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|Title:||Strategic Voting in TV Game Show "The Weakest Link"|
Discipline of Economics
|Keywords:||The Weakest Link|
Experimental Game Theory
|Abstract:||This paper utilizes the data generated from the television game show 'The Weakest Link' to study real life strategic voting with large stake payoffs. Theoretical models are built to analyse the three-player voting possibly with second move of tie breaker. With reasonable specifications, equilibria can be constructed to support all observed outcomes. When the game structure is relatively simple with single possible tie breaker, the empirical results are in line with theoretical implications. When the tie breaker is uncertain, the predictability of basic game theory analysis is largely compromised. Regression results suggest that, with the presence of increased complexity and uncertainty in the voting game, naive coordination strategies are instead adopted. Strategic untruthful performance is found as a source of inaccurate prediction of theory.|
|Department/Unit/Centre:||Discipline of Economics|
|Rights and Permissions:||The author retains copyright of this thesis|
|Type of Work:||Thesis, Honours|
|Appears in Collections:||Honours Theses|
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