democracy and Social Justice: Ideals and Reality

From the beginning Rihani warned against the abuse of democracy. His early admiration of democracy and freedom, particularly in the United States, did not mean that he was not critical of certain aspects of American politics and society, and of the dangers that democracy could be abused by politicians. After he had lived in America for at least eighteen years, he remained strongly critical of certain aspects of American society which he saw was subject to all kind of distorted freedom and false democracy. In a series of articles written in about
1906, he lamented the fact that, under the pretext of democracy, the vast majority of the American people was severely exploited by a minority possessing money and political power. He wrote: "one hundred and thirty years had passed since American independence, but America is still far away from true freedom. America was liberated from a crowned king to fall into the hands of kings without crowns".36 "We have progressed in civilisation and modernity as some pretend. We have liberated... the slaves and given freedom...to every individual, rich or poor. But slavery today is dressed in new clothes... Shackles have changed... and the slave traders have been replaced by new ones".37

Similarly, Rihani criticised the English historian, Edward Gibbon, for considering modern civilisation as secure against a barbarous cataclysm.38 Having described and then questioned the bases of modern society, Rihani concluded that "the threat against our so-called civilisation is not from the outside but rather from the inside; it is not from the barbarians but from ourselves".39

It is possible that Rihani found Gibbon's conclusion too optimistic when compared to concrete reality. His belief that modern civilisation (al-tamaddun al-ḥadīth), as it appeared to him at the time, was self-destructive, was based, among other things, on what he perceived as discriminatory laws, corrupt judicial and educational systems, greedy monopolies, ignorance, delusion, and excessive emphasis on materialism and capitalism. Rihani asks: "what are the virtues of such civilisation whose laws are enacted by the capitalists (arbāb al-māl), executed by the stock-brokers (samāsirat al-burs) and industrialists (aṣḥāb al-maʿāmil) and are spread by the ministers of defence through cannons and armoured cars".40 Rihani deplores the negative spirit of commercialism which he saw as extending to social, religious and intellectual spheres in Western life, in which "modernity" meant "the accumulation of wealth (al-tamawwul)".41

Rihani found that a society subject to all kinds of corruption, crime and immorality, could not be a true democratic society, and that such obstacles were no less threatening in a free political democratic system than in an autocratic tyrannical one. Rihani may be the first Arab thinker to attack American political democracy which seemed to him disguised behind the appearance of free democratic election.42 "They say election in the republic corrects corruption, but
we say every vote, small or big, is bought and sold with the dollar. The majority of Americans vote only for the candidate who pays more...". This idea is further illustrated in The Book of Khalid (1911), where Rihani describes the corruption of political leaders and their subservience to their selfish materialistic interests at the expense of the values and principles which brought them to power.

In this book, Rihani attempts to give the exact meaning of such mysterious terms as "political canvasser" and "manipulations of vote" in a democratic country like the United States. Such activities were "essentially a trade honestly conducted on the known principle of supply and demand". Khalid's (i.e. Rihani's own) experience with American democratic leaders convinced him that "instead of canvassing and orating for Democracy's illustrious Candidate..., one ought to do canvassing for Honesty and Truth among Democracy's leaders", whom he describes as "tuft-hunters" and "stock-jobbers". With a somewhat sad, ironical tone, Rihani explains through Khalid's "Histoire Intime", how in "the land of democracy", men in power were able to manipulate justice to secure their interests and positions. After describing an arrogant democratic "boss", in his "costly furnished office" purchased with the money obtained from the poor, Rihani expresses amazement at how such a "bad smallman could lead by the nose so many good people". Having experienced the contradiction between the ideal and the reality, he points out that under a liberal constitution and a free government system "you can not with immunity give free and honest expression to your thoughts", but "you are at liberty to sell your soul, to open a bank account for your conscience". "Popular suffrage", he says, "helps not the suffering individual; nor does it conduce to a better and higher morality. Why, it can not as much as purge its own channels. For what is the ballot box ... but a modern vehicle of corruption and debasement? The ballot box, believe me, can not... shed a little light on the deeper problems of life. Of course, it is the exponent of the will of the majority, that is to say, the will of the Party that has more money at its disposal".

During the period between 1906 and 1911, Rihani did not only criticise the political aspect of American democracy, but also its social and economic aspects. Above all, he was critical of American capitalism. Such criticism was not only
descriptive and analytical, but also reflected Rihani's humanistic commitment, and to a lesser extent, ideological tendencies. For there is no doubt that he puts great emphasis on humaneness in society.47

Perhaps due to his rationalist orientation, his openness to Western thought and his own individual turn of mind and idealism, Rihani started from an early period to raise questions concerning economic and political issues. Unable to give a scientific or specialised answer, his concerns with such issues remained mostly in the form of questioning. In 1898, he wrote: "the resources of the earth suffice all its people. They are rather abundant... I truly believe the resources which the people harvest in one year would satisfy their needs for thirty years or more. Why then do we not have satisfaction? Why do people die of hunger?... Why are there millions of homeless people? Is it the mismanagement of the administration that distributes the resources among the people? Or is it the economic misuse in all the branches of government and private institutions? Is this what they call the unfair distribution of wealth?"48

At this early stage, Rihani showed an interest in the science of "political economy" (al-iqtisād al-siyāsī). Criticising some Arab writers for discussing the subject in a literary style,49 he insisted that political economy was "a philosophical science" which "required much accuracy in the search for facts". He was aware that political economy while having its essential and universal principles had to be understood within the context of the political system and the land concerned. This led him to question the role of government. He identifies six areas of responsibility for governments: to ensure consensus and unity; to enforce justice; to establish peace and security; to defend the nation and its rights; to guarantee its citizens happiness and comfort; and to ensure enjoyment of the blessings of freedom and political economy in the present and future.50

The socio-economic dimension of Rihani's interest in American politics, and his concern with social justice is particularly reflected in his stand during the 1900 US elections. Still an admirer of American democracy, he supported the Democratic candidate against the Republican.51 He saw the former as "a friend of the poor, defender of the worker and a leader of the people...". He expected a Democratic leader to stand for "equality (al-musāwāt)", to respect people because
of what they are, not because of how much they have. A democratic leader, in his opinion, was one who cared less about the "millionaires" than about "defending the rights of the weak and the poor"; he was the "enemy of the monopolist companies (al-sharikāt al-iḥtikāriyya)" and the "defender of the suppressed rights of the people (ḥuqūq al-sha'b al-mahdūma)" against the "power of capital (quwwat al-māl)".  

The issues of fair distribution of wealth and of government responsibility for welfare and social justice, were probably the main reason for Rihani's criticism of the American system. In 1906, in a frank and forthright manner, he criticised the supposed "virtues" of modern civilisation under democratic governments, whether republican or monarchist, which legalise and perpetuate the discrimination of one section of the population against the other: "between the strong and the weak, the poor and the rich". In the picture which he draws, American society appears as a class society in which a certain class was in a position to exploit the others. In such society of oppressors and oppressed, although slavery was eliminated, it could still assume a new form of exploitation. Although all citizens were supposedly equal and the old division into slave owners and slaves disappeared, the law in fact still discriminated between those who have and the masses who have not.

During this period, particularly in and around 1906, Rihani demonstrated a high degree of commitment to the cause of the workers and the poor people in general. For this, he devoted a series of descriptive and analytical articles in which he discussed the social and economic problems of the poor people and the working class in an industrial city like New York. Not only did he describe the sufferings of the vast majority of the people - with poverty, disease and injustice - but he also deplored the appalling condition of work in the mines, oil fields, textile factories, and in the industrial work place in general.

Rihani wrote at length about "the slavery of miners", their ten hour working day: underground with no fresh air, no fresh light or water, in addition to the inherent risks in mining. He considered mining as "the symbol of the gradual slow death"; and considered the society that was built "only upon the misery of one group of its people" as "an unjust, unbalanced and corrupt society". What
struck him most was the inequality between different groups: "in the Stock Exchange ... you win fifty million dollars in a little while, and thousands of miners work ten hours and risk their life... for one or two dollars a day. What a strange world! What a wonderful civilisation!"55

Rihani attributed social injustice and economic inequality to the monopolist, and the exploiting economic system characteristic of capitalism. He pointed out that in such so-called civilised society, "the monopolist companies exploit the resources of the earth only to store them in order to double their prices";56 while control of certain necessary commodities of life was used by the capitalists as means of pressure on the labouring class. The industrialists, for example, withheld coal, particularly in cold winters, to force striking miners back to work. "Thousands of loads of accumulated coal are withheld from the people, and in the city thousands of families are dying of cold... This is how the capitalists (arbaÁ£ al-mal) fight the workers, how the monopolies kill children for the sake of their selfish interests... and how the strong oppress the weak everywhere..."57

Perhaps echoing certain socialist ideas on the alliance of wealth and political power, Rihani emphasises the corruption of officials and institutions in a supposedly democratic modern society. He indicates that in such society judges were corrupted by wealth; professors of philosophy were subordinated to the will of the capitalists who would not let them teach new social sciences which might harm the schemes of those who have the wealth and power.58 He also condemns the alliance between capital and political power: "what misery do capitalists, in connivance with the law and the government, impose on the people in order to serve their own ambitious aims?!"59

It is thus clear that, for Rihani, democracy in the capitalist system was not the rule of the majority but the rule of the capitalists: those who have the wealth have the power. In a liberal, independent republic, where equality and justice supposedly prevailed, the capitalists still disdained the people and their representatives, and disregarded the press and the politicians. "Is this the democratic government which was founded to spread equality among the people?
What laws allowed those capitalists to monopolise the necessities of life and enslave the people?".  

At a more elevated intellectual level, Rihani touches upon the essence of the state and its significance and role in ensuring social justice, equity and genuine democracy. If in a democratic republic liberty was only for the capitalists, the democratic state, therefore, was not an expression of the popular will, but a tool that enabled the capitalists to maintain their power over the working class and the poor people. Popular suffrage and parliament were thus merely a formality. On several occasions, Rihani asserted that since power was essentially in the hands of capital, the latter dominated the state. The fair struggle of the "poor workers" against the "arrogant" employers and the capitalists further convinced him that the power of a handful of capitalists over the whole of a society was so blatant and so openly corrupt.  

Rihani drew attention to the "democratic" laws which allow the capitalists to exploit the masses, while the latter possessing nothing, grow steadily impoverished and ruined and become converted to revolutionary workers. A clear manifestation of this is the exploitation of child labour. He condemned "civilisation which compels its young children to work in the factories and deprives them of education". Such civilisation was "corrupt and incomplete", because it secured the interest of the wealthy and ignored the rights of the masses (al-jamāḥīr).  

Rihani insisted that "the state which condones child labour is a crooked state". While he did not condemn the parents for sending their children to work, he blamed the state which allowed poverty to prevail. He accused the state of lack of control over industry, labour and welfare services (i.e. provision of public housing and schools for the poor), and condemned state support for monopolies to deprive the poor people of the necessities of life. He insisted that poverty was caused by the "greed" and "cheating" of the wealthy, as a result of the encouragement of the state which turned a blind eye to them, and allowed itself to be dominated by the power and will of capital.  

Rihani assigned to the state the task of correcting society's injustices. He believed above all that the impoverishment of the masses would lead them to
revolution. "Poverty", he explained, "generates ignorance, disease and crime... It kills hope and dignity...". He warned that young children who were compelled to work would grow unconfident and ignorant, while oppression and frustration turn them into rebellious adults. Because he believed the government should "fear those oppressed youth and revolutionary adults", he suggested that the government should ensure a decent life for the parents, and build public housing and schools for the poor people in order to save the children from the slavery of hardship.  

However, Rihani was certain that redress of injustice would not be possible without reform of the state system itself. He was convinced that the problem of poverty would remain as long as those who could find a solution for it were kept away from legislative power. He did not expect the workers to seize political power, but he thought the intellectuals could help enact non-discriminatory laws to ensure justice and equality. He was not so optimistic about this either. He doubted that in a democratic system, thinkers like Tolstoy for example, although admired by statesmen, would be allowed effective legislative participation for fear that they would defend the rights of the poor people. One of the fallacies of democracy, in his opinion, was that candidates would proclaim the principles of justice and equality but would often renounce these principles once elected.  

Rihani warns against the danger of possible abuse of freedom in the capitalist political system, because such freedom could become "a means to assist its 'enemies' against the country's citizens". In such a system, the government "becomes in the end incapable of controlling the capitalists or curbing their defiance". Rihani, in fact, attributes the possible fall of the democratic republic to socio-economic agents. "Just as the monarchy in the past had helped statesmen to oppress with their power, the republic today seems to help the capitalists to oppress with their money".  

Rihani seems to imply the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism from within. However, at this stage he did not identify the following phase in a post-capitalist society. For example, although he attributed the anticipated fall of capitalism under the Western system of democracy to economic agents, he did not clearly deduce, from the economic law of motion of contemporary society, an inevitable transformation of capitalism into socialism. He saw that the greed of
capitalists was self-destructive. "Have a glance at the world of commerce and business. Can you see this buffalo in the Stock Exchange thrusting and killing those small lambs. He kills his creator and then kills himself".68 He also foresaw revolution caused by poverty and oppression. He warned that the exploited workers and the poor people would not bear the oppression for ever. "The Stock Exchange is standing as a dam between the monopolies and the stores, between the merchants and the consumer. But when the deluge comes the dam would not stop it... Could the stockbroker or the wheat monopoliser calm the agitation when the cyclone bursts?"69 But he failed to specify who would hold power after this supposed revolutionary cyclone.

Despite the obvious influence of socialist thought on his ideas, Rihani's "socialism" was not of the purely materialist type, it rather has a dimension of welfare and social justice. It is clear that Rihani's concern at this stage, was not that of private or public ownership of the means of production. But in criticising American democracy, he was much more concerned with the fair and equitable redistribution of wealth. In 1906, he reiterated the same idea that the resources of the earth would be sufficient if they were fairly and justly distributed among all the people of the world. "The wheat grown in the USA every year can feed all the people of the earth, why then there are people dying of hunger while others are dying from overeating?"70 His aim was not to see a change of power within the class society where the oppressed assume power, and oppress their former oppressors, but to see a fine equilibrium where there is no longer a situation in which some overeat while others starve. In his idealism Rihani was confident that a day would come when happiness and contentment would prevail among all the people. "When the minority rids itself of overeating and the masses are secured from hunger, when all members of society become equal, only then would equilibrium prevail and the signs of beauty and perfection appear in society. I do not believe that day will see you or me, but I am sure it is coming any day".71

Rihani has been considered, with Farah Anton (1874-1922) and Nicola Haddād (1870-1954), among the first pioneers of socialism in modern Arabic thought.72 The influence of socialist thought on Rihani's ideas is quite obvious, even though in his discussion of the ills of the American system, he does not
specifically use the words capitalism (al-ra’smāliyya) or socialism (al-isḥīrākiyya). However, his socio-economic lexicon contains many words which are found in the socialist literature.

The term (isḥīrākiyya) has been current in Arabic since 1890. Reference to it can be found in al-Muqtaṣaf of 1890 and 1894, and al-Afghānī used the term with respect to social reform in 1895. Already by the end of the nineteenth century many Arab intellectuals, who had been influenced by certain socialist ideas current in Europe, started to reflect these ideas in their novels and writings. A number of Arab intellectuals of that period provided a systematic commentary on the doctrines of socialism. With the writings of Shibīl Shumayyil and Farāḥ Anṭūn socialism in the Arab world made its strongest impact. Not only did it receive its best comprehensive analysis but with them socialism reached the level of political and ideological commitment. Shumayyil, whose writings were fairly widely read in the Arab world, was the first to spread the concept of socialism in Arabic. By 1913, socialism was already a subject for Arab idealists and intellectuals concerned with social reform.

Rihani used the Arabic term isḥīrākiyya perhaps for the first time in 1900 in conjunction with civilisation (al-tamaddun) and enlightenment (al-nūr). He put the socialist principles (al-mabādī’ al-isḥīrākiyya) on equal terms with the democratic principles (al-mabādī’ al-dīmuqrāṭīyya) and Christian charity (al-raḥma al-masīḥiyyya) in the context of civilisation and enlightenment; characteristics of the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. In 1903, he described the contemporary American and European humanist poets (shu‘ara’ al-insāniyya) as "the poets of social progress (shu‘ara’ al-ruqi’ al-ijtīma‘i‘), the apostles of socialism (rusul al-isḥīrākiyya), all-embracing love (al-mahabba al-shāmila) and universal compassion (al-shafāqa al-‘umūmiyya). In an article written in 1910, he reiterates his conviction concerning certain resemblance between socialist principles and the teachings of true Christianity. Thus both in this context and in his analysis of the problems of industrial society in the USA, Rihani’s socialist outlook cannot be missed. Nevertheless, in his discussion of the social and economic problems of American democracy, Rihani seemed to avoid the use of the term isḥīrākiyya. It is possible that Rihani, who was writing for an
Arab readership, chose to be careful with the use of the word *ishtirākiyya* so that he could get his message through. Yet, the socialist trend of his thought at this stage is quite clear.

**Rihani and the Socialists**

It is obvious that Rihani was somewhat familiar with European socialist thought long before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Prior to this Revolution, Rihani did not try to give a comprehensive analysis of socialism or of Marxism. Nor did he try to look at the practicality of those doctrines to see whether they were tenable or not in terms of their philosophical validity or social feasibility. Although he seems to predict the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and the inescapability of revolution, he does not indicate who was to take control over society. It is not clear whether the "balanced society" which he foresaw was the "socialist society" as foreseen by the socialist thinkers. Nor is it obvious whether, at this stage, Rihani saw socialism as possible to realise.

How Rihani's thought responded to and developed after the Bolshevik Revolution, and how he himself saw this movement, can be deduced from a number of articles which he wrote after the revolution, and particularly in his monograph, *The Descent of Bolshevism* published in English in 1920.

Prior to 1917, Rihani seemed more concerned with the problems of the industrial capitalist society. However, his position towards all the groups of the propertyless classes everywhere was very clear. It is true his main concern in the Arab homeland was political and national liberation from external domination, Ottoman and European, nevertheless, socio-economic problems were not far less important for him. As early as 1909, he emphasised the contrast between the wealthy (*al-mutamawwilūn*) and the poor (*al-fuqara*), between the notables (*al-wujahā'*) aristocrats (*al-dhawāt*) and officials (*al-mā'murūn*) on the one hand, and the peasants (*al-fallahūn*), sowers (*al-zāri'ūn*) and other workers in general, whom he addressed as "his fellow poor compatriots". His preference and respect for the latter class was obvious. Similarly, his struggle for economic emancipation as an inherent part of political liberation during the French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria should be viewed in the same light. Not only does it indicate Rihani's
concern with the social and economic problems of his people, but it also indicates the influence on his thought of the socialist, including Marxist, ideas concerning imperialism and its connection with capitalist exploitation.

Some four years before the Bolshevik Revolution took place in Russia, Rihani had asserted that the decline of all the Eastern countries (i.e. the countries of the Near East and Asia) could not be ended except by revolution which would bring fresh blood and regenerate the spiritual and moral powers of the nations. At this time, he was convinced that the coming revolution in the Ottoman Sultanate, particularly in the Arab East, will be caused by hunger. He could not imagine "the people starving while the rulers of the Sultanate were safe and secure in their seats..." 81

In 1920, Rihani seemed not wholly enthusiastic about the outcome of the Bolshevik Revolution, however. In an article written that year, he imagined Bolshevism would fail in the face of the policies of "the Allied Powers". On the other hand, he predicted a rise of the proletariat to power in the USA some 30 years after the end of the First World War or by mid-century.82 The rule of the proletariat, in the picture which he portrayed, was the phase before the last which, he imagined, would be the rule of "constitutional socialism" that would complete all the preceding phases. The question of transition, for him, seemed to be established by the universal theory of development. After setting the preceding phases as the "patriarchal rule" of wisemen, the "autocratic rule" of absolute monarchies, and the "constitutional rule" of the notables and the bourgeoisie, he indicated that "all the phases seem to follow each other in this manner according to the law of History and the law of Evolution and Progress".83

The "democratic socialist rule" of the proletariat, as imagined by Rihani, would be established upon several foundations. The seizure by the government of all public institutions and the fixing of the income of individuals and institutions, was essential. The establishment in each state of an agency with its capital collected from the surplus of income of individuals and private institutions was to be used for public works, scientific, cultural and medical institutions. At the international level, under the rule of the proletariat, Wilson's principle of self-determination to all the small and big nations would be put in practice; European
imperialists would evacuate their colonies; and the League of Nations would be established as an international army after the seizure of the armies of all the member nations.\textsuperscript{84}

In this article Rihani attributed the predicted revolution of the proletariat to the seeds of peace which, after the First World War, grew inside the working and poor classes around the world, the only classes, in his view, which paid the blood levy of the devastating war. He imagined that the rise of the proletariat to the position of the ruling class in the US would happen after the workers and the poor classes, unarmed men and women, united with the armed forces and disobeyed orders to go to war. After the collapse of the "governments of war" in Washington and London, he saw, for the first time in the world, the sun of fraternity and freedom rising, and the revolution spreading in the whole of Europe and America. He saw "Bolshevism resurrected and purified by failure and time". The difference was that this was an unarmed peaceful revolution which would seize power in the civilised world, and in which women would be a strong element in a resounding victory.\textsuperscript{85}

Rihani here reflects the bitterness of the betrayed peoples after the end of the First World War and the failure of Wilson’s principles of self-determination before the imperialist ambitions of European powers. He saw the salvation of the betrayed nations in the hands of a true democratic rule, not of capitalists but of the proletariat. "Thirty years have passed", he says, "and the peoples (al-shu‘ūb) who have had enough of war have accepted what happened. They have been silent over old and new tyrannies... Yes we have accepted laws that were enacted in the Peace Conference, and contracts concluded between the nations. The world has accepted the Versailles Treaty like a sick person accepts the medicine".\textsuperscript{86}

Rihani explained the relation between the forthcoming rule of the proletariat and the outcome of the war in terms of class struggle. He noted that while the war had ended the monarchies it had established in power those politicians who spoke of freedom and equality, but in reality served the only interest of the capitalists. The "bourgeois class" that has come after the collapse of monarchs has not done away with class antagonisms. The "War of Nations", he wrote, "ended ... but did not end the war of classes (ḥarb al-tabaqāt) whose causes
were deep rooted in Human society and nature".87 "The Versailles Treaty divided the civilised world into two principal parts: the rulers (al-hukkām) and their supporters, the financial and commercial interest groups on the one side, and the workers who, from time to time, protested by means of strikes or by means of useless local revolutionary movements on the other".88 This means that the rule of the proletariat, as foreseen by Rihani, would be the outcome not only of a national proletarian revolution against the government of capitalists in one country, but also an international revolution which would unite the workers and the poor classes of all the countries against the exploiting governments which had used them for war in order to protect the interests of the capitalists of the world.

At this stage, the influence of Marx’s theories of class struggle and the development of future communism, on Rihani’s ideas is evident, particularly on his prediction of development of the rule of the proletariat into "constitutional socialism". Although Rihani admired Marx’s theory of international peace in particular,89 he was not wholly convinced by his materialistic concept of history and his exclusion of religion and underestimation of the arts. In 1921, he wrote: "the conception that the fundamental factor in the development of any nation, is the economic factor, that is the way in which a nation produces and exchanges commodities, - is the narrowest, shallowest, most sordid, and most pernicious that ever was conceived by a man with any pretension to learning and wisdom. It is a shallow well, indeed, that of Marx and its water withal is brackish. I turn away from it, thinking how well it could be filtered, if it were allowed to pass through the channels of religion, at least, and the arts".90

Rihani’s first direct discussion of the socialist movement was The Descent of Bolshevism, a "little book" of approximately seventy pages which he published in 1920 and dedicated to his American friend Michael Monahan. In the introduction, under "seeds for the sower" Rihani considers the Rule of the Proletariat in Russia as a transitional phase of History, "another swing of the pendulum of Time". Bolshevism or the dictatorship of the proletariat is, for him, like autocracy, an absolute rule of a minority. The difference between them is the ruling class. While "autocracy is a government of the few from above, Bolshevism is a government of the few from below".91
In his introduction, Rihani also raises the question of the relation of dictatorship to democracy. True democracy, in his opinion, is the cure for most of the social and political ills, but such democracy is still an ideal to be attained. Society, for him, is like a rod which only a just government can balance properly, but no one yet, even Bolshevism, has found the balancing point. For "Bolshevism is the other end of Czarism".92

The Russian Revolution, for Rihani, was one of those movements in History where people revolted against the inequalities of life and refused to submit to the restraints of laws, and often went through a period of terror in the hope of realising ultimately the perfect state. In such movements, he explains, the leaders, sincere at first, espouse a utopian dream. But with the material for revolt at hand, and unable to resist the seductions of the nascent power, they soon transform into demagogy if they fail, or autocracy if they succeed.

This explains why, in his opinion, Bolshevism had not attained the stage of true democracy yet. By utilising "the elements of negation in society", the leaders of such movements only succeed in setting up another government, which, no matter how just its foundations are in theory, soon becomes in practice more despotic and corrupt. Despite some optimism, Rihani remains sceptical about the future of Bolshevism. He is optimistic because he sees that the "vision of the Perfect State" which awakens people and leads them to martyrdom "continues to leaven the aspirations of succeeding nations". And no matter how ruthless the leaders, the nation would sooner or later find its balance again, and re-establish, through law and order, the principles of justice and progress. He remained sceptical because, although "as a rule a nation emerges stronger, morally and spiritually, from a revolutionary upheaval", he still believed that all the movements of the world that sought to establish, by force or peace, a utopia on earth "have been doomed to failure".93

Rihani views Bolshevism as an Oriental movement. "Bolshevism", he says, "may be Marxian in theory, but it is Hulagoesque in practice. It may be of European descent, but it is Oriental in tradition, Oriental in mood, Oriental in temperament".94 He sees Bolshevism in such movements as Mazdakism in fifth century Persia, the Khawarij in early Islamic Arabia, the Karmathians in the ninth
century Iraq and the Assassins of Neishapur. He also sees it in the movement of the Illuminati, the "intellectual Bolshevism" which first appeared in Germany in the eighteenth century with Adam Weishaupt, and which Rihani likens to the Isma'ilis of Islam and the Mazdakites of Persia.

However, it should not be understood that by comparing Bolshevism to such Arab and Islamic movements Rihani "traced back the roots of the socialist thought in the world to Oriental, Arab and Islamic sources", as has been claimed. It seems that Rihani here was not concerned to prove whether socialism was compatible or not with Arab society and culture, nor was he concerned with proving the originality of Arab socialism. In fact, unlike some Arab intellectuals of his generation, Rihani did not provide a socialist-Marxist interpretation of such movements. For, he did not emphasise the ideological link between their doctrines and those of socialism, except perhaps a small reference to Mazdak's "communism" and his law of the "community of women". It is true he viewed Bolshevism as Oriental but in the sense of extremism. Because, in his opinion, "the Orientals are the extremists of the world". He likened Bolshevism to mystic and religious movements in the East and to the Illuminati in the West because these, in his opinion, were the most prominent movements in history against the existing order of things. The common element between them is that all were a "revolt against the inequalities of life", and a "refusal to submit to the restraints of laws and creeds". They were similar in the sense that all were against organised society. "Concealed by the apostles of violence, under the cloak of religion" or "under the mask of philosophy", those movements "sought to undermine all existing authority in the state and all creeds and moral codes in the nation". The difference between them and the Bolshevik Revolution was "in the background and the surroundings which give the movement distinct local colours and strange sounding names". In the forward to The Descent of Bolshevism, Rihani writes: "as a rule, however, the tyranny of inequality has been at the bottom of all revolts and revolutions. Only that in the past it was embodied in religions and autocracies, today it is embodied in industrialism. The masters in the past were the kings and priests, while in our times they are the captains of industry and the labor leaders. Under either
condition, however, a long-suffering and downtrodden people will be driven ultimately to extremes of materialism expressed in universal negations".  

A more favourable attitude towards the Bolshevik Revolution and the socialist doctrines is reflected in a series of Arabic articles and lectures published in 1928 in a book entitled al-Tatārruf w-al-Islah (Extremism and Reform). The theme of the first essay, 'al-Sullam' (the Ladder), was the struggle of the exploited peasants against the oppressive exploiting landowners, in an unspecified society. Was he then aware that the big landowners in the Arab countries had increasingly begun to play the role of agents of Western imperialism, particularly of British power in Palestine? and was he responding to such a particular problem? It is not clear. The peaceful attempts of the peasants to get a rise in wages or to demand a minimum sharing of profit were, in his view, justified because they represented the legitimate rights of the peasants to a decent life. On the other hand, the arrogant rejection of these demands by the landowners was unjustifiable and rather extremist. The landowner's oppressive measures consisting of expulsion of workers led, in his view, to the revolt of the peasants who, under the leadership of an intelligent, energetic and capable peasant, rejected the whole system and demanded the appropriation of the land. The peasants' slogan: "the land is the property of the peasants, the profit to be equally shared among them", was just and fair not only because it responded to the needs and rights of the peasants, but also because it was a natural and inevitable outcome of the oppression and exploitation by the landowner.

Rihani, in this essay, tries to prove that when the means of reform fail, revolution becomes necessary to get rid of injustice. This is rather well expressed in the second essay, 'al-Tatārruf' (Extremism), where Rihani makes it clear that revolution becomes inevitable when the voice of wisdom and reason is no longer heard and the people become accustomed to enslavement. People's enslavement to social, political and religious traditions could not be ended except by a revolution similar to Bolshevism as a revolt against ignorance, cowardice and oppression. Those who "cheat", "crawl" and "enslave" others angrily fear Bolshevism because this will reveal their falsehood.
At this stage, Rihani believed that revolution, as a purifier of the human individual and nations, begets all that is good and true. He was optimistic that the Bolshevik Revolution which had sown the seeds of reform was going to reach the heart of the East to wash it and clean it. Violence, at this stage, became necessary because it rids society of slavery; and a revolution, even if it carried anarchy and disorder, was better than permanent oppression because revolution would soon re-establish a new and just order. Thus, the Red Revolution at this stage was, for him, the "catastrophe" that bears the seeds of the ultimate social reform. In its apparent evil there is an inherent good which can not appear except by violence.\textsuperscript{107}

The difference in tone between \textit{The Descent of Bolshevism} (1920) and \textit{al-T\=atarruf w-al-I\=sl\=ah} (1928) is quite clear and could be understood in the light of the circumstances in which Rihani wrote each work. When the first was written, not only the Russian revolution itself was still too young, three years old, to be judged by its achievements, but also the political situation and Western imperialism in the Arab East had not yet crystallised. By 1928, Western imperialism had established itself in the form of French mandate in Lebanon and Syria, British mandate in Iraq and Palestine - the latter incorporated the Balfour Declaration on a homeland for the Jews - and other forms of British protection in other parts of Arabia. Particularly significant in this respect was the nature of the alliance between Anglo-French imperialism and Zionism.

As an Arab nationalist, Rihani's main concern during this period (1920-1928), was the liberation of the Arab land from foreign imperialism. By 1928, he had already visited Arabia (1922-1923) and closely seen the working British imperialism in the Arab world. He had begun his campaign against the French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria, and against Zionism in Palestine.\textsuperscript{108} In his struggle for national liberation, Rihani emphasised not only the role of political uprising but also that of revolt against all social and political ills in order to get rid of political slavery. It was thus natural for him to support the idea of revolution in general and the Bolshevik revolution in particular after ten years of its rule in Russia. Perhaps the communist support, during this period, of the Arab nationalists in their struggle for independence from French and English
imperialism was also an important factor in Rihani’s favourable attitude towards the Russian communist revolution.\textsuperscript{109} The main contradiction for Rihani remained, at this stage, that between the oppressed world and Western imperialism; and no doubt he was aware that the new communist state stood potentially in the former camp.

Supporting Bolshevism as a revolutionary spirit did not mean that Rihani then believed Bolshevism attained the perfect state as a system. But, in the 1930s, he certainly saw Bolshevism as "the greatest political and economic experiment in the history of the world, and as such, it deserved to be taken into consideration".\textsuperscript{110} At that time, Rihani was still convinced that a fair and just distribution of wealth, according to laws enacted by "sincere humanists", was the principal blessing, while the accumulation or inflation (\textit{tadakkhum}) and concentration (\textit{takattul}) of wealth were the cause of all the misfortunes.\textsuperscript{111} He saw, in his own days, the condition of the poor had greatly improved, but, he admitted, this was still below the state of perfection. "It seems to me", he said, "that the ultimate goal of the liberated peoples is in the middle between the Marxist Bolshevism of Russia and the Democratic Socialism of America. In both countries, there are today serious attempts which, in their aim at justice, are more ambitious than any preceding reforms in ancient and modern history".\textsuperscript{112}

Rihani saw some improvement in the increasing number of the well-to-do in the world and the disintegration of capital concentration. However, progress in his view, should not stop at limits. Poverty was still not ended, and there were still all kinds of injustice and oppression in certain big financial activities which needed an essential change in the economic system. "The poor in the world should decrease until poverty withers away". This, in his opinion, was not the goal only of the socialist thinkers and politicians, but also of every "progressive, humanist and universal thinker". "Such is the ultimate goal that all the civilised nations will one day reach."\textsuperscript{113}

Does this mean that Rihani aimed at a complete equality among all people? His early writings certainly reflect a hope and indeed concern for a socio-economic equilibrium, and even some hostility towards the capitalists. In a later period (1937) he seems to take a moderate, or rather moderating position between
the rich and the poor, the capitalists and the working classes. In a real sense, his stand was somewhat tilted towards the former.

At this stage, Rihani considered "just equality (al-taswiya al-ādila) as based on three of the natural laws governing all creatures and beings: specialisation (al-ikhtīṣās), co-operation (al-taʿawun), and reward (al-mukāfaʿa)". While he criticised the worker's unions in their warfare against the capitalists and the employers, he saw the rich as entitled to gain from their own initiative and mental efforts, as much as the workers gain from their physical work. The "absolute power" in the hands of the leaders of the working class was, in his opinion, equally oppressive because it limited the individual freedom of the workers in their choice of work or wages. He acknowledged that the workers still suffered from poverty and misery. But he also recognised the efforts of a number of capitalists who, indirectly, helped the workers attain a better condition of life through financing cultural and social activities such as universities, museums, and hospitals, which could benefit the rich as well as the poor.

There does not seem to be real justification for the assertion that Rihani "explicitly rejected the principle of equality". Rihani's ideas need to be understood in the context in which they were expressed. It is important to remember that Rihani used the above argument to encourage the Syrian and Lebanese capitalists in the USA to invest their money in a Syrian national university in Damascus or Beirut. However, this raises an important question. Did he truly believe that ending poverty was a charitable deed on the part of the rich rather than a duty? Is the concept of social justice in his thought based on a benevolent and charitable act or on the concept of "right and duty" in a society?

Rihani saw social injustice and economic inequality as the product of conflict within society directly related to the monopolist and exploiting economic system characteristic of capitalism. At one stage, through his analysis of the ills of the American political and social system, he criticised the Western democratic government as being a tool in the hands of capitalists and monopolies, and he assigned to the state the task of correcting society's injustice as we have seen. In all this, one could see that Rihani had been influenced by the socialist doctrines which he himself saw, in many of their aspects, similar to the principles of social
reform and liberalism. However, his socialism did not reach the stage of ideological commitment.

It was clear that Rihani demanded a just and fair distribution of wealth, and he aimed at an equitable and just order. But unlike Shumayyil and Anṭūn, Rihani did not concern himself with bringing about a political socialist order. He for example, did not form, or belong to, any political socialist party or any other party, nor did he present a programme for one. While he was in the Arab East between 1904-1910 and 1922 onward, Rihani was not very far away from the intellectual atmosphere, particularly in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, in which the socialist ideas were spread through leading journals including al-Muqtatāf, al-Hilāl, and al-Jāmi‘a (Cairo), and al-Ḥaqiqā, al-Ma‘rad, al-Ṣīḥāfī, al-Ta‘īh, al-Ta‘īf and al-Duhūr (Lebanon), to most of which he had written many contributions. No doubt while he was in Lebanon in 1907, Rihani witnessed the first initiative which marks the birth of the "socialist movement" in Lebanon. This was in the form of a celebration of the first of May, which, early in 1907, was organised by a number of intellectuals including Jurfī Niqūfa Baz, Felix Fāris, Muṣṭafā al-Ghalyīnī, Khayrallah Khayrallah, and Dāwūd Muṭā‘īs, all associates of Rihani.

While he was in Mexico in 1918, Rihani also had contact with the socialists, the "true friends of Social-Democracy", in that country. But he was not actively involved in any political socialist movement or party, nor did he appreciate the multitude of socialist doctrines. He even criticised detailed discussions of the various socialist doctrines, as he saw such knowledge as "confusing and annoying" and "is of no practical use". This probably explains why, unlike other Arab writers, Rihani did not write detailed analysis of socialist doctrines. "There are many doctrines but the aim is the same. To abolish poverty and accumulated wealth in human society, this is what I understand of socialism", he says. He rather preferred to spare the readers the "Babel of socialism" and introduce to them instead the biographies of the most prominent socialists. He had in mind some Western social thinkers, the "Humanists" as he called them, like Robert Owen, Rodbertus, Saint Simon and Kropotkin, who although were "rich and aristocrat" deserved to be considered, not for what they taught but for what
they did. For "the life of those reformers who fought for their teachings" is, in his view, "more important than their teachings". 123

Socialism, for Rihani, is a practice rather than an ideology. Being a socialist was not only in word but more importantly in deed. "The poor who calls himself a reformer and advocates socialism, impertinently against the rich, but stands astonished when he sees a rich person in his car, deserves flogging not respect. Because such poor reformist would disregard the socialist teachings when he becomes rich". 124 Tolstoy, in his opinion, was a great socialist and a real reformer, not because of what he preached but also because, like Jesus, of what he said and did. "His greatness stands on the good work, good example and right thinking". 125 For Rihani, "false socialism like false religion" is short-lived and "the hypocrisy of socialists like the greed of capitalists" does not last. 126

It is true Rihani was concerned about an equitable society in economic terms but he refused to limit his socialist theory only to "the stomach of the people, to their pocket or to the glory of authority". Ideologies concerned only with "satisfying the hungry people", "equality between the poor and the rich" and "destruction of the monopolist companies", are as bad as those concerned with "enhancing the national trade", "supporting the authority of the government" or "enlarging the colonies". All are, in his opinion, "a mercantile philosophy which has no sign of spiritual perfection or moral progress... An animal philosophy which has no food for a progressive sublime life. This does not flourish without strong elements from the heart and consciousness". 127

The phrasing of Fried and Sanders in their Socialist Thought, can perhaps give a good description of Rihani's socialism. "European Socialism was an attempt not only to redistribute wealth more equitably, but to rediscover the way to freedom in a world governed by the industrial system... Socialism should not be taken as mainly an economic theory or tradition of theories. It is rather, in a sense, anti-economic; it aims, in an era in which men have become burdened, and as often as much victimised as served by a vast economic structure, to put the economic forces in their place, to subordinate them to human life, and place them in the service of man... The socialist seeks to transform more than the material organisation of society. He seeks above all a change of consciousness..." 128
The direction of the progressive socialist trend in Rihani's thought is now clear. It stands, not on readily established theories, but on a complex effort of search, analysis and discussion, and on a dynamic relation between reality and reason. Such intellectual development reflects his vision of the "Great City" (al-Madinah al-Uzma), a vision that Rihani formed through his direct contact with the cultures and problems of both the East and the West.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR


2. For the evolution of these terms and others in modern Arabic political discourse, see A. Ayalon, Language and Change in the Arab Middle East, pp. 43-53, and passim.

3. Ḥaqq al-‘itirād’ (c. 1898), in Shadhariy, AAK, 6, p. 385.


5. Ḥaqq al-‘itirād’ (c. 1898), in Shadhariy, AAK, 6, p. 385.


7. al-Ḥukūma al-Dīmūqrāṭiyyā (1900), in Shadhariy, AAK, 6, pp. 428-429. It is interesting that Rihani often spells the word with a "k" and "t" at this stage "al-dīmūqrāṭiyā", perhaps an indication of the novelty of the word in Arabic writing.

8. Ibid., pp. 426-429.


10. ‘al-Ḥukūma al-Dīmūqrāṭiyyā’ (1900), in Shadhariy, AAK, 6, pp. 422-423. He also refers to a new form, the mixed government (al-hukūma al-mukhtalata) which mixes aspects of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy.

11. Ibid., p. 428.

12. Ibid., p. 429.


14. He occasionally uses the synonymous term jawr with ṣulm.


17. On oppressed classes, see in particular ‘Fil Mithl Ḥadhā al-Yawm’ (1906); ‘Abna al-Bu’s (c. 1906); ‘Nahnu w-al-Aqdamūn’ (1930), in al-Rihaniyya, AAK, 7, pp. 133, 144, 431-441; ‘al-Sullām’ (c. 1928), in al-Tatāruf, AAK, 8, pp. 443-445; on slaves Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 362-385; ACA, pp. 216-231; also Ch. 3, above; on women Ḥabl al-Tasa’ul (1932), in al-Rihaniyya, AAK, 7, p. 461; on workers Jami’a Wataniyya (1937), in al-Qawmiyya, AAK, 8, p. 414.

19. 'al-Maktubī (1900); 'al-Adīb fi al-Dawlā al-'Utrānīyya' (1901); 'Dā' al-Adīb' (1901), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 280-282, 306, 309 and passim; 'Waṣīyyat Fū'āḍ Pasha' (c. 1908), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 47-48 and passim; letter to the editor of al-Haqīqa magazine, 30 Jul. 1906, in Rasa'il, p. 96.


21. 'Ṭariq al-Iṣlāḥ' (c. 1898); 'al-Maktubī (1900); 'al-Lubnāniyyūn w-al-Muṭaṣarrīf al-Jadīd' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 386-387, 276-277, 456; 'al-Tarqī fi al-'Amal' (1909); 'Fatihā Mubārakā' (c. 1909); 'al-Hurriyya Wahdah la Tuwaḥshidūnā' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 22, 55, 62; al-Nakābāt, AAK, 6, p. 212.

22. 'Idhā Kān la Budd Min al-Zulm' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 454.

23. 'al-Lubnāniyyūn w-al-Muṭaṣarrīf al-Jadīd' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 455-456; 'al-Hurriyya w-al-Tahdhib' (c. 1908); 'Ruḥ al-Thawra' (1913), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 38, 104.

24. 'al-Maktubī (1900), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 276-277, 284; also letter to Constantine Yanni, 20 Jan. 1906, in Rasa'il, p. 77.

25. 'al-Maktubī (1900), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 284.


27. 'Ingiltār w-al-Raḥma al-Maṣḥīyya' (1899), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 398-411.


29. 'Madhhbāt Waṣṭanī' (1927), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 245.

30. 'al-Sīhāfā w-al-Dawlā' (1931), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 295.

31. Ibid., p. 295.

32. 'Bayn 'Aḥdayn' (1933), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 323.

33. On education as means of eradicating tyranny, see 'Ṭariq al-Iṣlāḥ' (c. 1898), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 387; 'Ruḥ Ḥadhā al-Zaman' (n.d. c. 1906), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 155-161; 'Waṣīyyat Fū'āḍ Pasha' (c. 1908); also 'al-Tarqī fi al-'Amal' (1909); 'Fatihā Mubārakā' (c. 1909); 'al-Ḥurriyya Waḥdāh la Tuwaḥshidūnā' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 46, 22, 55, 62; on democratic rule, see 'al-Hukumā al-Dimūqraṭīyya', in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 428; 'al-Sīhāfā w-al-Dawlā' (1931), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 294-298 and passim; on civil disobedience, see 'Indama Yākūn al-Tamarrūd Waṣībān' (1931); 'Ḥabbaṭ Manṭiq' (1933); 'al-Tamarrūd 'Alā al-Zulm' (1933), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 278-282, 309-312, 313-318 and passim; on armed revolt, see 'al-Ḥayāt w-al-Hurriyya w-al-Ṣayl' (c. 1917), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 148.

34. 'Min Ghānim Ilā al-Bustānī' (1908); 'al-Hurriyya w-al-Tahdhib' (c. 1908), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 18, 33-34, 38; Nicola Ziadeh names Riḥāni and al-Kawākibī amongst the most prominent Syrian intellectuals who advocated constitutional rule in Syria, see, N. Ziadeh, Shamiyyāt, p. 249.
35. 'al-Sīḥa'f a-w-al-Dawla' (1931), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 298.

36. 'al-Tamaddun al-Ḥadīth' (c. 1906), in al-Rihāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 141.


39. 'al-Tamaddun al-Ḥadīth' (c. 1906), in al-Rihāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 143.

40. Ibid., pp. 139-141.

41. Ibid., p. 141.


43. 'al-Tamaddun al-Ḥadīth' (c. 1906), al-Rihāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 142.

44. Khalid, pp. 123-128.

45. Ibid., pp. 128-134.

46. Ibid., pp. 134-135.

47. See in particular, 'al-Ḥikma al-Muthallatha' (1924); 'Naḥnu w-al-Aqdamūn' (1930); 'Innī Mutafa'il' (1932); 'Hadafi wa Wasilaai' (1935), in al-Rihāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 392-393, 441, 459-463, 559 and passim.

48. 'Su' Tawzī' al-Tharawāt' (c. 1898), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 388.

49. It is not clear whom Rihani is specifically criticising here. The first Arabic work on political economy was probably a book by Khālīf Ghanīm published in Alexandria in 1879. Rafi'ī Jirjis also published Usūl al-Iqtiṣād al-Siyāsī in Cairo 1886. In the Arabic periodicals, 'Isā Iskandar al-Ma'llūf (an associate of Rihani) published 'al-Iqtiṣād' in 1892, see Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals, pp. 81-82.

50. 'al-Iqtiṣād al-Siyāsī' (c. 1898), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 389; on his early interest and knowledge in political economy, see also 'Naḥnu wa Jam'iyyatuna' (1900); 'al-Mas'ala al-Fiḍdiyya' (1900); 'Idhā Kān la Budd Min al-Ẓulm' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 269, 444-446, 454.

51. Rihani obviously reflects here a liberal attitude compared to the general "conservative" strand of Syrian emigrants in the USA. When indicating a concern with domestic American politics, the emigrants, in general, voted Republican. See Berger, 'Americans From the Arab World', in Kritzeck and Winder (eds.), The World of Islam, p. 363.

52. 'Bryan al-Mušlih' (1900), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 430-432.

53. 'al-Tamaddun al-Ḥadīth' (c. 1906), in al-Rihāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 139.

54. 'Fawq Suţūh New York' (1906); Fī Mithl Hadḥa al-Yawm' (1906); 'al-Tamaddun al-Ḥadīth' (c. 1906); 'Abna' al-Bu'as' (c. 1906), in al-Rihāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 128-149.

55. 'Fawq Suţūh New York' (1906), in al-Rihāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 132.

56. 'al-Tamaddun al-Ḥadīth' (c. 1906), in al-Rihāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 139.

58. 'al-Tamaddun al-Ḥadīth' (c. 1906), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 139-140.

59. 'Fī Mithl Ḥadhā al-Yawm' (1906), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 137.

60. Ibid., p. 137.

61. 'al-Tamaddun al-Ḥadīth' (c. 1906), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 141-142.

62. 'Abnā’ al-Bu’s' (c. 1906), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 143.

63. 'Abnā’ al-Bu’s' (c. 1906); 'Fī Mithl Ḥadhā al-Yawm' (1906), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 144-147, 137.

64. 'Abnā’ al-Bu’s' (c. 1906), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 144-145.

65. Ibid., pp. 146-147.


68. 'Fawq Suṭūh New York' (1906), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 129.

69. 'Abnā’ al-Bu’s' (c. 1906), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 148.

70. Ibid., p. 148.

71. Ibid., p. 149.


73. S. Hanna and G. Gardner, Arab Socialism, pp. 264, 22. The Book is a documentary survey of Arab socialism in the works of Arab authors in different ages with an introductory chapter on Arab socialism.

74. On the notions of socialism in the writings of a number of Arab intellectuals, see Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals, pp. 79-86; on the socialist ideas of al-Kawākibī, Anṭūn and Shumayyīl in particular, see Barakāt, al-Mujtama‘ al-‘Arabī, pp. 410-417; Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 252-254; al-Husry, Three Reformers, pp. 73-78; R. al-Sayyid, Thalathat Lubnaniyyin fī al-Qahira, pp. 57-68, 118-151; on socialism in the writings of Muslim Arab thinkers, see Jedaane, Usus al-Taqaddum, pp. 494-546.

75. Hourani, op. cit, pp. 252-254; Sharabi, op. cit, pp. 84-86; Hanna and Gardner, op. cit, p. 264.

76. 'al-Tasāḥul al-Dīnī’ (1900), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 49.

77. 'Shu’āra’ al-‘Asr’ (1903), in Shadharā, AAK, 6, p. 513.

78. 'Khītāb al-Masīh’ (1910), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 196. This article was written for the Sarkis Magazine in response to the editor's question "what would Christ say if he returned to the world on this Christmas day?".

80. On his campaign against the French Mandate, see Ch. 7, below.
82. 'Ṣanat 1950' (1920), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, pp. 343-354.
83. Ibid., p. 345.
84. Ibid., pp. 353-354.
85. Ibid., pp. 351-353.
86. Ibid., p. 346.
87. Ibid., p. 345. Rihani uses the terms harb al-tabagāt or nīdāl al-tabagāt, rather than al-nīdāl al-tabagū, commonly used in Arabic for class struggle, and al-muṭṭama' al-istiṭḥārī al-‘āmilī (the socialist workers society), or istiḥārīyyat al-umām (the socialism of nations), rather than al-umamiyya commonly used for International. See 'al-istiḥārīyya al-‘Arabīyya' (n.d.), an open letter to Ibrahim Haddad on his al-istiḥārīyya al-‘Arabīyya, in Adab wa Fann, AAK, 9, p. 403.
88. Ibid., p. 349.
90. The Path of Vision (1921), pp. 76-77.
91. The Descent of Bolshevism, p. vii.
92. Ibid., p. vii.
93. Ibid., p. xi.
94. Ibid., p. viii.
95.Jurjī Zaydān also compared Russian nihilism, the materialist socialism to the Kharijites of Islam, see Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals, p. 81.
96. The Descent of Bolshevism, pp. 47-52.
97. See A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freike, p. 313.
100. Ibid., p. viii.
101. Ibid., p. xi.
102. Ibid., p. 47.
103. Ibid., pp. ix-xii.
104. On this phenomenon, see M. Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World, p. 80.

105. 'al-Sullam' (c. 1928), in al-Tāţarruf, AAK, 8, pp. 443-445.

106. 'al-Tāţarruf' (c. 1928), in al-Tāţarruf, AAK, 8, p. 449.


108. On his campaign against the French Mandate, see Ch. 7, below; on his endeavour to bring about Arab Unity, see Ch. 8, below; on his campaign against Zionism see his activities, Ch. 2, above, and his posthumous The Fate of Palestine and other articles cited in the Bibliography.

109. On the communist attitude towards the national struggle in the Arab countries, see Rodinson, op. cit, pp. 84-119; on the impact of such attitude on the thought of a number of Arab and Muslim intellectuals, see Dahīr, Tarikh Lubnān, p. 289.

110. Fayṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, p. 520.

111. 'Naḥnu w-al-Aqdamūn' (1930), in al-Riḥānīyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 431.

112. Ibid., pp. 438-439.

113. Ibid., pp. 431-441.

114. 'Jami'a Wašṭaniyya' (1937), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 414.

115. Ibid., 413-414.

116. Ibid., p. 415.


118. 'Jami'a Wašṭaniyya' (1937), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 416.


120. From an unpublished letter to the editor of La Voz de la Revolución, organ of the socialist revolution in Mexico, 31 March 1918, partially quoted in A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freike, pp. 92-93.

121. 'al-Ishtirākiyya al-'Amaliyya' (n.d.), in Adab wa Fann, AAK, 9, pp. 402-403.

122. Ibid., p. 402.

123. Ibid., pp. 402-403.

124. 'Tolstoy' (n.d.), in Wujūḥ, AAK, 9, p. 466.

125. Ibid., pp. 466-467.


127. 'Ruḥ Hādhā al-Zaman' (n.d. c. 1906), in al-Riḥānīyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 156.

128. A. Fried and R. Sanders, Socialist Thought, pp. 3-4.
CHAPTER FIVE

RIHANI'S IDEAS ON OTTOMAN REFORM, DECENTRALISATION AND ARAB INDEPENDENCE

Rihani's early career as a writer and public speaker corresponded to the last twenty years of the Ottoman Empire. His political ideas during the period between 1898 and 1918 in which the Arab East was still under Ottoman rule are reflected in articles and speeches which were later published in a number of his collected works. A survey of these writings shows that Rihani was concerned with the main issues of the period. Apart from his contributions on the ideas of progress, justice and democracy (discussed in chapters Three and Four), his concerns included more specific issues such as reform of the Ottoman State and constitutional rule; administrative and political reform in Mount Lebanon; Lebanese privileges and autonomy at the political, administrative, economic, and cultural levels; position and role of the Arabic language and culture in the Ottoman Empire; whether revolt against the Turks to liberate Lebanon and Syria was the right path to follow; and the fate of Lebanon and Syria at the end of the First World War.

Ottoman Reform: Impact on Syria and Mount Lebanon

To begin with, between 1898 and 1910, while Rihani like other Arab writers of his generation, considered the Ottoman "umma" as his own, he nevertheless emphasised his Syrian identity within the Ottoman State, using such expressions as "We Syrians" and "the Syrian nation" in his writings and speeches. With "its diverse peoples and languages", Rihani considered "the Ottoman State" as his own state and did not, at this stage, advocate breaking away from it. Like many Arab reformers during this period, Rihani was concerned with the reform of the State: "our state's unsound system (nizām dawlatīnā al-mukhtālī)" and "our nation's crooked and corrupt way of life (tāriq håyat ummatīnā al-mu'wajjī al-fāsidī)."

It is perhaps important to note that when Rihani began his call for reform in 1898 in the United States, the policy of oppression adopted by the Sultān
'Abdul-Ḥamīd in the Arab provinces, together with the Sultan's call for Pan-Islamism, had resulted in paralysing the reform movement and the drowning of any voices calling for Arab autonomy in Syria. Although Rihani in the USA was naturally safe from persecution, the reticence of opposition back home may have convinced him that revolution was still premature, because neither the people nor the leaders were prepared to take such a radical step. Thus, despite his complaints against the Turkish misgovernment, he was contented with the call for reform which until 1913, and with calls for autonomy or decentralisation, remained the dominant trend in the Arab provinces.

Rihani was aware that during this period there were some voices in Syria and among Syrian emigrants in America calling for revolution against the Ottoman State. These were mainly Christians who sought independence from the Turks and would have preferred the replacement of Ottoman rule by some European protection or even control. He was most probably aware of this tendency among the Syrian emigrants. Thus, in 1901 he criticised his friend Shibli Damūs for encouraging the idea of revolution, arguing that a revolution at this stage was too early, not only because both Ottoman people and leaders were not ready for it, but also because Ottoman rule had not yet reached a stage to be overthrown.

However, despite his preference for reform instead of revolution, Rihani was sceptical about the revival of the decaying Ottoman State. This suggests that reform for him, at this stage, was only a transitional step towards achieving more radical changes in due course. It also supposes that his rejection of the idea of revolution was not the result of his belief in the Ottoman State system as it stood then, but rather due to his conviction that, in order to succeed, revolution should not be hurried.

Rihani's ideas for the reform of the Ottoman Empire were based on the concepts of justice, equality and freedom, discussed in earlier chapters. By the time Rihani started writing, these ideas had begun to influence the political consciousness of intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire, including in Arab lands, and had become incorporated in the programmes of Ottoman revolutionary organisations in which Arabs played a significant role.
A particularly important concept in Rihani's thought during this period, and throughout, was that of patriotism. He saw patriotism (wataniyya) or "love of the country" (hubb al-watan), as a sentiment that should be spread amongst Ottoman subjects through public, non-sectarian, education. It is clear that by advocating this, Rihani's aim was not only to counter the decline in Ottoman society but also to fight against the political tyranny of 'Abdul-Ḥamīd.13

Of course, the concept of patriotism was not unfamiliar in the Ottoman Empire during this period. The principle of broad patriotism or loyalty to the Ottoman State was adopted by the Tanzimat reformers and statesmen as the basis for the new institutions which were envisaged to modernise the state. The Tanzimat statesmen also emphasised the importance of educational reform, and they endeavoured to develop a secular programme in the public education system. Similarly, the Young Ottomans adopted, as early as 1868, Ottoman patriotism as one of the two main points for their programme (the other was consultative government).14 Meanwhile notions of love of one's own country (al-watan), as distinct from the larger and universal Ottoman Empire, was already introduced into Arab thinking by such nineteenth century reformers as the Egyptian Rifāʿa al-Ṭaḥtāwī (1801-1873) and the Syrian-Lebanese Butrus al-Bustānī (1819-1883).15 While Rihani, ever since he started writing in 1898, advocated patriotism which signified loyalty to the Ottoman State he, like most Arab thinkers at the time, seemed to adopt the principle of Ottomanism coupled with an emphasis on his loyalty to his native Arab land, particularly Lebanon and Syria.16

Constitutional Reform, Autonomy and Decentralisation

After the Young Turk coup of July 1908,17 and the restoration of the constitution which was greeted by the Arabs with enthusiasm, Rihani, in common with other Arab intellectuals, expressed cautious joy over the victory of this "peaceful revolution".18 In a speech delivered on this occasion, he praised 'Abdul-Ḥamīd for restoring the constitution and for "inaugurating a new era of freedom, tolerance, equality and fraternity".19 This attitude should not be understood as toadying to 'Abdul-Ḥamīd. For while Rihani saluted the Sultan for granting freedom to the nation, he warned that political freedom was useless if
stripped of its spiritual dimension, and that constitutional government was meaningless if the people did not understand the real significance of liberty or if the "ambitious" leaders exploited it for their own interests.\textsuperscript{20}

It did not take long before Rihani realised that his fears were justified. In April 1909, a counter-revolution broke out in Istanbul in favour of 'Abdul-Ḥamīd who believed that with the aid of reactionaries he could restore the system of absolute government.\textsuperscript{21} It was natural for Rihani, who from the beginning saw that reform of the state required the curbing of the Sultān's absolute rule,\textsuperscript{22} to give support to the anti-Hamidian movement and to the army which crushed the counter-revolution. In an article published on 30 April, 1909 he praised the "great Arab" Maḥmūd Shawkat (Şevket) Pasha, the general commander of the "Army of Deliverance".\textsuperscript{23} In his opinion, Shawkat played an important role in establishing freedom, for if Niyazi and Enver had dug the foundations of liberty, Shawkat has now put the cornerstone of the building by defending the constitution. The fact that an Arab upheld the constitution gave Rihani hope in ending Arab-Turkish disunity and beginning a new era of peace and co-operation. In this context, Rihani criticised those members of parliament who supported 'Abdul-Ḥamīd, and he called upon them to depose the Sultān for breaking his constitutional oath and because he "was already deposed by the force of justice". He argued that if the parliament failed to do so, it should be dismissed by the people because it would be no longer representing their will.\textsuperscript{24}

Rihani's hopes in the constitutional government under the Committee of Union and Progress ended in bitterness and disappointment. Between 1909 and 1910, more than ever, he asserted the futility of political revolution unless it was accompanied by a moral one. He was now convinced that the constitutional government was not the solution to all the nation's problems. "If the army destroyed the stronghold of the despotic government, it did not destroy the bases of tyranny... there is no difference between an autocratic despotic government and parliamentary despotism as long as ignorant fanaticism continued to prevail amidst the nation."\textsuperscript{25}

The repressive and centralisation policies of the Young Turks, between 1909 and 1914, no doubt resulted in a change in Rihani's political tendency, in
common with other Arab thinkers and activists of the period. The harmonious Arab-Turkish relationship, which he thought would be secured with the Arab participation and the presence of Shawkat in power, suffered greatly because of the centralisation policy and the imposition of the Turkish language and culture on the Arabs. The breach between the Young Turk régime and the Arab nationalists resulted in the proliferation of nationalist societies in Syria and Istanbul, as well as in Cairo and Paris, the principal centres of Arab exiles. They ranged from public associations which called openly for Arab autonomy within the Ottoman state, to secret conspiratorial groups which had concrete revolutionary programmes and a definite idea of Arab independence. While in Lebanon, Rihani participated in some of these activities through delivering speeches and contributions to newspapers.

The activities of Arab nationalists culminated in the holding of the first Arab Congress, (in Paris, June 1913) where the necessity of reform on the basis of decentralisation and the assertion of Arab rights within the Ottoman State were emphasised. Rihani also maintained personal contact and correspondence with prominent Arab nationalist figures including some of the organisers of the Paris Congress. But there is no evidence that he was a member of any of these associations; and whether he attended the Congress of Paris is still debatable. However, Rihani’s ideas during this period reflect a clear disapproval of the Unionist policies and a growing tendency towards autonomy (or independence) for the Arab provinces. For example, in 1910, he deplored the Unionist attempts to abolish the privileges of Lebanon in order to end its autonomy and restore Ottoman authority. Furthermore, in 1911, for the first time he declared his Arab identity as distinct from his Ottoman identity. This important development will be discussed later in this chapter. Meanwhile he continued to call for reform, with the main object being autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. In 1912, he called for political autonomy of all the provinces and all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, including the political autonomy of Lebanon. After the defeat of the Ottomans in the First Balkan War (August 1912-May 1913), Rihani predicted the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The change of government
after the coup d'état launched against Kamil's cabinet would not, in his opinion, stop the spirit of the anti-Ottoman revolutionary movement. More importantly, he now found it possible to ascertain the inevitability of revolution against the Turks and the necessity of establishing a new "Arab Muslim Christian Syrian union (al-Jāmi‘a al-Sūriyya al-‘Arabīyya al-Islāmīyya al-Masīḥīyya)", based on Pan-Arab national unity (al-waḥda al-qawmiyya).  

Rihani's passage from 'Ottomanism' to 'Arabism' thus did not happen suddenly. While asserting his loyalty to the Ottoman State and calling for its reform, Rihani was concerned about administrative and political reform for Lebanon and about restoring Arab glory. In fact, these two issues were at the centre of his general concern for Ottoman reform. Thus, a discussion of these two issues is necessary, not only as an introduction to his anti-Turkish campaign for liberation but also his campaign for Syrian and Arab unity at a later stage.

Rihani's early writings reflect a particular concern for the reform of the administrative and political system of the Mutasarrifīyya of Mount Lebanon within the Ottoman Empire. Established to bring an end to the 1860 sectarian disturbances, the Mutasarrifīyya organised the political life in Mount Lebanon from 1861 to 1915, i.e. until shortly after the outbreak of the First World War. While a detailed discussion of this period will not be attempted here, a summary of the arrangements brought by the new régime must suffice. In 1861, a new statute known as the Règlement et protocole relatifs à la réorganisation du Mont Liban, constituted Mount Lebanon as an autonomous Ottoman province under a plenipotentiary governor-general designated by the Porte and approved by the signatory powers. The governor, or Mutasarrif, should be an Ottoman subject of the Christian faith but not of Lebanese origin.

The Règlement provided Mount Lebanon with an entirely new and distinctive status within the Ottoman Empire. Mount Lebanon's autonomy was internationally recognised and guaranteed by the signatory powers. The Règlement stipulated also the formation of an elective Administrative Council (Majlis Idāra) of twelve representatives from the different religious communities to advise the Mutasarrif.
Geographically, the Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon did not include the Biqā‘, Wādí al-Taym, Beirut and Sidon, all of which had belonged at different points to the Lebanon of the Ma‘ni and the Shihabi amirs. The ports of Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli, remained under direct Ottoman rule. The territory of the Mutasarrifate was treated as a privileged Sanjak, and was divided into seven administrative districts (qaddā‘), each under a Qā‘imāqām appointed by the Mutasarrif from the dominant sect. The districts were, in turn, divided into more or less homogenous sectarian sub-districts (nāhiya) where special administrative officials were appointed. Finally, in every village, the headman, or sheikh, nominally elected by the local people, received formal appointment from the Mutasarrif. These village sheikhs elected the members of the Administrative Council.

By the terms of the Règlement, the government of the mountain maintained its own judiciary and preserved order by a special corps of Lebanese gendarmerie. No Turkish troops were quartered in the land, no military service was incumbent on its citizens and no tribute was due to the Porte. The new constitution abolished all feudal privileges, declared equal rights to all Lebanese citizens and provided for a census of the population and a survey of the land. With modifications, the Règlement remained the basic constitution of Mount Lebanon for the next fifty years, when in summer 1915, after entering the war on the side of Germany, the Ottoman authorities abolished the Mutasarrifiyya and placed the whole Arab East, including Mount Lebanon, under military rule.

Rihani’s first concern over the Mutasarrifiyya régime was in connection with the full executive power given to the governor by the terms of the Règlement. This concern was particularly expressed as strong criticism of the appointment of Muẓaffar Pasha (1902-1907), an Ottoman General, as Mutasarrif. This was the first time Rihani was able to express an opinion on such an appointment since he only started writing in 1898. Rihani saw the appointment of a military man to the Mutasarrifate as a contradiction of the principle of “civil government” (al-ḥukūma al-madaniyya) as declared by the Règlement. Moreover, he argued that a military man was not fit for the governorship, not only because such a man would have limited knowledge of
political, economic, and cultural sciences (al-‘ulūm al-‘umrāniyya), but also because a military ruler "is often tyrannical (mustabidd)".\(^{40}\)

The military background and career of the new Mutāsarrīf did not seem to impress Rihani who stressed that a good governor should be a distinguished intelligent diplomat, a civil law expert, and an honest executive legislator.\(^{41}\) He should stand against favouritism in the government and against the influence of foreign Consuls on the internal affairs of the Mountain. He should be prepared to respect the representatives of the people, and share the executive power with the Administrative Council.\(^{42}\)

Rihani’s strong reservations about the new Mutāsarrīf raised a number of issues in the Mountain’s politics. To begin with, Rihani was concerned about the distinctive autonomy of the Mountain within the Ottoman State. Thus he warned against the signs of hypocrisy and blind obedience shown by the public in welcoming the Mutāsarrīf. He feared that such subservience would make the "military" governor into an absolute autocratic ruler (ḥākim mufrad mutlaq). This, in his opinion, not only was "contrary to the terms of the Protocole which granted distinctive autonomy (istiqlāl nāwī) to the Mountain", but also contradicted the interest of the Lebanese people who should be the only absolute master of their country (al-wātan).\(^{43}\) Similarly, Rihani argued that with absolute power, the new Mutāsarrīf would undermine the "civil government", particularly that in his speech on the assumption of office the Mutāsarrīf showed little intention to consult the Administrative Council or increase its executive power.\(^{44}\) This also shows Rihani’s awareness of, and concern with the consultative function and the increasing power of the Administrative Council which was encouraged by the successive governors to participate in the government of the Mountain.\(^{45}\)

It is important to note that during this period, Rihani’s anti-sectarian ideas began to evolve and take a hostile attitude towards political sectarianism which had become the official basis of the Lebanese political system since the Mutāsarrifiyya.\(^{46}\) Rihani expressed indifference to "whether the Mutāsarrīf was a Maronite or an atheist as long as he was honest and above corruption".\(^{47}\) This in itself is significant. For it indicates that Rihani suggested a radical change in the terms of the Règlement according to which the Mutāsarrīf had to be a Christian.
At that time, during the controversy over the selection of a new Governor as a successor to Na‘ūm Pasha (1892-1902), the Russian Ambassador had considered putting forward a Greek-Orthodox candidate for Mutasarrif against the name of Yusuf Bey the candidate supported by both the French Ambassador and the Maronite Church. Without contradicting the letter of the Règlement the selection of a non-Catholic governor would have been a radical departure from its spirit. By considering the religious affiliation of the Mutasarrif as irrelevant, and by criticising the interference of foreign consuls, Rihani was obviously expressing his opposition to the sectarian nature of the system and the role of foreign powers.

Rihani’s criticism of the Maronite hegemony over the government, his call for separating the state from the church, and his defence of the rights of the Administrative Council, all clearly demonstrate not only his opposition to the Maronite Church, but also his strong leaning towards the liberal opposition line. This opposition had begun to form among young public figures since 1883 as a consequence of the enhanced importance of the Council and in opposition to the rapprochement and collaboration between the Maronite Church and the traditionally influential families of Kisrawān. Rihani’s ideas of administrative reform in Mount Lebanon during this period reflect this line of opposition.

In 1902, Rihani criticised Muḥaffar Pasha’s promises to eliminate corrupt officials in the administration. He considered the Mutasarrif’s supposed programme of reform as quite impractical since it ignored important issues for the improvement of the Lebanese life and government. His own view of administrative reform consisted of establishing national public schools, prohibiting the interference of notables (al-wujahāʾ) in the administrative and political affairs, and appointing the officials and police, not on sectarian basis or favouritism, but according to qualifications. He saw that such reforms should be implemented only by effective legislation put forward by the Administrative Council. Significantly, this implies an increase of the power of the Council which Rihani was keen to support as the "representative of the people".

The aforementioned demands reflect Rihani’s awareness of many problems then affecting the political and social life of Mount Lebanon and his concern for
genuine reform. The call for national public education shows his awareness of the political importance which foreign and private educational institutions assumed as vehicles of influence for the power sponsoring them, and of the negative impact of these institutions in widening the gap between the Christians of Mount Lebanon and their Muslim compatriots as well as their Muslim neighbours in other Arab provinces. This issue of national public education, as discussed above, concerned Rihani throughout his career and put him under severe attack particularly from the Maronite clergy.  

His campaign against the notables, on the other hand, reflects his position towards an essential problem in Lebanese politics, i.e. political 'feudalism' (iqtā'). Although the iqtā' system was officially abolished by the Règlement, Lebanese 'feudal' (muqāṭī') families retained their influence in the Mutasarrifate through holding leading government positions, and through their direct interference in the appointment of the members of the administrative and judiciary councils. By terms of the Règlement, all members of these councils were to be nominated by the leaders of the respective communities and appointed by the government after agreement with the notables. This method of appointment, carried over from the earlier period of the Qā'imamātiyya, ensured the continued influence of the traditional leaderships during the Mutasarrifiyya and throughout Lebanon's most recent history.

Similarly, Rihani's insistence on secular appointment of officials and police forces reflects not only his concern for individual freedom and equality of all people before the law, as stipulated by the Règlement, but also his opposition to Maronite hegemony and the Church's influence on the government. Although a Maronite himself, Rihani refuted the claim that members of the Lebanese gendarmerie must be recruited in proportion to the various sectarian communities. This, in his opinion, not only would consolidate sectarianism, but would also contradict the principle of justice which should be the basis of the government. For "a just government does not support the strong to the detriment of the weak, but maintains a complete equilibrium between all communities". In this Rihani was critical of the Maronites who, as the largest community, dominated the police
force and, with the support of the Maronite Church, were the best politically organised community in Mount Lebanon.\textsuperscript{58}

In order to diminish the Church's influence on Lebanese politics, Rihani advocated the separation between the two. For this purpose, he called for a change in the Lebanese régime which would allow the election of councillors from political parties rather than from different religious communities in the Mountain.\textsuperscript{59} His idea of political parties may be influenced by the Western political system. However, his distinction between the religious and political parties (al-ahžāb al-dīnīyya w-al-ahžāb al-sīvāsiyya), seems to reflect a particular political conflict which, since 1873, started to become visible in Mount Lebanon between the Maronite Church and the government.

In order to weaken the influence of the Maronite clergy in government offices, the third governor, Rustum Pasha (1873-1883), began to replace high-ranking officials, who were known for their affinity to the Maronite Church and the French Consulate, with a cadre whom he held to be professionally better qualified. Despite great opposition from the French Consul and the Maronite clergy, Wāṣa Pasha (1883-1892) pursued a similar policy and strengthened the position of the newly appointed officials. The conflict between the group which constituted the core of Wāṣa's "government party" and the protégés of the Church openly manifested itself in intense competitions during successive elections for the Administrative Council.\textsuperscript{60}

It is true Rihani had not started writing during these early years. However, his ideas, expressed since 1902, on the appointment of qualified officials and the election of councillors from political parties, as opposed to sectarian considerations, no doubt reflect the conflict between the Maronite Church and other emerging political parties; a conflict in which he obviously did not support the Maronite Church.

Rihani's opposition to the clergy and the Church's policy in Mount Lebanon culminated in 1904 with the publication of his \textit{al-Muḥāla fa al-Thulāthīyya} which was banned by the clergy and consequently Rihani was excommunicated. The opposition continued significantly during his stay in Lebanon between the years 1905 and 1910. The most important aspect of this
opposition was his strong attack on the confessional régime of Mount Lebanon which allowed the Maronite Church and the notables to exercise strong influence on the government. In 1909, he reasserted the need for prohibiting the "sheikhs of the villages", the "clergy" and the "wealthy" (aghniyya al-bilad) from interfering in government affairs because such interference pressurised the officials and hindered the progress of the people.⁶¹ This not only shows Rihani's critical assessment of the Church-notables alliance in this period, but also that he aligned himself with a new emerging anti-clerical current which had developed among the Maronites of Kisrawān and the Mātn districts since 1902.⁶²

To outweigh the Church-notables sectarian alliance, Rihani suggested the formation of a non-sectarian union (ittiḥād) between all the groups in the country, with one patriotic (waṭanī) aim and under an honest and courageous leader. He stressed the need for a strong independent leader capable of carrying the difficult task of reform and uniting the people under the patriotic banner. Such a leader, in his opinion, would be capable of opposing European Consuls and leading the country to progress in order to face European powers on equal footing.

An independent leader, in Rihani's view, should be free from any connections with, and consequently from the influence of, the Maronite Church, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the European Consuls, the Freemasons, the Reformists (those politicians working closely with the CUP and the Freemasons), and the Lebanese notables and merchants. Such a leader may be an ordinary man, not necessarily from a noble line, who has a "divine enlightenment" (nūr ilāhī) to lead his people.⁶³ Thus, Rihani indicates the need to replace the Ottoman Governor by an indigenous leader, an idea which became more explicit in his later writings when he openly claimed the right of the Lebanese people to elect a Lebanese Governor.

These ideas were expressed in 1909, one year after the Young Turks coup which complicated the politics of the Mutasarrifiyya by drawing the Mountain into political tensions and military uncertainties which disturbed the rest of the empire. After one year of constitutional government, Rihani complained that the "promised Lebanese freedom was only a lie", and that the political situation in Lebanon had not improved. He was highly critical of the coalition between officials of the
CUP, the Freemasons, the Reformists, and the Maronite Church. He equally criticised the European interference in the Mountain under the excuse of protecting its people, and the corrupt Lebanese councillors who, concerned only about their interests and positions, were prepared to make concessions to the central government to the detriment of their own people and the rights and privileges of their own country.64

These ideas reflect, in general, the changing circumstances in Mount Lebanon after the coup of July 1908. By then, the Mutassarif Yusuf Pasha (1907-1912), had restored to office many of the 'conservatives' who had been dismissed by Mu'azzafar Pasha. A coalition of Druzes and Maronites, with the support of the European powers and the Hamidian court, stood behind Yusuf's government, largely undermining the importance of the Administrative Council whose members were afraid of dissolution and benefited from the salary increases that the Mutassarif had introduced. Early in July 1908, with the 'liberal' opposition in disarray, Yusuf had succeeded to exercise direct authority over the Mutassarifiyva, thus implicitly recognising Lebanon's subordination to the Ottoman Empire.65

The restoration of constitutional government sparked off the latent opposition to Yusuf Pasha. Under pressure from the CUP, and the threat of a unified Druze and 'liberal' Christian opposition, the Mutassarif made some concessions. However, many critical questions, related to the policy which the CUP adopted in order to strengthen the central government and the empire, stirred the Mountain. This policy included an attempt to impose a Lebanese participation in the revived Ottoman parliament; the closure of Lebanese ports to international traffic; and the imposition of the identity card on Lebanese citizens. This policy was seen by the Lebanese leadership as a threat to Lebanon's special autonomy, and to the privileged status of Lebanese amongst other citizens of the empire.66

Reflecting such developments in Lebanese politics, Rihani's ideas underwent some change. As seen above, in 1909 Rihani was highly critical of the Lebanese régime which reinforced European interference in the internal affairs of the Mountain. European protection, in his opinion, was no longer needed because the Lebanese people had recovered from their calamity. The régime which was
created to protect them should be completely abolished, since it was founded on
confessional basis, and had become outmoded. 67

However, as a response to the Unionist attempts to restore the authority of
the central Ottoman government over Lebanon, Rihani defended Lebanon’s
privileges and called, instead, for the amendment of its régime. In 1909, he
asserted that he did not “venerate” the régime of Lebanon, nor did he consider it
"natural". For "its terms of reference are too narrow for the Lebanese people, and
our deputies do not have the courage to work according to its spirit (ruh al-nass)".
Thus while he called upon the Lebanese people to protest outside the European
Consulates in Beirut against the government’s attempts to abolish the privileges of
Lebanon, he also urged the Lebanese to seek amendment of the régime which was
no longer suitable for their aspirations. He argued that "the narrow (dayvio) régime is no longer beneficial to us because of our growth (numuw)". 68 He did
not, however, explain whether this growth was an increase in the number of the
population or a result of political and social progress. Thus, it is difficult to
assume that his demand for reform and amendment to the régime included also
territorial adjustments.

In another article written in 1910 in New York, Rihani called upon the
Lebanese emigrants to form a "Lebanese society" (jam‘iyya lubbāniyya) and seek
the amendment (ta’dîl) of the régime hand in hand with the Lebanese in the
homeland. He reiterated similar ideas on the "too limited (mahdud) and narrow
(dayvio) régime to suit the Lebanese condition today". 69 However, unlike some
other Lebanese Maronite Christians, he did not explicitly call for extending
Lebanese territory. 70 He in fact contented with the demand for an increase in the
autonomy of the Mountain by introducing in the Règlement additional articles
allowing the people "at least to directly elect the councillors to the Administrative
Council". "These limited and reasonable demands" were, in his opinion, "all what
the people should claim at this stage to be favourably received". He put much
reliance on the assistance of the guaranteeing powers to ensure the necessary
amendments and to defend the autonomy against the coalition of Lebanese
politicians and the Young Turks. 71
Although, while in Lebanon, Rihani enjoyed the protection of the United States as a naturalised American, and was thus able to be more vocal in demanding reforms, his ideas on autonomy were still within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps because the Ottoman authorities then had started to tighten their policy of centralisation, applying their authority even to naturalised emigrants, Rihani limited his campaign only to these "reasonable" reforms.

A note of discontent with the Unionist policy began to appear in 1910, when Rihani started to complain against anarchy and degeneration under the rule of the CUP. In an article written that year he deplored the politicians’ attack against the Lebanese press, sarcastically, accusing them of attempting to secure their "own noble ambitions". Like the identity card which was rejected by many Lebanese as being contrary to their privileges, the Lebanese press was reluctant to recognise the applicability of the new Ottoman press law that the Mutasarrif sought to impose on the Mountain. Apart from supporting the press’s contention, the article reflects Rihani’s suspicions towards the Unionist policies which were applied in Lebanon by the Mutasarrif and the government’s officials, as new aspects of Ottoman authority.

Another important aspect in this attack against the Lebanese politicians is that Rihani pointed to the relationship between the CUP and the Masonic movement. He described the "Reformists" who exploited their position "in the name of the constitution" as "Freemasons". Rihani was not the only one to raise this idea at the time. The Jesuit father Louis Cheikho, who interestingly accused Rihani himself of being a Freemason, showed in a series of articles in 1911 a close relationship between the CUP and the Masonic movement. Cheikho also argued that the overthrow of 'Abdul-Ḥamīd was a Masonic plot with a clear Zionist influence. Recent studies which seem to confirm this relationship have sought to link the overthrow of 'Abdul-Ḥamīd and his refusal of the Zionist demands in Palestine, and have pointed out that a number of newspapers including Līsān al-Ḥal in Beirut and al-Muqattam and al-Muqtaf in Egypt, which had an anti-Ottoman line of thought, openly supported the Zionist movement.

In this context one may wonder whether Rihani was aware of the Zionist movement at this period, and knowing his contribution to the above mentioned
newspapers, what was his attitude towards this anti-Ottoman Zionist relationship? If Rihani seemed to be aware of the relationship between the "Reformist Unionists" and the "Freemasons", he did not seem to be aware though of a Zionist involvement in the CUP movement or of the anti-Ottoman trend which supported the Zionists. Nothing in his early writings indicates that he was aware of the Zionist ambitions at this stage. His later writings about the Palestinian question, in which he took an Arab nationalist stand, did not mention any connection between the Zionist demands in Palestine and the overthrow of ‘Abdul-Ḥamīd.\textsuperscript{78}

By 1912, Rihani had begun to assert that decentralisation and political autonomy (\textit{al-istiqāl al-siyāsī}) were now inevitable. In an article entitled ‘\textit{al-Lāmārkaziyya wa Lubnān}’ (Decentralisation and Lebanon, 1912), he warned that for the Ottoman State to survive it must secure individual freedom (\textit{al-ḥurrīyya al-šākhsīyya}) and political autonomy (\textit{al-istiqāl al-siyāsī}) for its "small peoples (\textit{al-shu‘ūb al-saghīra}) regardless of religion or race". Political autonomy, in his opinion, was the basis of sound patriotism and progress of any nation, and being multi-national, the Ottoman Empire could no longer ignore the fact that its survival necessitated autonomy of the various nations within it.\textsuperscript{79}

At the same time, Rihani was aware of other voices calling for decentralisation and autonomy of the Arab provinces within the Ottoman State, and he saw that Lebanon should have a place in the new order. The Mountain, accordingly, should be granted its political autonomy and proper means of its agricultural, commercial and cultural progress should be ensured. Again he did not explain whether these means included the enlargement of Lebanon to include Beirut and the Biqā‘, as some other Lebanese were advocating, but he certainly stressed the need to open the Lebanese ports to international traffic to allow the mountain to become economically viable, an issue also discussed at the time by many other Lebanese. As Rihani considered Beirut a vital political, cultural and economic centre in Lebanon’s life,\textsuperscript{80} one could assume that he considered Beirut a legitimate and vital part of the Mountain.

At the administrative level, he saw that the political autonomy of Lebanon could be achieved by safeguarding its privileges, and making the political and administrative system broader, more relaxed and more representative. This
required direct election of the councillors by universal suffrage, and, more importantly, the replacement of the foreign Mutasarríf by a Lebanese governor (hākim) to be elected for 2 or 3 years.81

These ideas were not quite unfamiliar in Lebanon at that time. Similar demands for the revision of the political order in the Mountain were put forward by a number of organisations of significant influence, especially amongst the Christian Lebanese, both at the popular and intellectual levels. Two of these organisations are of particular interest here: Mukarzil's Lebanon League of Progress (LLP) (Jam‘iyat al-Nahda al-Lubnāniyya, New York, 1911) and Le Comité Libanais de Paris (CLP) (al-Rabita al-Lubnāniyya fi Barīs), founded in 1912 by a group of Lebanese journalists and men of letters including Khayrallah Khayrallah, ‘Abbās Bajjānī and Shukrī Ghānim. When first established, the LLP aimed at safeguarding the Lebanese privileges, the opening of a seaport and improving Lebanon's means of progress. The CLP proposed the election of the Administrative Council by universal suffrage with greater administrative and legislative powers, the opening of Lebanese ports to heavy tonnage, and the annexation of the Biqā‘ and either the two ports of Sidon and Tripoli, or that of Beirut. Both organisations played a significant role, before and after the First World War, in the campaign for the independence of Lebanon and were particularly active in opposing the idea of Lebanese unity with Syria in the Peace Conference between 1919 and 1920.82

There is no doubt that Rihani was aware of the existence and programmes of these two organisations. It is also possible that he was not too far-away from their establishment. Rihani had just left New York (end of July 1911) while Mukarzil's LLP was established in August 1911. And earlier in 1910, during a visit to Paris, he had discussed the political situation in Lebanon with Ghānim, Khayrallah and Bajjānī, the organisers of the CLP. However, and despite the similarity between his ideas and some of the aims of both organisations, there is no evidence of an official involvement on Rihani's part in the activities of either the LLP or the CLP.83

Rihani probably shared some of the two organisations views, particularly in their early days, but during and after the First World War, his ideas took a
different direction. While the LLP and the CLP sought an enlarged Lebanon and worked for its independence (the LLP advocated independence under French protection) Rihani adopted a broader perspective of independent united Syria, including Lebanon. During the war, as will be discussed later, he had collaborated with Shukri Ghanim who abandoned the CLP and formed the Syrian Central Committee (Comité Central Syrien) which aimed at the liberation and unity of all Syria under French protection.54

In Rihani’s call for decentralisation and political autonomy during the pre-war period, two points need to be emphasised. First, while advocating political autonomy Rihani endeavoured to assert his Ottoman loyalty. Loyalty to the Ottoman State, the "broader country" (al-watān al-kabīr), in his opinion, should not contradict Lebanese patriotism and loyalty to Lebanon, the "small country" (al-watān al-saghīr). Indeed, political autonomy allows the Lebanese people to become genuine Ottomans in spirit, word and deed, and administrative reform eliminates hatred and strengthens the Lebanese-Turkish loyalty and brotherhood. And while he advocated peaceful means to achieve autonomy, he anticipated other options such as revolution.55 Secondly, Rihani’s idea of political autonomy was, at this stage, centred around Lebanon. In fact, until 1912, Rihani was more specifically concerned about Mount Lebanon. In his pre-1914 writings, Syria appears more as a homeland rather than a potential political entity.56 And although he considered himself a Syrian in the cultural, regional sense, he spoke as a Lebanese and his concerns were those of the Lebanese people when it came to political and administrative affairs. "Syria" as a political entity and "Syrians" as a distinguished people, are reflected more in his post-1914 writings, which show the development of Rihani’s thought from the narrow idea of Lebanese autonomy to the broader one of complete independence and Syrian unity and later to Arab unity.

Rihani’s concept of decentralisation and political autonomy reflects the general trend of reform and decentralisation which was dominant in the Arab East before the war and was expressed in the Arab Congress in Paris 1913. It is well known that different tendencies were present at the Congress. There were the Arab nationalists who sought the independence of the Arab countries from the
Ottoman State, the Christian regionalists who sought the independence of Lebanon under French protection, and the decentralisation reformists who tried to channel all these varied trends.

Unlike the Christian separatists, by political autonomy Rihani understood the right to a Lebanese elected government which would enable the Lebanese people to exercise their national rights within the Ottoman State. In asserting his loyalty to the Ottoman State, Rihani insinuated other possibilities. His assertion of loyalty carried a hint of resistance if the Ottoman State stood hostile and ignored the Lebanese demands. In this, he went along with the Arab nationalists who, while working for reform and decentralisation, also considered the possibility of resistance and separation in case the Ottoman State did not respond to Arab aspirations.

From Ottomanism to Arabism

Despite the distinction between his "Ottoman" and "Arab" identity, and despite his nationalist leanings, Rihani did not share, at least openly at this stage, the separatist ideas of the Arab extremists who demanded complete independence. Nor did he, as a Christian Lebanese, share the claim of the regionalist separatists for a Lebanese entity under European protection. Thus, until 1914 Rihani seemed to go along with the Arab reformist trend which, through the Paris Congress, aimed at rallying the reformists around a common Arab action to face the Unionist policy and Turkish dominance.57

Thus, Rihani’s writings prior to the war reflect his dual Ottoman-Arab identity. This dualism in fact, reflects a conflict between two ideologies which, at the beginning of the twentieth century, competed for the loyalty of the Arab subjects of the Ottoman State - Ottomanism which defended the unity of the empire, and Arabism which proclaimed that the Arabs were a distinct people with their own particular characteristics and rights. Both ideologies aimed at restoring the greatness of the East. Having this same goal, Arabism had to wait until the declaration of the war to gather strength and momentum. Ottomanism appeared ineffectual in the face of Europe, and the turkification policy provided the Arabs’ objectives with a great stimulus.58
While Rihani considered the 'Ottoman Umma' as his nation, he showed pride in his Arab identity which was expressed in the first instance in his love of the "noble" Arabic language which, like the earlier generation of Buṭrus al-Bustānī and Ibrāhīm al-Yāzījī (1847-1906), he identified with his motherland (al-watan). Love of Arabic was expressed at an early stage in his determined effort to learn the language of the ancestors which competed with English, the language of his adopted country.89

Rihani assigned to the Arabic language an important role in the life of the Ottoman peoples. In 1898, he suggested that Arabic should be the universal language of the Ottoman nation (al-umma al-'uthmānīyya), because diversity of languages caused disintegration of the brotherhood bond and difference in inclinations. It also weakened the patriotic feeling which united the people (al-qawm) as "one nation" (umma wāhida). Language, according to Rihani, was the means of communication (wāsīṭat al-taʻāruf) and mutual understanding (al-tafāhum) between the people of the nation. He argued that, in both ancient and modern civilisations, the unification and refinement of a language, and the spread of its literature were the most important means of progress. Accordingly, he saw that progress of the Ottoman State depended on two conditions: the unification of its languages and the recognition of Arabic as its universal language. Speaking as a "Syrian", he urged his fellow Syrians to endeavour to protect, modernise and unify the Arabic language throughout the Ottoman State in order to preserve their identity. He draws the attention of linguists, politicians and journalists, in the Arab world in general and in Syria and Egypt in particular, to uphold Arabic as the language of the Ottoman State because Arabic was the language of the glorious noble Arabs, and particularly the language of the Prophet.90

This idea was later ascertained in 1908, the last year of 'Abdul-Ḥamīd's rule, when Rihani declared that loyalty to his motherland urged him to reconsider writing in Arabic, because he loved his "noble language" and his motherland - a love that was originated from his "self-love".91 Rihani at this period, became also conscious of the glorious Arab past and contribution to modern civilisation. This past was a source from which the strength could be drawn for Arab awakening and liberation. Reflecting a theme that has been popular in modern
Arab nationalist thought, Rihani proclaims that "the sun which rises from the West today is in fact our sun, it is the sun of our literature and religions. It is the sun of our past glory". This cultural awareness of his Arabhood was accompanied by a geo-political definition of his Arab motherland as early as 1909. "Three countries occupy the heart of the world map. These are Syria (including Palestine), Iraq or Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula. These countries are our motherland (watan) and the heart of the world where the Prophets appeared and religions rose. From this heart the sun of science, philosophy and literature shined upon Europeans and brought them out of ignorance and barbarity to progress and civilisation".92

His awareness of Arab identity and Arab consciousness evolved with the deterioration of the Ottoman State and the failure of constitutional reforms. In The Book of Khalid (1911), he talks with sarcasm about Ottoman corruption and the sterility of Turkish culture. And he talks with pride about the "great Arab race" who had fallen on evil days, a race that "gave Europe a civilisation and gave the world a religion". In this work, Khalid dreams of reviving this glory and rebuilding the "great Arab empire".93 This needed an Arab revolution which would throw the Turkish Empire and he looked upon Arabia to start this revolution, "not against Christianity or Muhammedanism, but against those Tataric usurpers who are now toadying to both". The Turks, in his own words, "were given a last chance to rise; they tried and failed. They can not rise. They are demoralised; ... high-sounding inanities about fraternity and equality can not regenerate an Empire. They must go: they will go".94

Rihani quite distinctly proclaimed his Arab identity as distinct from the Ottoman identity, in an article dated March 1911, New York, in which he wrote: "I am a revolutionary Oriental Arab... I am an Arab who does not hate the Turks, an Oriental who does not disdain the West and a revolutionary who is interested in the Ka'ba for example, more than in the Constitution... I am an Arab who dreams of reviving the Arab glory whether under the Constitution or under its enemies. I am a free Arab and my freedom is neither from the grace of the Constitution nor from the generosity of my Turkish brothers. My freedom is from God (Allah)...".95
Call for Syrian-Lebanese Independence and Arab Federation

At the outbreak of the First World War (1914), Rihani, like other Arab intellectuals, expressed much discontent with the Young Turk régime. But his Arab consciousness and enmity to the Turks culminated with the execution of the Arab nationalists and the declaration of the Arab revolt in June 1916. Amongst his writings during this period, two articles are particularly significant: 'al-Ḥaq w-al-Quwā' (Right and Force), and 'al-Hayāt w-al-Hurriyya w-al-Sayf' (Life, Freedom and the Sword). In the first, written in Paris in 1917, he compared the French war in defence of freedom against the Germans with the Arab revolt to liberate Islam from the Turkish evil. Both wars were for a right cause for, in his opinion, both Islam and the French Revolution shared a message of truth and perfection. As German autocracy and material interests overtook freedom in Europe, Turkish ignorance and greediness destroyed the bases of Islam. Thus, in his view, the Arabs' resort to revolt as descendants of the partisans of the Prophet (ansār al-nābi), was justifiable, for it sought to save Islam from Turkish corruption and tyranny, and to bring about its past glory.96 He obviously was referring to the Arab revolt of Shāhīr Ḥusayn who proclaimed that the Arab break with the Ottomans was because the Turks had ceased to execute the Shari‘a and thus to fulfil the conditions of the Caliphate.97

But the Arab revolt of 1916, in Rihani's view, did not only aim at defending Islam against the Turks. It was also a fight for principal human rights: namely, freedom of thought, speech and work which are the fundamental bases of progress. For this divine and essential eternal truth, the Allies and the Arabs were conducting the war, whereas the Turks and Germans were "the enemies of both freedom and rights of all humanity".98

Rihani uses the Arab revolt as an example to encourage the Syrians to take up the struggle against the Turks and liberate Syria. He endeavoured to show the Syrians that in the name of the Constitution the Turks committed the most horrible crimes in their history: the massacres of Armenians, and the execution of Syrians in 1916. "In the name of the Constitution, the Turks looted our country, famished our people, and killed thousands of innocent Christians and Muslims". He warned against the constitutionalists' policy of transplanting the Kurds and the Turks to
Syria, with the intention of exterminating the Syrians and make Syria a province (wilāya) of Anatolia. Those disasters perpetrated by the Turks in the name of the Constitution and the Islamic Umma (al-milla) were, in his opinion, enough reason to awaken the Syrians and stir up their "nationalist zeal" (al-ḥamīyya al-qawmiyya) and "patriotic zeal" (al-naʿra al-wataniyya). 99

Reflecting the sentiments and the anti-Turkish propaganda of his period, Rihani claims that "Turkish enmity for freedom is in their own nature. Their history is a chain of atrocities and injustice from Hulqū to ʿAbdul-Ḥamīd to Jamāl Pasha... But the Syrians shall not become their slaves". He urged the Syrians to take the example of the "Arabs of the Hijaz" and other small nations which revolted against their oppressors to break the shackles of enslavement. Syrians in particular should, in his opinion, take advantage of the support offered to them by a "great power" as France, and of the US involvement in the war as the "greatest republic defending freedom and humanity". 100

Rihani thought that Syrian emigrants in the USA, in particular, should join the US Army, not only because it was their duty as Americans to express their loyalty and gratitude to their country of naturalisation, but more importantly to liberate their afflicted country of birth. He argued that if Syrians fought with the US Army, America, "the greatest defender of the small oppressed peoples", will speak on their behalf in the Peace Conference and support their independence. He also argued that if Syrians volunteered in the US Army, they could ask the government to send them to fight in Syria, and this would allow them to later claim their national rights, while liberation at the hands of another nation would subject Syria to foreign sovereignty. He wrote from Spain to the editors of the Arabic newspapers in New York urging them to establish a Syrian committee aiming at organising a Syrian-American battalion to be sent to Syria under American commandment or under the "Legion d'Orient" that France sought to form to occupy Syria. 101 For this purpose, in Paris in 1917, Rihani discussed the matter with French officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with Shukri Ghānim who was working closely with the French authorities to get the Turks out of Syria. 102
As a result of his, and other Syrian emigrants', efforts, the Syrian-Mount Lebanon League of Liberation (SMLLL), an affiliation of the Syrian Central Committee (SCC) presided over by Ghānim, was established in New York in 1917. In a speech delivered on the occasion of its founding, Rihani urged the Syro-Lebanese community in the USA to join the "Legion d'Orient" which was formed in 1917 by the French Government to fight the Ottomans in the Arab East. He was aware that the SCC was formed in Paris at the instigation of France to communicate between Syrians in the diaspora and the French Government. Because he was convinced that the first aim of this Committee was to liberate Syria and Lebanon from Turkish rule with the help of France, and because "the most important thing", then, was "to rescue the country from the Turks", he supported the SCC and worked for the establishment of its affiliations in New York, Mexico and Merida. It is not clear whether Rihani was aware at this stage of the real aim of the SCC, which was to achieve Syrian unity under French protection or whether he knew about the role of the French colonialist associations and chambers of commerce which supported these aims.

At this stage, Rihani seems to have no reason for doubting France's intentions in the war. On the contrary, he was convinced that France wanted to help the Syrians if they themselves fought for their own cause. After his discussions with Shukrī Ghānim and the French officials, he found the French promises reassuring. France, he explained in the same speech, promised to liberate Syria from Turkish rule, and to establish a just and modern government (ḥukūma ṣādiqa raqiya) which would ensure security and pave the way for progress. He assured the Syrians that the French government promised to grant all Syrian provinces (wilāyat), including Lebanon, a special autonomy (istiqāl nawi); all the provinces would have administrative councils (mājālis idāriyya) like the one Lebanon had before the war, and local administrations (nizāmāt mahāliyya) to suit their people and conditions; qualified Syrians would be appointed to the high positions by the Governor General (al-hākim al-ṭām). Other promises such as the establishment of secular public schools -a matter which had always a special place in Rihani's thought - convinced him that siding with the Allies, France in particular, was the only way out of the crisis, and if Syrians did
not contribute to the liberation of their own country, they would miss this unique opportunity to save their people.\textsuperscript{105}

In his speech, Rihani did not clarify whether the Governor General would be French or whether the autonomy of the provinces would be under direct control of the French Government. Both stipulations were agreed upon in the Sykes-Picot Agreement which divided the Arab territories between France and Britain in May 1916. An "Amir from a French origin" was also considered essential for the independence of Syria under French protection, by the Colonial and Maritime Studies Association (Jam‘iyyat al-Dirāsāt al-Iṣti‘māriyya w-al-Bahrīyya), one of the French associations that supported the claims of the SCC.\textsuperscript{106} Rihani was of course unaware, at this stage, of the Sykes-Picot Agreement which remained secret at least till December 1917.\textsuperscript{107} It is also difficult to ascertain whether he was aware of the reports of the colonial associations and the chambers of commerce which supported the SCC.

When the war ended however, Rihani realised that the French promises had been "nothing but glittering war promises which misled him and many others".\textsuperscript{108} What remains to be asked is whether before the end of the war, Rihani was really unaware of the European ambitions in the Arab lands. In fact, when calling upon the Syrians to collaborate with the Allies in the war, Rihani had suspicions that the great powers would not help the Syrians to obtain their freedom gratis or as a "gift for the sake of humanity and democratic principles". The price for freedom was to fight in the \textit{Legion d'Orient}, because "every thing is mutual between people and nations..." and if the Syrians did not contribute to the liberation of their country they would no longer have a right in it, nor would they have the right to protest against those who liberate it and build it. Their freedom would be incomplete and tied to the will and political interests of those who liberated them.\textsuperscript{109}

Even at this stage, Rihani suspected the European ambitions, but between Turkish oppression and European threat he opted for European assistance. He warned that in helping the Syrians, France had in mind its own strategic, political and economic interests. But at that time, liberation from the Turks was his first priority, because liberation would bring about political independence. It was
nonsense, in his view, to claim political independence under the auspices of death, famine, humiliation and disgrace, and the Syrians had to save the nation first even if they had to collaborate with the "devil". The "free sons of the nation", in his view, "were only those who would fight in their land, with the army of freedom, for the sake of their nation."¹¹⁰ By the army of freedom he obviously meant the French Army.¹¹¹

Rihani endeavoured to convince the Syrians that if they did not all collaborate in the war they would only win "an incomplete, weak and vulnerable independence".¹¹² He argued that religious differences were used to prevent the Syrians, particularly Muslims, from fighting the Turks. The Lebanese in the past enjoyed certain privileges which the "people of the provinces" (abnāʿ al-wilāyāt) did not have, but at the present they all became one in heart and soul. Turkish policy and disasters united them and all differences between Muslims and Christians, between Lebanese and Syrians, were no longer justified. He attacked "those who still call upon religious or sectarian fanaticism to try to spread the seeds of disunion (al-shiqāq) between us for personal ambitions or political purposes".¹¹³ At this stage, unity of Syria was Rihani's goal. He insisted that Lebanese and Syrians must fight together to liberate all Syria. Syrians today were, in his view, one and "Syria is a unity which we will not allow to be divided".¹¹⁴

A month after the war ended, Rihani showed great happiness that the country had got rid of the Turkish yoke and the world had been liberated from the horrors of war. But politically, enough had been happening to fill him with great anxiety about the future of the homeland.¹¹⁵ Since hostilities with the Turks ceased, the status of the Arab land in the East was that of an Occupied Enemy Territory. On 23 October 1918, the whole of Syria had been divided into three zones, each placed under a separate administration: Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) South or Palestine was British; OETA West including Lebanon and the Syrian seacoasts was French; and OETA East or the interior of Syria was Arab.¹¹⁶

Even before the Armistice with Turkey was signed on 30 October 1918, plans to inherit the possessions of the "Sick Man" (now dead) of Europe were
Preparations for the Peace Conference were then under way and the Sykes-Picot Agreement which divided the Arab territories into zones of influence between France and Britain, was one of the topics of the day. Anglo-French discussions were held to have the Agreement modified in order to meet the interests of Great Britain in the Middle East, and the "rights of France in Syria and Cilicia". America which got out of the war more prestigious than France and Britain, was now a part of the secret discussions for the new "arrangement". After British-American talks, a British Peace Plan (October-November 1918) outlined the division of the Near East into three zones of influence: Great Britain in Mesopotamia; America in Palestine, Constantinople and the Straits; and France "probably" in Syria. In addition to recognising the principle of self-determination in 1917-1918, President Wilson seemed to have in mind a project for a Confederation of Arab states under the guidance and protection of the United States. This project was later recommended to Wilson and to the Peace Conference by the "Intelligence Section" of the American Delegation to the Conference.

Meanwhile, Fayṣal who had entered Syria on first October 1918 and started to press the case for Arab unity and independence, was faced in Lebanon and Syria with different reactions of support and opposition. His Arab government, whose authority in Lebanon lasted only one week, not only aroused French distrust of Fayṣal but gave misgivings in the minds of the Christians, particularly Maronites, with regard to his intentions to join Lebanon with Syria.117

In the light of these new circumstances, it was natural for Rihani, who had been closely following the campaign of liberation, to express concern over the future of Syria. He was then in New York and was no doubt familiar with Wilson's principles on liberty of the oppressed peoples and their right to self-determination.118 His political involvement with the SCC and the SMLLL must have provided him with information about the various peace plans for Syria and the reactions of Lebanese and Syrians to these plans. Also his presence in New York put him in close contact with the various political trends among the Syrian-Lebanese emigrants, such as the trend of Lebanese independence under French protection advocated by the LLP of Naʿūm Mukarzil, the trend of Syrian unity
under French protection advocated by the SMLLL, and that of Syrian unity under US protection which was advocated by a group of Lebanese and Syrians in Syria, Egypt and America (particularly South America).\textsuperscript{119}

In a letter written to "a friend" on 26 November 1918, Rihani reflected the suspicion which filled many Syrians about the real intentions of France and Britain and the anxiety about the future of Syria on the eve of the Peace Conference. In this letter, which obviously was a reply to a friend's letter carrying information about the situation in Syria, and this is why it is significantly relevant to this discussion, Rihani expresses pessimism about the future of the "country if divided into Islamic and Christian regions, or into European "spheres of influence", as England today, it seems, intends to do".\textsuperscript{120} Rihani proclaims in his letter: "I am an Arab Lebanese first, and a Maronite after that". He believes "the political unity of the different religious elements is soon achievable, if the European powers, particularly France and England, really cared about our well being, so they would not prolong by their policy a division created among us by the Turks".\textsuperscript{121}

As if he is responding to a particular statement, he says: "it is unjust to give our opinion of the Arabs today before we know them in their new conditions created by the war". In his opinion which "you may consider a dream", the solution to the "Eastern Question" consists of "political unity of the religious elements in order to pave the way for a federation (ittiḥād) of the Arab provinces which include Syria, Lebanon and Palestine". The best form of government for the federation is the "republican government like the one in Switzerland". To ensure "the equality of all the provinces", "the president of the federation should be alternatively elected from the high executive council once every year. This way every member of the council would have a share in the presidency, a solution which would satisfy all the elements and provinces". "A European protection (ḥimāya) for a limited time is necessary at the beginning". He prefers to call it "wisaya (supervision, custody), where the supervising state acknowledges the government after it being established on solid basis".\textsuperscript{122} By solid basis, he presumably meant the separation in government between religious and civil authorities, as he explained in a letter to Jibrān Khalīl Jibrān.\textsuperscript{123}
Rihani believes that if the country was divided into "separate regions where France, Britain and Italy have so-called "spheres of influence", old divisions amongst the citizens, and rivalries between representatives of the protecting states, would soon appear. Thus, remaining as we were in the dark past, the Maronites among us are French, the Druzes are British, the Protestants are Americans, the Muslims are Ottomans and the Orthodox are Russians, none of us is Syrian, Lebanese, Palestinian, Arab. Do you see the truth in what I say? I am an Arab Lebanese first, and a Maronite after that".124

Several elements in this letter are significant: it shows that Rihani's suspicion of the real intentions of European powers was now justified. Even though he only mentioned Britain's plan, when he talked of European policies of division he accused both Britain and France. Although his idea of a "federation of the Arab provinces under European supervision" seems to agree with president Wilson's plan he does not specify the identity of this supervising power. European powers, for Rihani, in terms of civilisation, modernity and progress include the USA, thus allowing to presume that he did not rule out the possibility of an American supervision.125

Another important point which the letter raises is what happened to Rihani's involvement with the SMLLL which he himself convened, drew its strategy and was in 1917 its vice-president. In a letter to the Peace Conference dated 1 February 1919, the SMLLL urged the General Secretary of the Conference to solve the Syrian question on the basis of confederation in geographical Syria under French protection. In this letter, the SMLLL strongly rejected Fayşal's claims to Syria and Palestine on the basis of their counter claims that: the Syrians were not Arab; that the Arabic language was imposed on the Christians who were the indigenous inhabitants of Syria; that Arab occupation of the Syrian land has caused a lot of damage to the peace in Syria and that any sovereignty of the Hijazi tribes over 'civilised' Syria would be a serious set back to the progress of Syria in the future. Because of the common historical, economic, and educational interests with France, the signatory members requested French protection which they claimed had a legitimate right in Syria.126
It is significant that Rihani's name does not appear among the signatory members of the SMLLL to this letter, although at that time he was in New York.\textsuperscript{127} This means that either at this time he was no longer a member of the SMLLL or if he was still a member he did not approve of this particular letter.

In putting his Arab identity in the first place above his religious identity, and in defending the Arabs against any misjudgment, Rihani was clearly taking a different stance from the political line of the SCC and the SMLLL. There does not seem to be any justification for assuming that Rihani favoured such political line which was so blatantly pro-French and anti-Arab.\textsuperscript{128} Thus his Syrian national tendency takes now a wider Arab aspect in opposition to the narrower Christian Lebanese nationalism, and against the strain of pan-Syrian nationalism isolated from the Arab environment.\textsuperscript{129} This is clearly demonstrated, above all, in his support for Faysal's claim to a Syrian unity with French assistance, and his campaign against the French Mandate, as discussed in the following chapters.
1. These are to be found mainly in Shadharāt, AAK, 6; al-Rīhāniyyāt, AAK, 7; and al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8.

2. 'Ṭariq al-Islāḥ' (c. 1898); 'Ṭawḥīd al-Lughâ al-‘Arabiyya' (1898); 'al-Maktoobī' (1900); 'Da‘ al-Alqāb' (1901); 'Hal Yumkin Islah al-Sharq' (1901), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 387, 481-485, 276, 284, 309, 450-451 and passim; 'al-Sha‘b w-al-Siyāsiyyūn' (1910), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 75 and passim.

3. See in particular 'Bi‘ism al-Khayr' (1898); 'Ṭawḥīd al-Lughâ al-‘Arabiyya' (1898); 'Naḥnu wa Jam‘iyyatunna' (1900); 'al-Dawwar' (1900); 'Hal Yumkin Islah al-Sharq' (1901), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 245, 484, 269-271, 273, 450 and passim; 'al-Tasāhil al-Dīnī' (1900), in al-Rīhāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 50; 'al-Sha‘b w-al-Siyāsiyyūn' (1910); 'Lubnān' (1910), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 74, 72-78 and passim; Rasūl, pp. 15, 26-27, 37, 93 and passim.

4. 'Hal Yumkin Islah al-Sharq' (1901); also 'Ṭariq al-Islāḥ' (c. 1898), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 450-451, 387.


6. 'Hal Yumkin Islah al-Sharq' (1901), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 449.


8. See Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 275; idem, A History, p. 309; also Dūrī, op. cit., p. 152; K. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 114. It is believed that the first open call for complete independence from Turkish rule was launched by the Party of Young Syria (Ḥizb Sūriyya al-‘Aṣārī) established in New York in 1898 by Yusuf Abī al-Lamā‘, Shibli Damūs, ‘Īsā al-Khūrī and Jamīl Ma‘ṣūf; all well-known to Rihāni. See Dāhir, Ṭarīkh Lubnān, pp. 166-167; Murād, al-Ḥaraka al-Wahdawīyya, pp. 55-56; Dā‘īkh, Aqīdat al-Biran, pp. 21-25.


10. Ibid., p. 452; see also his idea of progress and reform, Ch. 3, above.

11. See Ch. 3, and Ch. 4, above.


13. 'Ṭariq al-Islāḥ' (c. 1898); 'Hal Yumkin Islah al-Sharq' (1901); 'al-Ṭa‘ifiyā w-al-‘Askar al-Lubnānī' (1902); 'al-Aḥliyya fī al-Ahl' (1902); 'al-‘Alqāb al-Siyāsiyya' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 387, 449, 463, 465, 469; 'Ḥumān wa Ḥumāk' (c. 1909); 'Turkiyya al-Jaddā' (c. 1910); 'al-Ḥurriyya Wahdānī fī Tuwaḥṣidūnā' (c. 1909); 'Nicā al-Waṭan' (1910), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 43, 53, 62-63, 82-84 and passim; for his ideas on political tyranny see Ch. 4, above.


17. On this coup, see F. Ahmad, The Young Turks: pp. 1-13; Lewis, op. cit., pp. 174ff; W. Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, pp. 474ff; E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 266-267.

18. Arab writings of that time reflect an atmosphere of almost delirious joy, see A. al-Maqdisī, al-Ittiḥād al-Adabiyāt fī al-'Ālam al-'Arabī al-Hafīzī, pp. 44-51; Zein, The Emergence, pp. 79-80; see also Commins, Islamic Reform, pp. 124ff; al-Ḥakīm, Sūriyya w-al-'Ahd al-'Uthmānī, pp. 158ff; idem, Bayrūt wa Lubnān, pp. 35-36.

19. 'al-Ḥurriyya w-al-Tahdīhīb' (c. 1908), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 33-34.

20. Ibid., pp. 35-39. Similar views were expressed by Sulaymān al-Bustānī (1856-1925) whose candidature to the Ottoman parliament was later supported by Rihani himself, see ‘Min Ghānim Ilā al-Bustānī’ (1908), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, PP. 17-20; on al-Bustānī’s reaction to the constitution, see Maḥāraẓa, al-Ittiḥād al-Fikriyya, p. 108; eventually al-Bustānī was elected in 1908 to the Ottoman parliament as a representative of Beirut, see al-Ḥakīm, Bayrūt wa Lubnān, p. 113.


22. See his ideas of justice and tyranny, Ch. 4, above; together with al-Kawākibī, Rihani was considered as the most prominent advocate for constitutional rule amongst Syrian thinkers in the nineteenth century, see Ziadeh, Şāmiyyāt, p. 249.

23. 'W-al-Nuwwāb' (1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 31-32; Shawkat came from an Iraqi family. The remoter origins of his family were Georgian. Later bibliographical notes on him are found in Ahmad, op. cit., p. 179; Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 104; P. M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, p. 259; Lewis, op. cit., pp. 212-215, 220-221.

24. 'W-al-Nuwwāb' (1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 31-32. Eventually, 'Abdul-Ḥamīd was deposed by the parliament on 27 April 1909.

25. 'al-Ḥurriyya Waḥdahā fī Tuwaḥhidunā' (c. 1909); also 'al-Thawra al-Khuluqīyya' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 62, 64-73; Khalid, pp. 340-342.


28. See his political activities, Ch. 2, above.

29. 'al-Sha'b w-al-Siyāsīyyan (1910); 'Lubnān' (1910); 'Nida' al-Waṭan' (1910), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 74-76, 77-81, 82-84.

31. 'al-Lāmar-kaziyya wa Lubnān (1912), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 89-93.

32. On this war and its repercussions on Ottoman politics, see Ahmad, The Young Turks, pp. 112ff; Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 220-221; Miller, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 501-502; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 293-296.

33. 'Rūh al-Thawra' (1913), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 100-101.

34. Ibid., pp. 94-106; see also Rihani's letter to 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahārwī, in Rasā'il, pp. 150-151. The letter is noted by the editor to be sent from al-Freik in 1910, but at least two points show that it was more likely sent from New York in 1913. First, Rihani sent his wishes from the "country of work" (bīlād al-'amal), meaning New York, secondly, he was writing after the Ottoman "state finally recuperated Adrianople (Edirne)", i.e. in 1913 by which time he was back in New York. For these events, see Ahmad, op. cit., 112ff; Miller, op. cit., pp. 501-502; Shaw, op. cit., 295-296.

35. The Règlement was signed in Istanbul on June 9, 1861, by Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, Turkey, plus Italy which adhered to the statute as a seventh guarantor in 1867.

36. The Council was composed of four Maronites (plus a Maronite deputy chairman), three Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sunniite, and one Shi'ite. The position of a deputy chairman was introduced during the tenure of the first Mutassarrif, Dāwūd Pasha (1861-1868), and was held by a Maronite.

37. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, pp. 64-69.


40. 'Muẓaffar Pasha' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 458-459.

41. Ibid., pp. 458-459.

42. 'Muẓaffar Pasha' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 458-459.


44. 'Muẓaffar Pasha' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 459.


47. 'Muẓaffar Pasha' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 458.

48. See Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon, p. 221.
49. 'al-Ta'ifiyya w-al-'Askar al-Lubnānī' (1902); 'al-Ahliyya la al-Ahl' (1902); 'al-Mabda' Fawq al-Rajul' (1902); 'al-Ahzab al-Siyāsyya' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 462-471; see also his anti-sectarian ideas, Ch. 3, above.

50. See Spagnolo, op. cit., p. 218; Akarli, op. cit., p. 90.

51. On the programme of reform of Muẓaffar, see Spagnolo, op. cit., p. 223.

52. 'al-Iṣrāḥ al-Maw'ūd w-al-Iṣrāḥ al-Murtajā' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 460-461.

53. 'Muẓaffar Pasha' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, p. 459.

54. See his ideas on public non-sectarian education in Ch. 3, above; on attacks on him by the Maronite clergy see in particular the articles of P. L. Cheikho, in al-Mashriq, 1910, pp. 620-626, 703-710.


57. 'al-Ahliyya la al-Ahl' (1902); also 'al-Ta'ifiyya w-al-'Askar al-Lubnānī' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 465, 462-463.

58. See Spagnolo, op. cit., pp. 53-56; Akarli, op. cit., pp. 79-80; on the increasing influence of the Maronite Church and community in the Mutassarifate, see Kawtharānī, al-İtijāḥāt, pp. 70-82.

59. 'al-Ahzāb al-Siyāsyya' (1902), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 468-469; see also Ch. 3, above.


62. On this faction see Spagnolo, op. cit., p. 230; Akarli, op. cit., p. 91.

63. 'Rajul al-Sha'b' (c. 1909); 'al-Tarqī fi al-'Amal' (1909), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 9-15, 26.

64. 'Rajul al-Sha'b' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 9-15.


66. For further details on these issues, see Spagnolo, op. cit., pp. 250-258.

67. 'Rajul al-Sha'b' (c. 1909); 'Taṣḥīḥ Rajul al-Sha'b' (c. 1909); 'al-Tarqī fi al-'Amal' (1909), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 14-15, 16, 21-26.

68. 'Ila al-Sha'b al-Lubnānī' (1909), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 27-30.

69. 'Nīdā' al-Waṭan' (1910), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 83-84.

70. A maronite lawyer, Būlus Najaym (Paul Noujaim), writing in Paris in 1908 under the pseudonym M. Jouplain, sums up the aspirations of Lebanese Christian nationalists at the time. For a review of his ideas, see M. Buheiry, 'Būlus Najaym and the Grand Liban Ideal' in The

72. On the privileges of American naturalised emigrants in Ottoman territories see K. Karpat, 'The Ottoman Emigration to America', in IJMES, 17 (1985), pp. 175-209.

73. 'al-Sha'b w-al-Siyāsīyyun' (1910), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 74-76.

74. See Spagnolo, op. cit, pp. 211, 258.

75. 'Lubnān' (1910), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 78-79.


78. See in particular his The Fate of Palestine.

79. 'al-Lāmārkażīyya wa Lubnān (1912), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 89-91.

80. See 'Min Ghanim Ila al-Bustani' (1908); 'Ila al-Sha'b al-Lubnān' (1909); 'al-Lāmārkażīyya wa Lubnān' (1912), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 17-20, 28, 92.

81. 'al-Lāmārkażīyya wa Lubnān' (1912), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 92.

82. On these organisations, their programmes and activities, see Khaliṣ, Abhāth, pp. 109-120; Mahāfẓa, al-Fikr al-Siyāsī fi al-Urdun, vol. 1, pp. 34-35; Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon, pp. 275-279; see also Ch. 2, above.

83. See Ch. 2, above.

84. See his political activities, Ch. 2, above.

85. 'al-Lāmārkażīyya wa Lubnān' (1912), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 90-92.

86. See 'al-Taraqqī fi al-'Amaq' (1909); 'Huna wa Hunak' (c. 1909); 'al-Ḥurriyya Waḥdahā la Tuwaḥḥiduna' (c. 1909); 'al-Thawra al-Khuluqīyya' (c. 1909); 'al-Sha'b w-al-Siyāsīyyun' (1910), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 21, 41-45, 63, 65, 74.


89. See some of his letters in Rasā’il, pp. 71, 76, 79, 105; ‘Hunā wa Hunāk’ (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 41; see also a passage of his biography by his brother Albert quoted in al-Kayyālī, Amin al-Rihānī, pp. 11-12.


91. ‘Hunā wa Hunāk’ (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 42-43.

92. ‘al-Thawrā al-Khuluqīyya’ (c. 1909); ‘Min Ġhanīm Ilā al-Bustānī’ (1908), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 65, 18; Khalid, p. 340.

93. Khalid, pp. 37, 45, 323-326.

94. Ibid., p. 325.

95. ‘al-Thawrā al-Ḥaqiqīyya’ (1911), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 85-86.

96. ‘al-Ḥaqiq w-al-Qawwāl’ (1917), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 142-144.

97. On Sharīf Husayn’s proclamations of war, see Maḥfūẓa, al-Fikr al-Siyāsī fī al-Urdun, vol. 2, pp. 5-13; see also discussion in Dawn, From Ottomanism, pp. 75-86. Interestingly, in 1924 Rihani was somewhat critical of Sharīf Husayn’s reasons for revolt, see Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 60-61; ACA, pp. 107-108.

98. ‘al-Ḥayāt w-al-Ḥurriyya w-al-Sayf’ (c. 1917), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 145-147.


100. Ibid., p. 148; letter to Shukri Bakhkhāsh, 18 April 1917, in Rasā’il, p. 168.

101. See his letters to Shukri Bakhkhāsh, 18 April 1917, and to ‘Abd al-Masīḥ Ẓaddāq, 19 April 1917, in Rasā’il, pp. 168-174.

102. See his political activities in Ch. 2, above.

103. ‘al-Ḥayāt w-al-Ḥurriyya w-al-Sayf’ (c. 1917), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 149; also Ch. 2, above.


105. ‘al-Ḥayāt w-al-Ḥurriyya w-al-Sayf’ (c. 1917), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 150.

106. Khalīfī, op. cit., p. 76.


108. A footnote which he must have made when he republished his article ‘al-Ḥayāt w-al-Ḥurriyya w-al-Sayf’ in al-Rihānīyyāt in 1924, see the note in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 150.


110. ‘al-Ṣalib’ (1917), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 140-141.
111. See 'al-Ḥayāt w-al-Ḥurriyya w-al-Sayf' (c. 1917), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 153.
112. 'Lā Shay' Bīlā Shay'' (1917), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 163.
113. 'al-Ḥayāt w-al-Ḥurriyya w-al-Sayf' (c. 1917), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 151-152.
115. See a letter addressee unknown, 26 Nov. 1918, in Rasā'il, pp. 178-180.
118. See a letter to 'Abd al-Māshīḥ Haddād, 19 April 1917, in Rasā'il, p. 172.
119. On these trends see Khallīf, Abhāth, pp. 84-115; a large group of intellectuals in Syria was reported to have favoured an American mandate, see al-Ḥakīm, op. cit., p. 108; Cf. Jibrān, 'Mustaqbal Sūriyya', extract in Dāyeh, op. cit., pp. 369-370.
120. Letter addressee unknown, 26 Nov. 1918, in Rasā'il, pp. 178-180.
121. Ibid., p. 179.
122. Ibid., pp. 178-180.
123. Letter to Jibrān, New York, Monday morning (sic), 1918, in Rasā'il, pp. 175-176.
124. Letter addressee unknown, 26 Nov. 1918, in Rasā'il, pp. 178-180.
125. Particularly in The Book of Khalīd, the USA is associated with Europe and European civilisation.
126. See the letter in Khallīf, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
127. See the itinerary of his travels in A. A. Rihānī Faylaṣīf al-Freike, p. 355.
128. See, for example, an opposite opinion in Dāyeh, op. cit., p. 195.
129. On these tendencies see, Hourani, Arabic Thought; Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 151-154; Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon, p.249; also Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, pp. 53-54.
CHAPTER SIX

RIHANI’S IDEAS ON LEBANON’S UNITY WITH SYRIA AND ON SYRIAN PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM

As an activist writer, Rihani called upon his fellow Syrians during the war to fight with the Allies in order to ensure their own independence. When discussions about the political future of Syria began, he found it his national duty to defend the unity of the Syrian land. Not only did he use a scholarly argument to justify the geographical and national unity of Syria, but he also endeavoured to support his argument in political and economic terms and provide practical solutions for the complex Syrian-Lebanese question. He gently reminded Jurjī Zaydān that "scholarly study (al-baḥth al-‘ilmī) of the affairs of nations is not enough. If explanation of the problem is good the removal of the causes is even better".¹

This chapter discusses Rihani’s call for Lebanon’s unity with Syria, what kind of Syrian unity he preached, how he thought it could be achieved, his explanation of why it was aborted, and the elements of Syrian patriotism or nationalism in his thought.

The "Lebanese Idea" and Syrian Unity

It is clear that Rihani was a persistent campaigner for the liberation of the whole Syrian land, an advocate of Syrian unity and an opponent of the idea of an isolated, independent Lebanon under the protection of France. In an article entitled 'Lanā wa Lakum' (Ours and Yours) written about 1918, he expressed what was probably the earliest known criticism by a Lebanese of the then current "Lebanese idea (al-fikra al-lubnāniyya)" and the "Lebanese [political] renaissance (al-nahḍa al-lubnāniyya)". In his view, such notions were based on archaic sectarianism (ta’īfiyya) and isolationism (i’tizāl), and thus contradicted the correct social idea of union (al-ittihād) among the oppressed peoples (al-shu‘ūb al-mustad’afa) which was, in his opinion an important basis for the Syrian unity.² Although he did not name the party supporting the idea of "Lebanese renaissance", it is clear that this refers to the Lebanon League of Progress (LLP) of Na‘ūm
Mukarzil in New York. The Arabic name of the League, Jam‘ıyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnāniyya), literally means "Lebanese renaissance", and its main objective was the independence of an enlarged Lebanon under the protection of France. As president of the LLP, Mukarzil worked incessantly, particularly before and during the Paris Peace Conference (1919) towards this aim, often using, among other methods, religious mobilisation and his influence on the French and Lebanese clergy to achieve his goals.³

Rihani considered the "Lebanese idea" to be based on a "delusion" that France would grant Lebanon its independence gratis to please its Christians, "simply because they are the descendants of the Crusaders, as the pretenders claim". He endeavoured to explain that Lebanon's independence under French protection involved a high degree of risk, for as a rule, a country offered its protection to a people, "whoever this people may be", only because of natural resources and trade markets. He saw the principles of protection (al-himāya), occupation (al-ihtilāl) and colonisation (al-isti‘mār)" as closely connected; and warned his fellow Lebanese that "incapable as we are to win our freedom by ourselves, we will have to pay the price in return".⁴ Since Lebanon, as he explains, did not possess any means of prosperity or essential resources, therefore the Lebanese could not expect France to give them "freedom without any blemishes or a completely pure independence for the sake of God... The independence which imposes unrealistic illusory political or commercial limits on a nation, will vanish as soon as the power and resources of this nation dry up".⁵ Thus, he saw the promised independence of Lebanon would not be viable because the French protection would sooner or later become an occupation.

The only way to encounter potential French occupation of Lebanon under the above circumstances was, in Rihani's view, unity between Lebanon and Syria. "Co-operation (al-ta‘āwun), mutual benefit (al-tabādul) and union (al-ittihād), in his opinion, not only conformed to the law of progress among independent and powerful countries but also among the oppressed peoples, especially "those of the same blood, the same country (quṭr), and the same language". According to him, the Lebanese of all creeds must unite with all Syrians, because their fragmentation into separate parties (ahzāb), sects (tawā‘if) and narrow loyalties (‘asabīyyāt),
would "kill patriotism in the cradle" and open the door for unlimited foreign occupation. In this, Rihani raises the question of "isolation" of the Christians of Lebanon and its harmful ramifications not only on them but also on Lebanon itself. For him, the independence of Lebanon, isolated from other parts of Syria, would be the beginning of its end. Whereas internal regional autonomy (istiqlal dakhili maḥalli) within the Syrian unity would guarantee Lebanon's organic strength and viability. He understood Syria to include Palestine as well: "If the Syrian wins his freedom and independence, this will include the Lebanese and the Palestinian, the Christian, Muslim and the Druze as well. Those who fear such an equality are weak, incapable and not confident in themselves, and consequently unfit for freedom and independence".6

Rihani's strong advocacy of Syrian unity was in a real sense a response to the vehement Maronite campaign for Lebanon's separate independence under French protection. In addition to the Lebanese delegation, headed by the Maronite Patriarch Ilyās Ḥuwayyik, to the Peace Conference (1919) there were other influential organisations including the Lebanese Union Party (Ḥizb al-Ittihād al-Lubnānī) of Yūsuf al-Sawdā, and Anṭūn al-Jumayyil; and the LLP of Naʿūm Mukarzil.7 He saw the ideas of Syrian unity and Lebanese separatism as diametrically opposed. While the former was evolutionist and progressive, the latter was regressive. Based on sectarianism, the "Lebanese idea", or rather the "sectarian national idea" (al-fikra al-qawmiyya al-tāʻifiyya), as he describes it, was too dependent on the past and drawn from an old imaginary relationship between the Christians of Europe and those of Lebanon. Such an idea, in his opinion, was the cause of "our decline (taqahqur) and calamity in the past, and if dominated it would be also the cause of calamity in the future".8

Rihani criticised those Maronites, perhaps including Mukarzil, who sang their past as Mardaites and Crusaders, and who claimed that the Lebanese descended culturally and racially from the Phoenicians.9 In his view, the Mardaites and the Maronites in the past fought against the Arabs, not to safeguard their own civil political independence, but out of religious antagonism, because the Arabs were Muslim. Similarly today, the Maronites, in his view, seemed less keen to win their independence, than to ensure their isolation from, and rejection
of co-existence with the Arabs, "their neighbour brothers", simply because the Arabs were Muslim. In this regard, he considered such Maronite attitude "reactionary (raj'iyya) because their tendency was still as sectarian" as it was "a thousand years ago".10

Rihani opposed the separation of Lebanon from Syria because he saw that "patriotic unity (al-wahda al-wataniyya) and national unity (al-wahda al-qawmiyya)" both required progressive thinking. He argued that while the Phoenicians, Mardaites and Maronites may have played their role in the past, today the interests of both Lebanese and Syrians required another kind of commitment, i.e. a broad national commitment. Therefore they both must consider their common national interest first, and must look ahead for a better future in unity and co-operation.11

Rihani was convinced that the first obstacle to national Syrian unity was the problem of sectarianism and sectarian identity, since "most Syrians would first identify themselves with their religion, then with their place of birth and then with their region ... thus one would say I am Maronite, Shababi, (from Bayt Shabab) Lebanese; the other would say I am Muslim, Damascene, Syrian". It was because their sectarian fanaticism overrode their patriotism and occupied the first place amongst their interests, that Rihani saw the necessity of separating religion from politics, and the need to replace sectarian partisanship (al-tahazzub al-dini) with patriotic solidarity (al-ašabiyya al-wataniyya).12 He also considered the separation of religion from politics as the only way to secure equality and justice amongst all people of the country. Rihani argues quite bluntly that the Christians sought independence under foreign protection because they were less patriotic than Muslims. To strengthen their patriotism, they must feel secure amongst the Muslims, therefore they should be treated on equal footing with them in civil and political life.13

Rihani was aware of the sensitive question of religious minorities which, in his view, was the first and most important cause of calamities throughout the history of Syria, and he warned against the French policy which exploited this problem to dominate Lebanon.14 He saw that the Maronites refused the unity with Syria because, thinking of themselves simply as Maronite instead of
Lebanese or Syrian, they feared the Muslim majority and sought French protection. Although he comprehended their fear, he still believed that unity with the Syrians, not French protection, would ensure the Christians security and independence.

On several occasions, Rihani argued that independence under foreign protection would be no more than paper independence, because protection would gradually deprive the Lebanese of their identity. Even if France withdrew from Lebanon, the latter's independence would still be not viable. Weak as it was, Lebanon would, sooner or later, be annexed to Syria, the "dominant power" in the region. His solution for this dilemma was the acceptance of Lebanon's unity with Syria, not by force but by agreement and mutual understanding. He believed that all the obstacles could be removed, if Syrians and Lebanese agreed on a "civil government based on the principle of patriotism and national sovereignty (hukûma madaniyya 'alā mabda' al-waṭaniyya w-al-siyāda al-qawmiyya).

To further alleviate the fears of the Christians of Lebanon, and safeguard the whole of Syria against permanent foreign threat, Rihani believed that a form of "European supervision (mushārafa)" was necessary. This would allow Syria and Lebanon to become capable of self-government, and would encourage the Christians to trust their "Muslim brothers", and live in harmony within the unity. Thus, he disagreed with the "Damascenes" (al-dimashqīyyūn) who demanded the complete independence of Syria while they were still in urgent need of European financial and scientific assistance. He thought Syrians should accept a limited French supervision for five or ten years, during which period they must prove to France that they consider themselves with the Lebanese people as "one nation" (umma wāhida) with equal rights and duties.

Rihani himself acknowledged in 1920 that his opinion in support of some kind of protection was a departure from his earlier view (1918) when he was against such protection. Under new circumstances he now obviously felt it necessary to be realistic, for "obsession is often misleading, and stubbornness other than for what is right is killing." He now realised that independence was impossible without European supervision. It is important to remember that between 1918 and 1920 several developments have taken place. These included,
for example, the Fayšal-Clemenceau agreement which affirmed the occupation by France of Lebanon and the coastal regions of Syria, and the establishment of an Arab state in the interior. The agreement also stipulated that the Arab state should turn to France for any assistance it might require.21

The change in Rihani’s attitude could also be seen in the light of his awareness of the complexity of the problem, in which fear of the Christian minority had played a major part. In his opinion, intolerance of both sides, the apprehensive Christian minority and the Syrian "extremists", gave France a unique opportunity to enhance its domination over Syria, by exploiting the existing religious disparities and encouraging the Lebanese to seek French protection. Therefore, he believed that concessions should be made on both sides: the Christian minority accepting unity, and the Muslim majority softening its attitude and accepting a moderate government under Fayšal's leadership. Fayšal, in his opinion, was no doubt the national leader who was able by his wisdom to lead the "extremists" in Damascus in the "proper rational moderate way".22

It is clear that while Rihani disagreed with the Maronites who insisted on Lebanon’s independence, he equally disagreed with those Syrians who, while insisting on complete unity between Lebanon and Syria, were unrealistic in their demands for complete independence from foreign influence.23 The intransigence of the Syrian nationalists became even more vehement after the Fayšal-Clemenceau agreement which they viewed as a dismemberment of Syria. Despite Fayšal’s insistence that the agreement was only an inevitable temporary measure, it was condemned by the vast majority of Syrians who asserted their desire for unity and complete independence.24 It was this position that Rihani criticised because insistence on complete independence gave France the justification to enhance its presence in Lebanon and Syria, and he was hoping that Fayšal would succeed in convincing the "extremists" to accept the French 'supervision'. (Fayšal eventually was unsuccessful as is well known).

Rihani was in favour of Arab rule in Syria, including an internal independence (or autonomy) for Lebanon, under Fayšal’s leadership and French supervision. He argued that if unity of Lebanon and Syria was achieved under solid constitutional government acting according to the principles of justice and
equality, European supervision would not be needed for long. Such government would be able to ensure internal security and order and protect the rights of minorities. In five or ten years at the utmost, the Lebanese and Syrians together would be able to manage without foreign assistance. This was, in his opinion, the only solution to achieve the complete national Syrian unity which would bring the minorities under its banner and bring about complete independence.25

As further reassurance to the minorities, and "to prove their good will", Rihani suggested that Muslim Syrians could give the Christians more than they get themselves, because of the "Lebanese traditions (taqālīd) and the nature (tabū'a) of their country".26 He did not explain this, but he probably refers to the traditional autonomy of Mount Lebanon, to the nature of its population where the Christians formed a majority, and perhaps to its strategic position as a vital access of Syria to the sea.

The idea of Muslim concession was more clearly expressed by Rihani later in 1928. By then, the French presence in Lebanon and Syria had been officially settled by the Mandate Contract; the Lebanese Republic had been established with its own constitution in 1926, and the Syrian parliament had begun negotiations to establish the Syrian constitution and to replace the mandate with a treaty with France.27 Within his campaign against the French colonisation (isti'mār),28 and in order to ensure the independent Syrian-Lebanese unity and assure the minorities, Rihani insisted that Muslims must initiate a change in their mentality and political attitude if they really wanted to establish the cornerstone of the new national edifice. As he put it, "Muslims must be tolerant in regard to what they consider their traditional inherited rights". Rihani argued that while he was not against a republican system for Lebanon, because "a republic was the best form of government for the Lebanese-Syrian country", he warned that a multitude of "small republics" would be harmful. Thus, he advocated that "one republic named the Syrian-Lebanese Republic" should be established.29

Before the newly elected Syrian Legislative Council had begun the discussions of the new constitution (June-August 1928), Rihani sent a letter, on 30 May 1928, to the Syrian leaders and members of parliament urging them to solve the problem of minorities which he saw as Syria's biggest problem. His solution
consisted of establishing the Syrian republic with a Christian as its first president. (Eventually the draft constitution passed on August 1928 declared that the Syrian president must be Muslim.) Moreover, he nominated Fāris al-Khūrī, a prominent Christian Syrian nationalist figure to be this first Syrian president. Rihani insisted that "if the first president of the republic was a Christian, during the days of the second or third president at the most, whether this was Muslim or Christian, the great Syrian unity would be completed and the two republics would become one Syrian-Lebanese republic".

Rihani was obviously well aware of the Lebanese Christian attachment to their republic after it became a reality, and of the minority question which was at the root of their intransigence concerning their independence. His proposition that the first president be a Christian not only reflects his awareness of the actual political situation, but also his belief that it would provide a solution which he thought could please both the Christians and the Muslims at the same time. In giving up the presidency of the Syrian republic to a nationalist Christian, he thought, the Muslims in Syria would prove to the Christians of Lebanon, and to Europeans that they really respected the Christians' rights. This, in his opinion, would help the Christians of Lebanon to trust the Syrians and to feel secure in Syria as if they were in Lebanon. Thus their patriotism would grow wider and deeper and "Great Lebanon" (Lubnān al-Kabīr) would become the "Greater Lebanon" (Lubnān al-Akbar) and would join the Syrian republic in a "Great Syrian Unity", as the Muslims desired.

In the proposed Syrian-Lebanese republic under a just civil government, as advocated by Rihani, the Christians would have equal opportunities in Lebanon as well as in Syria on the one hand, and Syrian unity would be achieved, on the other. This was the only way he saw the two republics could get rid of the French Mandate. For "the Syrian Lebanese nation could not completely get rid of foreign ambitions and occupation unless fraternity and national loyalty (al-ikhā' and al-walā' al-qawmi) became the foundations of the Syrian-Lebanese Republic".

Rihani did not believe the Lebanese and Syrian republics were viable as two separate states. He was convinced that if Syria achieved independence
without Lebanon, foreign domination in Lebanon would complicate the Syrians' problems and hinder their national aspirations. On the other hand, if Lebanon obtained independence while remaining separate from Syria, the latter, as the dominant power in the region, would aggravate Lebanon's political situation and obstruct its national progress. Thus, even when the Lebanese Republic became a fait accompli, Rihani still believed that Syrian unity was possible. Indeed, such unity became more urgent, because only a complete economic and political unity of Lebanon and Syria could get rid of the French occupation. Such unity, in his opinion, would not be possible without a revolutionary change in the political and religious traditions of the two countries. This change would allow the establishment of justice on a civil secular, rather than religious basis, an objective that could not be achieved unless religious loyalty was replaced by national and patriotic loyalty. This is how secularism in Rihani's thought is essentially connected with patriotism and nationalism both of which form the basis of his argument for Syrian unity.

The discussion of Rihani's ideas on Syrian unity raises the question of the place of Palestine in such unity. While concentrating on the unity between Lebanon and Syria, Rihani, even before the capitalisation of his perception of the Palestine question and of the Zionist threat, was clear about the place of Palestine as part of the Syrian Unity.

In 1934, Rihani published his book Fayṣal al-Awwal. It is true this is not a political essay, but since Rihani's history is not devoid of opinion, one can still follow through this work the change and continuity in his ideas on Syrian unity. The importance of the book in this regard resides in the fact that when Rihani wrote it Fayṣal, who was considered the symbol of unity, had died (September 1933), the Lebanese Republic had been declared (1926), and the hopes for unity were weakened, especially that France was negotiating a peace treaty with Syria without mentioning the unity with Lebanon. By that time Rihani had long started his campaign to liberate Lebanon and Syria from the French Mandate within a framework of unity between the two countries and a greater Pan-Arab unity.
Rihani still believed, in 1934, that Fayṣal’s efforts and moderation could have succeeded if the "international politics" and the "extremist" nationalists did not impede his mission. He acknowledged that the difficulties which faced Fayṣal when he was in Syria were both internal and external. In addition to the French and British secret political designs and the violation of the Allies’ promises concerning Arab rights, he emphasised the differences between the various religious communities in the country and lack of patriotism and national unity among the people of Syria and Lebanon.38

Rihani now attributes part of the blame to Fayṣal for ignoring the different reactions of support and opposition which appeared in Lebanon and the Syrian coast when he entered Syria in October 1918. He accuses him of committing a blunder in sending an Arab force to establish an Arab Hashimite Government in Beirut. It seems that Rihani considered this as a short-sighted policy because Fayṣal did not take into consideration the sharp differences between the desires of the Muslims and the Maronites for the future of Lebanon.39

Nevertheless, Rihani still believed that Fayṣal had good intentions towards the future of Lebanon. He insists that Fayṣal intended to enlarge Lebanon and grant it an internal administrative autonomy; that the Lebanese-Syrian unity was "not to be compulsory but out of the people’s choice"; that "for Fayṣal, there was no difference between a Lebanese and a Damascene, or between a Muslim or a Druze". He asserts that this was the principle which Fayṣal sincerely believed in and sought to ascertain, but in certain attitudes, he was defeated by the circumstances and by some men who frustrated his efforts.40

Rihani’s attitude towards the Maronite claim for the independence of Lebanon did not change. He still believed that this claim was unjustifiably sectarian. He explains that while Fayṣal was calling for a national non-religious unity between Syrians and Lebanese, the Lebanese, that is the Maronites, provoked by the clergy and in collaboration with Picot, the French High Commissioner, sent a Lebanese delegation to the Peace Conference to claim a Lebanese entity under French protection. By entrusting the Maronite Patriarch, Ilyās Ḥuwayyik, to head the delegation which was exclusively Christian, and by
refusing to have any relations with the Muslims, he argues, the Lebanese turned
the question of Lebanese independence into a religious sectarian one.41

Rihani attributed also part of the blame to the Muslim Syrians who
persisted in their claim for unity and complete independence. "Some of them
even became more fanatical", and it was this fanaticism, in his opinion, that was
partly behind the disturbances of February 1919,42 which did discredit to the
Arabs and weakened their cause. Not only did he accuse the Arab leaders of
ignoring European political ways and international politics,43 but he also held the
Arab government of Damascus partly responsible for the unrest because it was
unable to control the Muslim Arabs of Syria.44 The "gangs" who were
responsible for the incidents, he indicates, were in good relationship with the Arab
Government in Damascus. But while he blames Fayṣal for failing to control the
government, he accused the French authorities of deliberate negligence, insinuating
that they did not stop the riots so that the gap between the Muslims and the
Christians was widened to justify their occupation of the whole of Syria.45 Thus
his view that France would always exploit the religious disparities and the
question of minorities to justify its occupation of Syria did not in fact change.

Rihani considered Fayṣal’s acceptance of foreign assistance in Syria, and
foreign mandate on Palestine and Iraq,46 as a wise attempt by Fayṣal to strike a
compromise between the interests of the Arabs, particularly the Kingdom of the
Hijaz, the policies of Britain, and those of France, which claimed (as in Pichon’s
declarations) "historical, legal and cultural rights in Syria".47 But Rihani saw
that the work of the American King-Crane Commission together with Wilson’s
famous principle of "the right of peoples to self-determination" had sadly misled
Fayṣal who had hoped that the American government would help him to get rid of
Britain and France, when he eventually rejected the proposed agreement with
Clemenceau.48

This change in Fayṣal’s attitude, was in Rihani’s view a sign of weakness.
If inconstancy in politics is acceptable amongst the great powers because they can
consolidate their position with force, the weak, in his opinion, should hold firm to
one position. Like some who accused Fayṣal of being "easily impressed by
everyone who had a touch of patriotism", and of taking different positions towards
the same matter," Rihani saw that "because of his people and his own personality", Fayṣal lacked sufficient strength to play the political game of the great powers. Unlike those who accused Fayṣal of weakness because of his compromise with Clemenceau, Rihani, however, saw that Fayṣal was weak because he submitted, in this matter, to the influence of his "extremist" advisers. In his view, Fayṣal was aware of the French ambitions in Syria. He knew that Britain would not support him against France nor would the American government interfere in the internal affairs of Syria. He also knew that he was incapable of changing the British policy, or opposing France militarily. Thus, Fayṣal in his opinion was left to choose between two options, both requiring "honesty, wisdom and patriotism": to lead the Syrian people to moderation in a way to secure the common interest of Syria and France, or to resign. Like some other contemporary Arab nationalists, Rihani seems to have ruled out as impractical, the third option taken by Yusuf al-ʿAẓma and his comrades.52

Does this mean that in criticising Fayṣal, Rihani was defending the French policy in Syria against Syrian interest? The moderate attitude which, in Rihani's opinion, Fayṣal should have adopted seemed to be a tactical rather than an ideological stance. In moderation, Rihani saw an opportunity to win independence, albeit incomplete, by making necessary concessions according to a given political situation. Thus, moderation should not be seen as denial of the Arab national rights but as a temporary diplomatic attitude. Rihani's opinions on the situation in Syria under Fayṣal's rule, as expressed in Fayṣal al-Awwal supported the Arab cause in principle. For example, the resolutions of the General Syrian Congress which proclaimed the independence of Syria (including Palestine, and Lebanon) as a sovereign constitutional monarchy, reflect in his opinion, "an undeniable proud nationalism". He considered that neither France, nor any European or foreign state had any right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arabs, and that the election of king Fayṣal was purely an Arab affair: "An Arab king, elected by an Arab Congress for an Arab country, so what does Europe, or rather France or Britain have to do with this?".54

Rihani seemed to favour the French proposal which granted Fayṣal the rule of Syria with French assistance and granted Lebanon its independence. This,
however, did not mean giving up the aim of Syrian unity. By independence of
Lebanon, Rihani understood autonomy, or an internal independence within unity
and co-operation with regard to economic affairs and international politics. This
was how he understood the decision of the Administrative Council of Mount
Lebanon (10th of July 1920) which, after indirect negotiations with Fayṣal,
declared the complete unrestricted independence of Lebanon, its neutrality and the
enlargement of its frontiers; at the same time it ensured the rights and interests of
Lebanon and Syria, and the endurance of their good relationships in the future.
And contrary to the French presumptions which accused members of the Council
of national betrayal, Rihani saw that the "legitimate representatives of the nation"
were only "inspired by the common interest of Lebanon and Syria".55

In conclusion, despite the political developments at the international and
domestic levels, Rihani’s position regarding Syrian unity and the independence of
Lebanon did not, in principle, show great changes from 1918, the year which
witnessed the beginning of the Syrian question, till 1934, the year he published his
book, Fayṣal al-Awwal. In his writings between 1918 and 1920, he had supported
Fayṣal’s moderate policy regarding Syrian unity which included Lebanon,
Palestine and Syria, with the respect of the internal autonomy of Lebanon, and a
limited French assistance. And in 1934, even after the death of Fayṣal, he was
still convinced that moderation would have led to success, had the Allies respected
their promises and the extremists not pushed Fayṣal to adopt an extreme policy,
thus causing the fall of his Arab rule in Syria and the failure of Syrian unity.

Elements of Syrian Patriotism and Nationalism

Rihani’s call for Syrian unity was first based on a firm belief in his Syrian
identity. In his pre-1918 speeches and writings, the words "Syrians" (al-sūrivyūn)
and "Syrian nation" (al-ummā al-sūrivyā) designate Lebanese and Syrians alike.
The "Syrian nation", in his view, was formed of all fellow Syrians inside and
outside geographical Syria. In New York, he tackled the issues concerning the
"Syrian community" (al-fālia al-sūrivyā) as a "Syrian" addressing his fellow
"Syrians" from all religious sects.56 As for the word "Lebanese", he used it to
designate the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, i.e. the Mutassarrifiyya.57 After
1926, when the Lebanese Republic was constitutionally established with its present borders, he started to refer to "both nations, the Syrian and the Lebanese". To this extent the nation (al-umma) was the people: "individuals, political and intellectual leaders".58

Despite his love for Lebanon, his place of birth, and although he was proud of being Lebanese, Rihani’s broader national loyalty was to greater Syria as a whole, "the big country”, and "the real country" as he calls it. "Contrary to most Syrians and Lebanese", as he puts it, his loyalty to Syria comes before loyalty to his place of birth and above his religious belonging. "I am Syrian first, Lebanese second and Maronite after that. I am Syrian and seek the national, geographical and political Syrian unity. I am Syrian, Lebanon is my place of birth, I respect (ahārīm) the Arabs, who are the source of my language, and rely in my religion only on God."59 To begin with, he did not precisely define the geographical borders of Syria. But speaking of the Syrians, he included the inhabitants of Lebanon, as well as the regions of "al-Shām" (Damascus), Aleppo and Palestine,60 all correspond to the Ottoman divisions of geographical Syria before 1914.61

Rihani’s loyalty to Syria, therefore, does not negate his loyalty to Lebanon. He admits that he cared for the future of Lebanon as much as, and probably more than, any other Lebanese. But the difference between him and others is that he saw the welfare of Lebanon and Syria together in their unity. His two loyalties, therefore, do not contradict but complement each other because, for him, the two countries themselves complement each other. Moreover, his Syro-Lebanese loyalty complements his loyalty to the whole Arab world (al-bilād al-‘arabiyya jam‘ā’). As he puts it, "no doubt every one prefers their place of birth, and from this first love begins love of the country (ḥubb al-watān). My love for Lebanon is based on my love for al-Freike, much the same, my love for Syria is based on my love for Lebanon. Also my love for Syria is the basis of my love for the northern Arab regions, Palestine, Iraq and East Jordan, and my love for these regions is a part of my love for the whole Arab countries. And this is the biggest patriotism (al-ḥubb al-watānī al-akbar)".62
Rihani distinguishes between the "small country" (al-waṭān al-ṣaghīr), and the "big country" (al-waṭān al-kabīr) which included all the small countries created by the colonialist power. In about 1918, answering the advocates of Lebanon's separation from Syria, perhaps responding to Jam‘īyat al-Nahḍa al-Lubnāniyya (LLP) of Mukarzil, he says: "there are among us two groups or two parties: a party which draws a small circle and says 'this is our country...whoever is not of our religion is out of the circle', the other party draws a big circle around the small one and says 'this is our country, and our circle includes yours and protects it'...The first circle is Lebanon, the second is Syria. The first is the symbol of Lebanese renaissance (al-nahḍa al-lubnāniyya), the second is the symbol of Syrian unity". He did not blame those who had their loyalty to the small country, because he himself was one of the most loyal, but he differed from them in that he extended the scope of the circle of his national loyalty.

Throughout the 1920s, even after the Syrian revolution of 1925-27 had failed, and after the Lebanese Republic had been established (1926), the concept of the big country in Rihani's thought, far from narrowing, actually continued to include the entire Arab world "from Aleppo to Aden and from Jerusalem to Baghdad", as he puts it in an article written in 1928. Rihani did not mean to be precise in his geographical definitions here, for he was not drawing a political map but merely indicating the general extent of the Arab homeland. And while, in 1922-1923, he had embarked on his mission for Pan-Arabian unity, he continued to stress that the benefit of Lebanon and Syria was in their unity.

Rihani's belief in his Syro-Lebanese identity is grounded in a strong belief in the natural unity of Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. This unity was, for him, a historical fact, because it emanated from objective elements forming the components of Syrian patriotism or nationalism in his thought. At this stage qawmiyya and waṭanivya are still used in the same context of nationalism. It should be emphasised, however, that Rihani did not elaborate a theoretical concept of Syrian nationalism, but his ideas which can be gleaned from his speeches and writings, particularly during the late 1920s, clearly indicate those elements of Syrian unity. They are: geography, history, culture, including language, blood relationship (rābitat al-dam) or nationality (al-qawmiyya i.e. belonging to one
people) and common interest (al-maṣlaḥa al-mushtaraka). Although he seems to concentrate on nationality, language and the common interest, a careful reading of his works would indicate that geography and history are no less important.

Geography

Although Rihani did not originally define the borders of geographical Syria, some different geographical definitions can be found in his writings. Some of these definitions may seem of a "poetic" rather than geopolitical nature, and Rihani probably did not mean to precisely draw a political map of Syria. For example, he speaks of the "great Syrian unity" from "Aleppo to al-Nāqūra and from al-Suwaydā' to al-Suwaydiyya". However, his first clear definition of geographical Syria can be found in al-Nakabat (1928), where Rihani starts his short history of Syria by defining its "frontiers, the first characteristics that nature itself helped to draw". Sūrīyya, as he prefers to call it rather than Bilād al-Shām, was naturally formed rather than artificially. That is geographical features, e.g. deserts, mountains, rivers and the seas which surround the country, defined its borders. According to him, the Syrian frontiers are: the Mediterranean Sea which meets the Red Sea at 'Aqaba from the West, the Mountains (the Taurus mountains) from the North, The Euphrates from the East and the (Arabian) desert from the South. With a slight difference in the poetic style, Rihani's definition of Syria's boundaries corresponds to that declared by the General Syrian Congress in its meeting in Damascus on 2 July, 1919.

Lebanon then, in Rihani's view, is geographically an integral part of Syria. Geography, not only imposed the unity of the land but also provided it with its aspects of strength, security and economic survival. Even as late as 1939 he still wrote that "Lebanon and Syria form one country at least geographically and economically: plains can not exist without seacoasts, and mountains can not survive without plains", he wrote with an almost Khaldunian turn of phrase. Between Lebanon and Syria there was no real boundary, and the actual frontiers were, in his view, only artificial. These were "discovered, invented and imposed" by the "foreign colonialist enemies, and their friends in the interior" to divide the country and facilitate its occupation.
To those who refused the unity with Syria, claiming that Lebanon was not Arab but Phoenician, Rihani resorted to geography to reject their claims. He argues that the borderline between "Phoenician Lebanon" and "Arab Syria" is an imaginary one, a simple piece of wood not even with Phoenician script, but a French inscription which is the symbol of occupation and intellectual colonisation. This artificial line, in his view, could not hide the natural unity of the land. "How excellent the mandate and the Mountain's politicians are, to see the benefit of the Eastern and Western nations in this piece of wood which tells the great distance between the Phoenician and the Arab Country. A great distance (i.e. between Beirut and Damascus) that can be covered by car in only one hour".73 Thus geography seems an important basis on which Rihani built his argument for Lebanon's unity and integrity with Syria at the national, cultural, historical, economic, and political levels.

Nationality and Kinship

Rihani identifies three essential cornerstones (arkan jawhariyya): language (al-lugha), national identity (al-qawmiyya) and the common interest (al-maslahah), without which nationalism or patriotism (al-wataniyah) anywhere cannot stand.74 Starting from the controversy over whether the Lebanese people were Phoenicians or Arabs, Rihani asserts that both opinions were equally wrong, exaggerated and historically unjustified.75 His own view was based on the common origins of the Lebanese and Syrians, and on the similarity of their characteristics.

Rihani sees that given the mixture of the people who lived in Lebanon, it is hard to prove that the Lebanese have pure Phoenician blood. Even so, this does not make them non-Arab; because Arabs and Phoenicians descended from the same origin, from Aram the son of Sam. "Aram was the Arabs' ancestor, and the Arabs are the Phoenicians' ancestors".76 He based this theory on the ancient history of Herodotus and Strabo, and on archaeological evidence found in Eastern Arabia (Bahrain).77 Accordingly, the Phoenicians possibly originated in the Gulf area and migrated from Eastern Arabia to the Mediterranean Syrian coast. If, however, this was open to question, one thing was certain in his opinion: "either the Phoenicians, who are Semites, are descendants of the Arabs, or the Arabs are
descendants of the Phoenician". What's important for him is in fact the essential and undeniable bond (ṣila) which existed between the Phoenicians and the Arabs. This bond is reflected in the observable characteristics of the two peoples. The Arabs, particularly along the coasts of the Gulf and the Red Sea, inherited the skill and the daring of the ancient Phoenician navigators, as well as their passion for trade.\textsuperscript{78}

This similarity can also be traced in the characteristics of the Lebanese and Syrian peoples. These characteristics are, in his opinion, a mixture of Phoenician and Arab: both peoples have the Phoenician boldness and love of adventure and the Arab pride and love of glory. "What are the first characteristics of Lebanese and Syrians?" he asks. "Aren't we in daring and adventure and in our love for travelling and trade like the Phoenicians? Aren't we in pride, dignified manner and fondness for culture, in love of glory and nobility like the Arabs, sons of 'Adnān and Qāḥītān? The Arabs and the Phoenicians are therefore our ancestors. Above all, nations are not measured by their origins but by their virtues. And if we look at the national, spiritual, intellectual or social inheritance of the Lebanese and Syrians, we find that both peoples have the same characteristics, good and bad, of the two Semitic origins, Phoenician and Arab".\textsuperscript{79}

In the similarity of characteristics, Rihani found the substitute for the theory of origin because he did not believe in the theory of pure race, particularly as far as the Lebanese and Syrians were concerned. In his view, the waves of migration and occupation, from different places and different races, left their marks on the racial and characteristic composition of the original people and subsequent settlers in geographical Syria. Thus, without denying the Phoenician and Arab blood, he did not believe the Syrians were a pure race. In al-Nakabāt, he wonders whether all who lived in geographical Syria (ṣūrīyya al-tāhīyya) were from the Aramaean race which had blended with that of the Hittite, Can'ante, Phoenician and Hebrew. Whatever the truth may be, Rihani had no doubt that "in the Syrian people today there remained some of the characters and blood of all the ancient peoples who lived in the country, from the Can'ante to the Arabs passing through the Israeli, Egyptian, Assyrian, Hittite, Phoenician, Aramaean, Chaldean, Greek, Roman and Tatar".\textsuperscript{80} All this supports his claim that between Lebanon
and Syria there was, not only geographical unity, but also a blood relationship which bonded together the two brotherly peoples and imposed on them cooperation and unity.

Culture and Language

Rihani argues in al-Nakaba that since the days of the first settlers, there has been a cultural continuity in the language, traditions and religion of the peoples who have lived in geographical Syria. Throughout the history of Syria, local culture, in his view, blended with those of the conquerors to form one culture that was unmistakably Syrian. Under Greek occupation for example, Greek culture spread among the high classes of the people. Greek myths replaced and sometimes blended with Assyrian and Phoenician myths, and although Aramaic remained the language of ordinary people, the elite classes spoke the language of the conquerors as well. In his opinion, it was easier for the Syrian people to change their language than their customs and morals. Hence the variety of languages that Syria knew in the course of centuries, until finally Arabic replaced them all, after the Arab Islamic conquest and the gradual Arabization of the Syrian people.81

Culture, in Rihani's thought, is a proof of identity and thus of nationalism. It is so indispensable that its loss means the loss of the people's existence as a distinguished nation. For example, in 1920, Rihani warned the Lebanese against the French protection "which is incompatible with Lebanese patriotism", because protection "will gradually deprive the Lebanese of their nationality, their language and traditions and, like the Algerians and Tunisians they would become neither Lebanese nor French".82 In a speech delivered in 1927 to the Syrian immigrants in New York, he reasserted the Arab identity of Lebanon and its unity with Syria on the basis of their cultural unity as well as the common heritage with other Arab lands. "Despite the political divisions and international ambitions, the old country is one. Our language in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine is the same, the language of Mudar and Rabi'a (the two major confederations of the northern Arab tribes), the language of the Arabs. Our literature, traditions and customs, and our spiritual
character (nafsiyya) are the same whether in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq or in Najd and the Yemen".83

Within culture, language for Rihani comes before traditions and religion. Language, together with nationality (qawmiyya) and common interest, is one of the essential elements of patriotism and national unity. Language in Rihani’s thought is a means of communication and mutual understanding among individuals. It is the instrument of thought and the means of transmission of ideas and principles, and as such, language for him always had a special importance. As early as 1898, and long before Sā‘īd al-Ḥusnī saw language as the most important element of nationhood,84 Rihani had assigned to language a crucial role in the life of a nation.85 Again, in an article published in 1909, he expressed his love of the "noble" Arabic language as the first manifestation of his Arab identity,86 and in 1920, he insisted that the Lebanese and Syrians were bound together not only by blood relationship and geography but also by language. Language for Rihani was not only a means of comprehension but it creates a feeling of closeness among people from the same origin.87

Arabic as the common language of both Syria and Lebanon was one of Rihani’s arguments for the unity of the two countries. Responding to those, particularly Christians, who argued that the Lebanese people were Phoenicians, he insisted that "despite every thing Lebanon is Arabic at least in its language".88 When he embarked on his call for Arab unity in its broader sense, once again language was one of his fundamental arguments.89 However, while Rihani sees "unity of language as necessary to protect the independence of a country", language alone in his opinion, could not achieve national unity, because "language may not be enough to unite two different and separate nationalities".90 "Language alone can not unite the racial elements, and can not overcome tribalism". Arabic, for example, in the past could not unite the Arabs in Syria. Although Arabic united the Lakhmī and Azdī Arabs, their tribal fanaticism (al-‘asabiyya) remained dominant.91

Unlike language religion as a cultural aspect was, in Rihani’s thought, not only less important, but also potentially of divisive effect among the Syrians. In al-Nakabāt, Rihani blames religious fanaticism for most of the calamities that
Syria had experienced throughout its ancient and modern history which explains why he excludes religion from the essential elements of Syrian nationalism.

Although Rihani saw that the Syrians in the past had almost the same gods, rites and customs, and that Islam was a great Arab achievement which Arabised the Syrian peoples and their language, he did not think that religion would help achieve national unity. He tries to prove that in the past, even Islam which professed the unity of God could not unite the Syrians, because Islam was unable to overcome tribalism and the personal and political interests. This explains why some Arabs fought on the side of foreigners and why non-Arabs fought against Arabs although they all were Muslims. This also explains why Arab tribes, e.g. the Qays and the Yamani clans, fought each other although they were united in Islam. If tribalism was "the first and most important factor in the decline of many Islamic states", it proves that religion alone was unable to unite different nationalities and racial groups.

Moreover, even if "tribalism in the present had begun to disappear", Rihani was still convinced that religion would be unable to achieve Syrian unity because of the remaining problem of religious and sectarian fanaticism which divided the Syrians into different groups according to their creed. This division was the cause of the problem of minorities which is still the enigma that has not been truly solved since the Umayyad era. Throughout history, he believes, the minorities have always been exploited by the tyrant rulers and the various conquerors. But if the minorities have always been a woe for themselves and for the majority, the latter is equally responsible because the Muslims always saw civilisation, progress and happiness achievable only under a strong Islamic state, and because they put justice, equality and economic development in the second place, and this, in Rihani's view, was their biggest mistake. This explains why Rihani did not agree with the Muslims on a government formed between the various sects (al-tawa'if) in Lebanon and Syria, and did not believe in the pan-Islamic unity. Instead he saw secularism as the only way to achieve national unity because it replaces fanaticism and religious loyalty with patriotism and national loyalty.
History and Nationalism

History, in Rihani's thought, is a very important element of Syrian nationalism. In al-Nakabāt, he tries to demonstrate that, throughout their history, Lebanon and Syria had experienced the same disasters and that their present was a continuation of this disastrous past. In this short history of geographical Syria, Rihani evokes common memories of bygone events and past misfortunes and he urges the Syrians, including the Lebanese, to re-examine their history with a new critical spirit in order to draw a lesson for the future, to forget the negative aspects of their past without regret and reject its false glory. Rihani does not want to forget the history of the nation, but he sees history as a factor which should be evoked to enlighten the present and not to paralyse it by the heavy burden of illusions. Thus, the whole truth about the past should be known and the nation should not be content with remembering the achievements of the ancestors but should rely on its present abilities to build its future. In this, Rihani would seem to disagree with Sā'īd al-Ḥusayn’s contention that in the study of history, selection should be carried out so as to deepen the spirit of nationalism in the souls of the students. This, for al-Ḥusayn, means that the black pages of the past should be ignored for they would negate the spiritual vitality which history is capable of inspiring and would weaken the student's faith in the future.96

The ancient and modern history of Syria are viewed by Rihani as a chain of catastrophes and successive invasions some of which were commemorated in inscriptions still to be seen in Lebanon. Syria, as he points out, was "the captive of nations, the mother nation of the East and the West...and the bearer of the foreigner's yoke". Since the days of the Hittites, Hebrews and Phoenicians, Syria had been a route for conquerors and a destination for all nations.97

In evoking common memories, Rihani attempts to prove, to Lebanese and Syrians alike, not only that they shared the misfortunes of the past but also those of the present, and that instead of avoiding their ancestors’ mistakes, they were repeating them under the yoke of new conquerors. The conquerors’ policy is, in his opinion, invariable. In the past conquerors supported one Syrian king against another to achieve victory; Alexander kicked the Persians out and occupied the whole of Syria, and today the "Allies" kicked out the Turks and then replaced them. Even when the indigenous people rule, their national sovereignty is tied to
the foreign policy of the dominant power. Such was the Arab Nabataean rule, centred in Petra, which was ended by the Romans who established their complete Roman rule all over Syria. Furthermore, he draws a parallel between this and the situation of his time: for just as many Arabs, for their own selfish interests, helped the Romans achieve their colonialist aims, so today some Syrians collaborate with the foreigners, so as "the yoke on Syria's neck is not put by foreign hands but by its devoted sons themselves”. The Romans and the Persians consolidated their respective rule in Syria and Iraq by the use of certain Arab tribes. The Lakhm and Ghassān brothers, though both Arab, fought each other to help the foreigners. And "as Romans and Persians made kings of our Arab ancestors, foreigners make the kings nowadays".98

The main factors contributing to foreign occupation of Syria are, in Rihani's opinion, racial and religious fanaticism which have been deep-rooted since the days of the Assyrians who used them to consolidate their domination. Syria's biggest calamity, according to him, happened at the hands of the Crusaders who exploited the existing religious differences to achieve their aims. In his opinion, the Crusaders' success was not because the Maronites and the Isma'īlis helped them but because the Arabs were divided. And "today the hatred continues and the artificial and non-artificial divisions embrace the whole of the old Syrian country, and nothing is new... Oh my country (baladī), Lebanon! The Crusaders had left but you remain, would not you learn?!".99 In this, Rihani sees that the Muslims also committed deadly mistakes for they always looked for a strong Muslim state whatever this state may be. For example, the Ottomans who had none of the attributes of true Islam, were accepted as rulers, simply because they were powerful Muslims. Christian and Muslim Syrians did not learn from history how to avoid such tendencies because all their leaders were only concerned about their own interests.100

To consolidate their rule, the Ottomans also, according to Rihani, revived the tribal and clannish loyalties to keep the Syrians divided. Their rule lasted long in Syria because the rebellious were not united against the state. Revolts such as 'Ali Pasha Janbułād’s in Aleppo and that of Fakhr al-Dīn in Lebanon, failed because of the revived tribalism amongst the feudal lords and the pashas (Wāliṣ)
of the provinces, who fought each other to defend the Ottoman Empire. During the Ottoman era, Syria's calamity was not only caused by the tyranny of the pashas, Janissaries and amirs, as Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī suggests, but as Rihani sees it, by prevailing ignorance at all levels of the nation, which caused tyranny, division and submission without which "the criminal empire would not have ruled its multi-religious and multi-racial flocks with the horses tails [i.e with whips]."

Rihani divided the hundred years of Syrian history between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries into: the war of sects (harb al-ṭawā'if) and the privileges of sects (imtiyāzat al-ṭawā'if) in Lebanon. These privileges, in his view, "were in their results worse than wars because they enhanced religious fanaticism, the biggest enemy of the human kind". Three parties were, in his view, responsible for the 1860's events: the conqueror Ibrāhīm Pasha who fought the Druzes by other fellow Lebanese which enhanced hatred among them; the civil and religious leaders who rallied the inhabitants of the Mountain against Ibrāhīm Pasha to defend their own rights; and France which first provoked Ibrāhīm Pasha against the Ottoman State and then, like England, allied itself with the state to defend its interests.

By his own time, nothing has changed and a new parallelism could be drawn: France, "as usual", was the perpetrator of "nice Christian massacres"; the Mandatory State, the new conqueror, was fighting Syrians by other Syrians; the Lebanese leaders allied themselves with France, not to defend their national rights, but to recover their feudal rights; and Europeans who came to protect the Christians were, in fact, protecting only their political and economic interests.

In conclusion, Rihani sees the Lebanon of his day as the victim of its leaders and their collaboration with the foreigners. The Maronite collaboration with Ibrāhīm Pasha led to the events of 1845, and these led to the tragedies of 1860. Under the pretext of defending their rights, the Lebanese leaders refused Lebanon's participation in the Ottoman parliament and this led to Jamāl Pasha's martial law. To protect their privileges, the Lebanese leaders refused the constitution and today they gave up these privileges to France in return for a bankrupt "great republic."
From this chain of catastrophes, Rihani draws the lesson, for, history’s usefulness, in his view, lies in its lessons. “Today the one country is two: Lebanon and Syria. Here we are repeating our ancestors’ mistakes. History is repeating itself and a foreign state is using us, as the Ottomans did, for its aims. Let’s sincerely and wholeheartedly forget our ancestors, and our historical states and use our strength for our welfare... O brothers, fellows of this country, plain, mountain and coast, do we remain shackled in fear, ignorance, fanaticism and illusions? Do we always serve the interest of the turbaned and cuffed leaders and that of the foreigners against that of the country? Let’s agree to say: we all are fellows of one country with equal rights and duties? let’s reject every old hatred and ugly religious rancour? O Lebanon, my home (baladī)! O Syria my country (biladī), your people today are submissive, content and hopeless, your people are the descendants of those who in the past paid the taxes and suffered the whip”.

In this conclusion to Syria’s history, Rihani suggests that as in the dark eras, all Syrians were subject to the same humiliation; today, they have one destiny and share a common interest. To overcome their painful past and get rid of the new occupation, all Syrians must look ahead for a better future in unity and co-operation, based not on factionalism and fanaticism, but on nationalism, justice and equality. The welfare of Syria is not in its past, but rather in a future based on a new vision of its history.

Common Interest

Common interest (al-maslahā al-mushtarakah), in Rihani’s thought, is an essential basis for nationalism or patriotism. In 1921, Rihani asserted that "genuine patriotism is based on the unity of race (wahdat al-jins), unity of language (wahdat al-luğha) and unity of interest (wahdat al-maslahah). In 1928, he wrote that "the most important and the strongest of the patriotic bonds ... is the economic, commercial and material bond. Let us freely and frankly say, the common interest is before every thing and above every thing". In 1939, calling for Lebanese-Syrian unity within a greater Arab unity, he pointed out that every Arab country (nawr) had at least one problem caused by foreigners and such
a problem could not be solved without co-operation with other Arab countries. In one of his speeches that year, he emphasised that: "Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians are brothers and neighbours united by the same interest. They are united at least by one fundamental national interest". He emphatically adds, "I said interest, not language, nationality or traditions, because all these consolidate the fraternity..., means of peace, co-operation, progress and national welfare".111 The national interest, in this context, is the common interest of liberation from foreign occupation. Thus, common interest is understood by Rihani in both economic and political terms.

Amongst the elements of Syrian nationalism, in Rihani's thought, common interest is clearly the most practical one. It is inherent in the actual political, social and economic life of Lebanon and Syria. In 1920 Rihani proclaimed that it was in the interest of the "Mountain and of its people" to form a unity with their "brothers in the interior (al-dākhiliyya)". In an article entitled 'Ishrūn Ḥujja' (Twenty Proofs),112 he enumerates, in point form, the proofs which justify his call for unity. These can be divided generally into two major categories: economic and political.

Geography is Rihani's first proof of the common interest in economic terms. Separation of Lebanon from Syria is, in his view, abnormal, "a mistake against geography", because economically the two countries complemented each other and needed each other. Lebanon, for example, did not need all its exits to the sea, while the land means of transport, which are mainly centred in Damascus, are vital for Lebanon's economic survival. An independent Lebanon, in his opinion, was not economically viable because its separation from the interior would close these routes and cut its means of subsistence, Ḥawrān wheat for example. Beirut which had half of its commerce with the interior, would also lose its important trade resources. The industry which needed Lebanon's silk would be gradually strangulated, thus seriously harming the whole economic life of both countries which would end in the hands of stockbrokers and creditors. Separation of Lebanon and Syria would also adversely affect other means of communication such as post, telegraph and railways which would be tied by the destructive
resentful competition, and the customs posts on the artificial borders would have negative effects on industry, commerce and tourism.\textsuperscript{113}

A detailed discussion of the general development in population, education, agriculture, transport, industry, foreign trade and financial system of Syria and Lebanon is beyond the scope of this study. However, it suffices here to emphasise the extent to which Rihani was aware of the danger in economic terms of Lebanon’s separation from Syria, particularly as geographical Syria had started to witness discernible progress before the outbreak of the First World War, and continued to do so in the post-war period.\textsuperscript{114}

In terms of communication, Beirut during this period, was already playing an important role in Syria’s economy, particularly as the leading seaport for Syria and the chief point of its communication with Europe since 1849. Of nine ports in geographical Syria, four, including that of Beirut, were in Lebanon as constituted under the French Mandate in 1920. The only exit from Lebanon by road was, up till 1883, the carriage road between Beirut and Damascus, the only modern line of transport in Syria at the time. Since 1861, Beirut had been linked to the outside world by the Beirut-Damascus telegraph line which was highly profitable for the government and the commercial interests of Syria. Railways, although suffered many defects because of the duplication and lack of coordination between the various lines, were equally vital to the economic life of Syria, since all exports from Beirut and Tripoli were carried by rail as was a large proportion of imports. In agriculture, silk was among the most economic factors in the mountain, and although the whole of geographical Syria carried heavy handicaps in its industrialisation, the silk industry was also among the most important. Banks, most of them foreign, were already making important profit compared to agriculture and industry.\textsuperscript{115}

Rihani warned of the difficulties which the two countries would be heading into in case of separation. It seems also that he was aware of the danger of favouring the third sector of banking and trade at the expense of industry which in fact has had serious ramifications for Lebanon’s future.\textsuperscript{116} In considering the economic factor as an important basis for patriotism and nationalism, and more specifically for Lebanese-Syrian unity, Rihani seems to be one of the rare Arab
thinkers of his days who gave the economic common interest a significant role as a factor in achieving national unity. Sāti' al-Ḥuṣrī, for example, would not agree that economic interests provide a sufficient basis for national unity. For him, economic interests played an important role in the lives of the individuals but they could not form the "cornerstone of the lofty edifice of nationalism".117

In the case of separation, Rihani argues, Lebanon and Syria would each have its own army to protect it from its neighbour. In this case, Lebanon would be under permanent threat because the Lebanese will remain the smaller neighbour. Unable to afford the costs of its own civil government, how can it then finance a big army? This situation would affect the investment of Lebanon's resources because insecurity would lead to the immigration of labour and capital to safer places. Lebanon also could not count on France to help it financially and economically because, in his view, French policy in the colonies was based on spending from the local resources. And since Lebanon's resources were poor, it would miss the opportunities of reconstruction and economic development.118

At the political level, division of geographical Syria into small states, completely independent from each other, would put an end to its unity and independence and facilitate its colonisation. This was a major concern for Rihani. For Lebanon and Syria, in his view, shared the political aim of achieving independence and freedom, and of establishing national sovereignty. Division of Syria into European "spheres of influence" would, in his opinion, revive the Eastern question, "the first cause of misery and backwardness", not to mention the interference of European consuls in the internal affairs of the Mountain. As he saw it, the whole country had been the scene of European ambitions, and the victim of European foreign policy and commercial interests.

Rihani argues that although small modern nations may have replaced the old great monarchies in the world, the materialistic spirit of the time was still that of exploitation and monopolisation. This materialism was the enemy of the small nations especially if those, like the Syrian nation, were in a land which witnessed the struggle of so many people in the past and was still the target of European colonialist ambitions. He warns that the economic war in the world at the time imposed unity, solidarity and mutual support (wahda, tadamun and takatuf)
between the nations in order to protect their interests and secure their existence. Thus, if as neighbours and brothers, Lebanese and Syrians were subject to the same threats, they also in his opinion, shared the same national interests. "Our neighbour, regardless of religion, is closer than the foreigners, especially if we are bound together not only by common interest but also by blood, geography and language".

Separation of the Lebanese from their "brothers in the interior (al-däkhiliyya)", was in his opinion, a sign of religious and political fanaticism. It shows that the Lebanese put their own narrow interests above those of their country and that they cowardly feared the majority, and this in his opinion, meant that they were not fit to have a free, developed and independent nation. Being a Lebanese himself, he disagreed with those who justified their call for separation by fear from the majority, and he argued that the Lebanese were active, intelligent and rational. This should lead them to success wherever they were, and ensure their interests and equal rights even as a minority.

It was on the basis of such arguments that Rihani advocated Syrian unity under French supervision. Such a moderate unity would, in his opinion, prevent the separation of Lebanon which, if allowed to happen, would kill any hopes of independence and freedom. Syrian-Lebanese unity would also prevent the French occupation of Syria which the Syrian nationalists feared. At the same time it would secure the rights of the Christian minority and assure them. Moreover, he thought, without French assistance, Syria with no capable army to ensure even internal stability, would be unable to keep the threats of Turkey and Bolshevism at bay.

When the Lebanese Republic was declared and hopes for Syrian unity dwindled, Rihani started to call for a Lebanese-Syrian co-operation at the economic level and unity only at the level of national policy. At the same time, he saw complete unity between Syria and Lebanon would come in a later stage as a first step towards a complete Pan-Arab unity as shall be discussed in the following two chapters.
1. 'Bayn Shā'ir wa 'Ālim' (n.d. c. 1919), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 169.

2. 'Lanā wa Lakum' (n.d. c. 1918), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 164-165. The term "i'tizāl" which he used as early as 1918 is currently used (in the derivative, in-'izāl) as an attribute to criticise the Lebanese ideology as advocated by some Maronite thinkers, particularly, Yusuf al-Sawdā', Michel Chiha, and their more recent followers, see, for example, W. Nwayhid, Naqḍ al-Fikra al-Lubnāniyya: al-Fikr al-In-'izāl Min al-Wahm Ilā al-Ma'qūl. For a critical assessment of the Lebanese idea in the writings of Maronite historians, see, Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: Taqī al-Dīn, al-Mas'āla al-Ṭa'i'ifiyā fi Lubnān, pp. 12-30.

3. On the aims and activities of Naʿūm Mukarzil, see Khalīfī Abhāīh, pp. 109-115; Dāyeh, 'Agīdat Jibrān, pp. 87-88 and passim; Naff, Becoming American, pp. 88-89.

4. 'Lanā wa Lakum' (c. 1918), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 166.

5. Ibid., pp. 164-167.


8. 'Lanā wa Lakum' (c. 1918), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 165-166.

9. 'al-Marada w-al-Ṣalāḥiyān' (n.d. c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 202-204; on Naʿūm Mukarzil's Phoenicianism, see Naff, op. cit, pp. 88, 238, 310. For the Phoenician thought and the ideas of Lebanese nationalism, see in particular Y. al-Sawdā', Tārīkh Lubnān al-Maḥārī.


13. 'al-Taṣawwur w-al-Istiqāl' (c. 1920); 'Madhhabī Wajāni' (1927), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 189-200, 245; see also his anti-sectarian and secular ideas in Ch. 3, above.


15. He particularly refers to the bloody attacks against the Christians in Marjīyān in South Lebanon in 1919-1920, see Fayṣal al-Awadī, AAK, 4, pp. 346-352. On Fayṣal's attitude towards these events, see his memorandum to Lloyd George after he left Syria in 1920, in Dīh, Qarqūṭī, al-Mashriq al-ʿArabī wa Muṣṭama' bayn al-ʾArabī, p. 181. On these events see also al-Hakīmi, Sūriyya wa-al-ʿAhd al-Faysali, pp. 169-170; S. H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate, p. 96; Qasimiyya, al-Ḥukūma al-ʿArabīyya, pp. 151-152.
16. 'al-Taṭawwr w-al-‘Istiqāl’ (c. 1920); 'al-Marada w-al-Ṣallyibiyūn' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 198, 202.

17. 'Madhabī Waṭanī' (1927); also 'al-Taṭawwr w-al-‘Istiqāl' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 246-247, 200.

18. 'al-Taṭawwr w-al-‘Istiqāl’ (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 198.


20. For the difference between his usage of the terms supervision (mushārafa) and protection (himāya), see Ch. 7, below.


22. 'al-Taṭawwr w-al-‘Istiqāl’ (c. 1920); 'Ishrūn Hujja’ (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 199, 208.


24. For the Syrian reactions to the agreement, see Antonius, op. cit., pp. 301-304; Sharabī, Governments and Politics in the Middle East, pp. 116ff; Kawtharānī, op. cit., pp. 306ff; Zeine, op. cit., pp. 130ff.

25. 'al-Taṭawwr w-al-‘Istiqāl’ (c. 1920); 'Ishrūn Hujja’ (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 199-200, 208.

26. 'al-Taṭawwr w-al-‘Istiqāl’ (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 198-199; Fayṣal himself was quoted as saying that "the minorities should be given more than they have right to", see a pamphlet by Jam’il ṣawt al-‘Istiqāl al-Sūrī al-Markaziyīya (the Central Association for Syrian Independence), in Qarqūṭ, op. cit., p. 28; on Fayṣal’s views in regard to the minorities, see also his speeches in Damascus and Aleppo in early June 1919, in al-Ḥakīm, op. cit., pp. 72-74.


28. See Ch. 7, below.

29. 'Ṭaḥt al-Sīlah' (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 267.


31. See the letter in Rasā’il, pp. 346-351; also 'Ṭaḥt al-Sīlah’ (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 267.

32. 'Ṭaḥt al-Sīlah’ (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 266-268.
33. Ibid., p. 269; Rasā'īl, pp. 350-351.

34. 'Madḥhabī Ṭawāni' (1927); 'Rūḥ al-‘Urūba' (1928); 'Taḥt al-Silāḥ' (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 246, 261, 264.

35. See Ch. 3, above.


37. Rihani in fact wrote Fayṣal al-Awwal during his compulsory residence in Iraq when he was expelled from Lebanon by the French mandatory authorities, consequence to his campaign against the French Mandate, see Ch. 7, below.

38. Fayṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 325-326.

39. Ibid., p. 326. See also Zeine, The Struggle, p. 36; Hallaq, al-Tavyarat al-Siyasiyya, p. 46.


42. The reference is to the massacre of the Armenians in Aleppo in February 1919 and the events of Marj-yīūn in early 1920, see Fayṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 335, 343, 351; see also note 15, above.

43. Fayṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, p. 334. Rihani was not alone in this, for example, 'Awnī 'Abd al-Hadi, a Palestinian who was a member of the Hijazi delegation to the Peace Conference, also thought that the ruling class in the Arab administration in Damascus lacked the political expertise and ignored the realities of international politics and methods. See Qasimiyya, al-Hukūma al-‘Arabiyya, p. 263.

44. Fayṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 334-336.

45. Ibid., p. 351. Mas'ūd Dāhir states that Rihani's explanation of the French delay in stopping the riots was the "best explanation" for the French policy in Syria and Lebanon. See Dāhir, Tarikh Lūbnān, p. 39.

46. See the memorandum which Fayṣal submitted to the Peace Conference in January 1st, 1919, in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, vol 2, pp. 38-39; Qarqūt, al-Mashriq al-'Arabi, pp. 20-23; Zeine, op. cit, pp. 248-251;

47. Fayṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 330-334; On the claims of France and Britain see Zeine, op. cit, pp. 63, 76-77.

48. It is interesting that Rihani did not accuse the American President of any conspiracy against Fayṣal, because Wilson, in his opinion, was true to his own beliefs in "the rights of self-determination", Fayṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 337-340.

49. See the opinions of al-Shahbandar and Muhammad Kurd 'Alī in Qasimiyya, op. cit, p. 264.

50. Fayṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, p. 345.

51. See, for example, reactions in Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 302.
52. Faysal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, p. 347. See a similar opinion by Yusuf al-Hakim, Vice-President of the Syrian General Council (1919), in al-Hakim, Suriyya w-al-'Ahd al-Faysali, pp. 220-221; see an interesting criticism of Faysal, his handling of the negotiations with the French and his Arab rule in Syria, by 'Abd al-'Aziz al-'Azma, (brother of Yusuf al-'Azma, Minister of War in Faysal's Arab government and the hero of Maysalun), in 'A. 'A. al-'Azma, Mir'at al-Sham, pp. 241-268. The author, who remained pro-Ottoman to the end, it seems, reflects an opposite view to that of his own brother, Yusuf.

53. See the resolutions of the General Syrian Congress on 8 March, 1920, in Mahfarza, al-Fikr al-Siviisi fi al-Urduyn, vol. 2, pp. 29-33; Qarqur, al-Mashriq al-'Arabiy, pp. 93-96. It seems that King Husayn advised the Syrian National Congress to delay the proclamation of the monarchy in Syria till after the Peace Conference when Turkey cedes the Arab regions to the Arabs, see 'Abdullah Ibn al-Husayn, Mudhakkirat al-Malik 'Abdullah, p. 152.


55. The members of the Administrative Council were arrested by the French authorities and sentenced to exile, see Faysal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 345-355; al-Hakim, op. cit., pp. 164-165; Hallaq, al-Tayyaraat al-Siyasiiyya, pp. 55; Sh'ayb, Tarikh Lubnani, p. 26; See the resolutions of the Administrative Council in Zamir, al-Kiyani al-Masrii al-Lubnani, pp. 347-349; Zeine, The Struggle, pp. 165-167.

56. See his articles, 'Bi'ism al-Khayr' (1898); 'al-Wataniyya w-al-Dukhala' (1898); 'Na'ulu wa Jam'iyyanin' (1900); 'al-Dawwar' (1900), in Shadharat, AAK, 6, pp. 245-246, 250, 269-271, 272-275, and passim; 'al-Ta'ahul al-Dini' (1900), in al-Rihaniyya, AAK, 7, pp. 50-51; 'al-Suriyyun w-al-Harb' (c. 1917); 'al-Hayat w-al-Huriyya w-al-Mayi' (c. 1917), in al-Qawmiiyya, AAK, 8, pp. 108, 148-154, and passim; his letters in Ras'a'il, pp. 15, 21, 26, 166-180, and passim.

57. See his articles 'al-Lubnaniyyun w-al-Mutasarrif al-Jadiid' (1902); 'Idhā Kan la Budd Min al-Zulm' (1902), and passim in Shadharat, AAK, 6, pp. 435-465; 'al-Ta'awwur w-al-Istiqla'il' (c. 1920); 'al-Marada w-al-Salibiyyun' (c. 1920); 'Ishrūn Hūja' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiiyya, AAK, 8, pp. 197-209.

58. See in particular 'Taht al-Silah' (1928), in al-Qawmiiyya, AAK, 8, p. 265.

59. 'al-Ta'awwur w-al-Istiqla'il' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiiyya, AAK, 8, p. 197.

60. 'Lanaa wa Lakum' (c. 1918), in al-Qawmiiyya, AAK, 8, p. 167.


62. 'al-Sharak al-Jamii' (1928); also 'al-Ta'awwur w-al-Istiqla'il' (c. 1920); 'al-Marada w-al-Salibiyyun' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiiyya, AAK, 8, pp. 254-256, 197, 204.

63. 'al-Sharak al-Jamii' (1928); also 'al-Mawdū' al-Mar'ūf' (c. 1927); 'Risālat al-Mughtaribīn' (1927), in al-Qawmiiyya, AAK, 8, pp. 254-255, 223-229, 242.

64. 'Lanaa wa Lakum' (c. 1918), in al-Qawmiiyya, AAK, 8, p. 165.

65. 'Risālat al-Mughtaribīn' (1927); 'al-Sharak al-Jamii' (1928), in al-Qawmiiyya, AAK, 8, pp. 242, 254-255.


67. 'al-Sharāk al-Jamīl' (1928); 'Rūh al-‘Urūba' (1928), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 255, 262-263. On his ideas of Arab unity, see Ch. 8, below.

68. 'al-Mawdū’ al-Ma’lūl' (c. 1927), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 226.

69. Ibid., p. 154.

70. See the resolutions of the Congress in Antonius, op. cit., pp. 293, 440; Hurewitz, Diplomacy, pp. 62-64; Qatar, op. cit., pp. 41-42. For earlier definitions of Syria see, for example, N. Qasṭīf (writing in 1895), quoted in Gharāybeh, Sūriyya fi al-Qarn al-Tāṣī, 'Ashar, p. 14.

71. al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, p. 154.

72. 'al-Watan al-Wahīd' (1939); 'al-Ḥudūd' (1936), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 425, 378.

73. 'Rūh al-‘Urūba' (1928), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 262-263.

74. 'al-Sharāk al-Jamīl' (1928), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 257.

75. Ibid., p. 257.

76. al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, p. 156.

77. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 710; he also uses George Rawlinson’s Ancient History.

78. Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 710-714; ACA, pp. 271-274. Edmond Rabbath asserts that the inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent are of Semitic origins, and that there is a near unanimity among scholars that the Semites came from the Arabian Peninsula, see E. Rabbath, 'al-Maṣḥiyyūn fi al-Sharq Qabl al-Islām', in I. Khūrī (ed.), al-Maṣḥiyyūn al-'Arab, pp. 21-23.

79. 'al-Sharāk al-Jamīl' (1928), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 258.

80. al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, p. 157.

81. Ibid., pp. 174-175.

82. 'al-Tatawwur w-al-Iṣtiqlāl' (c. 1920); 'Madhhabī Watani' (1927), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 200, 247.


85. 'Tawḥīd al-Lughah al-‘Arabiyya' (1898), in Shadharāt, AAK, 6, pp. 481-485.

86. 'Hunā wa Hunāk' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 42; see also Ch. 5, above.

87. 'Iṣhrūn Hueja' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 208.

88. 'al-Tatawwur w-al-Iṣtiqlāl' (c. 1920); 'Gha‘yati wa Thawra‘i' (1922); 'Takallumū bi-al-'Arabi' (1922), in al-Qawmīyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 197, 215, 220.

89. See Ch. 8, below.
90. 'al-Sharak al-Jamīl' (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 257.

91. al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, p. 176. For tribalism as a major obstacle to Arab unity, see Ch. 8, below.


93. From a letter, 30 May 1928, which Rihani sent to various Syrian leaders and members of parliament on the occasion of al-Nakabāt's publication, see Rasā`il, pp. 346-351; see also al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, p. 147.


95. 'al-Tatāwur w-al-Istiqāl (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 197-198.


98. al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, pp. 164-173.


100. Ibid., p. 203.

101. Ibid., p. 209.

102. Ibid., p. 212.

103. Ibid., p. 216.

104. Ibid., pp. 216-219.

105. Ibid., pp. 216-218.

106. Ibid., pp. 216-219.

107. Ibid., pp. 220-221.

108. Ibid., p. 149.


110. 'al-Sharak al-Jamīl' (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 258.

111. 'al-Wāṭan al-Wāhid' (1939), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 424.

112. 'Ishrūn Ḥujja' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 205-209.

113. Ibid., pp. 205-206.


117. For a discussion of this issue in al-Ḥusri's thought see Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist, p. 108.

118. ‘Ishrūn Ḥujja’ (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 206-208.

119. Ibid., p. 208.

120. Ibid., p. 208.

121. Ibid., p. 208.

122. Ibid., pp. 208-209.
CHAPTER SEVEN

RIHANI AND THE FRENCH MANDATE IN LEBANON AND SYRIA

"The mandate (al-intidāb) as defined by Woodrow Wilson, the immortal American, is reasonable and acceptable. But in practice it is reprehensible and despicable. It is more wicked (akhbath) than colonialism (al-isti‘mār)."¹ I urge you to struggle against it to the end. The spiritual struggle (al-īḥād al-rūḥī) is more honourable and useful than the material one (al-īḥād al-māddī). Passive and peaceful resistance (al-muqāwama al-salbiyya al-silmīyya) is more appropriate for oppressed, destitute people (al-shu‘ūb al-mustaqṣafa al-saghīra) than other forms of resistance. I urge you to struggle, peacefully and spiritually, against the mandatory governments and all the oppressive governments. Revolt, boycott, go on strike, do not pay taxes and fees, welcome imprisonment and punishment for the sake of right and freedom".² It was with these words, that in his political will (Wašīyati, written in 1931), Rihani summed up his views on the mandate and the means to struggle against it. This chapter deals with these views, and the way Rihani saw Lebanon and Syria could terminate French colonialism and build a new society.

Mandate or Colonisation?

From the above discussion (in chapter 6) of his ideas on the future of Lebanon and Syria, it is clear that, soon after the end of the Ottoman Empire, Rihani believed that independence of both countries was unrealistic without some foreign assistance. But between "protection" (al-ḥima‘a) which could lead to permanent occupation, and "supervision" (al-musharafa) which would have a specific role for a limited time, Rihani certainly preferred supervision. This, as he perceived it, would consist only of neutral assistance without interference in the internal affairs of government, and without support to one community against the others.³

After the French Mandate was established in Syria and Lebanon, Rihani no longer considered France as a "supervising power" (al-dawla al-musharīfa), but a "mandatory" and a "colonial power" (al-dawla al-muntadaba and al-musta‘mira).
Under supervision, Rihani had expected Lebanon and Syria together to enjoy partial independence, while he had expected France, as the supervising power, to ensure that the rights and security of the indigenous people, particularly the minorities, were respected. This role, he thought, should end when Syrians and Lebanese proved able to live in harmony and co-operation. He saw that the mandate on the other hand, negated independence. Tied to the interests of the mandatory power, independence would be "mere ink on paper".⁴

The mandate, in Rihani’s view, was a new name for foreign domination and colonisation,⁵ and a renewed form of European interference in the internal affairs of the Lebanese and Syrian people, under the pretext of protecting religious minorities. He saw this as a trivial excuse arguing that there were no Christian minorities, in Algeria and Tunisia, India and the Sudan, for example, which were under French and British occupation respectively.⁶

Rihani was well aware of the distinction made, in principle, between the mandate and colonisation. Quite familiar with the principles of President Wilson on self-determination and the latter’s ideas on the mandate, Rihani was willing to acknowledge that the "mandate itself was not pure evil".⁷ He argued that Wilson invented the principle of mandate to curb European imperialist ambitions in the territories formerly under the Ottoman Empire. Rihani was convinced that, in such "political invention", Wilson perceived the salvation of the peoples who had been under the Turkish yoke, and expected that those peoples would sooner or later win independence and freedom. However, Rihani did not fail to note how the colonialist politicians laughed at Wilson’s "democratic naivety".⁸

Rihani admits, with a touch of scepticism, that Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, later incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles which provided the Mandate System, was "it is true, a model of justice and nobleness but it was unique in having too high expectations of the honour of the Great Powers, and of the capability of peoples aspiring for independent self-government". However, Rihani also realised the huge gap between principle and practice, as was clearly demonstrated in the French and British Mandates in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and East Jordan.⁹
Thus, Rihani had a clear idea that the mandate in principle was not the same as colonisation, but was meant to assist the mandated country which was not deemed capable of self-government. He was equally aware that European supremacy (ṣīyāda) and presence in the Arab world, whether British, French or Italian, served only the interests of the European power and not the governed people. To that extent, European presence in the Arab lands was "colonisation" (isti‘mār). Mandate, in Rihani's writings, is almost always associated with foreign domination and colonisation. A republic under a mandatory power, in his opinion, had no sovereignty. "Could the mandate be considered an independence?", he asks. Particularly in his writings in the late 1920s and 1930s, both "intidāb" and "isti‘mār" were used interchangeably to describe foreign tyrannical rule, exploitation and domination. He accused the "mandatory power" in Lebanon and Syria of colonialist practices, and all European mandates of acting wholly as "colonising" powers in Arab countries.

In general terms, Rihani accused the European powers of injustice, for they did not treat the people of the East, i.e. the Middle East, Asia and Africa, in the same way they treated each other and their own people. This was because they carried "two different scales for justice and two different criteria for social and patriotic qualifications". He argued that while Europeans in general believed in freedom and independence in their own countries, in the Arab world, they suppressed the indigenous peoples who sincerely aspired to freedom and independence; they only favoured those who supported them for their own selfish interests.

French policy in Lebanon and Syria was a clear example of such contradiction in European values. Rihani points out that while the French in their own country "hated to combine religion with politics", in Syria and Lebanon, they followed a policy based on the exploitation of religious disparities in order to achieve their colonialist aims. For example, their promise to assist the Christians achieve the independence of Lebanon was, in his opinion, given as "flattery" (mujāmala) and was inconsistent with the French liberal principles. "The liberal Clemenceau", he pointedly says, "was reactionary in his Lebanese policy".
Rihani warned that European colonialism used several means to establish itself. Amongst the most important and serious were the foreign educational institutions which, in common with other Arab intellectuals, Rihani accused of spreading hatred and disunity amongst the people of the same country. He argued that when the Lebanese were the subjects of a state (i.e. the Ottoman) which they feared and hated, "foreign schools appealed to their fear and charged them a high price", that is division, and loyalty to the new foreigners. "Every foreign school tinted a portion amongst us with its own colour", he says, "so there was the French, the English, the American, the Russian and the Italian, and amongst those thus educated there was no genuine Lebanese or Syrian".

Foreign schools, in Rihani’s opinion, were particularly harmful under the mandate. He argued that with their sectarian tendency, foreign schools in Lebanon promoted an anti-Arab propaganda in order to keep the Lebanese away from the Arab renaissance (al-nahda al-'arabiyya). He accused the "masters" of foreign schools, who were concerned primarily with their "commercial" interests, of educating the Lebanese only to make them "permanent servants for the foreigners". For this purpose, he insists, foreign schools propagated amongst their students the notion that the Arab renaissance was harmful to the Christians, and that they, therefore, should not trust it nor take part in it. This is how, for example, he explained the revival of Pharaonism in Egypt and Phoenicianism in Lebanon. Such "so-called cultural movements" were, in his opinion, "encouraged and supported by foreign educational institutions and imperialist politicians for the purpose of overcoming and obliterating in these two countries, pro-Arab sentiment and activity".

Division of loyalty which separated the Lebanese from their Syrian and Arab neighbours was, in Rihani’s view, deepened by a political division imposed by Europeans before and after the First World War. Rihani insisted that the policy of "divide and rule" was the foundation of European colonialism in the Arab East. It was the "pillars of colonialist policy" (asārūn al-syāṣa al-isti’mārīyya), in his opinion, who divided the Arab land, created artificial countries, and gave them power and legitimacy in order to facilitate European domination over the Arab World.
Rihani drew attention to another important aspect of European colonialism. This is the economic colonialism which, as he saw it, was no less dangerous than the political one. He warned against the colonial policy which resorted to economic measures to oppress the indigenous people. In Lebanon, for example, the French policy consisted of introducing the people to luxury and wasteful consumption habits. On several occasions, he insisted that through foreign schools the colonialisst French taught not only their language but also the French culture and the "Parisian" way of life. He criticised those Lebanese who aped the French in their language, food and clothing, observing that "those who used to be satisfied with their simple life have now become accustomed to cars, French "gateau", and all the European luxuries".\textsuperscript{24}

Rihani gave special attention to the economic situation in Lebanon under the French Mandate. He expounded the effects which the mandate, together with the First World War, had on the Lebanese industry and crafts, especially textiles, the Lebanese chief manufacture. Thus, he explained that the competition of European textiles which flooded the Lebanese markets, not only adversely affected local textile factories which came to a complete standstill, but had also its cultural impact on the Lebanese society. The loom, for example, was not only subjected to unfavourable foreign competition but also to "moral decline", where "the Lebanese women looked down upon it" and were now accustomed to imported goods for all their needs.\textsuperscript{25}

Beside unemployment, apathy and despair which severely affected Lebanese society, Rihani pointed out that the increase in demand resulting from the newly adopted 'Parisian' style of life, and the economic dependence on the colonial power contributed to Lebanon's impoverishment. Under the mandate, he argued, Lebanon's dignity and national wealth, i.e. the revenue from raw materials and local crafts, were ruined. This is because while buying raw materials from Lebanon at cheap prices, Europeans deprived local manufacturers of raw material, and sold their manufactured goods to the Lebanese people at high prices. Moreover, the increase in consumption corrupted the Lebanese people who, he warned, would do "anything" to satisfy their new "foreign-inspired needs". It was
thus, with "golden shackles" and a "silk yoke" that European colonialism was tightening the noose around Lebanon's neck.26

While strongly attacking the French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria, Rihani bitterly criticised the political, financial and economic abuses of the governments under French mandatory control. In 1933, in his famous speech 'Bayn 'Ahdawn' (Between two Epochs), after which the mandatory authorities were to expel him from Lebanon, Rihani publicly accused the French Mandate of establishing in Lebanon and Syria a new domination, which caused the old Turkish régime, with all its tyranny and corruption, to be remembered with regret. Under the mandate, he claimed, Lebanon gained nothing except a transition from moral to economic, and material tyranny. Hypocrisy, corruption, humiliation, ignorance and fanaticism, all increased and the nation was still torn by divisions and hatred. Worst of all abuses, was the division of "the one country", i.e. geographical Syria, into what Rihani calls with bitter irony, four "great" "independent" countries, all miserably bankrupt.27

In 1939, he reiterated similar ideas: "in the days of the Turks the country was one at least. No customs barriers between the vilayets to shackle trade and add to the depression of the country; no passports, frontier police or intelligence officers at the end of every fifty or a hundred miles to make travel an abomination to its people; no paper money to remind them always of the gold that was their stable currency; no top-heavy double governments, native and mandatory, to raise taxation and customs duties to the point of desperation and ruin..."28 Interestingly, Rihani accused France of exploiting the privileges given to it by the international treaties to increase its fortune and impoverish Lebanon by destroying its national wealth and moving its antiquities to the Louvre in Paris.29 Obviously, he did not fail to note that the mandate could not have been so harmful without the co-operation of the Lebanese political and religious leaders, both Muslims and Christians.30

Independence: Means of Resistance to the Mandate

Rihani's campaign against the French Mandate started as early as 1920, the year "Greater Lebanon" was officially declared by the French Mandatory
power. His views of independence and liberation from the mandate evolved between 1920 and 1936, the year of the Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties. By then, independence had become, for him, not only the goal of Lebanon and Syria but also a universal national Arab goal.

Rihani, as discussed above, disagreed with the idea of Lebanon's independence from Syria under French protection, whether within a small circle, as the "Small Lebanon" or a wider one as the "Greater Lebanon". Both ideas had supporters among Christian writers and politicians.31 Both entities, in Rihani's opinion, would restrict the Lebanese talent to the "rocks of Lebanon, and this in itself was an insult to the Lebanese people, to their individual ability and intelligence."32 Rihani was aware of the double meaning of "independence" as used in the Lebanese political discourse of his times. He therefore points out that "independence (al-istiqlāl) is not to be independent from each other, ... or that each of us should close his door in the face of his neighbour and brother ... For such independence would only enable the foreigners' yoke to be tightened around our necks, it would be slavery itself. True independence is rather that we all have complete independence (istiqlāl tāmm) for all of us from the foreigners (al-sjānib)."33

While in the early years of the mandate, Rihani's opposition took the form of a continuous call for Lebanon's unity with Syria, after 1927 his opposition to the mandate took a different course. After the failure of the Syrian armed revolution (1925-1927), and the declaration of the Lebanese Republic (1926), Rihani realised that political unity with Syria had become difficult. Thus, he became convinced that the struggle against the mandate should be from within the Lebanese entity itself, without in any way renouncing the idea of future unity and co-operation with Syria.

In his speech 'Bāyn 'Ahdāyin' (1933), Rihani said: "before I say God be with you (i.e. good-bye), let me tell you three words: firstly, people's salvation is in their own hand, Rise! and God will rise with you; secondly, a nation with many parasites can not survive for long, we must be productive,... think of productivity before consumption destroys you; thirdly, your close neighbour is better than your far away brother, even better than your far away affectionate
mother (i.e. France) ...". In these "three words", Rihani summarised three types of struggle against the French Mandate in Lebanon: national liberation, productivity and economic independence, and Lebanon's co-operation with its neighbours, particularly Syria. All were recurrent themes in his writings and speeches throughout.

Rihani doubted that France would grant Lebanon its independence freely, and he was convinced that the Lebanese people should not rely on foreign assistance because this would be tied to the interest of the foreign power. Therefore, he believed the liberation of Lebanon from the French Mandate was exclusively the task of its people and depended only on their national uprising.

National liberation, as deduced from Rihani's writings, speeches and activities, could be seen at two levels: an active resistance taking the form of attack, using particularly the force of the intellect; and a passive resistance in the form of boycott and retreat from political life.

Rihani always preferred the spiritual and moral revolution because it went deeper in society, but in critical moments he did not exclude political and armed revolution. It was mainly after the Syrian Revolution of 1925-1927 that he expressed himself more in favour of armed action to achieve independence and freedom. By then, he had realised that, for European powers, "might is right" was the motto. And he suggested that Lebanon should follow the example of Syria which, by its armed struggle, had taken big steps on the way to independence and political progress. He was aware that the Syrian Revolution failed militarily, but such failure, in his view, was nothing if compared with its political achievements. He did not explain what these achievements were, but he probably had in mind the popular mobilisation and intensified national awareness, and at a more practical level, the Treaty of alliance which the French were then envisaging to conclude with Syria after the revolution died down.

After the costly revolution in human lives and material devastation, the French adopted a more flexible policy in Syria. Realising how unfruitful their violent policy was, the French felt it necessary to conclude a treaty of alliance with Syria to replace the mandate. Rihani was obviously aware of these political developments when he criticised the Lebanese subservience to France.
saying that "in two years of military struggle Syria had achieved more than the Lebanese Republic was going to achieve in twenty years of obedience and subservience."

In his campaign against the French Mandate, Rihani attacked the political institutions which were created under the mandate auspices and controlled by the French authorities. Among such institutions were the Lebanese and Syrian governments both of which he criticised on several occasions. He was convinced that a government under French tutelage, "had nothing of the Lebanese and for them except the name". It is true that, for a while, Rihani had agreed to commit himself under family pressure to keep-away from "politics and religion", yet in every public speech he found himself attacking the government and the French authorities that stood behind it. Unable to heed his family's wishes, he justified his continuing interest in politics by asserting that "Politics and religion", were "like bread and water for every meal", after all, what's the use of a topic which has a safe ending and an ineffective result?"

The press was the most important means for Rihani to express his criticism of the mandate authorities and the governments of Syria and Lebanon, as he considered the press "the stronghold and the watchdog of the nation". He contributed to a number of Syrian and Lebanese newspapers which carried out the campaign against the mandate, some of which, such as al-Qabas, al-Duhur and al-Tair'a, were banned by the French authorities for their vehement, anti-mandate stance. A journalist and contributor to the press from the very beginning of his career as a writer, Rihani assigned to the press a special duty to stand up for the truth and oppose any attempt to violate freedom of expression.

Concerned with protecting human rights and liberties, Rihani criticised the Lebanese and Syrian governments under French rule. Protecting liberties, particularly the freedom of the press, was for him, an essential element of constitutional democratic governments. This, he saw, was lacking in governments under the mandate control. Between 1928 and 1933, a number of Syrian newspapers were banned, some for several times, for attacking both the French and the Syrian government for its submissiveness on the question of national sovereignty. Al-Qabas, organ of the Syrian National Bloc, criticised the
circumstances which brought the Syrian government to power and attacked the oppressive measures against the press and the interference of the French authorities in Syrian elections.48

In an article (1931) defending Najib al-Rayyis, the owner of al-Qabas, Rihani accused the new "independent" governments in Lebanon and Syria of autocracy and tyranny.49 He warned that a national government which would not accept any criticism and would consider itself above the law, was more dangerous than foreign colonialism itself. He pointed out that a nation under such government would not be oppressed by the foreigners only, but by its own people who were supposed to liberate it from the foreigners. Rihani believed that "the ruler was the servant of the nation"; failing to assume such responsibility the ruler should be duly dismissed. This, in his opinion, was the principle of constitutional democracy which the French, and the governments under their control, pretended to uphold. But, he insisted, by violating the freedom of the press, the new tyrant rulers forgot the basic element of democracy.50

Rihani emphasised the role of the press in the struggle against the mandate. Since he believed that the duty of the press was to watch the government and disclose the truth in order to ensure the rights of the people, he urged the national press to stand up against oppression and suspension. He was optimistically certain that such opposition would bring tyranny to its end. For "however oppressive the rulers might be, they could not silence criticism or drown the voices of opposition and protest".51 On this particular issue concerning the oppression of the press and the imprisonment of Najib al-Rayyis, Rihani held out some hope in the judiciary system which he expected to curb the injustice of the mandate and the government.52

When the government in Beirut, in 1931, suspended, a number of newspapers and put some of the journalists in jail, Rihani congratulated the journalists for attacking tyranny and especially for exposing the government as both wrong and unreasonable. He argued that the government was illegitimate, and the fact that it resorted to violence and the banning of papers not only proved its weakness but also its illegitimacy. The government claimed that the journalists had conspired against the security of the state, but in his opinion, "nothing was so
unusual in this". "If this was true", he says, "where is the sin in that, especially if the targeted party was alien to the country?"53

In his campaign against the French Mandate, Rihani, on several occasions asserted that Lebanon’s biggest problem resided in its religious and political leaders, both Muslims and Christians, whom he accused of mercenary co-operation with foreign colonialism. He considered Lebanon’s politicians and leaders as new autocratic tyrants. In order to secure their selfish interest and safeguard their positions, they spread disunity and hatred among the people and contributed to the division of the country.54 This convinced him that all politicians were selfish, and that politics tied the people and prevented them from doing useful work for themselves and for their country.55 While acknowledging that "a country could not do without politicians" he warned that Lebanon had too many politicians, and was thus turning into a land with too many "prickly bushes". He ironically observes: "unlike any other country in the world, Lebanon is small in its surface and population but large in its politics and politicians"; "in Lebanon, politicians are the majority of the population, and each politician pretends to be conducting the world affairs with sagacity and sound opinion".56

Rihani saw that the real interest of Lebanon was neither in politics nor in working with the government, but in the productive work (e.g. agriculture). Politics, in his view, was Lebanon’s biggest enemy because it impoverished the Lebanese people and demoralised them. Thus, he called upon them to keep away from politics and get back to their land to ensure economic satisfaction and dignity. "There is no dignity nor self-sufficiency in politics. Every Lebanese has something good until he becomes a politician, and every Lebanese loves Lebanon until he holds a position in the government (al-hukūma)57

Such views may reflect an attitude that was current among a small number of Lebanese intellectuals who, for many years, refused to take part in the government or hold positions in the public service, as they considered this cooperation as a recognition of the mandate status and the Lebanese entity.58 But Rihani’s views indicate also the extent of his awareness of the importance of economic production in the fight against French colonialism. In encouraging agricultural and industrial production against the third sector, (the public service
and political activities), Rihani demonstrates a particular awareness of the nature of the Lebanese economy which, under the French Mandate, was becoming more and more dependent on the trade and services sector as a result of the French colonial policy.  

In April 1932, in a speech delivered in Iraq on the occasion of the Agricultural and Industrial Fair, shortly before Iraq was declared independent, Rihani emphasised the role of economic progress in the achievement of political independence. After he closely observed Iraq’s efforts at encouraging economic growth as an urgent need for independence, Rihani emphasises that "it is the economic independence which secures freedom for the nation, strengthens its rights and safeguards its dignity amongst other nations... Political independence rests upon economic independence which no nation could do without".  

The economic struggle against the French Mandate, as advocated by Rihani, could be conducted in two inter-connected ways: encouragement of local industry and agriculture, and boycott of foreign economic institutions. Rihani’s visit to India no doubt drew his attention to the role which the people could play in their economic and political independence, particularly under the influence of Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas. In a speech delivered at a public function held in Beirut to encourage the Lebanese national crafts, Rihani insisted that any national renaissance (al-nahda al-wataniyya) could not survive without economic independence, and without national industry and agriculture. All this, he warned, required from the people money, time and sacrifice of artificial luxury. "Every progressing nation (umma raqiya), small or big, strives nowadays to get rid of economic enslavement. There are many ways for salvation, but all require sacrifice".  

Rihani recalled how Ghandhi had shaken up the Indian people and awaken in them the genuine national spirit based on sacrifice and economic development. He emphasised that the economic and political circles in Britain were stirred when the Indians started to knit and wear their own fabrics. He thus urged the Lebanese people to follow the Indian example, to produce and consume their own products, if they wanted to become independent. He was certain that productivity, not the natural beauty of Lebanon, would guarantee its independence. "True
independence is unattainable without economic independence. This would not stand without productivity which in turn could not stand without taking interest in, and encouraging of, the national crafts. A nation that does not produce eventually dies, even if it has silver mountains and golden meadows".62

In his campaign to encourage national products, Rihani drew upon both sentimental and socio-economic arguments. Touching first on the people's patriotic feelings, he expounded the notion that buying national products would teach the people love of their country and sacrifice for it. More importantly, by encouraging national crafts, people would provide work for a higher number of people, men and women, in the community. In this, Rihani drew attention to an important aspect in Lebanon's socio-economic development, that is the increasing role of women in the work force and their contribution to the industrial production, textiles in particular. "The concern by women in the country's economy", he said, "is in itself a good sign of national renaissance".63

An equally important arena of Rihani's campaign against the mandate was his support of and participation in the passive resistance which Lebanon and Syria witnessed between 1928 and 1935. Especially after the Syrian revolution died down, the struggle against the French Mandate in both countries took a peaceful course in the sense of unarmed struggle which was carried out through strikes, demonstrations and other forms of public protest. The protest culminated in summer 1931, when the French Electricity Company was boycotted in order to bring about reduction of electricity prices and tramway fares. In Beirut, the boycott was universal and lasted for three months during which mass demonstrations were organised and Lebanese opinion was united perhaps for the first time since the beginning of the French Mandate.64

Rihani supported this unarmed uprising and praised the boycott as "a new spirit of co-operation and mutual support among the oppressed people against tyranny (al-tughyān)".65 He saw in the unity of the Beirutis who, for the first time, men and women, stood up against the company and the government, the first sign of a popular movement of liberation from the "power and arrogance" of the mandate and its economic and political institutions. He compared this movement with Gandhi's peaceful spiritual revolution, and hoped that "such peaceful uprising
would soon embrace the whole of the Near East (al-sharq al-adnā). Strikes in Baghdad against the government taxes; the protest in Palestine against Zionism and the British Mandate; and the unity of the Syrians and the Lebanese against French violence, further convinced him that if oppression was the first cause of revolution, an idea which he best expressed as early as 1906, the peaceful means of the popular uprising was the best weapon against oppression. For him, "there was no better weapon than that drawn by the voices coming from the depth of prisons, and from the heights of right and peace".

It is important to note that in Lebanon and Syria in the 1930s, a group of Arab intellectuals including Salīm Khayyāṭa, Michel ‘Aflaq, ‘Alī Naṣir, Ra‘īf Khūrī, Kāmil ‘Ayyād and Iḥsān al-Jābīrī, linked social and economic emancipation with national liberation from foreign colonialism. Influenced in varying degrees by Marxist ideas, those 'revolutionary democratic' intellectuals expressed their views in a number of newspapers and magazines including al-Duhūr, al-Tali’a, al-Sīḥāfi al-Ta‘īh, and al-Makshūf, echoing the sufferings and social struggle of the poor classes. Rihani had been committed to the cause of the poor classes from an early period of his career. His participation in certain workers' activities, his contributions to some of the above mentioned newspapers, and his support of the strike movement all demonstrate Rihani’s certain and strong affinity with those "revolutionary democratic" intellectuals who linked the struggle for social justice with national sovereignty, and the independence from French colonialism.

In an article written in support of the taxi drivers in 1933, Rihani explained the "logic" of supporting the drivers’ strike. He argued that by reducing the use of cars, the people would prevent the national income from deserting the country and aggravating its economic dependence on the colonialist power. "Millions of pounds leave the country every year benefiting only a small number of merchants and enslaving ten thousand drivers". By reducing the use of cars, he explained, saving in the national income would result in less expenditure on the import of cars and petrol from France. With the world economic crisis and in a small city like Beirut business, in his opinion, did not need fast means of transport. Thus he suggested that in "the black days of the mandate and poverty", instead of cars, people could use horses and carriages. This, he saw was the only way to prove
their patriotism and solidarity without affecting their dignity. For not only this would encourage the local industry of carriages and the production of barleycorn, thus, providing work and income for a large number of citizens, but with "the use of horses", the people at least would be "completely free from the slavery of the French petrol".⁷³

The idea of boycott was reiterated in another article supporting the general strikes of the workers and merchants in 1931. That year, Rihani expressed his fury that the people had reached the apex of obedience. Despite oppression and suffering they were incapable even of hatred. He was convinced that the Lebanese people were not prepared, for lack of financial means or want of "heroism", to oppose the mandate and defend their rights by force.⁷⁴ Thus, he urged the Lebanese to, at least, support the workers and small merchants on strike, by boycotting foreign goods and products, even if they had to deny themselves some of the new luxuries. In such conditions, the boycott, in his opinion, remained the sole weapon with which the oppressed people could claim their denied legitimate rights and save their remaining dignity and means of subsistence. "Boycott", he insists, "is the most honourable, peaceful and strongest means to stir the people from their sleep and to awaken the feelings of those in power".⁷⁵

Rihani's call for peaceful boycott, however, could not hide his anger at the French oppressive policy and his frustration with the people's passive reaction to oppression. Thus, while he urged the people to show some kind of support (munāṣara) and solidarity (wahḍat al-nidāl) by boycotting foreign products, he insinuated a kind of threat to the French. Convinced that oppression would one day result in revolution, he warned the French authorities against violence and arrogant monopoly which he saw as equally harmful to the Lebanese people as well as to the French. He saw that if the French were keen to have good political and economic relations with Lebanon in the future, they should not impoverish or humiliate its people, otherwise they would be pushing them to revolt, and he stressed that history has examples of this. "If those in power continue in their policy of "today is for us and tomorrow is for the devil", we do not think that, well educated as they are, they would ignore the changes and surprises of history
and life which allow another motto to be justified: "today is for the devil and
tomorrow is for us".76

Unity as a Means and Guarantee of Liberation

In his call to support the workers movement, Rihani emphasised the role of
solidarity and unity amongst the whole nation to enable the movement to succeed.
In fact, in all his writings which dealt with the Arab problems, Rihani invariably
emphasised the importance of unity to achieve political liberation and social
progress. In Lebanon and Syria, he considered unity as a very important means of
struggle against the French Mandate. He advocated unity at two levels: at the
level of religious and sectarian communities, and at the level of political and
economic relations between Lebanon and Syria and their neighbouring Arab
countries. He was certain that Lebanon and Syria could not get rid of French
colonialism without unity and co-operation between them and with other Arab
countries as well as other Eastern countries (e.g. Persia and India), which all faced
the same challenge to attain social progress and liberation from Western
domination.77 Indeed, unity at the internal level and the Lebanese-Syrian-Arab
unity continued to occupy the first place in his concerns.

Rihani considered French colonialism in Lebanon and Syria as a divisive
factor in its very nature, since the French exploited the disparities between the
religious sectarian communities to enhance their domination. Rihani saw from the
beginning, that unity could not be achieved without a national patriotic feeling
replacing all the religious sectarian feelings. This is an idea which he expressed
under Ottoman rule and continued to express under the mandate. True freedom,
dignity and common interest of the Lebanese and Syrian people, could not be
secured except through patriotic unity. Religious tolerance, which he always
championed, was the key to patriotism.78

In 1936, Rihani continued to insist that if the Lebanese and Syrians did not
replace loyalty to their religious community with loyalty to their country (al-
watān), and if they did not put the country above all the sects and religions, all
their work and struggle would be in vain. "We have no salvation, freedom,
sovereignty or dignity, except in our union (al-ittihād) in heart and soul, ... mind
and deed... Such union is impossible as long as we continue to think of our national affairs, as Muslims, Christians, Druze, Alawite or Jews... There is no hope to become one nation... unless we forget our religious communities in our patriotic struggle, and replace in our heart the narrow idea with the universal patriotic one. Only then our voice would be heard, and we would become strong enough to save the country from all internal and external threats". 79

If unity at the community level was so important to get rid of the French Mandate, so was the political unity between Lebanon and Syria. Rihani saw such unity as the safeguard for both Lebanon and Syria against foreign domination. But while he continued to believe that Lebanon and Syria must be united in their "national policy" (al-sivāsa al-qawmīyya), i.e. in their foreign policy, and must have economic co-operation, at one stage, in the 1930s, Rihani called upon the advocates of Syrian unity not to insist on the complete political unification or merger between the two countries. 80 This subtle emphasis must be understood in the light of the political developments in Syria and Lebanon which, between 1933-1936, witnessed a Muslim-Christian as well as a Lebanese-Syrian rapprochement around the campaign for independence of the two countries from the French Mandate.

In the 1930s, Lebanon and Syria witnessed many developments in their domestic, economic, social and political affairs, as well as at the regional and international levels. While the world economic crisis of 1929-1932 created some sort of national co-operation between the various communities of the two countries, at the political level the practices of the mandate authorities, especially manifested in the frequent suspension of the constitution, made the Lebanese as well as the Syrians realise the true nature of "democracy" under the mandate. A Lebanese opposition movement began to appear, not only the Muslims - who were naturally discontented with the discriminatory policy of the mandate authorities and continued to claim unity with Syria, but also among the Christians. This opposition included the Lebanese Christian bourgeoisie whose interest suffered from the monopoly of French capital, as well as other groups, Christians and Muslims, who were hostile to the mandate and demanded real independence for Lebanon on the basis of unity with Syria. Such was the National Congress (al-
Mu'tamar al-Watani), held in 1933 at Rashid Nakhle’s home, including Christians and Muslims who asserted the necessity of replacing the mandate with a treaty between France on the one hand and Syria and Lebanon on the other, on the basis of respect for independence of Lebanon within its union with Syria.\textsuperscript{81}

The Lebanese opposition included also factions within the Maronites, the traditional friends of the mandate, who feared that under pressure the French would consider the reintegration into Syria of those districts annexed to Lebanon in 1920.\textsuperscript{82} The Christian Maronite opposition took a constitutional form with the formation in 1934, of Bishara al-Khuri’s Constitutional Bloc (al-Kutla al-Dusturiyya). This, although mainly of a Christian Maronite leadership, included members of parliament from different religious communities, thus attracting the Muslims and paving the way for a joint Christian-Muslim resistance to the mandate. The Christian-Muslim rapprochement was also manifested through the social workers movements (1929-1935), such as the boycott of the Electricity Company and the strikes of workers, taxi drivers, solicitors and merchants, and most importantly the boycott of the French Tobacco Company.\textsuperscript{83} The leading figure of the latter movement was the Maronite Patriarch Antoine ‘Arisha who attacked the mandate and accused the monopoly of creating a state within and above the state.\textsuperscript{84}

Meanwhile a growing number of Lebanese Sunni Muslim leaders and their supporters in the Muslim bourgeoisie had come to accept the division of Lebanon and Syria as a fait accompli. The idea of reintegrating the annexed districts into Syria was becoming increasingly untenable. Lebanese Sunni leaders had begun to accept the Lebanese entity and to actively compete with the Lebanese Christians for political and commercial power on the Lebanese stage. Eventually, it was the alliance of the Muslim and Christian commercial bourgeoisie which brought, in 1943, the two major advocates of an independent Arab Lebanon to power: Bishara al-Khuri was elected as president and Riyad al-Sulh as Prime Minister.

In Syria, most nationalists had started to move along a parallel line to the Lebanese nationalists on the issue of future relations. By 1936, the Syrian National Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wataniyya al-Suriyya) had virtually renounced its longstanding demand that the districts annexed to Lebanon in 1920 be returned to
Syria and had begun to support the Lebanese movement led by Riyadh al-Ṣulḥ to promote better relations between Lebanese Christians and Muslims. In this direction, the leader of the National Bloc of Syria supported the Lebanese Constitutional Bloc which was presided over by Bishāra al-Khūrī; and they endeavoured to win the friendship of the Maronite Patriarch Antoine 'Ardā. They declared that the national interest required the preservation of Lebanon's Arabhood and the integrity of its territories on the one hand, and ending the mandate and recognition of the independence of Lebanon on the other. As for the issue of frontiers, they accepted that it could be considered later, if necessary, on the basis of Arab brotherhood and the common interest of the two countries.\textsuperscript{85}

Between the trend of Lebanese-Syrian unity on the one side, and that which advocated a 'Small Lebanon' as a 'Christian national home' on the other, there evolved in the 1930s a new trend. This asserted the frontiers of Lebanon as declared in 1920, and demanded a complete independence of Lebanon in close alliance, but not unity, with Syria. According to this trend, Lebanon should be closely related to the Arab homeland without cutting all the cultural economic and political ties with the West especially with France. With the support of the Patriarch 'Ardā and the National Bloc leaders in Syria, the two major representatives of this trend i.e. Bishāra al-Khūrī and Riyadh al-Ṣulḥ, led the campaign for an independent Arab Lebanon. They were strongly opposed by the Lebanese National Bloc (al-Kutla al-Watanīyya) of Emile Eddé which supported the continuity of the French military existence.\textsuperscript{86}

It is within this context that we should understand Rihani's call for the independence of Lebanon and Lebanese-Syrian co-operation during the 1930s. The rapprochement which the Maronite Patriarch's attitude created amidst Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, and between the Lebanese and the Syrians, was probably the first of its kind in the history of the two countries under the French Mandate.\textsuperscript{87} In a speech delivered on the occasion of the Patriarch 'Ardā's visit to him in al-Freike (1936), Rihani greeted the Patriarch's attitude with joy, as he considered it a good sign of unity and understanding between the two major communities in Lebanon and between the Lebanese and the Syrians.\textsuperscript{88} The Patriarch's gesture represented, for him, "unique national renaissance (nahda
wataniyva farida) in our ancient and modern history", because for the first time religions, usually divisive factors, were the factors of unity and patriotism.99

Interestingly, Rihani explained this development not only in political but also in socio-economic terms which indicates his awareness of the impact of socio-economic factors on the political situation. The 'union' of all the Lebanese people with the Syrians was, in his opinion, due to the same problems which the people of the two countries were facing, regardless of their religion. He saw the people were united under one banner, because "oppression, poverty, humiliation and all the misfortunes were the same whether in Damascus or in Beirut, in the North or in the South... ". He was optimistic that the new national renaissance which stemmed from resistance to oppression and poverty would unite the Lebanese and Syrians, Muslims and Christians alike, around a new religion: i.e. patriotism, or the religion of the country (din al-watan).90

Conscious of the developments during this decisive period of the history of the two countries, Rihani considered the rapprochement between the Lebanese, particularly the Maronites, and the Syrians as the key solution to their problems. He saw such rapprochement as the most important step towards establishing the future relations of the two countries on solid bases of co-operation (al-ta‘awun) and mutual understanding (al-tafahum). He greeted and lauded the Patriarch warmly, not only for defending the rights and well-being of the Lebanese people against the French monopoly, but particularly for "setting the solid bases of Lebanon's relations with its neighbours: as friendship to suit the spirit of the time, and the economic, political and social development". Defending the welfare of the Lebanese people was important, but paving the way for their happy future was, for Rihani, more urgent. Because only when "the citizens of the same country" co-exist in solidarity (al-tadamin) and harmony (al-ta'aluf), could "the means of freedom, dignity and security be ensured to all the Lebanese and the Syrians, including Palestinians".91

It is clear that Rihani here emphasised Lebanese-Syrian co-operation and mutual understanding, rather than the complete unity of the two countries. In fact, at this stage, Rihani, preferring not to insist on complete political unity, called upon the Syrian National Bloc not to insist on solving the issue of the frontiers
with Lebanon until Syria and Lebanon achieve independence and terminate the mandate. (Eventually the Syrian National Bloc decided to adjourn the discussion of the issue.) In his opinion, when independence is achieved, all the artificial frontiers, created by the foreigners, between the two countries would disappear. "It would be unwise and short-sighted policy", he argued, to claim a part of Lebanon without the other parts. In doing so, the Syrian National Bloc would be contradicting its political pact. Not only this would make the Lebanese more attached to their "Greater Lebanon", but would also make the French more intolerant towards the Syrian struggle for national independence.  

Rihani was suspicious and concerned that, with their divide-and-rule policy and their political power, the French would obstruct any understanding that could be reached between the Lebanese and the Syrians. So it would not be useful to claim a part of Lebanon while the French had ambitious plans for the whole of Lebanon as well as other coastal parts of Syria. He obviously was aware of the newly formed opposition to the mandate among the Christians which brought out a new dimension of the Syro-Lebanese relations, and he saw that this factor should be taken into consideration to achieve independence. He drew attention to this group of Lebanese who, "daring and honest in their broad patriotism", started to oppose the colonialists, and suggested that the Syrians must co-operate with such Lebanese and be careful not to fall in the foreign trap which aimed at separating the two peoples. After all, if the Syrians accepted only a part of Lebanon, he argued, they would be implicitly renouncing their political principle of general unification (al-tawḥīd al-ʿām) and this, the "nationalist unionists" (al-wataniyyūn al-ittihādiyyūn), neither in Lebanon nor in Syria, would accept.  

Above all Rihani justified his attitude by insisting on the right of both peoples to self-determination. For him, the same right which would allow the Syrians to demand unity, would allow the Lebanese to seek separation. This clash of interest could be solved by mutual understanding and by putting an end to the contradiction between political wishes and sectarian traditions. The Christians and the Muslims, in Rihani's view, inherited two different political traditions. Indirectly alluding to the historical experience under Ottoman and pre-Ottoman rule, Rihani argues that since "the inheritance of the subject" could not be
"reconciled with that of the master, particularly if the latter's sovereignty was based on injustice and inequality", the Syrians in particular, should comprehend the fear of the Christians and prove to them, by word and deed, that they were brothers.⁹⁴

Because the Syrians were aware of this past, and perhaps because they were the majority, they, in Rihani's opinion, should be the first to eliminate all traces of political and religious prejudice inherited from the past. Therefore, they should go beyond the principle of equality and be willing to give the Lebanese more, in order to prove to them that the time of exploiting the minorities had gone for ever. This is how they could prove their flexibility for the sake of unity which is the "greatest national cause". But Rihani still considered independence from the French Mandate as the higher priority. For "what is the meaning of unity or separation if the country as a whole (al-bilād) was still under foreign domination?".⁹⁵

While he repeatedly warned the Christians against the "caricature" independence under French protection, urging them to reject the French Mandate, he equally asked the Syrians not to push for unification but to let the Lebanese try their way until the time was ripe to achieve unity. In this context, Rihani emphasised the role of freedom, justice and equity which should prevail in order to create mutual trust between Syrians and Lebanese. For, "one year of independent national rule, based on justice and equality would be better for the big country and for the achievement of its complete unity than twenty years of speech and writing".⁹⁶

The idea of adjourning the debate on Syrian unity, while asserting its inevitability in the distant future, was reiterated in a letter dated 11, September 1936, which Rihani sent to Shukrî al-Quwwatî, the then National Bloc vice-president. The letter was apparently written to congratulate the Syrians for the initialling of the treaty with France (9 September 1936). Apart from reminding the Syrians that this was only the first victory in their Arab national struggle and that Syria would not enjoy its independence as long as Lebanon and Palestine were under foreign domination, Rihani praised the Syrian leadership for its political wisdom asserting that the unity of Syria depended on proceeding slowly
but surely. "The unity of the two countries is inevitably happening sooner or later...", he wrote, "do not rush it, and do not fall into the traps which are set for both countries..."97

There is no doubt that Rihani saw the accomplishment of independence for Lebanon and Syria from French domination as an immediate goal, after which both countries could work freely and slowly for complete unity. Thus, he saw their co-operation and mutual understanding to be so crucial at this stage of their national struggle for liberation. Furthermore, co-operation and understanding were, for him, not only "the solid basis" and "proper means" to achieve "political national unity (al-waḥda al-qawmīyya al-sīyāsīyya) of Syria and Lebanon and Palestine, "the northern part of the Arab homeland", but also to achieve "the complete greater Arab alliance (al-ḥilf al-‘arabī al-akbar al-‘atāmm)".98 This is how, Rihani saw the independence of Lebanon and Syria, and how their future unity could be the first step toward the "greater Arab unity (al-waḥda al-‘arabīyya al-kubrā). In this respect Rihani was not a lone voice, for other intellectuals, and indeed political leaders viewed the unity of geographical Syria in the same light, though not necessarily always with the same emphasis on freedom and understanding which Rihani constantly asserted.99

The Role of France

Liberation of Lebanon and Syria depended, in the first place, on the effort, awareness and unity of their peoples. However, in Rihani's view, France as "the effective ruling power" should play an important role in the process of liberation. Throughout the period of the mandate, Rihani charged the French authorities with the responsibility for their practices, warning them that they were not only harming the dominated people but also French interests in the East. He also put them face to face with the ultimate responsibility of granting complete independence to Lebanon and Syria.

Using a classical Arabic maxim, "justice is the foundation of the state", Rihani pointed out that the French divide-and-rule policy in Lebanon and Syria was threatening the interests of France in the East as well as its dignity and glory. To consolidate his argument, he referred to the principles of the French
Revolution - justice, freedom and equality - upon which, as he sincerely believed, French glory rested. It seems that by doing this, Rihani not only meant to remind the French authorities of the foundations of their own state so they could rely on them in the East, but also to expose their hypocrisy in supporting democracy and human rights in their own country and violating these same principles in their colonies. When he attacked the mandate, he did not attack the French people, but the tyranny, exploitation and corruption of the mandate authorities. Addressing these authorities after they expelled him from Lebanon, he said: "I am only the enemy of practices, not the enemy of men...".101

Rihani’s attitude towards France underwent some changes according to the political circumstances and to the attitude of France itself vis-à-vis the Arabs in general and the Lebanese-Syrian question in particular. His attitude was somehow conciliatory, in the sense that when he noticed elasticity and softness in the French policy he considered that as a good sign of a new era of Franco-Arab relations, and he optimistically looked forward to a better future of understanding and mutual respect. But every time France deceived and frustrated the Arab aspirations and contradicted its promises, he realised his mistaken opinion and decisively attacked the French vacillating policy. Thus a constant line persisted in his writings throughout the period of the mandate, that is his concern for the well-being, unity and independence of his own people.

Because he had been supportive of France during the First World War, Rihani hoped that when the war ended and negotiations for settlement began, France would be in favour of the Arab cause and the unity of Syria. But he soon realised that the "liberal" French were "reactionary" in their Lebanese policy. France’s double standards vis-à-vis the Syrian question, and its contradictory promises to Faysal and to the Lebanese Maronites concerning the unity of Syria and Lebanon’s independence, led to Rihani’s sense of betrayal and frustration.102

In 1936, after many years of hostile opposition to the French policy in Lebanon and Syria, Rihani expressed some optimism in France’s good intention towards the future of the two countries. It is to be remembered that by then a left-wing Popular Front government had come to power in France; an Anglo-Iraqi treaty of independence and a similar Anglo-Egyptian treaty were signed in 1932
and 1936 respectively; the expanding Fascist threat and the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian War had raised tension throughout the Mediterranean. These factors contributed to a new French effort at conciliation in Lebanon and Syria, a French-Syrian treaty was initialled in September 1936, and negotiations were under way to conclude a similar treaty with Lebanon.¹⁰³

That year, responding to a question concerning the French attitude to the Arab renaissance and to the future of Lebanon, Rihani considered the new French policy as a good sign of better Franco-Arab relations in the future. He wrote: "it is not possible to say about France today, after the French-Syrian treaty, what we said in the past, and I don’t think in its new policy, after the Syrian revolution, France is hostile to the Arabs all the time, as I have been aware of the development of its Arab policy in the last ten years".¹⁰⁴ He explained that France’s hostility towards the Arabs in the first years of occupation was mainly due to its rivalry with Britain over Syria, but once this rivalry was settled and France became aware of the harm inflicted on the Arabs because of this rivalry, it started to improve its Arab policy.¹⁰⁵

Rihani’s optimism was due to several other reasons. Rapprochement between France and Ibn Sa‘ūd, to which he particularly contributed;¹⁰⁶ improvement in the French-Syrian relations after the treaty of 1936; the good relation of France with independent Iraq; and more importantly the signs of progress and unity which began to appear in the Arab nation particularly after the Iraqi-Sa‘ūdī Arab Alliance (1936) in which he saw a symbol of Arab strength and unity.¹⁰⁷ Because of these developments, Rihani was certain that any European power with vital interests in the Near East would be ignoring the simplest political principle of international relations if it was hostile towards the Arab nation. And this applied to France in particular. Thus, he was convinced that in the future, France would be friendly to the newly independent Arab states, whether in the Peninsula or in the northern part of the Arab land, and would agree with them that Lebanon was a complementary part of the Arab land and like them should join the Arab Alliance. Consequently, he believed that "Lebanon in the future should be sovereign and independent in its internal politics and its administrative and economic affairs; united with Syria in its national politics (al-siyāsa al-qawmiyya),
and ... a contracting ally (muta‘āhid and mutahālif) in the Arab Alliance, as an independent Arab country like all the other independent Arab countries”.

Nevertheless, Rihani remained sceptical about France’s policy and did not believe that it was prepared to grant Lebanon real independence. In an article published in 1936, probably while the Franco-Lebanese talks were under way to conclude a treaty, Rihani doubted that the independence as envisaged in the treaty would satisfy the wishes of the Lebanese. While Europeans might understand independence as freedom of opinion and the spirit of democratic constitutional national rule, they were not, in his opinion, prepared to acknowledge these meanings in their foreign policy. In an article displaying his familiar sense of irony, Rihani expresses suspicion that with the help of "the Orientalists and their colonialist advisers", the French were hardly ready to renounce their 'rights' in Lebanon, and all what they were prepared to give was a formal independence which would give them more freedom and arbitrariness in the destiny of that country.

Perhaps the French oppressive practices during the mandate could explain some of Rihani’s scepticism concerning French intentions. But the initialling of the French-Syrian treaty in September 1936, preceding negotiations of the treaty with Lebanon, no doubt helped to strengthen his attitude. It is to be remembered that by the time the Lebanese-French talks began, much of the provisions of the French-Syrian treaty had become known. It seems that Rihani was aware that the Lebanese treaty was to be modelled on the Syrian treaty, according to which French cultural, economic and military supremacy in the Levant would be preserved. This may have been enough reason for his doubt and misgivings. Eventually, the Lebanese treaty which was concluded in 13 November 1936, proved some of Rihani’s fears, for it stipulated a French guarantee of Lebanon as a separate entity, and the French military existence was to be even stronger and for a longer period than it was in the case of Syria.

In 1939, on the eve of the Second World War, Rihani was again optimistic that the mandatory power would submit to the wishes of the Lebanese and Syrian peoples. Such attitude by the French authorities was not only dictated by the will of the peoples themselves but also beneficial to the French mutual interests with
the Arabs in general. That year, Rihani optimistically predicted the "success of an Arab confederation, following the pattern, more or less, of the United States of America". He was sure that the people in Lebanon and Syria and Palestine would join such confederation, if the two powers (France and Britain) that were in control were to withdraw from the region to make such confederation possible. Although he doubted France and Britain would sincerely welcome such development, he was almost sure that pushed by their interests with the Arabs, the two powers would begin to look with favour upon it. He linked this with the role of Ibn Sa'ūd. The rivalry between Britain and France to win the friendship of Ibn Sa'ūd, who in Rihani’s opinion was destined to lead the Pan-Arab movement, convinced him that both powers had begun to soften their policy due to their fear of Ibn Sa'ūd and to save their interests in the region.\textsuperscript{113}

While by the end of the First World War Rihani had looked forward to a federation of Arab provinces which would include Lebanon, Syria and Palestine under limited European protection, in 1920 he supported Faysal’s claim to Syrian unity including Lebanon’s autonomy and French assistance. After the French Mandate on Syria and Lebanon was officially established, he resented the division of both countries and continued to call for their unity without foreign assistance. During the first seven years of the mandate, the unity which he advocated was to be a political unity where the Syrian country (al-bilād al-sūriyya), including Lebanon, would be ruled by one constitutional civil government. However, after the declaration of the two republics, of Lebanon and Syria respectively, his concept of Syrian unity was modified. This was no longer the ultimate goal for him, but a stepping stone toward a wider Pan-Arab unity. Instead of a complete political unity between Lebanon and Syria, he now saw that the two countries could be separate but co-operate on the economic level, and be united only in their national policy. As for their complete unity it could be achieved after they became independent.

With the Second World War approaching, Rihani realised perfectly well that the French promises of independence were more remote than ever, and he began to look for salvation in the Arab direction. He had been working for Arab unity in the Peninsula since 1922. Now, in the late 1930s, many factors made
him believe that if the complete success of Pan-Arabism, the unity of the Arab world under one ruler, was not expected in the near future, at least an Arab confederation was not far off. He had no doubt that the people of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine would welcome it. How the idea of Arab unity evolved in Rihani's thought, and what were the obstacles facing it? What is this Arab confederation which he predicted instead, what were its chances, and what was the place of Lebanon and Syria in it? These are some of the questions which are discussed in the following and final chapter of this study.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN

1. In his English writings, Rihani used both "imperialism" and "colonialism" for isti'mar, see 'The Pan-Arab Dream'; 'Pan-Arab Nationalism', in Asia, January, 1938, p. 46; Ibid., August, 1939, p. 455. Both terms are used in this study.

2. Wasiyyati, par. 5 and 6, in AAK, 8, p. 500.

3. 'al-Tatawwur w-al-Istiqlal' (c. 1920); 'Ishrūn Hujja' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmivyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 198-200, 208-209. He also used custody (wisiya), see his letter, addressee unknown, 25 Nov. 1918, in Rasī'il, p. 179.

4. 'Madhabī Watani' (1927); also 'al-Tatawwur w-al-Istiqlal' (c. 1920); 'Ishrūn Hujja' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmivyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 246-247, 198, 209.

5. See in particular 'Fi Rabī al-Ya's' (1928), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 426; 'Bayn 'Ahdayn' (1933), in al-Qawmivyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 319-328; Wasiyyati, AAK, 8, p. 500.

6. 'Taḥt al-Silāh' (1928), in al-Qawmivyāt, AAK, 8, p. 267.


9. Ibid., p. 484. For Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, see Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, Ch. 9 and Appendix A, pp. 163ff, 308-314; Hurewitz, Diplomacy, pp. 61-62.

10. 'Madhabī Watani' (1927), in al-Qawmivyāt, AAK, 8, p. 247. Paragraph 4 of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon as conferred on France stated that the duty of the Mandatory was that of "rendering of administrative advice and assistance". See Hourani, op. cit. pp. 163-164; Hurewitz, op. cit. p. 62. The King-Crane Commission also made this distinction when it advised that the mandate recommended for Syria should come in no sense as colonialism, but the mandatory power should have the "well-being and development" of the Syrian people as its "sacred trust". See the recommendations of the Commission in Antonius, The Arab Awakening, Appendix H, p. 443.

11. 'Miqyās Wahid' (1933), in al-Qawmivyāt, AAK, 8, p. 300.

12. 'Madhabī Watani' (1927); also 'Wafā al-Salāb' (1926); 'Durūs Min al-Qāmūs' (1936), in al-Qawmivyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 246, 231, 369 and passim.

13. See 'al-Mawdūʿ al-Malīl (c. 1927); 'al-'Amūd al-Rūmānī (1928); 'al-Mujahidūn w-al-Shuhada (1930); 'al-Sha'rāf w-al-Dawla (1931); 'Habbat Muntiq' (1933); 'al-Tamarrud 'AŠ al-Zalīm' (1933); 'Bayn 'Ahdayn' (1933); 'Durūs Min al-Qāmūs' (1936), in al-Qawmivyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 225, 270, 277, 297, 309, 317, 323, 326, 369, and passim; 'Fi Rabī al-Ya's (1928), in al-Riḥāniyyāt, AAK, 7, p. 426; 'Nabd wa 'Intīdāb', in Ṣā'um al-Shu'ūrā', AAK, 9, pp. 222-229.

14. 'al-Mawdūʿ al-Malīl (c. 1927); 'Madhabī Watani' (1927); 'Rūh al-'Urūba' (1928); 'Taḥt al-Silāh' (1928); 'Miqyās Wahid' (1933); 'Habbat Muntiq' (1933), in al-Qawmivyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 225, 246, 263, 266, 299-300, 309.

15. 'Kuta Sharqiyya' (1935); also 'Miqyās Wahid' (1933); 'Durūs Min al-Qāmūs' (1936), in al-Qawmivyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 343-344, 299-300, 367.'
16. 'Miqyūs Wāḥid' (1933), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 300.

17. 'al-Tatawwur w-al-Istiqlāl' (c. 1920); 'al-Marada w-al-Ṣalībiyyūn' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 201-202.


20. 'Lubnān w-al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 356-357.

21. 'Pan-Arab Nationalism', in Asia, August, 1939, p. 455.

22. 'Tajzi'at al-Bilād al-'Arabiyya' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 364; Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 200-201, 407-408 and passim. See also the discussion of his ideas on British "divide-and-rule" policy in Arabia in Ch. 8, below.


24. 'al-Hurma fī al-Ḥirmān' (1933); also 'Takallamū bi-al-'Arabi' (1922); 'al-Mawdū' al-Ma'lūf' (c. 1927); in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 331-333, 218-219, 227; Rihānī's letter, address unknown, 19 April 1928, in Rasa'il, pp. 340-341.


26. 'al-Masnū'at al-Wataniyya' (n.d. c. 1926); also 'al-Mawdū' al-Ma'lūf' (c. 1927), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 234, 227.

27. 'Bayn 'Ahdayn' (1933), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 319-326.

28. 'Pan-Arab Nationalism', in Asia, August, 1939, pp. 454-455.

29. 'Bayn 'Ahdayn' (1933), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 325.

30. Ibid., pp. 323-325.


32. 'al-Marada w-al-Ṣalībiyyūn' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 202-204.

33. 'Madhbabī Waṭānî' (1927), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 245-246.
34. 'Bayn 'Ahdayn' (1933), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 326. The expression "our affectionate mother" (ummānā al-hanūn) is still used by some Christians to describe France, particularly during crises.

35. 'Kutla Sharqiyyya' (1935), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 344.

36. See his ideas on progress and revolution in Ch. 3, above.

37. 'al-Mawdū‘ al-Ma‘lūf' (c. 1927), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 224-225.


40. "Indamā Yakūn al-Tamarrud Wajīban' (1931), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 279. The Lebanese constitution of 1926 had confirmed the continuation of the French Mandate as declared by the League of Nations, see article 90 of the Lebanese Constitution declared on 23 May 1926, in al-Khaṭīb, Dūstūr Lubnān, p. 77.

41. After his expulsion from Lebanon following his speech 'Bayn 'Ahdayn' in 1933, Rihānī promised his mother to keep away from politics for a while.

42. 'al-Siyāsah w-al-Dīn' (1935); also 'al-Mawdū‘ al-Ma‘lūf' (c. 1927); 'Lanā‘ Amīr' (1934), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 340-341, 223, 335.

43. 'al-Šīhāfa w-al-Dawla' (1931), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 298.


45. "Indamā Yakūn al-Tamarrud Wajīban' (1931), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 278-279. On Rihānī’s contribution to the press and his ideas on freedom of the press, see Ch. 2, above.

46. 'al-Šīhāfa w-al-Dawla’ (1931), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 294-298.

47. Al-Ayyām was another major paper of the Syrian National Bloc.


49. 'al-Šīhāfa w-al-Dawla’ (1931), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 294-295; also his ideas on tyranny, Ch. 4, above.

50. 'al-Šīhāfa w-al-Dawla’ (1931), in al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, p. 298.

51. Ibid., p. 295.

52. Ibid., pp. 297-298. Rihānī’s article seemed to have some positive impact on the matter as seen in his letter to Najīb al-Rayyis, 13 Nov. 1931, in Rasa‘īl, pp. 369-373.

54. 'al-Iltiḥād' (1931); 'al-Šīḥāfa w-al-Dawla (1931); 'Bayn 'Aḥdayn' (1933), in al-Qawmiyya, AAK, 8, pp. 285, 295, 325.


57. Fī Bilād al-Zuhūr' (1936), in al-Qawmiyya, AAK, 8, pp. 350-351.

58. For many years, the inhabitants of the regions which were annexed to Greater Lebanon insisted on their reintegration within Syria and refused to take part in the government or public institutions, see Hallaq, Dirāsāt, p. 111; Murād, al-Ḥaraka al-Wahdawiyya, pp. 156-158, 252.


60. 'Risālat al-'Irāq' (1932), in al-Qawmiyya, AAK, 8, p. 302; on his speech see Qalb al-'Irāq, AAK, 4, pp. 188-195. Iraq was declared independent and was accepted as a member of the League of Nations in 3 November 1932. See Faysal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, p. 483; K. Ni'ma, al-Malik Faysal al-Awwal w-al-Ingīlīz w-al-Iṣtiqlāl, p. 305; Faysal's programme for internal reform, shortly before the mandate was terminated, including the encouragement of industry, indicates his concern with the economic development as an urgent need for independence, see M. Khadduri, Independent Iraq, pp. 34-35.

61. 'al-Maṣnūʿat al-Waṭaniyya' (c. 1926), in al-Qawmiyya, AAK, 8, pp. 233-234.


63. Ibid., pp. 232, 236; also Qalb Lubnān, AAK, 3, p. 95. On the woman's contribution to the work force in Lebanon, see Dāhir, Lubnān al-Iṣtiqlāl, p. 32; Naṣr and Dubar, al-Ṭabāqāt al-Ijtima‘īyya fī Lubnān, pp. 105-106.


65. 'Indamā Yākūn al-Tamarrud Wajīban' (1931), in al-Qawmiyya, AAK, 8, p. 282.

66. Ibid., p. 282.

67. Particularly since the events of 1929 known as "al-Būrāq Revolt" which was manifested in Palestinian demonstrations and active resistance against the Zionists and the British in Jerusalem, al-Khalīl, Saúde and Jaffa, see B. Abīl Gharbiyya, 'Ṣafahāt Min Tārīkh al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya Ḥattā Sanāt 1949', in A. S. Nawfal and Others, al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya fī 'Arba’in Āman, pp. 30-31.

68. See 'Fawq Sūṭuh New York' (1906); 'Fī Miḥti Ḥaddā al-Yawm' (1906); 'al-Tamaddun al-ḤadITH' (c. 1906); 'Abnā‘ al-Bu‘s' (c. 1906), in al-Riḥānīyya, AAK, 7, pp. 128-149; also Ch. 4, above.

69. 'Indamā Yākūn al-Tamarrud Wajīban' (1931), in al-Qawmiyya, AAK, 8, pp. 278-282.

70. On this movement, see Hannah, Min al-Ittijāhāt al-Fikrīyya fī Sūriyya wa Lubnān, pp. 108-122.
71. See Ch. 4, above.

72. For example, his participation as a special guest speaker at the cultural festival organised by "Niqābat ‘Ummāl Zahīl" on 10 June 1923, see Couland, al-Haraka al-Niqābiyya fi Lubnān, pp. 106-108; see Rihani’s contribution to the festival, ‘al-Sha’ir w-al-Faylasūf, in Antum al-Shu‘arā’, AAK, 9, pp. 197-201.

73. ‘Habbat Manṭiq’ (1933), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 309-312.


75. Ibid., pp. 332-333.

76. Ibid., pp. 331-333.

77. ‘Kutla Sharqiyya’ (1935), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 343-346.

78. ‘al-Tātawwur w-al-Istiqlāl’ (c. 1920); ‘Ishrūn Ḥujja’ (c. 1920); 'al-Mawqūṭ al-Ma‘lūf' (c. 1927); ‘Madhhabī Watān’ (1927); ‘al-Sharak al-Jamlī’ (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 197, 205-209, 223, 245-248, 254-259 and passim; see also Ch. 3, above.

79. See in particular, ‘Ma‘bad al-Watān’ (1936); also ‘Īlā ikhwān al-Tasāhul’ (1936); ‘Lā Ta‘ifiyya’ (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 383-384, 362-363, 386-387.


81. See Ḥallāq, al-Tayyārāt al-Siyāsīyya, pp. 78-79; idem, Dirāsāt, pp. 141ff; Murād, al-Haraka al-Wahdawiyya, pp. 228; Sh’ayb, Tarikh Lubnān, pp. 50ff.


87. See some positive reactions to the Patriarch’s attitude, amidst both Christians and Muslims, in Murād, op. cit., pp. 232-233.

88. ‘Lubnān al-Jadīd’ (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 393-394; see his letter of invitation to the Patriarch, June 1936, in Rasa’il, pp. 488-489; knowing Rihani’s attitude towards the clergy, the invitation of the Patriarch was in itself a significant gesture of his acknowledgment of the patriotic stance by ‘Arīda.

89. ‘al-‘Alaman’ (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 370.

90. Ibid., pp. 370-371.
91. 'Lubnān al-Jadīd' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 393-394.
92. 'al-Ḥudūd' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 378.
93. Ibid., p. 379.
94. Ibid., pp. 380-381.
95. Ibid., pp. 379-382.
96. Ibid., pp. 381-382.
98. 'al-Ḥudūd' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 379.

99. Cf. the views of other advocates of Greater Syria, including Lebanese Muslims, Hashimi monarchs such as Fayṣal and 'Abdullah, and, more recently, the present Syrian president, Ḥafṣ al-Asad, who portrayed the establishment of Greater Syria as a "step toward a wider Pan-Arab unity". Daniel Pipes describes such approach as "Pragmatic Pan-Syrianism" to differentiate it from the "pure Pan-Syrianism of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party of Antun Sa'īdē, see D. Pipes, Greater Syria, pp. 40-45.

100. 'al-Ḥurma fī al-Hirmān' (1933); also 'Bayn 'Ahdayn' (1933), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 333, 327-328.

101. See his response to the decision of expulsion which he expressed through al-Nida' newspaper, in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 326.

102. 'al-Tatāwwur w-al-Istiqāla' (c. 1920), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 199-201. On the contradictory assurances which Clemenceau gave, at the same time, to Fayṣal and to the Maronite Patriarch concerning the Lebanese issue, see Zeine, The Struggle, pp. 120-122.

103. See Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 199ff; Khoury, Syria, pp. 457ff; Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 53ff.

104. 'Lubnān w-al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 358.

105. Ibid., p. 358.

106. During the rule of the High Commissioner General Serrail in Syria (1924-25), the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Rihani to acquaint Serrail with some information about the Arab countries and rulers, particularly about Ibn Sa'īd. His contribution led to the rapprochement between Ibn Sa'īd and the French government. See 'Lubnān w-al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 359.


108. 'Lubnān w-al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 360.


112. See Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 384; Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 221-223; see the draft treaty in Hourani, op. cit, pp. 333-335; Hurewitz, Diplomacy, pp. 211-214.

113. 'Pan-Arab Nationalism', Asia, August, 1939, pp. 454-455; see also his ideas on Pan-Arab nationalism in Ch. 8, below.
CHAPTER EIGHT

RIHANI AND ARAB UNITY: IDEAS AND ENDEAVOURS

It is true that, unlike some other Arab nationalist thinkers of the interwar period, such as Sa‘īd al-Ḥusayn or Constantine Zurayq, Rihani did not develop an elaborate theory of the Arab nation or of Arab nationalism. His ideas were, however, drawn from his experiences and his perception of the reality of the Arab societies of his time. Although scattered in his various books, articles and speeches, it is nevertheless possible to form a clear picture of his position. Since Rihani was both an activist and a thinker his contribution needs to be seen at both the practical and theoretical levels. Among questions that need to be addressed are the kind of Arab unity he preached, its future prospects, the obstacles which he saw facing its realisation, and the essential elements of Pan-Arab nationalism in his thought.

Pan-Arab Mission in the Peninsula

This chapter takes up Rihani’s political ideas in the post-First World War years. During this period, he preached a cultural, geographical and political Arab unity based on mutual understanding and co-operation, regardless of religion or creed. We have already seen how Rihani’s ideas evolved from Ottomanism to Arabism, and how as early as 1911, he expressed his Arabhood, and the contribution of the Arab nation to the world civilisation. In The Book of Khalid (started in 1907, published in 1911), Rihani had dreamt of a revival of the great "Arab empire". For this purpose, he raised three essential and interrelated points: the existence of a distinct Arab people (or race) that had a glorious past and was looking for a better future; the need for a leader with heroic characteristics; and the capacity of the people to produce the future hero. This romantic ideological vision continued to haunt Rihani for years, and was a factor in his decision to undertake his journey to Arabia in 1922. Apart from the emotional and intellectual motives, his travels aimed at serving the Arab cause, namely Pan-Arabia (al-wahda al-‘arabiyya) which he saw as capable of being realised by the meeting of all the ruling amirs and their mutual acquaintance and common understanding.
When the Arab revolt was declared by the Sharīf Ḥusayn of Mecca against the Turks in 1916, Rihani identified strongly with it. In his writings and speeches, he called upon his fellow Syrians to contribute to the war of liberation, and he was in favour of Fayṣāl’s efforts towards a moderate Arab Syrian unity under a civil democratic government. With the collapse of the first modern Arab rule in Damascus, Rihani looked towards the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, where Ḥusayn and more particularly his son Fayṣal, leaders of the Pan-Arab movement, continued their efforts, and he envisaged a strong Arab state which would unite the Arab nation in a modern and civilised political entity. He was also concerned to meet other Arab rulers, particularly the Imām of the Yemen and Ibn Saʿūd of Najd.

When Rihani proceeded to Arabia in 1922, the political fortunes of the Arab countries were far from promising. French and British mandates had been set in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, East Jordan and Palestine; and Jewish settlement was proceeding in the latter. Two Hashimite monarchies were already set under King Fayṣal in Iraq and the amīr ‘Abdullah in East Jordan. Instead of fulfilling its pledges, made to the Arabs in the Ḥusayn-McMahon correspondence (1915-16), the British Government was seeking unsuccessfully to conclude with Ḥusayn a treaty in which he had to recognise the mandates and the divisions in the northern provinces which he and the Arabs considered as integral parts of the future Arab state. Meanwhile the long-standing dispute between Ḥusayn and Ibn Saʿūd of Najd over border territory, and more so over leadership of Arabia, was coming to a head. Ibn Saʿūd, an ally of Britain who had succeeded to bring an end to the rule of the Rashids in central Arabia (1921), was pursuing his course of conquest in the heart of the Peninsula. In the Yemen, the Imām Yaḥyā refused to recognise the rule of the Idrīsī, another ally of the British, whose presence in ‘Asīr he regarded as an encroachment on his own domain.

Before he embarked on his trip, Rihani was aware of the problems and obstacles in the way of a possible united Arabia. These he set out as a series of questions that have survived in his personal notes. Who was to achieve such unity, King Ḥusayn, Fayṣal or ‘Abdullah? What about the attitude of other Arab rulers towards Ḥusayn’s Pan-Islamism and Fayṣal’s Pan-Arabism; the educational, economic and military conditions of the Arabs; and the attitude of Britain and America towards
a united Arabia. These questions show that Rihani was aware of the complex problems facing the Pan-Arab movement because of Ḥusayn’s rivalries with other Arab rulers, especially Ibn Saʿūd; the tension between him and Fayṣal; and the rivalry between Fayṣal and ‘Abdullah. When Rihani met Ḥusayn in February 1922, the latter’s attitude towards his son Fayṣal seemed uncompromising. ⁹

Secret diplomacy of the foreign powers made Ḥusayn’s dream of an extended Hashimite Arab kingdom a mere illusion. But Ḥusayn was not prepared to yield to British pressure to sign a treaty which would suggest the recognition of the special position of Britain in Iraq and Palestine, including the Balfour Declaration. ¹⁰ He instead persisted in demanding the fulfilment of all the articles of the Anglo-Arab agreement, as stated in McMahon’s letters to him, or otherwise he would resign and retire from public life. Ḥusayn’s persistence impressed Rihani. "I do not desire it (the leadership)", he said to Rihani, "let the Ameers agree upon a leader and I will resign. Let them all agree to work for a united Arabia, an Arab empire, and I will withdraw, if they wish. I will even co-operate with them, whether I am to follow or to be followed...". "These words gave the impetus that day to one of the purposes of my travels and attracted me to the service of king Husein", Rihani wrote. "I proceeded, therefore, in my national mission, seeking to pave the way for an understanding between His Majesty and the other ruling princes of Arabia". ¹¹

Rihani was aware that Ḥusayn had a deep contempt for all the other ruling amirs of Arabia. If he insisted on the fulfilment of the Anglo-Arab agreement in full, this implied, among other things, that the British should help him crush the resistance of any amir, having in mind Ibn Saʿūd and the Idrīṣī. Rihani is critical of Ḥusayn not only for being naive to think that Britain would help him against its two other allies, but also for his failure to lay the solid foundation of his "Arab empire". This, in Rihani’s opinion, was no longer in Syria and Palestine as Ḥusayn thought, perhaps underestimating the reality of the mandates. It needed making up with the hostile amirs and putting down rebellious tribes in the Peninsula. ¹² Thus, in his mission Rihani started from the Peninsula where he endeavoured to bring about rapprochement between Ḥusayn and the other Arab rulers as an essential condition to achieve Pan-Arabia.
As a first practical step towards this goal, Rihani embarked upon negotiating a draft treaty between the Imam Yahya of the Yemen and the Sharif Husayn. Such treaty, he argued, would solve the Hudaideh problem to the Imam's satisfaction, and would facilitate an understanding between him and Great Britain. "You will get better terms from the English", he said to the Imam Yahya, "when they know that you and King Husein are united in a common cause". Understanding with the English should lead to an Anglo-Yemeni treaty of friendship and commerce which, he saw, was so vital for the progress of the Yemen and its need to be open to the outside world. At the same time, a Hijazi-Yemeni treaty would give the Yemen enough strength to maintain its integrity and independence, as well as peace and security. "I am solicitous about Arabia from ignorance and secret diplomacy", he said to the Imam. "I want to see Arabia mistress in her own house, which is only possible if the rulers and chiefs stop fighting against each other and unite in a common cause – the cause of national integrity and international peace and good will".13

Rihani believed that once the Hijazi-Yemeni treaty was concluded, the Idrisi of 'Asir, adversary of both Yahya and Husayn, would join the union because he could "not stand between two powerful neighbours and be hostile to them".14 Thus, the second stage of his mission was to negotiate peace and a treaty between Yahya and the Idrisi. After negotiations, he found that the three principal parties in question, the Idrisi, the British, as a wedge between the Idrisi and the Imam, and the Shafi Muslims, the traditional enemies of the Zaydis in the Yemen, were ready for talks. He, therefore, advised the Imam that the most practical way to peace was a conference to be held either in Hudaideh or in Aden. Such step would, in his opinion, set peace and close relationships of friendship and commerce between the Yemen and 'Asir.15

Long before any bilateral unity or federation in the modern Arab system, e.g. the unity between Egypt and Syria (1958-1961) or the Arab Union between Jordan and Iraq (1958), Rihani had proposed the bipartite treaties as a preliminary step to Pan-Arabia. During the negotiations, he endeavoured to ensure a balance between national unity of the Arabs and the regional sovereignty of the contracting countries.16 As a "constitution for action" (dustur lil-'amal), each of the proposed
treaties emphasised the unity of the Arab countries (al-bilād al-‘arabiyya, i.e. the Peninsula proper in this case), in religion, nationalism (al-qawmīyya) and language (al-līsān). The kingship of Ḥusayn would be recognised, in return he would recognise the Imamate of each of Yahyā and the Idrīsī. The actual rulers, Ḥusayn, the Idrīsī and the Imām, would continue to administer the internal and external political affairs of their respective countries. However, they would unite their national views and adopt a united foreign policy to ensure progress "without any foreign interference which may affect the integrity and independence of Arabia". This included that none of the signatory parties would interfere in the internal affairs of another party, or conclude a treaty with a foreign power concerning the rule of another party, "except after consultation and agreement between them". By introducing this clause, Rihani aimed at binding the Arabian rulers and paving the way for Pan-Arabia.17

It is important to note Rihani’s emphasis on the economic factor in the negotiated bipartite treaties among Arabian rulers. He suggested the founding of a savings account out of the alms tax (māl al-zakāt), to be spent in the future on developing the infrastructure of Arabia. Recent studies on the problems and prospects of Arab unity have naturally emphasised the importance of economic development and co-operation in consolidating the desired political Arab unity.18 Rihani’s idea, albeit a somewhat conservative one, may be considered as avant-garde for his time, since the pre-1940 Arab nationalist thought generally gave little attention to economic issues, and did not consider economic and social change as important factors in the attainment of independence and unity. It is true some intellectuals discussed the condition of the masses, class relationships and socialist principles, but they failed to link these ideas with Arab nationalism.19 Unlike many representatives of the prevalent Arab thought of the time, and before any inter-Arab economic co-operative body was established, Rihani had considered the economic independence of Arab countries a priority without which political independence would be impossible. He saw that Arab economic co-operation was the beginning of their independence and unity. "I am the apostle of this idea, I spread it in the court of every Arab amir and sultan. A savings account out of the alms tax, is the key to Arab independence if they understand. A common Arab monetary fund, to be used in ten
years for example, to build a railway between the Hijaz and ‘Asār and the Yemen'. Clearly reminiscent of Fayṣal’s statement after his return to Syria from the Peace Conference (1919), Rihani counsels Arabian leaders that if they "needed foreign technicians they could hire them and pay them from Arab money". He was convinced that even if the "bipartite treaties were limited only to this article and to defence and mutual help (munāsara) they would, for now, be good enough for all the Arabs..."\(^{20}\)

Rihani was aware that bipartite treaties were not sufficient to achieve Pan-Arabia, and his real aim was to conclude a quadripartite treaty between Ḥusayn - Yahyā - the Idrīsī - and Ibn Sa‘ūd, as a corner stone of Pan-Arabia.\(^{21}\) In a covering letter which he sent to Ḥusayn with the draft of the negotiated treaty with the Imām, he explained that the treaty contained some concessions, but only in detail not in essence. Other steps should follow when good relations are established between the two countries. He insisted that while not final, bipartite treaties were the first important step towards unity. For, "great national movements proceed only in modest steps towards completion".\(^{22}\)

Rihani saw that, since the Arab rulers were at war with each other, the first step to unite them was to establish friendship, mutual trust, and peace between them as equals. For this, he endeavoured to convince the rulers to accept the treaties in order to pave the way for the quadripartite treaty. While noting that the conditions were favourable at the time, since Britain was not opposed to the treaties, Rihani emphasises that any subsequent national pacts ('uhūd) between the Arabs should be their own concern alone; and that they should not miss this opportunity to bring about complete political Pan-Arabia.\(^{23}\)

An agreement between the Arab rulers was, in Rihani’s view, a *sine qua non* as an introduction to political unity, and such agreement required some concessions from every Arab ruler. He realised that all rulers claimed Pan-Arabia, but each of them was concerned about his own independence and feared the other’s dominance and Ḥusayn’s ambitions. He advised the latter, through his Foreign Minister, not to insist on the unity of 'flag', military system and foreign policy, and in particular not to insist, at least at this stage, on his claim as "king of the Arabs". Such claim was, in his opinion, premature and would harm the unity of Arabia as a top priority.\(^{24}\)
Through the treaties, Rihani hoped to render a service to the Imam Yahya by bringing his cause to the British understanding, and by mediating for rapprochement between him and the Idrissi. He also hoped to render a service to Husayn, whom he believed "represented a noble Arab national idea", by facilitating two treaties which would bind, "at least with a thread of silk", the Hijaz with each of the Yemen and ‘Asir. Ultimately Rihani's efforts failed. The Imam rejected the idea of a peace conference, insisted on claiming the Hudaibah and refused to recognise the suzerainty of the Idrissi in ‘Asir. The Imam, he noted, harboured the ambition to be the "king of the Arabs", while denying Husayn the same title. Husayn did not sign the treaties because the Imam and the Idrissi while offering him friendship and co-operation, refused to recognise his kingship. Husayn wanted "everything or nothing" and he got nothing, Rihani remarked. He later observed that had Husayn signed the treaties he would not have ended up defeated by Ibn Sa‘ud in Autumn 1924.

It is true Rihani advocated mutual recognition of the sovereignty of each of the rulers in the first stage, but he did not consider their territories should permanently remain separate Arab states. Indeed, he criticised the senseless settlement of boundaries and neutral zones between Iraq, Najd and Kuwait, in the Conference of Ojair (November-December 1922); and he expected these boundaries to disappear soon. He saw that the rapprochement between Fayṣal and Ibn Sa‘ud was the only good outcome of the conference.

Rihani was concerned first with bringing about peace between the Arab rulers. In addition to the treaties, he negotiated peace between Husayn and Ibn Sa‘ud and, after his departure from Arabia, he continued to work for settlement of the dispute between the two rulers. In a letter to his own friend Constantine Yanni, an official of the Hashimite Government, he advised that the dispute between Husayn and Ibn Sa‘ud over Tarabah could be settled by a referendum. He also wrote to Fayṣal expressing his conviction that mutual agreement and alliance between him and Ibn Sa‘ud would also pave the way for peace and alliance between Najd and the Hijaz which is the corner stone of Pan-Arabia (al-wahda al-‘arabyya). He warned Fayṣal that it would be unwise and useless to try to achieve a Pan-Arabia through a "Hashimite unity" between the Hijaz, East Jordan and Iraq, as he heard Fayṣal was advised to do. Such unity, he believed, would widen the gap between Fayṣal and Ibn
Saʿūd, thus threatening any hope of unity. He pointed out to Fayṣal that "there would be no hope at least of an Arab alliance (ḥilf ʿarabī) except through the effort of Fayṣal and Ibn Saʿūd".30

Rihani’s conviction that only peace would settle the disputes between the Arab rulers and would pave the way for an Arab alliance and unity was best expressed in his mediation between king ‘Ali and Ibn Saʿūd during the Hijazi war in 1924-1925. He then insisted that the Arab nation needed peace badly, and he tried to convince Ibn Saʿūd to avoid war between the "Arabs" "for the sake of Arab alliance and the interest of the whole Arab nation", and he was so disappointed when his mission failed.31

Rihani’s approach was pragmatic, starting from the reality in order to change it. His recognition of the regional sovereignties was only strategic, an organisational phase on the way to complete unity. He believed the achievement of Pan-Arabia (and later complete Arab unity) should be gradual. He accepted a limited aim which could broaden with the time rather than waiting endlessly in uncompromising all-or-nothing attitude.32 He realised that if the rulers remained at war it would be impossible to unite them, particularly with the interference of external agents; while peace would lead to their co-operation and union around common details, and then to complete unity. It is in this sense that his recognition of the regional sovereignties and existing rulers should be understood. Hence his advice on "not to insist immediately on the unity of the flag, military and foreign policy", and on the importance of laying the foundation of economic and communication infrastructures, e.g. self-sufficiency through a just economic fund and establishment of telegraphic connections, and his insistence on the role of education. It is in this sense too that we should understand his suggestion of two temporary unities in the Peninsula, and the Lebanese-Syrian unity, as integral part of the broader Arab unity, as shall be discussed.

Pan-Arabia: Obstacles and Needs

On the basis of his direct contacts with Arab rulers, and his keen observation of political and social conditions in Arabia, Rihani summed up, in his conclusion of Mulūk al-ʿArab, the requirements, difficulties, and future prospects of Pan-Arabia.33
In this he clearly seeks to engage the Arab rulers and readers in a realistic rational and open-minded dialogue. Obstacles and challenges facing Arab unity have become a constant theme in subsequent Arab discussions. The importance of Rihani rests not only in the fact that he was a pioneer but also in the fact that his own conclusions continue to be valid today.

First of all, Rihani asserts that Pan-Arabia would be a fact in the Peninsula "if geography had authority on politics; if religion could moderate the ambitions of the amirs, and if Arab nationalism (al-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya) was a real force to lead hearts towards the same goal". His territorial definition of Pan-Arabia included the whole geographical Arabian Peninsula including what is known today as the Arab Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, as well as Iraq and Jordan.

Rihani deduces two types of obstacles, internal and external, which hindered the political achievement of Pan-Arabia. Internally, there was sectarianism (al-madhhabiyya) where the religious sect (al-madhhab al-dinii) seemed to override common religious identity. There was also tribalism, or the tribal 'asabiyya, which appeared to predominate the Arab national spirit. However, he perceived that even if sectarianism and tribalism were removed and Pan-Arabia was achieved, this could not survive without three conditions which were lacking in Arabia. These are: an organised and just government; national public schools; and modern means of transportation and communication. He anticipated that only after twenty five years of the establishment of such institutions would Pan-Arabia become possible. When the new institutions could replace tribalism and sectarianism with the greater spirit of Arab nationalism; when rationalism, justice and mutual tolerance predominated political authority; and when the new Arab mentality put common Arab interests above other particular interests.

Rihani concluded that "today" i.e. 1924, "the Arabs could not hope to achieve complete Pan-Arabia". As a preparatory step he therefore advocated that Arab rulers could achieve mutual understanding and could realise "two preliminary unities" which would correspond to what he considered as the two geo-political parts of the Arabian Peninsula: the eastern part under Ibn Saʿūd, and the western part under the Imām Yaḥyā. 
Nevertheless, Rihani warns that two interrelated obstacles may hinder such preliminary unities. First, the Arab rulers who were each strongly attached to their own dominion, might not easily cede their authority to the proposed "Great Sultān" (Ibn Sa‘ūd in the east or Yaḥyā in the west). Secondly, Britain which preferred to deal with each ruler separately, would continue to follow the principle of divide-and-rule to guarantee its domination over Arabia. Thus, he was realistic enough to recognise the need to maintain the internal autonomy of each of the existing Arab rulers. In return, he proposed that they recognise the suzerainty of the "Great Sultān" and join with him under one leadership, in national defence and foreign policy, and in a unified system of economic and public affairs.

Reflecting the debate among Arab political and religious experts over the resurrection of the Caliphate and Ḥusayn’s bid for it in 1924, Rihani thought that the collapse of the Caliphate (khilāfa) and its abolition by the Turks (in 1924) would enable the Arabs to recover the Caliphate. But he thought that it should be separate from the civil authority. A Caliph from Quraysh could be appointed and given the oath of allegiance (al-bay’a) by all Muslims of the world. Ḥusayn, in his opinion, was the most suitable for the Khilāfa, and Mecca should be his residence. The first practical step which he suggested in this process was to hold an Arab conference in Mecca to be attended by all Arab rulers, and where the oath of allegiance would be given to Ḥusayn as Caliph, and to the two kings: the Imām Yaḥyā in the west and Ibn Sa‘ūd in the east. A treaty of economic alliance (muʿahada wala‘iyya iqtisādiyya) should be concluded between the two kings. Acknowledging the reality of British presence in Arabia, he also expected an agreement, in principle, or a joint treaty, between both of them and Britain.

The Obstacles: Sectarianism

Rihani recognised two dimensions of sectarianism. The first was al-tā‘ifiyya, fanaticism of one religious group against another, as an obstacle for unity in Lebanon and Syria. The second was al-madhhabiyya, fanaticism of one sect against another within the same religion. This, he saw as a major obstacle for unity in the Peninsula.

During his travels, Rihani found that although Islam was the main religion in Arabia, the various Islamic sects were very often in conflict. He came to believe
that sectarianism (Madhhabiyya) was at the root of hostilities between the people in many parts of Arabia.\textsuperscript{40} The most serious manifestation of sectarianism was that two sects, Wahhabism in Najd and Zaydis in the Yemen, formed in Arabia what, he seems to imply, were two ruling sectarian political parties that divided Arabia into two antagonist parts. While being strong in "solidarity (\'asabiyya) and politics" for their respective followers, Rihani observes that neither of the two sects was accepted by other Muslims. In other parts of Arabia, other Muslims would refuse to join any unity attempted by either the Wahhābīs or the Zaydis. Both Ibn Saʿūd and the Imām Yahyā who ruled "through and in the name of the sect, if not for it", were the most powerful of the Arab rulers. Therefore, if Ibn Saʿūd proceeded to unite Arabia under his rule, the Imām Yahyā would resist him in the Yemen and vice versa.\textsuperscript{41}

Rihani considered sectarianism as a divisive element in the Peninsula because of the identification of politics with the religious faith. In the Yemen, identification of Zaydisim\textsuperscript{42} with the politics of the Imām gave the latter power because he could use the sectarian solidarity to serve his political purposes. But it also betrayed his weakness which lurks in that strength. Analysing the elements of strength and weakness in the Zaydi rule, Rihani saw three basic elements, Zaydisim, patriotism (al-waṭanīyya) and isolation (al-uzla). These were at once factors of cohesion but also obstacles to progress. While the Yemeni idea of patriotism was narrow, almost bordering on racial identity, their isolation made for their backward social and political conditions, and sectarian Zaydisim was responsible for the permanent state of war in the Yemen.\textsuperscript{43}

Rihani analysed the relationship between Zaydisim as a faith and a method to attain and maintain political power, in a country and an age where religious faith was the most obvious expression of identity. People were treated as citizens of first or second class according to whether they were Zaydi or not. Religious feeling was evoked to ensure conservatism and prevent change in the political system. The almost complete identification between the Imām and the application of Zaydi Islamic law struck Rihani as a manifestation of his total control.

This sect-politics relationship ensured the Zaydi leadership of the Imām who is assumed to be also the military leader. The "rule which puts the sword in place of the electorate" was, in Rihani's opinion, responsible for the many conspiracies and
civil wars in the Yemen. He saw this method of maintaining power manifested in
two evil aspects of the Imām’s rule: the hostages as a guarantee of loyalty, and the
invocation of the creed of the Imām’s ancestors against other Arab Muslims (e.g. the
Shāfiʿīs of Tiḥāma and ‘Asīr), to serve his political ambitions. "One would feel
sorry", Rihani comments, "for this glorious Arab nation which upholds the sect above
al-Kitāb and al-Sunna, and uses the sect as a method of attaining power".⁴⁴

Rihani’s experience in Arabia allowed him to provide an important analysis
of the effect of religion on people’s thinking and social behaviour. In the Yemen,
he observed, religion had a great role in impeding social change. Zaydī fanaticism
interfered in the small details of social life. The Zaydīs "pray... to the Merciful, the
Compassionate, the God of all Creation", but treated with disgust and hatred non-
Zaydī Muslims, and other religious groups, particularly Christians and Jews.⁴⁵ He
blames Zaydī fanaticism and cruelty on the Sayyids, the noble and privileged class
in the Yemen who, claiming descent from Ḥusayn, grandson of the Prophet Muḥammad,
and concerned with maintaining the status quo, would keep the common
people in ignorance, or influence them by their fanaticism.⁴⁶

A combination of Zaydī intolerance and fanaticism was, in Rihani’s view, the
main reason for ignorance and backwardness in the Yemen. This impeded progress
and social and political change, threatened the peace among the Arabs and thus went
against Pan-Arabia.⁴⁷ More specifically, Rihani believed that if the Imām Yaḥyā’s
rule were not Zaydī, his traditional adversaries within the Yemen would have no
grievance against him, and would, in fact, have become his greatest supporters.⁴⁸

Wahhabism was another impediment for Pan-Arabia.⁴⁹ Like Zaydī
fanaticism, Rihani criticised the excesses of Wahhabism which seemed to him to
teach its followers to enjoy nothing in life but preaching and Jiḥād. The excessive
puritanism of the Ikhwān surpassed the fanaticism of the Zaydī warriors. He likened
the Wahhābīs to the first Protestants, while he likened Ibn Saʿūd to Cromwell.⁵⁰
The Ikhwān, the "frantically fanatical Unitarians" considered other Muslims, not of
their creed, as polytheists (mushrīkūn) who did not deserve to be greeted by them.
Like the Zaydīs, the Ikhwān were blind in their faith and saw the truth only in their
own beliefs; and this blindness affected their thinking and social behaviour.⁵¹
Rihani saw Wahhabism as a positive factor in strengthening the rule of Ibn Sa‘ūd because of its close interdependence, as an ideology, with the politics of the Sa‘ūdī House. The alliance between Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and Muḥammad Ibn Sa‘ūd in 1157 A.H. (1744 A.D.), he observed, had been based upon the sword of Ibn Sa‘ūd and the faith of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. "It was based in its inception upon a living, fiery faith which could find adequate expression only in the sword".\textsuperscript{52} He explains that by sticking to the Qur’an, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb infused into the people of Najd a spirit which gave them the power to expand and to express their superiority with the austerity and confidence of the followers of the Prophet. Rihani identified the militant spirit of the Wahhābis with their "national" Sa‘ūdī spirit (al-rūḥ al-qawmiyya). He considered Wahhabism in its outcome a political as well as a religious movement.\textsuperscript{53} This Wahhābi-Sa‘ūdī "dualism" was,\textsuperscript{54} in his view, the basis of Sa‘ūdī strength. The Ikhwān, the militant Wahhābis, were strong not only because of their strong belief in the Qur’an, but also because Ibn Sa‘ūd fired them with inextinguishable enthusiasm for Allah and for the Sa‘ūdī House.\textsuperscript{55} But Rihani insisted that Ibn Sa‘ūd kept the central power in his own hands. As the commander of the Ikhwān, he was able to direct and control them; as the head of the state, he was able to keep the religious ‘Ulama‘ under firm control.\textsuperscript{56}

In spite of his admiration for Ibn Sa‘ūd, whom he believed was the best ruler to take up the Arab leadership, Rihani still believed sectarianism in Arabia was standing in the way of its unity. He realised that both Ibn Sa‘ūd and the Imām, the two powerful rulers who could unite the Arabs, drew their strength from two conflicting fundamental Islamic sects. Both used religion to justify their political ambitions, spread their influence by the sword, and used the religious élites to establish their rule. This makes reconciliation impossible, not only between the Zaydī and Wahhābi followers, but also between each of the two groups and other more liberal Muslims. Therefore, he believed any Arab ruler would not achieve unity except after establishing a civil (madani) rule and separating religion from politics.

Because of the sectarian division, Rihani believed Islam was not enough to unite the Arabs. Pan-Islamic unity, as the Imām Yaḥyā proposed, could not, in his opinion, be the alternative to a secular Pan-Arab nationalism.\textsuperscript{57} This idea was developed by Rihani throughout his discussion of patriotism and nationalism in Syria
and Lebanon and in the whole Arab world. He argues that "the Kings of Arabia will never progress, will never achieve a lasting success in anything, so long as they use religion as a means to political ends or even a force for racial [national] solidarity". The failure of the Arab movement led by Husayn who used religion as a means to establish his supremacy and to achieve his own political aims was, in Rihani's eyes, a living proof. "The exploitation of a religious emotion, even if it benefits a religion, which is, let us suppose, all truth and all beauty and all good, is nevertheless a regrettable thing... How can a Jehad, therefore, by one Muslim political party against another ever succeed, especially these days? It is indeed regrettable".

Tribalism

The second internal obstacle facing Pan-Arabia was, according to Rihani, the intensity of tribal esprit de corps (rush al-qaba'il and al-'asabiyya) at the expense of national sentiment. The theme of tribal 'asabiyya was discussed by other contemporary Arab nationalists who saw that the division along tribal lines of the ancient Arabs led to the warfare of the Pre-Islamic age and subjected them to Roman and Persian influence. Rihani shared similar views in his al-Nakabat (1928) and considered the Arab division in recent history as a continuation of the old rivalries but under new foreign influence. His most important discourse on the harmful effects of tribal rivalries on the unity and progress of the Arabs is contained in his Muluk al-'Arab where he warns the Arabs that unless they forgot their tribal 'asabiyya in favour of the broad Arab solidarity ('asabiyya), Pan-Arabia would remain impossible.

Past and recent experience proved to Rihani that the Arab tribes sought independence at every opportunity, and that instead of being a factor of unity amongst the Arabs who were basically from the same origin, tribal 'asabiyya was a divisive factor. It limited loyalty to the narrow circle of the tribe or even the clan and, therefore, was used as a motive for separation. Such tendency was behind the prevailing anarchy in Arabia, since every tribe resorted to arms and alliances in order to secure its narrow independence. This, in his opinion, was "the first and principal calamity of the Arabs... this is a crime in the name of nationalism (al-qawmiyya) and
a piracy in the name of independence”. Rihani warned against arms in the hands of the ignorant tribes as a serious impediment to Arab progress and unity.63

Rihani was perhaps the first to warn against British exploitation of the tribal ʿasabiyya in Arabia. In order to make the rulers yield to the will of the British government, the British paid stipends to the chiefs of the rebellious tribes in order to accept or reject agreement with this ruler or that. Such was the situation, for example, in the Hijaz, ‘Asīr and Yemen, particularly in Aden and the nine Protectorates.64 He found that most of the rebellious tribes were warlike, slave-dealers, gun-runners and pirates. Conflicting rulers used them to serve their political purposes, and some of them played two or even three roles at once, and in the end they belonged only to whoever paid more money. This ambivalence, not only affected Arab mutual understanding, but most importantly allowed British interference in the national affairs of the Arab rulers. In Aden, for example, by precipitating fights between neighbouring tribes and by suspending or paying stipends, the British authorities forced the tribes and the Sulṭān of Aden to enter into individual treaties of friendship and protection which gradually tied up the Arabs with Britain "exclusively and forever".65

The tribal conflict represented a serious concern for Rihani. In the nine protectorates, he found that about eleven tribes with varying degrees of primitiveness and strength, were loyal to the British who made of them "independent" sultanates and emirates. By providing “protection” and paying the tribes to fight each other, the British in fact were protecting Aden. It was the "English gold" not the British army, he noted, which secured the city from tribal raids and kept the Arabs under the English thumb.66 The Arab rulers themselves used the tribes in the same way. For instance, the Imām Yaḥyā offered the tribes in the protectorates money, friendship and protection, and thus kept them away from other Arab rulers.

Historically the most serious aspect of tribalism which Rihani saw among the Arabs was the old enmity between the two major tribal divisions in Arabia, Qaḥṭān and ‘Adnān; and the rivalry for supremacy and power between Rabīʿa and Muḍar, two branches of ‘Adnān. He explained that Muḍar, to which the Prophet belonged, attained through Quraysh the supremacy in Mecca. While Rabīʿa, the tribe of most of the poets and warriors of Arabia, occupied central Arabia, and in the person of Ibn
Saʿūd, was now fast attaining the hegemony in all Arabia and refusing the authority not only of Qaḥṭān but also of Muḍar centred in the Hijaz. Rihani saw that tribal rivalry was so tense that if a strong ruler, like Ibn Saʿūd or the Imām Yahyā, called for Pan-Arabia in the name of nationalism, their call would not be welcome because of their strong tribal sentiment which would stir up the old enmity between Qaḥṭān and ‘Adnān, and between Rabīʿa and Muḍar.

After thoroughly examining the situation in Arabia, Rihani came to the conviction that Pan-Arabia was impossible unless sectarianism and tribalism were replaced with secularism and Arabism. These were associated in an inter-dependent relationship to the extent that the Arabs could not be national without being secular, and could not be secular without putting Arabism before and above any religious or tribal feeling. When both obstacles were removed, unity would become possible because the natural factors, the land and the population, would form a natural geographical unity. In such unity the national identity, characteristics, customs and traditions, are similar, and the people and their leaders, "the advanced among them", have a common interest. But would the English permit such unity?

The British Presence as an Impediment to Pan-Arabia

Western presence has preoccupied almost all Arab nationalist (and also Islamic) thought since the nineteenth century at least. Arnold Hottinger rightly says that individually Rihani has experienced and shaped into his life and work what was to become, later on, "a collective experience to nearly all Arab societies and communities, namely the presence and domination of the foreigner and his civilization..." Western presence in Lebanon and Syria, in Palestine or in Arabia, shaped Rihani’s thought to the extent that such presence became, in his view, the biggest calamity for the Arabs.

Rihani was aware that British policy in Arabia was guided by British interests in the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Arab/Persian Gulf. He saw that to secure those interests, the British exploited the troubled relations between the Arab rulers and made their mutual understanding and co-operation more remote. During World War I, in separate treaties, the British promised to support and protect every Arab ruler if he would help them against the Turks. When the war ended, even though the
English had no longer an adversary in Arabia, they continued to supply the Arab rulers, "their new political adversaries", with arms and ammunitions but only to fight each other.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, Ibn Sa'ūd waged war against Ibn al-Rashīd, Ḥusayn fought Ibn Sa'ūd and the Idrīsī continued to fight the Imām, all using English guns and gold.

On this basis, Rihani considered the Anglo-Arab alliance as an unbalanced relationship which consisted of violating the rights of the weak ally (the Arabs) by the strong. But while he blamed the British for pursuing the "same ill-fated policy that has the tendency of widening the breach between the various rulers of Arabia", he equally blamed the Arab rulers for their mutual ill-faith. He accused them of accepting the separate treaties with Britain, because "every one of them had an enemy of his race - a neighbouring ruler - whom he would first annihilate".\textsuperscript{72}

Rihani pointed out that the British "divide-and-rule" policy used different instruments. Offering monthly stipends, presents and "salute of cannons" to the sulṭāns, the sayyids and the chiefs of the tribes was the cheapest and the easiest. He was shocked to see that "all the Arabs of the Peninsula were subject to foreign influence and their hands were tainted with foreign English gold".\textsuperscript{73} This not only made the Arabs lazier, poorer, and more dependent, but it enabled the British authorities to control Arab policy. Another instrument was the amazing elasticity of the British in dealing with their foreign problems. Their formula: "be not too hard to bend, and bend not to the breaking point" was, in his opinion, most successfully used in Arabia, because of its geo-political and religious conditions, as well as the conflicting ambitions of its rulers.\textsuperscript{74}

Such elasticity, which the Arabs did not seem to understand, consisted of the English exploiting every Arab ruler's aspiration to independence to conclude with him a pact of friendship and protection. In this pact, the stipendiary should not enter into any treaty with any foreign power "except with the knowledge and sanction of the British government". This clause was, in his opinion, the noose which strangled the Arabs, since accordingly, all the other Arab rulers were considered as "foreign powers", and thus could not conclude mutual treaties without the sanction of the English. Just as Rihani saw the French Mandate in Syria-Lebanon as colonialism (isti'mār), he considered the British "protection" in Arabia as becoming, in fact, "possession" (istūlā') and "monopoly" (isti'thār).\textsuperscript{75}
However, Rihani was aware that, when necessary, the British could resort to violence to make their elastic formula more effective. Such was the case of Bahrain which, after a series of attacks, ended being administered in partnership with the British political agent. To secure the direct route to India and absolute control over the Gulf, the British perpetrated a series of incidents and attacked Bahrain. They divided the ruling House and concluded with the Amir an agreement of protection which later "developed into a title-deed in the hand of the British Government". Therefore, he concluded, British protection and friendship were only a step towards occupation and colonisation.76

Rihani was particularly critical of the British political agents who were sent through the India Office rather than the British Government itself. "Unqualified" and "suitable only for military service", and having neither knowledge of nor sympathy for the Arabs, those officers often concealed the truth about Arabia in order to secure their positions. Therefore, he noted, the British Government orders "came with little wisdom or justice", and very often did not consider the new developments in Arabia.77

More broadly, Rihani examined the British policy in the light of Western rivalry in Arabia. He observed that the diplomats of all foreign governments, with colonial ambitions in the East, had a kind of "Jekyll-and-Hyde" dual personality. Western rivalry (French, British and Italian) was most deadly in Arabia where patriotic education and civil authority were still old-fashioned, defective, or subject to periodical upheavals. In such circumstances, the diplomatic representatives in any Arab ruler’s court would create two or three political "parties" from among the ruler's subjects to work against him and against each other, in order to serve the interests of the diplomats of foreign nations. He acknowledged that all Western powers had their deadly secret ambitions, but since the Arabs could not do without commercial and scientific relations with the West, he was in favour of a single foreign influence to avoid rivalry and conspiracy. Thus, he recommended that the Yemen should seek the support of the British, because they were in favour of mutual peace between the Idrisi and the Imam, and because with their stipends, they were capable of using the Imam's enemies against him.78
While Rihani warned the Arabs against their division, he warned the British against their policy which harmed the Arabs as well as the long-term British interests in Arabia and in the East in general. Moreover it damaged the English reputation as a symbol of scientific achievement, morality and civilisation. Rihani no doubt admired the West for its scientific superiority, but once in Arabia, he found that the West sacrificed this civilisation for the sake of political ambitions and interests. "O my European brother... I want for you and the son of the East a common, mutual and equal benefit in his country", he wrote. "Your colonialist spirit does not impress the fair-minded in both nations... It degrades in the eyes of Orientals, the most important of the Western values, namely administration and order".

Rihani sensed the need for Anglo-Arab co-operation on both the political and cultural levels. He noted that during their presence in Arabia, the British did nothing, outside their political and commercial interests, for the social or intellectual progress of the country. "The East sees nothing in European civilisation except evil, greed and selfishness". "Before the East awakes, I want the European to become just and the Oriental to become reasonable, so they can reach mutual understanding, trust, and co-operation".

Anglo-Arab co-operation was, in Rihani's opinion, equally vital for the achievement of Arab political unity. He realised that the nearest approach to Pan-Arabia was impossible without securing the British interests, particularly in the Arab/Persian Gulf. The British were capable of doing anything to keep other Europeans out of Arabia. He identified two, admittedly idealistic, conditions that must be fulfilled: the British should change their colonialist policy; and the Arabs should unite under one banner and secure the British interests in the Gulf, the key to British policy in Arabia. Practically, he advised Ibn Saʿūd to firmly tell the British to "either help the Arab rulers to get together or let them do so directly..." Ibn Saʿūd, in his opinion, could enter into treaties with the sheikhs of Oman to keep peace on the Gulf. In a treaty with Britain, he could pledge himself to maintain peace and safeguard the British interests on the Arab side of the Gulf. With more power on the Gulf, Ibn Saʿūd could get the British to compel the governments of Iraq and East-Jordan to respect his rights in the north and the north-west. This would allow him
to unite eastern Arabia, from Muscat to the southern boundary of Iraq, including Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait.

Rihani was certain that Britain would not refuse to co-operate with Ibn Sa‘ūd because of his influence in Eastern Arabia. Moreover, in allowing the unity of Arabia, Britain would be creating an Arab block with which it could counter the combined influence of the Turks and the Bolsheviks. It is important to note that while Rihani believed in 1924 that Anglo-Arab co-operation based on mutual trust and interests could lead to Pan-Arabia, he could still count on Anglo-Arab friendship to solve the major problems facing the achievement of complete Arab unity in 1938.83

The Necessary Conditions for a Lasting Pan-Arabia

Rihani insisted throughout his writings that the Arabs could not achieve a solid lasting unity without modern political institutions and without developing their own human resources and infrastructure. This is best illustrated in the three conditions which he saw as necessary for Pan-Arabia to survive: a just and organised government; national public education; and modern means of communication and transportation.84

Just and Organised Government

The concept of justice (‘adl, ‘adāla) which figures prominently in Rihani’s early writings,85 appears as an integral part of the practical and realistic framework of his perception of a modern and lasting Pan-Arabia. Having closely seen many aspects of tyranny and the old-fashioned government systems in Arabia, Rihani highlighted the urgent need for just and organised government. In 1898, he had rejected the autocratic rule (al-ḥukm al-mutlaq) in the context of the Ottoman political system, because he found it incompatible with justice. Now, he found that, except for Fayṣal in Iraq who was a constitutional monarch, all Arabian rulers were autocratic. Justice was relative to the personality of the ruler not to his system of government; and some rulers, like Ḥusayn for example, seemed to him to compete with the despotism of ‘Abdul-Ḥamīd.86
Two rulers, however, the Imām Yahyā and Ibn Saʿūd, made a particularly strong impression in their two different ways. Both were autocratic in rule but not so in manner. While the former was a "humble and noble ruler", the latter was "autocratic-democratic and paternal". The Imām consulted his learned men. He "patiently, cheerfully, compassionately" heard and judged in his open-air tribunal where "no one shall stand between him and his people". He was autocratic with "a passion for justice", and "one who swerves not in the course of justice. He can be clement (ṣamīḥ), forbearing (ḥalīm) and paternal with his subjects." Here, justice was seen as the fair treatment of the subjects with pity and mercy. But was this form of justice efficient?

In another context, Rihani saw justice as giving everybody his rights and summarily enforcing the law without favour or discrimination. He saw both the appealing and the repellent forms of such justice. Both were necessary in his view. Hence his admiration of Ibn Saʿūd's rule which was based on both forms. Najd, in his opinion, was the only place in Arabia where the old maxim, "justice is the foundation of the state", was best honoured in theory and in practice. Security, the first manifestation of justice, reigned in the Arabian desert thanks to enforcing the Islamic law (al-sharʿ) with stern impartiality, Rihani observed.

Nevertheless, Rihani criticised Ibn Saʿūd's government system. This was paternal, free from clerkship and bureaucracy, but also innocent of any modern administrative method. On the other hand, he found the Imām Yahyā had some system in conducting the affairs of state. He was "practical and energetic, resolute and persistent, sagacious and far-sighted". Although he was everything in the Yemen, teacher, doctor and judge, his "one-man government" was run better than "an American corporation". Rihani especially admired the Imām's rule, rigorously observed, of disposing each day of the business that came to hand.

In discussing the form of government in Arabia, Rihani associated the idea of justice with the Islamic tradition of shūrā (consultation). In the Yemen for example, he saw the rule would have been close to a democratic one, if the Imām was appointed through election or selection (intikhāb) following the example of the Orthodox Caliphs, instead of the Imamate being a "spoil of victory" according to Zaydī doctrine. Rihani accepted the idea of a government for Arabia, religious in
inspiration, as long as the administration was secular and civil in practice. This explains how he could tolerate such rule as that of the Imām Yaḥyā and Ibn Saʿūd. The government of the Yemen was "theocratic in root and secular in branch",92 and Ibn Saʿūd was Imām of the Wahhābīs and had a strong sectarian feeling, but he knew when and where to relax and be tolerant in the interest of his country and his people. Ibn Saʿūd, Rihani observed, was "not in politics and religion the same man". His rule in the provinces, based upon a certain recognition of the native customs and beliefs, was "a kind of decentralisation which only an extraordinary personality makes possible in such a widely flung country..."93

No doubt, Rihani was impressed with the personalities of the Arab rulers and the signs of "Arab democracy" in their dress and manner of living. He, for example, was particularly captivated by the "charming personality" of King Ḥusayn whom he found "the most kingly, if not also the most spiritual and the least clannish" of all Arab Kings.94 It is true that Rihani was somewhat taken aback by the Hamidian style in which Ḥusayn accepted urban greeting in his court. But he was impressed with his liberal democratic attitude towards the Bedu Arabs.95 Similarly, Rihani appreciated the democratic manner of living as manifested in the common dressing and "tenue" of both kings, Ḥusayn and Fayṣal. He was also pleased with the "usual" simple decor and furniture of Ḥusayn's palace, and Fayṣal's "symbolic" throne. Because of the latter's natural and humble manners, he considered him "the closest to democracy" among all kings of the world.96

Rihani wrote in detail not only about Fayṣal's generosity and "noble democratic spirit", but also about his endeavour to establish the foundations of the Iraqi state. He observed that the King often worked more than twelve hours a day seeing all kinds of native and European people, examining their views, so as not to miss anything which might be beneficial to his nation. Moreover, Rihani admired Fayṣal for his endeavour to establish the Iraqi independent state by enhancing its development and progress on modern bases, particularly education and technology.97 However, when considering the practical political unity of Arabia in 1924, he opted for the strong leadership of both Ibn Saʿūd and the Imām Yahyā, as we have seen above.98
It is thus evident that Rihani concentrated on the personality of the Arabian rulers more than on their administrative system. He himself acknowledged that he shared neither the Imam's faith nor his basis of government, but he admired the latter which was "based, not on a principle, but on a personality." Rihani's interest in the man rather than the principle stems from his conviction that the monarchy would be the best suited method of government for Pan-Arabia. This was reflected in his *Mulūk al-'Arab*, completed in 1924, and strongly affirmed in his *Faysal al-Awwal* nine years later.

Rihani's support for the Arab monarchies may be elucidated by two points: his disappointment with Western freedom and democracy, and his conviction of the incompatibility of these Western concepts with Arabian society and culture. Rihani's stay in the USA strengthened his love for freedom and democratic principles, but taught him also that Western political methods do not always conform with the country's constitution. He saw that in reality, democracy was tied to the interests of a minority which possessed wealth, and social and political influence; and that the political right of election was nothing but a masquerade to distract the people from their genuine right to equality and social justice.

Democracy, for Rihani, was not a mere political concept isolated from the social environment. This leads to the second point of his argument, namely, the question of 'legitimacy' of the existing Arab leadership and régimes which Rihani regarded as compatible with the Arab society's values and interests. Rihani argued that "there was no universal government yet which, in form and essence, would suit all the people of the world". "Any government, republican or monarchist, would not stand unless it has its justifications and foundations in the mentality of the people, and in the traditions and culture of the nation".

"The mentality (‘aqliyya) of the Arab nation is monarchist", Rihani insisted. The Arabs, by nature, were democratic in their private life, but throughout their history, the Arab masses had developed a passion for monarchy and glory as well as a respect for the ruler's paternal authority. Moreover, he saw at the time that "the Arab nation did not have the cultural or educational means which may cause a sudden and essential change in its mentality or traditions".
"If such is the Arab mentality", Rihani asks, "would the republican government suit Arabia (al-bilād al-‘arabiyya)?". Writing exactly twenty years before the Yemen became a republic and twenty five years before the end of the monarchy in Iraq, Rihani was "certain that [republican rule] would be impossible... and any of the Arab countries (al-aṣqār al-‘arabiyya) would not try it by choice before twenty or thirty years". He does thus see a possible change in the future, but until that time comes the ruling monarchs would remain proper and deserving of support. They may have archaic mentalities, and may have failed to adapt their countries to modern civilisation, but most of them ruled with justice and passion. Rihani expressed such views during the early 1930s, the period of rising dictatorships in Europe. In this respect, he saw the Arab kings as, in some ways, more progressive than certain Western rulers; in claiming both legislative and executive powers, they were simply like other dictators in the world. "In a word they are the best example of the observed dictatorship. If the advanced European people accepted this system as the best for their countries, should not the Arabs hold to it?" Rihani asks. "The republican government in Arabia is impossible. Even so at present, it would be harmful".

It is clear that Rihani distinguished between the conditions in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, on the one hand, and those in Syria and Lebanon, the northern part of the Arab world, on the other. For as early as 1928, he argued that the republican form of government was most suited for Syria and Lebanon.

Rihani perceived the existing régimes and leaders in Arabia as compatible with the circumstances of the Arabian society. "You would be wrong if you assessed them outside their environment and political condition. I say they are worthy of great merit despite the stagnant environment and the elements of destruction in the political condition". He also found them worthy of support because of their commitment to certain issues of Arab concern. Thus, he supported King Ḥusayn for his services to the Arabs and his leadership of the Arab revolt; Ibn Saʿūd for achieving settlement, security and unity of a great part of the Peninsula; the Imām Yahyā for defending the Yemen from tribal strife and external ambitions; and Faysal for leading the Arab nationalist movement and achieving the independence of Iraq.
No doubt Rihani saw that a strong leadership was needed to achieve a solid and lasting Pan-Arabia, and that at the time the social and political conditions of Arabia would not allow an essential change in the existing order. It is interesting to note that some contemporary Arab nationalists, of his generation were even in favour of a strong ruler like Mussolini who would overthrow the establishment. Rihani's perception of the future Arab system was a mixture of modern and traditional forms. On the one hand, he saw that the monarchy would satisfy the Arab mentality and the need for a leading figure: a wise, just and especially paternal leader. This explains why in the end he leant towards the "big" personality of Ibn Sa'ūd to lead Pan-Arabia and the larger Arab unity.

Ibn Sa'ūd was, according to Rihani, the only Arabian ruler who was "loved and obeyed by his people". Ibn Sa'ūd seemed to him as a ruler who was confident; knew all the Arabs, their bad traits and their fine qualities; as one who sincerely believed in Pan-Arabism and was prepared to work for unity. Above all, Rihani saw Ibn Sa'ūd as what in modern terms can be described as a 'charismatic leader'. After his visit to Ibn Sa'ūd, Rihani wrote: "I have now met all the kings of Arabia and I find no one amongst them bigger than this man. He is big in word and gesture and smile, as well as in purpose and self-confidence. His personality is complex... The man in him is certainly bigger than the Sultan, for he dominates his people with his personality, not his title... I came to Ibn Sa'ūd ... with a hard heart and a critical mind, and I can say that he captured my heart at the first meeting..."

On the other hand, Rihani sensed the need for a civil government, elected democratically or by consultation, a government based on equality of all citizens regardless of religion, on the principles of political freedom and human rights, and on economic and social justice. From the above discussion, it can be deduced that the system of government which Rihani perceived for Pan-Arabia was a constitutional democratic monarchy which would limit the absolute authority of the ruler with democratic legislation and principles. It is clear that Rihani took into consideration the nature of Arab society which has a tradition of religious autocracy and culture. Thus, his concept of the just and organised government was not a complete imitation of the Western concepts of justice and democracy.
National Public Education

Education has preoccupied modern Arabic thinkers since the nineteenth century. For Rihani, it has been a major concern. For he considered it an essential condition for the achievement of Arab unity as well as progress in Arab societies. Rihani saw that the unity of Arabia, for example, was hindered by ignorance and fanaticism of the Arab masses, and even when achieved, it could not survive without developing the Arab human resources. The Arab mind, he observed, in spite of centuries of neglect, was still keen and bright. The minds of the children, the hidden treasures of Arabia, could not be discovered and developed without schools to teach modern sciences and technology.

Rihani recognised a number of obstacles, or inhibiting factors, in the way of educational progress for the Arabs. He emphasised the need for national public education because he saw that in Arabia there were no public schools, except the mosque-schools. Similarly, modern schools in Iraq were either in the hands of missionaries or under the control of the British colonialists. He attributes the lack of public schools to the religious and social traditionalism of the Arab authorities. In the Hijaz, for instance, Ḥusayn would not encourage a modern system of education because of his profound respect for tradition and the Quranic law. As Rihani observed, Ḥusayn opened a military college but not one public school to teach new sciences and sound knowledge. Thus the Arab monarch could allow the use of aeroplanes against other Arabs, but could not tolerate at all such aspects of knowledge "as would confuse the mind and corrupt the heart".

Rihani pointed out that education in some parts of Arabia was a monopoly and a means in the hands of the ruling class to consolidate its power. In the Yemen, the preoccupation of the Imām Yaḥyā with war, and his desire to keep his people under control, left the country without schools since the days of the Turks. The Imām was very learned, Rihani observed, but he did not seem interested in the promulgation of knowledge among his people. In the Yemen, only the ruler, his children, the Sayyids and those who might be eligible to the royal couch, received education. With such conditions, education in the Yemen was left to the mosque-schools, where the Sayyids would teach the common people (al-ʿāmma) submission. Thus would they enhance their own authority in the country.
The British authorities presence in Arabia represented, in Rihani’s view, another problem for education. He noted that the British cultural policy in Arabia ranged from complete neglect to the encouragement of anti-national education. In parts of Arabia, the British authorities had no interest in introducing public schools, since the Arab land was only essential to them politically and militarily. In other parts, e.g. Iraq, they objected to the establishment of national public schools and supported instead the foreign sectarian and ethnic schools. He highlighted and praised the efforts of Sātī‘ al-Ḥusnī, the then director of education in Iraq (1923), in establishing modern secular schools. But he warned against the British who would jeopardise such efforts for fear that education would be used as a factor of unity against them.

Rihani detected two other inhibiting factors for educational progress in Arabia: foreign missionary schools and shortage of qualified teachers. In principle, Rihani did not appreciate religious schools; and he saw missionary schools, particularly in Lebanon and Syria, as a divisive factor. In Arabia, the missionaries kept the Arabs away from education by insisting on evangelising. He thought that if the missionaries taught the Arabs health, hygiene and a right way of thinking, they would get a better reward and would encourage education among the Arabs. As for the shortage of qualified teachers, Rihani saw it was due to the narrow concept of nationalism which made Arab governments, e.g. in the Hijaz and Iraq, consider other Arabs, Syrians or Egyptians, as foreigners and refuse their expert educational assistance. He saw that unless this narrow ‘asābiyya was replaced with Pan-Arab nationalism, progress and unity would remain remote.

National education, in Rihani’s view, was the corner stone of sound and solid progress, the basis of true patriotism and the way to complete independence and unity. In a letter to Ibn Sa‘ūd in 1927, he wrote: "the first emigration (hiijra) of the Bedu, was from idolatry to the one belief in the Oneness of God, and from nomadism to civilization. The next hiijra will be from illiteracy to the alphabet, from ignorance to education... The achievement of your aspirations rests on schools. These complement the sword and pave the way for the achievement of a universal, solid and sovereign Arab unity".
Modern Means of Communication and Transportation

During his travels, Rihani found that Arabia lacked any modern roads, and that the accessible ones were accessible only for camels; the carriage roads, originally for military use not for peace and commerce, had succumbed to the agencies of destruction; railways and trains were also relics of the war; areas in the Gulf were not accessible to steam; and the only modern means of communication, the telegraph, was in the hands of the British. Concerned with the progress as well as the unity of Arabia, Rihani tried to convince the Arab rulers that in the days of the telegraph and aviation, the isolation of Arabia was no longer justifiable. For a better exploitation of its economic, natural and intellectual resources, Arabia needed to be more open to commerce and travel and to be exposed to the outside world. This was not possible without contact along modern lines of communication and transportation, and without technology, printing presses, education and a new way of thinking.

Modern means of communication and transportation were equally essential to establish economic and commercial relations and, more importantly, mutual understanding between the Arab "states" themselves. Rihani found that psychological as well as physical barriers separated the Arabs. Not only rulers were not interested in communicating with each other, but lack of communication prevented knowledge and mutual understanding at the people's level. Ordinary Arabs hardly knew anything about the life beyond the frontiers of their small world.

Rihani believed that the path of unity of the Arabs passed through mutual understanding and co-operation, and once unity was achieved it could not progress and survive without a network of modern communication and transportation. Such network was practically needed to traverse the long distances of the desert and to link the distant Arab countries. No doubt Rihani saw that in a "vast country" like Arabia, continuously threatened by rebellious tribes and ambitious dissidents, a government would need an efficient network of modern communication.

To be sovereign and independent, economically and politically, Rihani considered that the Arabs needed to free the strategic areas in Arabia from foreign control. Aden for example, "a very important station on the highway of world traffic and navigation", was controlled by the British who, by dividing the Arabs, ensured order and security. He noted that in Aden was "the most important telegraph office
in the world". Aden received and distributed the messages from and to the five continents. Through Aden "the East keeps in touch with the West", "the distances are bridged" with telegraph for business and intelligence, and the progress of the world is maintained.\textsuperscript{129}

It is clear that Rihani put special emphasis on Aden to awaken the Arabs to understand the British colonialist policy; to be aware of the assets of their country; and to attract their attention to the importance of having their own controlled modern means of communication for their own political and economic progress. For this, he stressed the need for knowledge and a firm hand to maintain security and order which such centres of materialism required. He saw that in their condition, the Arabs failed to fulfil those requirements. Not only because of their internal strife, but also because these stations needed finance and science, and the Arabs had none of these to enable them to carry out such a vital task.\textsuperscript{130} Modern means of communication and transportation depended on materialism and required new technology and science. This needed borrowing from the West, and Rihani had no objection to borrowing. Science for him, was the key and the door. Hence, the relationship between Pan-Arabism and scientific progress.

Just as he identified obstacles and recommended means for Arab unity, Rihani could see signs for optimism, during the 1930s in particular. In 1938-39, fifteen years after he left Arabia, Rihani was convinced that the dream of Arab unity had started to become true. In two articles published in English, in \textit{Asia} magazine in 1938 and 1939, he summed up the prospects of an Arab confederation in the near future.\textsuperscript{131} By then, King Ḥusayn and his son 'Alī were out of the Hijaz, and the Idrīsīs out of 'Asār. After the conquest of the Hijaz (1925), Ibn Saʿūd succeeded to unite most of the Arabian Peninsula under his rule. His kingdom extended to the Red Sea including the Hijaz, Upper and Lower 'Asār down to the Yemen border. In 1934, after he invaded the Yemen, Ibn Saʿūd withdrew his forces from Hudaidah and concluded with the Imām a treaty of friendship and defence (the Treaty of Ṭā'īf of 1934), thus making the two rulers allies. And in April 1936, a treaty of brotherhood and alliance was concluded between Saudi Arabia and independent Iraq, to which the Imām Yaḥyā subscribed a year later.\textsuperscript{132}
In the light of such developments, Rihani asserted that since, as he had advocated earlier, the Arabian Peninsula was now more or less united in two parts under the two strong men of Arabia, Ibn Sa‘ūd and the Imām, the chances of complete unity were becoming greater. Despite the British and French policy to maintain control over their "protectorates", both in the Peninsula (in Aden and the Arab/Persian Gulf). In the north (in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, East Jordan and Palestine) Rihani was convinced that an Arab unity had become a certain prospect. If not complete, this would at least be in the form of a confederation of Arab states. This is "obviously the first goal" of the "independent Arab states", he wrote, and it is "within sight".

Twenty three years after the Arab revolt, Rihani was able to assert that Pan-Arabism had become an all-Arab movement which swept through the Arab world and penetrated into the heart of the people as never happened in Arab history. He detected in the Arab world a passionate desire and striving for unity. The factors of its progress - as distinct from the early obstacles in 1924 - were, in his view, internal and external. Internally, tribalism had started to decline. The illiterate Bedouins had become a united people engaged in trade and agriculture. Those in the northern desert whose land was divided by the mandatory powers between Syria and Iraq, had begun to realise the evil of foreign rule, and they became militant apostles of a free and united Arabia.

Externally, he saw that the colonial policy, Turkish in Alexendretta, French in Syria and Lebanon, British and Jewish in Palestine, had raised against it Arab resentment. This had broadened the scope of Arab consciousness to include the Arabs of the Peninsula who, until a short time ago, were torn between their sectarian and tribal loyalties. The division of the northern territories into small "independent" states, and the abuses of the mandate authorities, made the people of those countries look for salvation in unity with other Arabs. The people of the north, particularly in Syria and Lebanon, may think their standard of culture was higher than that of the Peninsula. They may suppose that a government which suited Central Arabia may not be suitable for them. They may not even be ethnologically pure Arabs. But he was convinced that they embraced the Arab cause with unwavering conviction. Even the Christians, despite the attempts to keep them out of the Arab movement, were ready
to join the unity. The Greek Orthodox, together with the intelligentsia of all the Christian Arab countries were, in his opinion, whole heartedly Arab in creed and deed, and this was "a potent factor ... in the Pan-Arab movement".\(^{133}\) Internationally, he saw that the aggressions of Hitler and Mussolini had aroused suspicions and spurred the Arabs on to more practical efforts for solidarity and unification.

With those factors of speeding up the Arab movement, Rihani saw that if the complete unification of the Arab world under one ruler was not expected in the near future, the success of an Arab confederation, following the pattern, more or less, of the United States, was possible. The first sign of its success was the Iraqi-Saudi treaty (1936). This had welcomed every independent Arab state to join, and its protocol had set an example for economic and political Arab relations. Thus it represented, in his view, an organic instrument for the development within its frame of the foundations of an Arab confederation. A potential democratic government in the newly established Syrian Republic with the utmost goal of Arab unity, and the abolishment of visas between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, represented for him another two signs for the success of Arab confederation.

Of course Rihani was aware that the British and the French would not sincerely welcome such confederation. But he saw that because of their interests in the Arab world the two powers began to look with favour upon it. He counted upon the Anglo-Saudi friendship to solve the problem of Palestine and to encourage the establishment of the confederation. Moreover, he was hoping that the Arabs, especially Ibn Sa'ūd and the Imām who were aware of the implications of the colonial policy, would have realistic foreign relations and sincerely work for the Arab confederation.

Again Rihani found in Ibn Sa'ūd, now "King of Saudi Arabia", a title which reflected his "Pan-Arab mind", a new source of hope, inspiration and unifying power. Thus, not only had he succeeded to make himself the Lord of the Holy City, but also the Pan-Arab national leader. In Ibn Sa'ūd, Rihani found most of the conditions required for the leader of Arab unity. His personality, his justice, and the way he dealt with every situation, made him in Rihani's view, the best leader for the Pan-Arab movement.\(^{134}\)
Rihani also emphasised the dynamism of Ibn Saʿūd which contributed to his success. Ibn Saʿūd, he observed, had given the Arabs military triumph, security and freedom, and he had introduced them to modern technology and science. By seeking scientific assistance from the West and human resources from Egypt and Syria, Ibn Saʿūd proved to have a flexible mind, that was essential for Arab progress and unity. Moreover, Rihani emphasised Ibn Saʿūd's success in putting an end to tribal rapacity and warfare, in establishing among all the tribes a real and workable brotherhood, and in shifting them from the insecurities of nomadism to settlement and rural life. In a word, Rihani expected Ibn Saʿūd to play a great role in realising the Pan-Arab dream, because of his astuteness and diplomacy and his ability to deal successfully with the various obstacles in the way of the regeneration of Arabia.

The Arab Nation and Pan-Arab Nationalism

Rihani has been considered among the first to give a straightforward unambiguous political (as distinct from cultural or linguistic) definition of the idea of Arab nationalism. He was perhaps the first to provide a broad perception of Arab nationalism, deriving from literary renaissance, with a territorial definition. As early as 1909, Rihani defined his Arab homeland (al-watan) as comprising geographical Syria, Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula. In 1939, he reasserted the same territorial and political definition of Pan-Arabism. The Arab homeland, according to him, consisted of a well-defined area comprising two distinct geographical divisions: the Peninsula and "the Green Zone" in the north. These two divisions were, in his view, "one, but not the same". He saw them as complementary. For if the Peninsula was "the brawn" of the Arab world, the north was "its brain". The two divisions, he argues, depended upon each other in more than one sense. Without the desert, "the cradle of the Arab race" which supplied the north with new blood and power, the principal centres, Iraq, Syria (including Lebanon) and Palestine, would deteriorate socially, morally and materially. "And without the northern zone the people of the desert cannot long survive".

It is thus evident that Rihani excludes both Egypt and North Africa (al-Maghrib) from this political map for Pan-Arab unity. Two points need to be made here. First, Rihani was not alone in this. The Arabs meeting at the First Conference
in Paris 1913, excluded these countries. Although later on, Arab nationalist thinkers included Egypt, many Egyptian intellectuals in the 1930s still thought of their country, at least in the political sense, outside the framework of a Pan-Arab world.\textsuperscript{138} The Maghrib, then still under French rule, perceived itself more in terms of an Islamic rather than Arab identity, although the Arabic language was considered as important. Secondly, Rihani was of course aware of the Arab cultural identity of both Egypt and the Maghrib, as seen in many instances in his writings, although he did not extend this to the realm of politics.\textsuperscript{139}

Both geography and history provide the basis for unity of the Arab world, in Rihani’s opinion. The history of the Arab nation is characterised by continuous movement towards settlement and civilisation. Reflecting a perception of the pattern of Arab history that was familiar to both early Western Orientalists and, Westernising Arab authors, Rihani highlights the movements of the Arabs from the barren desert into the fertile zone and urban centres. According to this perception, when the sources of interest and subsistence diminished, the Arabs of the Peninsula migrate eastward and northward, to the cities on the Gulf, to Iraq, to Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. This continuous movement in times of peace, particularly to the fertile zone, becomes a mass-migration during and after a social or tribal upheaval. He also notes that when the Arabs migrate, they do not all remain nomadic. "Many of them settle in the big cities and establish themselves in business, while their children, receiving a modern education, become influential in the social, political and intellectual life of their communities".\textsuperscript{140}

Rihani did not provide a study of Arab history in the strict sense, but in his writings, he attempted to highlight the long history of the Arabs and their struggle against the harsh environment. The Arabs as a race originated from the Peninsula, a geographical area known by their name, \textit{(al-diýár al-‘arabíyya)}, thousands of years ago.\textsuperscript{141} The Arab nation survived the barren desert and triumphed over death. Moreover, it was a conquering and a civilised nation. In fact, this survival gave it victory and a physical power to spread and flourish.\textsuperscript{142} Rihani had a dialectical understanding of Arab history. This, for him, does not start only with the beginning of Arab expansion with Islam, nor does he confine himself to the nomadic life of the Arabs mainly in the Peninsula. In his writings, succinct reference is made to the
Arab states in pre-Islamic times, including the kingdoms of the Nabataeans, Qe'dar and Ghassân in the north, and the kingdoms of Saba' and Himyar in south-west Arabia.\textsuperscript{143}

In addition to Geography and History as essential elements for Arab Unity, Rihani also highlighted a number of other factors. In his perception language, culture and civilisation, common interest, and the specific Arab characteristics, were just as important. The Arabs, in Rihani’s view, are a civilised nation which contributed to the history of mankind in science, literature, language and religion. Highlighting a theme which was to become constant in Arab nationalist discourse, Rihani asserts that the Arab nation had carried civilisation to the four corners of the world when Europe was still submerged in darkness and savagery. Despite the artificial divisions created by foreign powers, the Arab nation preserved the same culture in the whole Arab world. Its language is Arabic, and the customs are the same. Rihani acknowledges that the Arabs in the north may have a standard of culture higher than that of the Arabs of the Peninsula. But he insists that, if religion is excepted, the Arab in Najd and in the Yemen, in his manner and social customs, and in his noble characteristics is very similar to the Arab in Syria, in Palestine or in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{144}

Arabic was the first expression of Rihani’s Arab identity.\textsuperscript{145} Language in this context takes priority over religion. Rihani discussed the relation of Arab nationalism to Islam, but unlike those Arab nationalists who used the Muslim element to ascertain the Arab nationalistic call, Rihani distinguished between Arabism and Islam and asserted the priority of Arabism.\textsuperscript{146} This is best manifested in his famous expression in 1938: “the Arabs were before Islam and before Christianity and they will remain after Islam and after Christianity. The Christians as well as the Muslims should know that Arabism (al-\textit{urūba}) is before everything and above everything”.\textsuperscript{147} Rihani considered Islam as a power that gave the Arabs a surplus of strength which enabled them to spread and flourish. But Islam, for him, was one of several factors which helped the spread of the Arabic language and culture. He indicated that Arabic in Syria was spread by the Pagan and Christian Arabs before Islam, and he highlighted in particular the role of the Christians in the modern Arab awakening.\textsuperscript{148} Thus while not completely rejecting the relation between Islam and
Arabness, he asserted that the latter was distinct and went beyond Islam to contain all Arabs, Muslims and non-Muslims.

But who are the Arabs? Ethnologically, the Arabs, according to Rihani, are originated from Qaḥṭān and ‘Adnān, both from Sām (Shem). But, for him, the people of the Arab world are not necessarily all Semitic. In the north, in Syria for example, the people are a mixture of Semitic and other elements. Arab blood mixed with Phoenician, Hebrew, Assyrian, Greek and other people who lived in geographical Syria since ancient times. Even in the Peninsula, Rihani found areas where the Arab blood was not pure. In ‘Asīr, the people were originally from Qaḥṭān but the prevailing type was not only Semitic. Besides ‘Asīr was subject to many foreign invasions, including Persian and Abyssinian, and the original type was subject to the modifying influences of these different invasions.

Rihani was proud of his Arab blood, and writing in a period when purity of blood was still considered important in both Eastern and Western thought, Rihani seems to dislike the result of the mixture of blood, for example as exemplified in Hudaidah, and in Tihāma, in general. But pure Arab blood and race did not seem, to him, essential elements for Arab identity. A person, for him, could be an Arab if he had Arab blood, but also if he spoke Arabic; if he had the Arab noble characteristics; and if he wholeheartedly embraced the Arab cause. Such concepts are reminiscent of the concepts of the Arab as expressed at the Arab Congress of 1913. Rihani observes that the Idrīṣī, for example, was "a negro sovereign who ruled a million Arab[s] among them many thousand descendants of the Prophet", but "he spoke Arabic perfectly and without accent" which Rihani found "a compensation". The people in the northern zone of the Arab world, in Lebanon and Syria for example, spoke Arabic, and had Arab characteristics, but their ethnological roots were not well defined. Their ethnological ties with the Arabs of the Peninsula may not be strong enough, but "whether they are of pure Arab blood or not", Rihani says, "they are today Arabs by choice and preference. They embrace the Arab cause with a stout heart and an unwavering conviction."

Rihani here points to the factors of will and aspiration in nationalism. While language and history create the desire for unity, according to certain Arab nationalists, for Rihani, what creates in certain people the will and the desire to
live together as one united nation, apart from language and race or nationalism (al-gawmiyya), is the common interest (al-maṣlaḥa). ¹⁵⁷ He argues that the tribes of Iraq and Syria were enemies of Ibn Saʿūd, but because they were fed up with the British and French mandates, they were willing to welcome Pan-Arab unity even under Ibn Saʿūd's rule. The same, in his opinion, is true for the people of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. These were fed up with the "blessings" of the mandatory régimes, and whether they were of Arab descent or not, they were willing to unite with the Arabs of the Peninsula under one rule. ¹⁵⁸

With geography, history, language, culture, and common interest, Rihani found a place for the ethnic minorities in Arab unity. Many Arab thinkers, since the mid-nineteenth century, have commented on the problem of religious diversity of the Arab East particularly Syria. ¹⁵⁹ In Rihani's view, if Arab nationalism was limited to ethnicity, unity would then exclude parts of the Arab world, particularly the north, where the original blood identity was lost under the influences of different invasions. Also in excluding religion, he found a place for the religious minorities to feel secure and comfortable in a society where they could exercise their rights on equal footing with other citizens.

Almost all Arab nationalists of the interwar years, with varying degrees of emphasis, considered the above elements of geography, history, language and culture as essential for Arab nationalism. Others gave special attention to the innate qualities which allowed the ancient Arabs to create civilised life and aided their great success after the coming of Islam. Together with language, the "noble characteristics" had become the basis of Arabness since the third century of the Hijra.¹⁶⁰ Rihani highlighted the Arab ethos, and considered such noble qualities: pride, dignity, self-respect, faithfulness, sincerity, courage, generosity, hospitality, valour, love of glory, and above all love of freedom, as essentially distinct traits of the Arab nation. These intrinsic qualities are, in his opinion, immortal. They survived the harsh environment of the desert and centuries of uneducation, and remained as characteristics of the Arab personality, particularly in the desert away from urbanism and civilisation. "This glorious courageous people has wisdom, dignity and noble-mindedness which is unusual to find in similar peoples". It was these special traits which brought him back from America and attracted him to the life in the desert. With this usual
romantic term of phrase, Rihani admits that "they tied my heart to that of the Arabs in a thread of hair stronger than any other tie".\textsuperscript{161}

However, Rihani does not fail to observe that the noble traits may not be found in the soul of every Arab everywhere.\textsuperscript{162} In certain parts of Arabia, those qualities had become only a "tradition", and in some Arabs you would not find even a trace for pride and valour.\textsuperscript{163} He also notes that the Arabs have their own failings too. "Whether Bedouin or urban, the Arab has his mixed traits", he wrote. The Arab, in his opinion, can be "fickle and impetuous, swift and violent in his reactions, jealous of his freedom; he is self-centered, self-sufficient; he is an individual with clannish absurdities of exclusiveness, and a respecter, as such, of authority only when authority has something to give besides orders". While, he saw, such individualism was at the bottom of inter-tribal warfare, and was, to a certain extent, responsible for the slow progress of the Pan-Arab movement, "it became nevertheless, on several occasions, a racial or a religious jingoism of power and conquest".\textsuperscript{164} His comments, on the face of it, suggest influences of the Western Orientalist tradition, particularly as reflected in earlier Western travellers. But it is more likely that Rihani is presenting his own frank and candid observations and analysis, in the same way as earlier scholars such as Ibn Khaldūn or more loyal Arab scholars have done.

With such national elements or unifying factors, Rihani saw that the Arabs were a nation and must therefore become, eventually, a state. In 1939, he realised that the establishment of one Arab state, i.e. Pan-Arab unity, under one Arab ruler for the whole Arab world was impossible. But he anticipated the establishment of an Arab confederation comprising the already established regional entities, in the north and in the Peninsula, as a first step towards that unity. Like other nationalists of his generation, Rihani's concept of Arab unity may have some influences from the political European philosophy of nationalism. It has even been observed, in 1939, that Rihani was the best known of the educated Arabs "who quite sincerely strove to apply to the essentially particularistic Arab world the European doctrine of national unity".\textsuperscript{165}

It is true that Rihani read European nationalist thought,\textsuperscript{166} but, unlike some Arab nationalists who drew their inspiration from the German romantic nationalism,\textsuperscript{167} it is not possible to say that Rihani was influenced by one European
doctrine rather than the other. While some other Arab nationalists seem to have searched for a metaphysical nation, Rihani was not concerned with proving the existence of the Arab nation. This, for him, existed in a specific geographical land where the people spoke one language, and had the same culture and characteristics. He was more specifically concerned with the need for the Arab nation to achieve unification and organisation in a new society. He not only asserted the need for the Arab nation to unite as a political and sovereign entity, but he also proceeded to give a practical picture for the proposed organisation of this nation already existing. In the Peninsula he suggested a unity in Arabia and development of institutions, infrastructure and human resources. In the north he insisted on democratic civil government, on education, economic development, on liberation and then on complete unity with other Arab countries.

Rihani’s concept of Arab unity was not isolated from social, intellectual and political development. His Pan-Arab nationalism, therefore, was both a reflection on, and an endeavour towards, the realisation of Arab unity and the reorganisation of Arab society. This makes it more of a rational reflection on the organisation of a society already existent but in a state of recent re-awakening.

Rihani was a spontaneous writer with a great deal of poetic and flair in his style. He may speak with romanticism about the Arabs and the Arab nation, but in his thought he tends to be more realistic and rational than abstract Arab nationalists.

The Arab nation, for Rihani, thus exists but in a fragmented state. It must have the national spirit (al-rūḥ al-qawmiyya) which unites all its parts and nourishes the nation to grow stronger and confident. "The ultimate goal" of the Pan-Arab movement, he insists, is "national (qawmi), moral, social and political". "A divided nation in the phase of formation and unification (dawr al-takwīn w-al-tawhīd), like the Arab nation, needs in the first place a national spirit. This emanates from the greatest historical reality (al-ḥaqīqa al-tārīkhīyya al-kubra), and is the first basis of the Pan-Arab movement". The Arab nation, for him, was formed a long time ago. But since it is dynamic and regenerative, unification becomes a decisive phase in the vital reformatory process of the new nation. The unifying spirit of the Arab nation, the factor which melts all the fragmented elements in one unit, is for
him, definitely national not religious. It is Arabism (al-‘urūba) because this is before and above any religion. "Arabism is before everything and above everything".\textsuperscript{171}

The national spirit, for Rihani, is the consciousness of the essential elements characteristic of the Arab nation. Such consciousness makes every one who shares the elements of nationalism proud of being Arab. This is the spirit which unites the Arab nation because the elements of nationalism belong to all the Arabs. Rihani was full of optimism for the future of Arab unity which he considered as "undoubtedly coming in a year or fifty years because it is an aspect of regeneration and progress".\textsuperscript{172} Such optimism stems from his strong belief in nationalism as the spirit which gives the nation its strength, and with which obstacles should be encountered. Sectarianism was one of the problems which Rihani consistently countered as an obstacle to unity, by emphasising Arab nationalism. "I believe we should get out of the sectarian idea (al-fikra at-ta'īfiyya) to the national idea (al-fikra al-qawmiyya)".\textsuperscript{173} The practical outcome of Arab nationalism is unity, to the advocacy of which Rihani dedicated a great part of his life and works with the Arabs. This included rulers as well as intellectuals and ordinary audiences. "We have no solution to our present condition ... except in co-operation and unity based on the national principle".\textsuperscript{174}

The national spirit could be nourished through national and secular schools in all the Arab countries. These, in Rihani's opinion, "must have one curriculum in order to spread not different nationalisms of many different countries, but only one nationalism". "All the national and patriotic movements ought to have one spirit, that of Arabism... Arabism unites us. It evokes our inherent strengths and enhances them. It establishes the belief, and strengthens the intentions, it kindles the valour and re-establishes the dignity, evokes the pride and inspires the glorious works and hopes... Arabism is the greatest patriotic power, the unbeatable power which Europeans will respect".\textsuperscript{175}

Arabism, Rihani argues, is not simply an intellectual or a political ideology. It is "an all-embracing spirit which induces one to co-operate and unite with one's brothers in order to have a strong sovereign country which provides them all with security and happiness... This is Arabism in its highest meaning and farthest aim. It is to replace the small and lost nationalisms with one big nationalism." This, "in its
modern form would not accept the fragmentation and differentiation between majorities and minorities". In it, "the Christian and the Muslim, Druze and Alawite, are one and equal". Arab nationalism, therefore, has two main characteristics: capability to overcome sectarianism in both forms, al-madhhabiyya and al-tā'ifiyya; and deep understanding of the delicate problem of religious, ethnic and political minorities in the Arab world. Pan-Arabism in his view, goes beyond all the narrow fanaticisms and nationalisms, and melts them all in an all-embracing non-religious national solidarity (āṣabiyya). "Nationalism (al-qawmiyya) unites and religion separates", he said to the Imām Yaḥyā. "The Christian of Syria is an Arab like the Muslim, and this nationality is destined to firmly unite the two and keep them united. ... Religion separates the Syrian Christians from you, but the feeling of nationalism will bring them back to you".177

The Arab Nation: Realities and Challenges:

Rihani did not write a separate treatise on the Arab nation. But from his writings two complementary pictures for this nation can be drawn. The first picture draws upon the past achievements and the challenges during the struggle for liberation and independence. The second picture takes its distinct marks from the present condition of the Arab nation and its potential reaction to the internal and external challenges. In this sense it is more idealistic because it looks towards the future and draws more upon the aspirations of the Arab people to build a new nation. Before and during World War I, Rihani perceived the Arab nation as one with a rich inheritance of science and belief. Its contribution to the civilisation of humankind and its sacrifice for the sake of Right and Freedom put it on the level of the great revolutions of the world. Small in number, the Arab nation was strong in its rights and defence against tyranny. Unlike the Ottoman nation, the Arab nation was free and just. It rejected all forms of oppression and loved freedom and sovereignty.178

In the 1920s, Rihani asserted the glorious past of the Arab nation and its contribution to the world civilisation. He insisted that this nation was a civilised one striving for freedom, independence, national sovereignty, and unity. But he warned against ignorance, sectarian fanaticism, and tribal divisions which were hindering its progress.179 In a speech entitled 'Rūḥ al-'Urūba' (The Spirit of Arabism) he said:
"the Arab nation succeeded to safeguard its existence (kīyān) in the barren desert, for more than two thousands years... It triumphed over death, moreover, it was a conquering and a civilised nation... Despite five hundred years of uneducation [i.e. under the Ottomans], it preserved most of its good characteristics... It is amazing how a nation sits in its rags on the floor, eats dates and drinks brackish water, yet talks about pride and haughtiness, faithfulness and sincerity, courage, generosity and freedom, its greatest treasure".180

In the 1930s, Rihani saw that the Arab nation in the future would be a regenerative nation in aims and methods. With modern science and technology, it would renovate its life and recover its past glory and success. This continuous modernisation would go hand in hand with unity which would replace the divisions at all levels. With national secular education expanding to modern sciences and philosophy, he saw that the educated Arab nation could lead its way in the future to contribute to the civilisation of humanity. Education, therefore, must reach all groups of people in order to unite them in a "new nationalism". As an active and dynamic nation, he expected the Arab nation to borrow certain Western values and give the West in return certain values of the East. Passiveness had tended in the past to lead the Arab nation to decay and to stop the pace of unity. But with modernisation, the Arab nation would survive, keep up with world progress and counterbalance Western expansive schemes.181

At the international level, Rihani insists, the Arab nation would have a positive relationship with both Western and Eastern nations, a relationship between equals without any superiority or inferiority complexes. With self-confidence emanating from its inherent moral values on the individual and collective levels, the Arab nation, in his view, would reach the "patriotic national" and the "universal human" summits.182 The Arab nation is a peaceful nation, but would not accept foreign domination over any of its countries on the Mediterranean, the Arab Sea, the Arab/Persian Gulf or the Red Sea. While not aiming at expansion, it would maintain friendly relations with other nations in order to establish peace and fraternity. Its foreign relations would be established on co-operation and mutual understanding, and strengthened with multilateral treaties of commerce and friendship. "The southern coast of the Mediterranean from Alexendretta to the Egyptian borders is Arab",
Rihani says. "It will remain Arab despite what happened in Alexendretta, in Lebanon, and in Palestine. The awakened Arab nation protests against every injustice done against its rights and as a united nation in the future, it will seek to terminate this injustice." 183

Rihani defined the Arab renaissance (al-nahda al-‘arabiyya) in three words: unity, peace and education. These are interdependent to the extent that the one could not be achieved without the other and without Arab-Arab as well as Arab-West co-operation. The world aims at universal fraternity and co-operation. To be able to contribute to this movement, the Arab nation should first unite, and continuously work towards this aim through education and by implementing the spirit of universalism among the people. But he insisted that the success of this aim depended on co-operation of other nations, especially Western, which should give the Arab nation the chance for peace and progress. 184

From the above, it is clear that Rihani’s nationalism did not take refuge in the past nor did it express itself in xenophobia (like German style nationalism). 185 His nationalism was rather progressive, for Rihani did not hesitate to criticise the Arabs in order to stimulate their progress and unity, and while proud of his Arabness he did not express fear or hatred of other nationalities.

More than a mere idea or ideology, Arab unity, in Rihani’s thought, was a realistic programme for a real society. Rihani’s works may contain "rhetorical speeches and fiery statements demanding independence and unity", 186 but this was not devoid of social or political content. Even in his speeches, Rihani did not fail to remind the Arabs that independence required unity and this was not possible without education, science, democracy, justice and equality, and without replacing the narrow loyalties with loyalty to the "Greater Arab Homeland". Rihani’s project for a unified Arab society, embodied in his works as a whole, was more than a geographical framework in which the lost Arab grandeur can be reconstituted. This was conceived, not in terms of physical or military power, but in terms of civilisation.

Rihani’s perception of Arab society was based upon a system of political and social values. It differed from that of Sāḥi‘ al-Ḫusri‘ī’s, for example, who saw "nationalism before and above every thing, even before and above freedom". 187 Rihani’s society was based upon justice, freedom and equality of all its members.
It was a democratic just society even though ruled by an individual. Unlike several Arab nationalists who adopted the Western concept of the state, and proposed a system modelled on Euro-American institutions (e.g. Rabbath and Zurayq), Rihani's system was not a copy of the West, but a system of values drawn from the Arab reality and shaped originally for this society. Considering Rihani's experience of life in the West, this stance of his is remarkable.

This does not mean traditionalism, for Rihani aimed at a modern society which drew from science its survival and continuity. Rihani's Pan-Arabism was progressive. For he always insisted that when the Arabs replace the old regressive sectarian and tribal feelings with the modern sentiment of Arabism, when they replace the archaic institutions with modern forms of government and education, and when modernity and science begin to touch all forms of life, only then would the new Arab individual and collective fight against the foreigners and only then would Arab unity become possible.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT

1. In both his Arabic Thought and A History of the Arab Peoples, Albert Hourani does not mention Rihani at all, apparently because he considered that Rihani had "no systematic body of ideas about politics", see Jayyusi, Trends and Movements, vol. 2, p. 88. Ḥalim Barakāt considers the nationalist trend in Rihani's thought as "an expression of his nationalist feelings rather than a methodological theory, for he did not evolve a concept of a nation", see Barakāt, al-Mujtama' al-'Arabī, p. 424.

2. See Ch. 5, above.


4. In his English books on Arabia, Rihani used Pan-Arabia for al-wahda al-'arabīyya. In this study, 'Pan-Arabia' is used for the unity of Arabia which he preached during and soon after his travels. 'Arab unity' is used for his wider concept of unity of the whole Arab world which he perceived particularly in the late 1930s.

5. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 527; APD, pp. 94-95; ISA, p. 39; see also his travels, Ch. 1, above.

6. See his ideas of independence and Syrian unity, Ch. 5 and Ch. 6, above.

7. See Mulūk, AAK, 1; ACA; APD; ISA; Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 325-334; Baker, King Husain, pp. 154-189; Hourani, A History, pp. 314-319; Gharaybeh, Mugaddima, pp. 416-419; Philby, Arabia, pp. 265-287; Sālim, Takwin al-Yaman, pp. 244-275; Wenner, Modern Yemen, pp. 48-51, 142-143.


11. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 72; ACA, p. 118.

12. Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 70-72; ACA, pp. 117-118.


17. See the texts of the proposed treaties between the Imām and Ḥusayn and between Ḥusayn and the Idrīsī, in Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 219, 357-359.

18. See for example various papers and the discussions in Dūrī and Others, al-Wahda al-'Arabīyya.


20. Letter to King Ḥusayn’s Foreign Minister, Fūʿād al-Khatib (n.d.), in *Mulūk*, AAK, 1, pp. 389-391. It is interesting to note that in 1937, Rihani indicated that considering his advice some Arab rulers began the work on such monetary fund, and he advised the Syrians, the Lebanese and the Palestinians to do the same, see his speech ‘Filāṣīn’ (1937), in *al-Qāwmiyyāt*, AAK, 8, p. 412; for his ideas on economic independence see also his campaign against the French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria, Ch. 7, above.


31. See in particular a letter to Ibn Sa‘ūd from Jeddah, 20 Jumādā al-Thāniya 1343 A.H. (the Christian date is noted as January 1924, but it is most likely January 1925 during Rihani’s mediation for peace), in *Rasā’il*, pp. 231-233. For his peace negotiations, see Tārikh Najd, AAK, 5, pp. 381-396.

32. A number of Arab intellectuals at present consider this the only sound approach in discussing Arab unity, see in particular Salāmē, ‘‘Awā’iq al-Wāqi‘ al-‘Arabī al-Qutri’, and the discussions on this paper, in Dūrī and Others, al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya, pp. 469-528; see also al-Jābirī, Ishbāliyyāt al-Fikr al-‘Arabī al-Mu‘āṣir, pp. 91-98; also an interview with al-Jābirī in al-Manāhib, 45-46 (Nov.-Dec. 1989), pp. 32-36.


38. See his anti-sectarian ideas and his criticism of the sectarian Lebanese ideology in Ch. 3, and Ch. 6, above.
39. Of the various Islamic sects in the Peninsula Rihani counts: Sunnis of the four persuasions, Shafi‘i, Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali; Shi‘a Ja‘faris, Zaydis, and Isma‘ilis; and the Wahhabis (he rightly considers Wahhabism as the revival of Hanbalism). There was also a minority of Christians, Jews, Hindus, Parsis, Baha‘is and Sabi‘a in Aden, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, the Yemen and ‘Asir (Jews in the latter two places). See Muluq, AAK, 1, pp. 22, 76, 228, 396, 494, 652, 694, 785.

40. e.g. the hostilities between the Ḥuwāshib who are of the Shafi‘i Sunna in one of the protectorates, and the Shi‘a Zaydis of the Yemen, see Muluq, AAK, 1, p. 95; APD, p. 27.


42. al-Zaydiyya is named after Zayd, the son of ‘Ali b. Ḥusayn b. ‘Ali b. Abī Talib. Zayd took up arms against the Umayyads, was persecuted and crucified, see Muluq, AAK, 1, pp. 140-141; APD, pp. 107-108.

43. Muluq, AAK, 1, pp. 152, 166-167; APD, pp. 136-137.

44. Muluq, AAK, 1, pp. 107, 142-143, 148-149; APD, pp. 49, 109-110, 115-116. Sayyid M. Sālim claims that by considering "the Imamate as the spoil of victory", Rihani misunderstood the truth of Zaydisim, see Salim, Takwil al-Yaman, p. 28; but Cf. S. H. M. Jafri, Origins and Development of Shi‘a Islam.

45. See Muluq, AAK, 1, pp. 187-188; APD, pp. 181-188, 190-191.


47. See also his idea of progress, Ch. 3, above.


50. See Muluq, AAK, 1, pp. 177, 570; ISA, p. 209. For a similar comparison between Wahhabism and Protestantism in the sense of return to the puritanism of religion, see for example, Hanna, ‘Mīzān al-Qwā al-Ijtima‘iyya‘, in al-Hirmāsī and Others, al-Dīn fi al-Mujta‘a‘ al-‘Arabī, p. 331.

51. See Muluq, AAK, 1, pp. 569-570, 600; ISA, p. 208.

52. ISA, p. 242.


55. Tārikh Najd, AAK, 5, p. 258; ISA, p. 209.


57. Muluq, AAK, 1, p. 132.
58. See the discussion of secularism as a prerequisite of progress and unity in Ch. 3, above.


62. See al-Nakabī, AAK, 6, p. 173.

63. Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 275, 277-278.

64. See Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 144, APD, pp. 110, 233-234.


67. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 659; ACA, p. 245.

68. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 922.

69. Ibid., p. 922.


72. Ibid., pp. 200-201; APD, p. 229.

73. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 206; APD, p. 233.


75. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 399; ACA, p. 309.

76. Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 764-776; ACA, pp. 300-304. On the British presence in Bahrain, see also al-Tajir, Bahrain.

77. Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 776-779. On the role of the Government of India in the Middle East from an English perspective, see E. Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, pp. 11-13 and passim.


79. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 776.

80. Ibid., pp. 407-408.

81. Ibid., p. 408.

82. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 549; ISA, pp. 66-67.

83. 'The Pan-Arab Dream', in Asia, January, 1938, p. 46.

85. See Ch. 4, above.


92. APD, p. 107.


94. ACA, p. 17.

95. *Mulūk*, AAK, 1, p. 28; ACA, pp. 18-19.


97. Fāyṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 493-505; also 'Rišālat al-'Irāq, (1932), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 301; *Mulūk*, AAK, 1, pp. 919-920.

98. *Mulūk*, AAK, 1, p. 927; see also this chapter, above.

99. APD, p. 221.

100. Fāyṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, pp. 570-571; see also his criticism of the abuse of American democracy, Ch. 4, above.


102. Fāyṣal al-Awwal, AAK, 4, p. 572.

103. Ibid., p. 572.

104. Ibid., p. 572.

105. Ibid., p. 573.

106. 'Taḥt al-Sīlāḥ' (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 266.


108. Ibid., pp. 573-575.

110. Mulük, AAK, 1, p. 927.


112. Mulük, AAK, 1, pp. 528-529; ISA, pp. 40-41.


114. On education in the thought of several Arab thinkers, see Hourani, Arabic Thought; Commins, 'Religious Reformers and Arabists in Damascus', in JIMES, 18 (1986), pp. 405-425; idem, Islamic Reform, 99-102, 126-127 and passim; on al-Husri's ideas and nationalist education, see his 'Ahamm Masha‘il al-Tarbiya', in Abhath Mukhtara, pp. 485-493.

115. See Mulük, AAK, 1, 162; 'Hayya ‘Ala al-‘Ilm' (1922); 'Ghayat bi Thawrati' (1922), two speeches delivered respectively in Kuwait and Baghdad during his travels in Arabia and published later in his al-Qawmiyyat, AAK, 8, pp. 212-214, 215-217; see also his letters between 1922-1925, in Rasâ'il, pp. 193, 201-206, 227-228, 253-254.

116. Mulük, AAK, 1, p. 52; ACA, pp. 88-81.


118. Mulük, AAK, 1, p. 441; ACA, p. 350.

119. Mulük, AAK, 1, p. 909.

120. He specifically addressed the Arabian Mission under the Board of Foreign Missions of the Reformed Church of America which had branches in Bahrain, Basra and Kuwait, see, Mulük, AAK, 1, p. 699; ACA, p. 260.

121. Mulük, AAK, 1, p. 700; ACA, pp. 260-261.

122. Mulük, AAK, 1, p. 912.

123. Ibid., pp. 919-920, 912.


125. Mulük, AAK, 1, pp. 234, 404-405, 516-517, 792; ACA, pp. 310-312; ISA, p. 23.


127. Ibid., pp. 9-11, 150, 166-167; APD, pp. 75, 136-137, 193.

128. Mulük, AAK, 1, p. 923; also a letter to Ibn Sa‘ūd, 9 January 1923, in Rasâ'il, pp. 201-203.


130. Mulük, AAK, 1, pp. 405-406; ACA, p. 312.


133. 'The Pan-Arab Dream', in Asia, January, 1938, p. 46; on the sense of Arab identity of the Greek Orthodox community in Arab society, see R. Haddad, Syrian Christians in Muslim Society, pp. 54, 65, 82 and passim; also al-Ḥusnī, Muḥādarāt, pp. 187-192.

134. 'The Pan-Arab Dream', in Asia, January, 1938, p. 45.

135. See Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals, pp. 118-119.

136. 'al-Thawra al-Khuluqiyā' (c. 1909), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 65.


139. See Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 912; al-Maghribi al-Ağā, AAK, 2, pp. 7ff; his poem on Egypt 'Ibnat Fir'awnn' (1922), in Hufūl, AAK, 9, pp. 106-111.

140. 'Pan-Arab Nationalism', in Asia, August, 1939, p. 453.

141. See Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 709-714; ACA, pp. 271-274; al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, p. 156.

142. 'Rūḥ al-'Urūba' (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 260.


144. 'Risālāt al-Mughṭarībīn' (1927); 'Rūḥ al-'Urūba' (1928); 'Lanā Amīr' (1934), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 242, 260, 336.

145. See Ch. 5 and Ch. 6, above.


147. 'al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya' (1938), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 421.

148. See al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, p. 176.

149. On the relation between Arab nationalism and Islam, see M. A. Khalafallah and Others, al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya w-al-İslām.

150. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 659; al-Nakabāt, AAK, 6, pp. 156-157; ACA, p. 203.

151. See 'Filastīn' (1937); 'al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya' (1938), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 408, 421; Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 339.

152. See his comments on the people of Hudaidah in Mulūk, AAK, 1, pp. 280-281; ACA, pp. 136-137.


155. 'Pan-Arab Nationalism', in Asia, August, 1939, p. 454; see also 'Lubnān w-al-Nahḍa al-‘Arabiyya' (1936), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 356-358.

156. See for example al-Husīrī, Abhāth Mukhtārā, p. 53.

157. See 'al-Sharak al-Jamīl' (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 258; see also his ideas on elements of Syrian Nationalism, Ch. 6, above.

158. 'Pan-Arab Nationalism', in Asia, August, 1939, p. 454.

159. See Qasāți, quoted in Gharāybeh, Surūyata fi al-Qarn al-Tāsi ‘Ashar, pp. 16-17; Hourani, Minorities, pp. 1-14, and passim.


161. 'Rūḥ al-‘Urūba' (1928), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, pp. 260-261; Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 268.

162. Compare a similar observation reflecting an absence of determination or stereotyping, al-Jāḥīz, 'Manāqib al-Turk', in Rasā’il, 1, p. 73.

163. Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 578; ISA, p. 228.

164. 'Pan-Arab Nationalism', in Asia, August, 1939, p. 453.

165. B. Alkīz, 'Pan-Arab Nationalism: is it a Myth?', in Asia, Aug. 1939, p. 450. This article was published under the same title with Rihani’s article in the same edition of Asia.

166. For example he read Rousseau’s The Social Contract and Hans Kohan’s A History of Nationalism in the East, and Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East, see, A. A. Rihani, Faylasūf al-Freihe, pp. 132-134, 411.

167. Particularly al-Husīrī’s works show strong traces of the influence of German nationalism, see Cleveland, The making of an Arab nationalist, pp. 86-90, 180; B. Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry, 101-112; see also C. Rizk, Entre l’Islam et l’arabisme, p. 293.


170. This is one of the premises of contemporary Arab nationalist thought in identifying the prospects of unity. See M. Shāfiq, ‘Nazarat Mustaqballya’, in Kazzıha and Others, al-Qawmiyya al-‘Arabiyya fi al-Fikr w-al-Mumārassa, pp. 510-512.

171. 'al-Nahḍa al-‘Arabiyya' (1938), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 421.

172. 'al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya' (1934), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 338. Optimism is a characteristic of Rihani’s thought, particularly of his nationalism, and deserves to be discussed in future study.

173. 'al-Nahḍa al-‘Arabiyya' (1938), in al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 422.
174. Ibid., pp. 421-422.

175. Ibid., p. 422.

176. 'al-'Arab w-al-'Alaqat al-Dawliyya' (1937); 'al-Watan al-Wahid' (1939), in al-Qawmiyyät, AAK, 8, pp. 405, 424.

177. Mulük, AAK, 1, p. 132; APD, p. 96.

178. See in particular his articles 'al-Thawra al-Khuluqiyya' (c. 1909); 'al-Haqq w-al-Quwwa' (1917); 'al-Hayat w-al-Hurriyya w-al-Sayf' (c. 1917), in al-Qawmiyyät, AAK, 8, pp. 65, 144, 145-154; see also Ch. 5, above.

179. Mulük, AAK, 1, p. 149; 'Hayya 'Ala al-'Ilm' (1922); 'Ghayati wa Thawra'i' (1922), in al-Qawmiyyät, AAK, 8, pp. 213-214, 215-217.


181. 'Risālat al-'Irāq' (1932), in al-Qawmiyyät, AAK, 8, pp. 304-305.

182. Ibid., p. 304.

183. 'al-'Arab w-al-'Alaqat al-Dawliyya', in al-Qawmiyyät, AAK, 8, p. 404. This was originally written as an introduction for the Bludan Congress on Palestine which was held in September 1937. But Rihani declined an invitation to the congress because of "personal reasons", see a letter to the President and members of the Congress, 9 September 1937, in Rasā'il, p. 521.

184. 'al-'Arab w-al-'Alaqat al-Dawliyya', in al-Qawmiyyät, AAK, 8, pp. 405-406.

185. For German nationalism described as xenophobic, see Tibi, Arab Nationalism, p. 10, 99-112.


CONCLUSION

Rihani's political and social thought reflects the richness and the diversity of his experiences, as he moved between two different political and cultural worlds during a period of rapid change. While experiencing the material and intellectual progress in the West, Rihani participated in the intellectual and political debates in the East. Thus his thought reflects the changes and transformations of the political life of his times, particularly in the Arab East.

Apart from highlighting his political, social and intellectual career, on the basis of his books and articles, systematic reference to his letters to prominent contemporaries provides significant insights into the intellectual issues that preoccupied him.

Rihani was concerned to see the growth in the Arab East of genuine patriotism and nationalism to counteract and overcome the prevailing religious fanaticism and sectarian attitudes. He did not view progress merely as a concept or an index of material development, but above all as a dynamic process of practical and moral improvement. He saw national secular education as an important means, indeed a prerequisite, to achieving this. He perceived the search for Arab unity, whether in Arabia or in the wider Arab East, in realistic practical terms, but with a deep understanding of both the historical depth and cultural factors that potentially unite the Arabs, as well as the real obstacles hindering their unity.

Rihani identified ignorance, fanaticism, tribalism and sectarianism (in both its madhhabiyya and šā'īfiyya varieties) as serious impediments to Arab progress and unity. His call for the regeneration of Arab and Islamic traditions and inheritance was coupled with his understanding of the need for mutual co-operation between East and West, instead of stagnation, blind imitation or borrowing of unsuitable Western ways.

It is clear that Rihani was not an armchair scholar or an ivory-tower intellectual. He has been rightly described as "a man of action who walked in the corridors of power, a dynamic personality, and a spell-binding orator" (I. Shahid). Despite his mystic and philosophical tendencies, Rihani concentrated his efforts on real life and society. His practical approach can be seen throughout the whole
range of issues which he discussed, from Ottoman reform, to Syrian and Lebanese independence and unity, to pan-Arabia, to the broader Arab unity.

It is unfortunate that most of the discussion of Arab nationalist thought has, until recently, underestimated the importance of the economic development factor. This aspect is quite important in Rihani’s political thought and endeavour. Indeed in his discussion of pan-Arabia, he constantly highlights issues of economic independence, economic development, the infrastructure of transport and communication and economic co-operation. Similarly his concern for the economic factor can be seen in his campaign against the French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria where he highlights the importance of economic independence.

Rihani’s endeavour to help Lebanon and Syria achieve independence and unity, and particularly to bring Arab rulers in the Peninsula together through mutual understanding and co-operation were among his most important practical concerns. He continued to be optimistic about the prospects of achieving Arab unity in the political sense. But unity for him was meaningless if it was devoid of the principles of progress, social justice, equality, liberty, human dignity and democracy in the sense of people participation regardless of religious differences.

Rihani was thus aware of both the strengths and weaknesses in Arab society. It is true he criticised traditional aspects of the Arab and Islamic inheritance. But his criticism was for a positive purpose. Because he loved the Arabs and was concerned about their future he identified the inhibitions and difficulties in the way of progress and unity in their culture and society, and attempted to prescribe solutions to these difficulties.

Rihani’s contribution to Arab nationalist thought does not lie in a philosophy of Arab nationalism but rather in an acute awareness and insightful articulation of the practical aspects which must be addressed to achieve Arab unity. Despite the gloomy picture which he saw in Arab conditions, Rihani remained optimistic about achieving progress and unity. His optimism emanates from his dynamic approach in viewing the new Arab culture from a perspective which combines the values of the traditional inheritance with openness to other societies and cultures of human kind.
Rihani’s unusual contribution, particularly as a Christian Lebanese, to Pan-Arab unity has been recognised by many of his contemporaries. It is true Rihani was a Maronite, but it is obvious he refused to be identified simply as such. Thus attempts at considering him a "Maronite" thinker and philosopher (e.g. Y. S. Sa‘ādē) could not be justified. Equally, the claim that Rihani rejected his Maronite identity for a pro-Muslim one is also untenable (e.g. E. Kedourie). Such misunderstanding highlights the need for Rihani’s ideas to be considered in their social and political context, and not in isolation.

That Rihani’s ideas show such foresight for their time, is seen in the fact that many of the issues raised by him are still relevant today, and continue to generate much discussion and debate. Indeed, the phenomenon of sectarianism, against which Rihani constantly warned, and which he viewed as the most serious problem for the Arabs, is certainly the main cause of the tragic recent history of Lebanon; it is also one of the potentially dangerous issues in the Arab Middle East today. The way Rihani linked the anti-sectarian national identity to democracy under a civil government is now a question often raised in current debate, particularly in the context of finding a solution to the conflict in Lebanon.

Patriotism and nationalism are two interconnected concepts in Rihani’s thought. Both connote love of country and faithfulness towards it, and are only different in the extent of the circle of loyalty. In his pre-1914 writings, Rihani’s patriotism signifies love of both the Ottoman country, and the native Arab land, particularly Mount Lebanon and Syria, within the Ottoman Empire. In the inter-war years, both patriotism and nationalism are inseparably used. While patriotism connotes loyalty to the "Small country", i.e. Lebanon, nationalism implies loyalty to the "Greater Country". The concept of the "Greater Country", in his thought, evolved from corresponding to Geographical Syria to the whole Arab world, or "the Greater Arab Country". At all times, Rihani’s patriotism and nationalism clearly implied a secular rather than a religious meaning of loyalty and commitment.

While not accepting the Lebanese idea in its political terms as advocated by certain Maronite intellectuals and leaders in Lebanon, Rihani advocated Syrian nationalism and later a broader Pan-Arab nationalism. He was always certain that
his broad nationalism did not in any way deny his Lebanese patriotism. For his nationalism was based upon the principles of justice and equality among all members of the Arab nation, and upon democracy and civil government. It was this that convinced him that Lebanon would be on equal footing with the other parts of Syria, first, and of the Arab nation in the broader sense. Thus Rihani's broad concept of Pan-Arab nationalism did not contradict his Lebanese and Syrian nationalism. Equally Arabs, the Syrians and Lebanese, if they succeeded in uniting, would have taken a first step towards achieving the Greater Arab unity.

Rihani himself did not see any contradiction in being both Christian Lebanese and Arab, because he believed Lebanon was Arab. In many of his writings, he strongly expressed pride in the Lebanese contribution to Arab culture. Indeed his Qalb Lubnān reflects a strong assertion of Lebanon's Arab identity, at least culturally, including the characteristics of the Lebanese people, their customs and even ethnicity. He saw no contradiction between Arab unity and the interest of Lebanon which could not be safeguarded outside a strong unity with the Arabs. Because Lebanon could not be independent and sovereign without maintaining good co-operation, political and economic, with the other Arab countries.

It is clear that the Lebanon which Rihani wanted was not the country of an isolated minority. He saw no other solution for the problem of minorities in the Arab world, particularly in Lebanon, except in a democratic system based upon separation of religion and politics, freedom of belief, and political and social justice. He believed that the Christians in the Arab world should not consider themselves, nor should be considered, as a minority within an ocean of a Muslim majority.

Rihani set out two conditions to achieve Arab unity: that unity be achieved gradually from the small to the large; and that unity be based on freedom. He insisted that national feeling must be universal and must reach the people's heart before it reaches the rulers themselves. Hence the important role of national education which, for him, was a guarantee to achieving unity. For true change in politics and government should be preceded by a change in ideas; political change could not be imposed on people by force. Rihani's belief in freedom as an essential element of human rights and as an essential basis for
unity, whether Syrian or Arab, is a distinct characteristic of his concept of nationalism. Rihani’s writings reflect the close relationship which he perceived between humanism and nationalism. His humanist vision and universal outlook is perhaps best expressed in such statements as: "a day will come when all nationalities disappear or become incorporated in one nationality: the nationality of Humanity, the nationality of the World" (al-Qawmiyyāt, AAK, 8, p. 257). On the other hand, he asserts that "no matter how much we let ourselves go in the absolute love of Humanity, we can not forget, if we are fair, the love of our own country" (Mulūk, AAK, 1, p. 130). On more than one occasion (for example, in al-Tāṭārūf, AAK, 8, p. 477), Rihani tells his fellow Arabs: "I am a Lebanese, volunteering in the service of the Arab homeland, and we all belong to it. I am an Arab, volunteering in the service of humanity, and we all belong to it".
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(The date of the first edition is noted in square brackets if it differs from the edition used in this study.)

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**Al-Nakabāt**

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