Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Transcendental-Phenomenological Proof and Descriptive Metaphysics|
|Publisher:||University of Sydney.|
|Abstract:||Following P.F. Strawson's reading of Kant, the majority of the literature on transcendental arguments seeks to divorce such arguments from their original Kantian context. This thesis is concerned with Mark Sacks's recent defence of transcendental arguments, which takes a different approach. A critique is given of Sacks's work and extensions and modifications of his approach are recommended. It is proposed that certain difficulties encountered by Kant's transcendentally-ideal approach can be overcome with Hegelian solutions.|
|Description:||Master of Philosophy|
|Rights and Permissions:||The author retains copyright of this thesis.|
|Type of Work:||Masters Thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||Sydney Digital Theses (Open Access)|
This work is protected by Copyright. All rights reserved. Access to this work is provided for the purposes of personal research and study. Except where permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, this work must not be copied or communicated to others without the express permission of the copyright owner. Use the persistent URI in this record to enable others to access this work.
|MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY THESIS.pdf||1.26 MB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
Items in Sydney eScholarship Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.