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http://hdl.handle.net/2123/6441
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| Title: | Ethnic Conflict: A Model of Concessions |
| Authors: | Samuel, Thampapillai Discipline of Economics |
| Issue Date: | 2008 |
| Abstract: | The Coase Theorem suggests that the ability of completely informed agents to make transfers should generally avert conflict. This thesis considers a complete information model of ethnic conflict where the dominated group consists of heterogeneous agents, but the dominant group can only bargain with the dominated group as a whole. This broadly captures a political system with race-based parties and coalitions. Moreover in this thesis the dominant group can make credible ex-ante transfers to the dominated group outside a standard bargaining framework. Then conditions arise where conflict occurs. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2123/6441 |
| Department/Unit/Centre: | Discipline of Economics |
| Appears in Collections: | Honours Theses - School of Economics Honours Theses |
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