Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1007
|
| Title: | Causal Asymmetry and Culpability |
| Authors: | Kutach, Doug |
| Keywords: | Time Causal asymmetry Causation |
| Issue Date: | 20-Jul-2006 |
| Publisher: | Centre for Time, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney. |
| Series/Report no.: | Origins III :: Intervention, Time and Physics |
| Abstract: | In developing an adequate explanation for causal asymmetry it is important to distinguish two importantly different applications of the concept of causation. One role for causation is in prediction. Knowledge of causal generalities allows us to predict how likely various effects will follow, given some alleged cause. In this prediction-permitting role, facts about causation can be empirically checked, e.g. whether this particular planetary probe will land on Venus. Another role for causation is assigning culpability for certain facts, i.e. the chunks of physical stuff that are responsible for the effect occurring. Although we humans sometimes have strong intuitions about how causal responsibility is properly allocated, there is no independent or objective check on whether our intuitions are correct. The asymmetry presumably present in manipulation, influence, and control involve a mixture of both roles. I will try to sort out what the distinction means for our understanding of causal asymmetry. |
| Description: | Contains one audio recording (mp3). For additional information please go to http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Douglas_Kutach/index.html#CausationSydney2006 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1007 |
| Appears in Collections: | Conference presentations, workshops and meetings |
Files in This Item:
|
Items in Sydney eScholarship Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.