

CONCLUSION.

In conclusion, and since I have already provided introductions, summaries and conclusions to individual chapters and sections, and in the case of chapters 4 and 5 extended these to critiques, I would like to confine myself to a brief recapitulation of the thesis.

My main concern has been with the educational history of the Athenian schools of philosophy. The dominant model of representing this history has been to subsume it within the well-known model expressed in the metaphor of the golden chain from Plato to Justinian, 387 b.c to a.d. 529. It is within this model that discussion about paideia has normally taken place. But this model of interpretation is mistaken. There was no such thing as a thousand-year institutional history of the Academy, Lyceum, Garden and Stoa. In the early centuries a.d. we have next to no knowledge of philosophical schools at Athens. There are good reasons to think that, except for the Garden, the Academy, Lyceum, and probably the Stoa too did not survive the first century b.c. as educational institutions as they had done in the past three hundred years.

Thus, although through paideia and its teaching the schools of philosophy served as a powerful instrument in the transmission of culture, the model of the four Athenian schools mediating this culture in the centuries a.d. must now be abandoned.

The history of the schools of philosophy in the centuries a.d. is the history of the Athenian schools'

representatives outside Athens. The epigoni of the schools, whether in the form of schools or individual philosopher-teachers each armed with three centuries of school cultural capital, continued the reproduction of the school tradition as competing alternatives of educational theory and practice. This was their mode of expression and one that placed them in a framework of theoretical rivalry. Philosophers and pupils engaged in teaching and philosophical debate where the rivals were not competing schools operating with teachers and students in gymnasia across the street, but a cluster of sophisticated theoretical positions contained in written works and in the discourse of their professional adherents.

The so-called syncretist modes of the first century b.c. and following were an attempt by its practitioners to reconstitute themselves amidst the ever-widening circle of cultural life in the Roman empire, where the sophists were cultural masters.

Thus in the centuries a.d. representatives of the schools in Rome and Alexandria, in Asia Minor and in Syria continued the inherited tradition. Although Marcus Aurelius endowed the four philosophies with salaried chairs (a.d.176), thereby institutionalising the four competing disciplines in Athens within an official framework of rivalry, we know nothing of their holders and their educational practices. But one thing we do know: that they were not the same schools of old. Nor is it likely that the Athenian chairs of philosophy survived into the fourth century a.d. as chairs of philosophy did elsewhere.

Eunapius (c. a.d.4th century) mentions not a single person holding a chair of philosophy in Athens.

The Athenian school of Plutarchus represented the last bastion of Paganism, and scholasticism was its primary mode of expression. The state itself, now fully Christian, accelerated the dissolution of the last representatives of the philosophic schools. After centuries of steady decline the few schools that were left retreated into de-luxe mental gymnastics - the realm of pure intellectual labour, until, with youths no longer attending them, they ran out of successors and died a natural death towards the later sixth century a.d..

So, in line with the alternative view of the schools' institutional continuity, there is a corresponding need to review and re-think the schools' intellectual and pedagogical history.

In the case of the latter, once freed from the negative restrictions of the ruling paradigm, it has been possible to examine the old and ongoing problems in a new light; it has been possible to ask new questions, and since new questions suggest new inquiries, to produce alternative interpretations and generate new evidence by rehabilitating, re-discovering and reclaiming neglected texts. This goes a fair way towards filling some of the gaps and arriving at a fuller and more coherent picture of the schools of philosophy.

In the case of the former, chapter 2 traced the historical process of the intellectual formation of the schools and of their articulation of the philosophical and

pedagogical enterprise. It was a process of differentiation and separation; of demarcation, of the making of distinctions and the setting up of boundaries. It was the theoretical articulation of an emerging institution and its practices; and within this institution, it was the conscious development and elaboration of a system of discourse about paideia and about socio-political life in general and its legitimation. It culminated in the theorisation and practice of philosophy as separate cultural activity sui generis.

Paideia was the schools' principal concern and teaching was the process by which philosophic culture was officially transmitted from teacher to pupil, school to society. In the process of formation, of theorising, debating and teaching, the schools and their paideia became institutionalised, but also dichotomised and highly problematic. The sophists, Plato and Aristotle were the first to realise this.

For in modern times there are opposing views about the practice of education. There is no general agreement about what the young should learn... and it is not certain whether training should be directed at things useful in life or at those conducive to virtue...

(Arist.Pol.VIII.2)

But just as philosophers needed to be clear on the what they were doing by theorising their subject, namely, philosophia; they also needed to be clear on their paideia. Thus, in both public and private settings of the gymnasium, agora, peripatos, house and garden; and in the formal and

informal teaching of the lecture, talk-walk, debate, conversation or symposium, the schools and their practitioners set up, defined, explored and debated the philosophic agenda for centuries and beyond. These activities were constitutive of their educational practices, and although there were important differences of individual school doctrine and emphasis - whether on selection of method, context or setting - there were also important similarities of basic educational and social organisation, teaching arrangements and practices. They were all private institutions and as such depended on fees, donations and patronage. But they were not thiasoi in a strictly legal sense, nor were they closed institutions or secret cult associations. Neither were they universities in the modern sense. Membership was voluntary and association was based on common professional and personal interests and friendship.

Interpersonal relations of intimacy were the dynamic of interaction and at the centre of teaching, in particular, and social life in general. The educative eros mediated the educational exchange in the teaching process in the form of teacher-pupil intimacy based on male eros and philia. This aspect, when not simply ignored or dismissed as an aberration or worse, has rarely been seriously considered within the educational context of the schools of philosophy. It needs, however, to be explained, not ignored. In Chapter 4 I forward the thesis of pedagogic domination based on an argument which characterises the schools as representative of the ruling class culture,

whose main task was the transmission of the dominant mental culture. This was a culture based on leisure and mental as opposed to manual work. This division was in turn grounded in a corresponding division of knowledge between "intelligible" and "sensible"; between reality and appearance, truth and falsity. It was then no accident that the term leisure (schole) was employed to designate this activity of mental culture. Paideia was thus a matter of schole. In teaching, it was characterised by intimate teacher-pupil relations which in the schools served to ensure doctrinal and material succession and continuity. These male social relations are illustrative of the dominant form of Greek paideia and are also entirely in keeping with the nature of the Greek school which was essentially a school for men, dealing with male forms of knowledge and culture. It was the consequence of a patriarchal society where the education of women at the tertiary level was at the bare minimum. In a society where schooling was itself in general restricted to the minority ruling class culture, and even here where it was anything but universal, depending as it did on private means, initiative and enterprise, the exclusion of women is then hardly surprising. In fact, the few women students, philosophers and other professional women that acquired higher education did so because they were integrated in the social, political, economic, intellectual and sexual life of men, and not because of any systematic programme designed for their educational needs. Philosophers reinforced this model of culture in their schools by their

conception of themselves as teachers in the form of the male model of the philosopher as wise man. Here, paideia was politeia and virtue was knowledge of things that had to do with the public-political life of men and male intellectual culture for its own sake. This was the good life, and the leisured citizen, philosopher, orator, ruler, sophos and god were its representatives in theory and in practice.

In the schools, over the centuries, philosophers as teachers elaborated, debated and engaged in the systematic teaching and transmission of this culture in the Ancient world: a legacy of intellectual culture which is still very much alive and active today, forming an integral part of the dynamic of Western education.